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x^-)0{a.i xtti aiimxjrxoii vwip'Tfi^ni^itiTis 'En Mezji 
Kiifitvyjv liuj "Em'i^ux-/. Plutarch. 

ilw *Aah'©eian ax-OTCdv, ■^an Tu wn an kv SwufMH (iiX' 
TIT95 ay xAt ^,v, etsriJ'ii' i7ro9i'ii<T!c», iX7ro9^>!crx«iv. Pbto. 

The Sixth Edition. 

To which is added a P R E F A C E, containing a General 
Account of the Life, Chara(5tcr, and Writings of the Author. 


Printed for John and Paul Knapton, at the Crncn in 
Luiigate-Strat. M DCC XXXVIII. 


I Few copies of this hooh^ tho not 
originally intended to be puhlijlj- 
ed, were printed off in the year 
I J 12, but, it being tranfcribed 
jor the prefs hajiily, and correct- 
ed under great difadv ant ages, many errata and 
mijiakes got into it, which could not all be pre- 
fently obferved. With a great part of them 

A 2 there- 


therefore fiill remaining four or five of the co- 
pies were afterwards given away ; and fome 
more^ taken from the print ing-houfe, paffed through 
hands unknown to the author^ and he fuppofei 
were fold privately. There has, hefide, been 
fome talk of a piratical defign upon it : and if 
that Jhould take ejfeci, both it and he might 
fuffer extremely. For thefe reafons he has 
thought fit to reprint it himfelf more correclly, 
with fome fmall alterations (in things not ef- 
fential to the main defign) and fome additions. 
Tho he cannot but be apprehenfive, that ftill 
there may be many things, which have efcaped 
his eye, or his attention. 





A General Account of the Life, Character, 
and AVri tings of the Author. 

E R H A P S the Pcrufal of the following Sheets may ex- 
cite the Curiofity of the Reader to wifli for fomc Gene- 
Tuil yltxount concerning the Author of them : And it 
is not improbable that He may defire to know, /// par- 
ticular. Whether tlie Perfon who compofcd them was 
a mere Speculative Admirer oi Virtue; or whether 
He was Himself an Example of that Morality which He has fo 
ftrongly recommended to the Practice of Oth lrs. If fuch a Curiofity 
(hall happen to be raifed in any One who was quite a Stranger to this 
Gentleman's Life &nd Chara^er, This slight Sketch of Bctb 
may chance injbme Meafure to gratify it. 

A 2 

Mr. William 

iv A ? R E F J C E. 

Mr. William Wollaston, the Author of the Religion op 
Nature delineated, was defcended from a Family which ap- 
pears to have been ancient and confiderable in the County of Stafford. 
It was, long fince, divided into Tvco Branches : ' The former of which 
continued feated in Stqffordjl-ire ; But the latter was in procefs of Time 
tranfplanted into other Counties. Tlie Head of the Second Branch 
flouriflied formerly at Oncot in the County of Stafford ; but, of late Years, 
at Shenton in the County oi Leiccjler : and was poffefled of a very con- 
fiderable Eftate in thofe and other Counties. From this Second Branch 
was our Author defcended : And from a younger Brother of the fime 
Branch fprung Sir John WoLLASTON, Lord Mayor oi London, well 
known in that City at the Time of the late Civil War. 

Mr. WoLL ASTON was born upon the 26th oi March 1659. at Coton- 
Clanford in Staffordjlnre. When Me was in the loth Year of his Age, 
a Latin School was opened at Sf.knjlon in Staffordjhire, where his Fa- 
ther, a private Gentleman, of a fmall Fortune, then refided : And 
Mr. Wollaston was immediately fent to the Mafter of it for fuch 
Inftrudion as He was capable to give Him ; and continued near two 
Years under his Care. Afterwards He was fent to Litchfield School : 
in which a great Confufion foon after happened, and the Magiftrates 
of the City turned the Mafter out of the School-Houfe. Many Scho- 
lars followed the Ejedied Mafter: And Mr. Wollaston amongft 
the Reft. He remained with Him till He quitted his School, which was 
about three Years : And then, the Schifm being ended. He returned into 
the Free-School, and continued there about a Year. This was All the 
5'6>fco(j////g- Mr. Wollaston ever had : And this Time was pafled, not 
without Uneafinefs. For, though He was always a great Lover of his 
Book, and deftrous of Improvement, Yet the Rudenefs of a Great School 
was particularly difagrecable to his Nature ; and, what was ftill worfe. 
He began to be much infefted with the Head-Ach, which fecms to have 
been conjlitutional'm Him. 

Upon the i8th oijiine 1674. He was admitted a Penfioner in Sidney 
College in Cambridge ; being then fo much upwards of 1 5 Years of Age 
as from the 26th of the preceding March. But here He laboured under 
^various Difadvantages : to which a Perfon fo circumftanccd as He then 


A T R E F J C B. V 

was, could not but be lubjed:. He had m Acquaintanci in the College, 
nor even in the Univcrfity (to which He was come a Country Lad front 
a Country School ;) fro) Books or Materials to work with ; no AJJiJlance 
or Ditrfiion from any Body ; nor fiifficient Confidence to fupply that De- 
fedt bv inquiring from Others. Add to this, That his State of Health was 
not quite firm : And that his Allon^mce was by no Means more than fuf- 
ficient for bare Kecefliiries j his tlicn Situation being that of a Second Son 
of a Third Son of a Second Son of a Second Son. (Tho' indeed, notwith- 
ftandir.g this Series of younger Brothers, his Grandfather, who ftands in 
the middle of it, had had a confiderable Eflate both Real and Perfonal, 
together with an Office of 700 /. per Afviuin.) However, under All 
thefc Difadvantages, IVIr. Wollaston acquired a great Degree of Re- 
putation in the Univerfity: perhaps /oo much; For had it been lefs^ 
it might have efcaped the Tax of Envy, which probably was the Caufe 
of His mifling a Preferment in the College, which a Young Man of his 
Character had Reafon to exped. 

Upon the 29th of September 168 i He left the Univerfity : being then 
Twenty two Years and an Half Old. He had commenced Mafier of 
Arts the Summer before : And it feems to have been about this Time, 
that He took Deacon's Orders. 

From Cambridge He went to pay his Duty to his Father and Mother, 
who now lived at Great Bloxiiyche: having firft made a Three Weeks Vilit 
to the then Head of this Branch of the Family, his Coufin Woli. astom 
of Shenton. And He remained at Bloxiiyche, with his Father and Mo- 
ther (whom He had not feen for many Years before) till May or 'Ju?je 
1682. About which Time, feeing no Profpedt of Preferment, He {o 
far conformed Himfelf to the Circumftances of his Fortune as to become 
Afllftant to the Hcad-Maftcr of Birmingham School : Who readily em- 
braced the Opportunity of fuch a Co-Adjutor, and confidcr'd Mr. Wol- 
L ASTON as one that prudcntially ftooped to an Employment below what 
He might have reafonably pretended to. And his Coufin of i'Z't'w/ow was 
far from being difpleafcd at this Inftance of his Relation's humble Indufiry. 
In a Ihort Time He got a fmall LcdorHiip at a Chappcl about two 
Miles diftant. But He did the Duty of the Whole Sunday : Which, to- 

jiri A PREFACE. 

gether with the Bafinefs of a Great Free-School, for about four Years 
began to break his Conflitution ; and, if continued, had probably over- 
come it quite, though the Stamina of it were p.: tu rally very flrong. 

During this Space Ho likewife fufifered many Anxieties and underwent 
a Deal of Trouble and Uneafinefs, in order to extricate Two of his Bro- 
thers from fome Inconveniencies to which their own Imprudencies had 
fubjedted thein. And in the good Offices which He did them at this 
Time, He feems to have rather over-a^cd his Part : For He indulged 
his Affedion for them more than was confiftent with a due Regard to 
his own Welfare, as He was then circumftanced. 

When He had been about four Years at Birmitighaw, He was chofen 
Second Mafter of the School : In which there were three Mafters, two 
Affiftants, and a Writing-Mafler. It was pretended that He was too 
Toung to be Head-Mafter of fo great a School : But in Reality, the Old 
Mafter was turned out in order to make way for a particular Perjbn to 
fucceed Him. In this Matter fome of the Governors themfelves owned 
that Mr. Wollaston had Wrong done Him. He kept this new Sta- 
tion about two Years. It was worth to Him about 70 /. per Annum. 
Upon this Occafion He took Pricft's Orders : For the Words of the Char- 
ter were interpreted to require that the Mafters fliould be in Thoje Or- 
ders, and yet muft take no Ecclefiaftical Preferment. 

The late Chief Mafter, a valuable and good Old Man, and for whom 
Mr. Wollaston of Shenton had an Efteem, retired after his Expulfion 
to his Brother's Houfe in the Neighbourhood of Sbenton. He once or 
twice waited upon Mr. Wollaston of Sbenton : And undoubtedly in- 
formed Him of the Character, Learning, Converfation and Condudt of 
our Author; which lie -was very capable of Joing, becaufe they had 
lived together till the Time of the Old Gentleman's leaving Birmingham. 

Mr. Wollaston of S/jcnton liaving now lately loft his o/ih Son, and 
never intending (as appears from his ivhole Condudl) to give his Eftate to 
his Daughters, purfued his Father's Defign of continuing it in the Male 
Line, and refolvcd to fettle it upon our Author's Uncle and Father (his 
own Jirji Coujins and liis ncarejl Male Rclaticns) in the fame Proportions 
and Manner cxridly in which it had been intailed formerly upon them by 
2 his 


his Father. And accordingly He made fuch a Settlement : fubjcd how- 
ever to a Revocation. 

Mr. WoLLASTON all this While applied Himfclf to his Bufinels: and 
never lb much as waited upon his Coulin, or employed any one to fpeak 
or a<fl any tiling in his Behalf; (tho' many then blamed Ilim for not do- 
ing fo.) Only One V'tjit He made Him, in the No^ccwbcr before his 
Dtiith : left a 'Total Abfence (hould be taken for Ingratitude. He went 
upon a Saturday in the Afternoon ; gave Him a Sermon the next Day ; 
received his Hearty Thanks ; and the next Morning told Him that He 
came only to pay thofe Refpedls which were due frSm Him, and to thank 
Him for all his Favors; and having done that, dcfired Leave to retura 
to the Duties of his Station : But 7iot one Ssllable did He fpeak, or even 
infinuate, in relation to his Estate. His Coufm difmiflcd Him with 
great Kindnefs : And by his Looks and Manner feemed to have a par- 
ticular Regard for him, but difcovered nothing of his Intention 
by IVords. 

Mr. WoLLASTON of Sbenton was ufed to employ Perfons privately, 
to obferve our Author's Behaviour : (who little fuiptdled any fuch Mat- 
ter.) And his Behaviour was found to be fuch, that the ftridler the Ob- 
fcrvations were upon it, the more they turned to his Advantage. In 
Fine, Mr. Wollaston of S/jentcn became fo thoroughly fatisfied of our 
Author's Merit, that He revoked the before mentioned Settlement, and 
made a Will in his Favor. 

In Auguft following Mr. Wollaston of Shenton fell fick : and fent 
fecretly to our Author to come over to Him as of his own Accord with- 
out any Notice of his Illnefs. He complied with the MelTagc : and ftaid 
fome Days at Shenton. But whilft He was gone Home again, under a 
Promifc of returning, his Coufin died. 

It was the 19th of Augujl 1688. when this Gentleman died. His 
Will gave a new and a great Turn to Mr. Wollaston's Affairs: who 
found Himfclf intitled by it to a very ample Eftate. 

The Circumflances relating to the Means whereby Mr. Wollaston 
came to the PofTcflion of his EAate, and the Steps which led to it, have 


vlii A T R E F A C E. 

been the more minutely particularized here; Becaufe Common Famt. 
has fomehow caught up and forwarded a groundkfs Imagination^ That 
our Author was an absolute Stranger to the former Polleflbr 
and his Family, and happened to fall into his Company by mere Ac- 
cident at an Inn. Which is fo far from being /rw? or even bearing 
any Rcfemblance to "Truths That they were very near Relations, and this 
'very Eftate had been .twice entailed upon Mr. Wollastgn's Uncle 

and Father. 

Such a Sudden and Advantageous Alteration of Affairs would have intox- 
zVrtfc^ Many a One. But the fame Firmness of Mind which fupport- 
ed this Gentleman under tlie Preffun^s of his more Adverfe Fortune enabled 
Him to bear his Profperity with Moderation : And his Rel i G i on and Ph i- 
L oso p H y taught H im to maintain a due Equanimity under either Ex t R e m e . 

In November 1688 He came to London : And about a Twelve-month 
after, upon the zOtb of November 1689, He married Mrs. Catharine 
Charlton, Daughter of Mr. Nicholas Charlton, an eminent 
Citizen of London, a fine Woman, with a good Fortune and a mojl ex- 
cellent CharaSler. They lived extremely happy in each other, till her 
Death left Him a mournful Widower upon the 2 iji of July 1720. By 
Her He had eleven Cliildren : Of whom four died in his Life-time ; the 
reft furvived Him. 

He may moft- truly be faid to have fettled In Lofidon: Fof He very 
fcldom went out of it. He took no Delight in unneceflary Journies: 
And for above Thirty Years before his Death had not been abfent from his 
Habitation in Charter-Uoufe Square, fo much as One ii-hole Night. 

In this his Settlement in London He chofe a Private and Retired 
Life, His Carriage was neverthelefs Free and Open. He aded like one 
that aimed at Jolid -.ind real Content, rather than Shew and Gran- 
deur: and manifcfted his Diflike of Power and Dignity, by refufing 
one of the highcjl Prefermciits in the Church when it was offered to 
Hini. He endeavoured to <'Aa7/in Sincerity and Usefull Sense, 
more than in Formalities and Trifles. 

He had now Books ^iX\d Leijure : And it was nofmallUjeHc made 
cf them. He v^^as perfedly acquainted with the Elementary Parts of 



Learning: And widi the learned Languages \ Latin, Greek, Hebrew, 
Arabic, 6fr. He thought it ncceflary to add to Tliele luch a Degree 
of Philology and Criticifm as leemed likely to be Uleful to Him ; Mathe- 
matical Sciences, or at leall the Fundamentals of them ; The General Phi- 
lofophy of Nature ; The Uiftcry and Antiquities of the more known and 
noted' Stattb and Kingdoms ; and fuch like Erudition. And in order 
to attain the Knowledge of True Religion and the Discovery of 
Truth, (the Points which He always had particularly in View, and to 
which He chiejiy direded all his Studies,) He diligently inquired into the 
Idolatries of the Heathens : And made Hinifelf Master of the Sen- 
timents. Rites, ^nd Learning oi the Jews; the History of the Jirjl 
Settlement of Christianity, and the Opinions and Pra^ices introdu- 
ced into it fince. In the mean time He cxercifed and improved his Mind 
by thrcru>ing off PREjuDfCEs"; ufing Himfelf to clear Images ; obferv- 
ing the Influence and Extent of Axioms, the Nature and Force of Con- 
sequences, and the Method of invefligating Truth. In General, 
He accuftomed Himfelf to Think much, . i— '■« % •«. 

By this Method indeed He was rather qualified (ov private InJlruSlion, 
than accomplifhed for public Conversation and Shew. But the latter 
was not his Point. He looked upon that Specious Sort of Knowledge 
which often gains a Man the Reputation of a Scholar at a very cheap 
Rate, to be a False Learning and of no kind of Service to Him 
who was in Queflof Real Knowledge. 

He was of Opinion too That a man might eafily read too much: 
And he conlidered the Helluo Librorum and the True Scholar 
as two very different Characters. 

The Love of Truth and Reason made Him love Free 
Thinking: and, as far as the World would ^^^r it. Free Speaking 
too. This tended, He thought, to the Difcovery of Error. Tho' 
He was not infenfible that This might render Him Icfs acceptable to 
many Perfons : To thofc who perhaps have only juft fenfe enough 
to perceive their own Weaknefs > or judge of Things by the Vogue 
they bear, or the Rcfpedl they have to their own Intcrell or Par- 
ty i or can neither bear the Trouble of an honcll Inquiry thcmfclvcs. 

X k 7 RE F ACE. 

nor yet that another fliould know what they do not know ; and, in lliort, 
to every Frejiidiced Pcrfon wlmtfoever. But He took all Opportunities 
to affcrt ferioiijly (Vid inculcate Jlrcnuoujly the Being and Perfecti- 
ons of Godj his Providence, both General and Parlicti/tjr ; the Ob- 
ligations we are under to adore Him ; the Reasonableness of all 
Virtue; the Immateriality and Immortality of the Soul; 
FUTURE Rk WARDS and Punishments; and other High and effcn- 
tial Points oi' N AT V R Ah Religion and the Christian Revelati- 
on. In Fine, To rcajon impartially, and to l:now ivhere to Jlop, was the 
Mark He always aimed at. y^ 

And He loved Truth, not in Speculation only, but alfo in Practice: 
For he loved punctual Honesty. 

He likewife delighted in Method and Regularity: And chofe 
to have his Labours and Refrelliments Periodical ; and that his Family 
and Friends lliould obferve the proper Seafons of their Revolutions. The 
Reverfe of this being the prevailing Temper, or at leaft PraSlice of Man- 
kind, oftentimes either deprived Him of Converfation or rendered it dif- 
agrc cable to Him. 

The General Character of his Nature was, That it was 
Tender and Sensible. This Tenderness difpofcd Him to />^/ 
and Compajjionate the Miferies of others: Infomuch that He many times 
fuffered more perhaps in another mans Cafe than the man did in liis 
oivn. This Tenderness induced Him always to endeavour to fa- 
tisfie and convince in Cafes where He might have comtnandcd moft dej- 
potically arid abfolutely. Tho' it is not improbable that in this He was 
frequently mijunderjlood as if He meant to chide, when He only intend- 
ed to explain and convince. To this Tenderness may alfo be afcribed 
that excejlive Mode/ly and Diffidence of Uimfclf, whicii made Him de- 
light in Privacy and Retirement ; and incapacitated Him in a great 
Mcafure from appearing in Public at all like what He rcaliy was; 
and even occafioned Him fometimes to feem inferior to thofc who 
exceeded Him in nothing but Forwardness and Conce it. Some- 
thing of this might indeed be owing to the Depreffion of his Spirits 


A T R E F A C E. 


in his younger Day?. From the fame Caujl-s might arile his llrong Ap- 
prehcnfionoftlie Unreasonableness and Injustice of thofe who 
were delignedly the Beginners of Quarrels or Abufes, or invaded without 
Provocation Another's Good Name. Tlic fame Tenderness rendered 
Him in a high Manner fenfible of tlie Dejcrtiori, Unkindnefs or Indiffer- 
ence of Friends. 

He never indulged his Passions to the Hurt of any One. If in any 
refpedl He Iliewed that He was not^ compleat a Stoic as to have cfii- 
dicated his Passions, or fo pcrfc6l a Philosopher ^i never to be fur- 
prized by them, it was in the E/cape of an hajlv IVord or Kxprefjion now 
and then, when He was put off of his Guard by Hurries, Indifpofitions, 
or fuch like Occafions. Yet He was not always angry, when the Ur- 
gency of Bufmefs, the Straitnejs of Time, the hnporttinity of impertinent 
People, or the like, caufed Him to talk louder or quicker than ordinary -, 
nor often, (if at all) without fufficient Rea/on ; nor ever Jo angry with any 
One elje, as He would be with Himself for having been fo. In fliort. 
If every One would reftrain their Anger within the fame Bounds as He 
did, there might be a ha/ly Word or Exprejfion dropped fometimes upon 
Provocation or Indifpoftion : But there would never be Resentment, 
Wrath or Quarrel more in the World. 

He was mort remarkably Chearful and Lively in Private Conver- 
sation, and by his Inclination ready, as well as by his Treafures of Learn- 
ing abundantly qualifed to be ferviceable to all forts of Perfons. This render- 
ed his Company agreeable: and Himfelf worthy to be courted by the Learn- 
ed and Virtuous. But a General Acqjjaintance was what He never 
cultivated : and it grew more and more his Averfion. So that He pafled his 
Days moftly at Home, with a few Friends : with whom He could enjoy 
an agreeable Relaxation of Mind, and receive All the Advantages of 
zjttice.'f and open Friendship. This ExcrJ/ive Retirement was however 
attended w'lthjome Inconveniencies. His Intimates were dropping off, and 
their Places remained unftpplied ; His own Infrmlties were increafing ^ 
The Frequent Remiffion of Study growing more and more neceffary ; and 
his Solitudes at the fame Time becoming lefs and lefs pleafant and agree- 

B 2 What 


What Decays focver there might be in his Bodily Strength, He 
neverthcicis ictained to the laft the Clearmjs and Ferfpicuity of his 
Thodgh Ts, But perceiving his Deligns frultrated by the daily Attacks 
of Nature, and that it would be impoffible x.o Jinijh and compleat them 
in the Manner lit wiihcd, it feems as if He had intended to deftroy with 
his own Hand the greatejl Part of his Works : And that thoje feiv 
Manufcripti which were found after his Death were indebted to the 
'Treachery of his Manory for their Prefcrvation. For He had within the 
lall two or three Years of his Life aElually burnt fcveral Treatifes, in tlie 
Compofition whereof He had beflowed 7io J'mall ^lantity of Time and 
Pains. The following indeed happemd to be Jpared : But from the Flace in 
which they were depofited, and ixovsxjbme other Circunijlances, 'tis probable 
that they owed their Efcape to mere Forgetfidnefs. They were in Number 
thirteen, (befides about Fourfcore Sermons) viz. i. An Hebrev: Gramm^tr. 
2. Tyrocinia Arabica & Syriaca. 3. Specimen Vocabularii Biblico-Hebrai- 
ci. Uteris noftratibus quantum fert Linguarum Dillbnantia defcripti. 4. For- 
mula; quasdam Gemarince. 5. De variisgeneribus/^^w/w, metrorum, carmi' 
nian^ &c. Apud Juda:os, Grcecos & Latinos. 6. De Vocum Totiis Monitio 
ad Tyrones. 7. Rudimenta ad Mathefin & Fhilofophiam fpcdtantia. 8. 
Mifcellanea Fhilologica. 9. Opinions of the Ancient Philojophers, 
10. 'Io'j<Ja(x.a : five Religionis & Liter aturtc Judaica Synopfis. 1 1. A 
CoUedion of fome Antiquities and Particulars in the Hiftory of Mankind ; 
tending to fliew that Men have not been here upon this Earth from Eter- 
nity, ^c. 12. Some Paffages relating to tlie Hijiory o/* Christ; col- 
lected out of the Primitive Fathers. 1 3. A Treatife relating to the Jews : 
of their Antiquities, Language, &c. And what renders it the more pro- 
bable, or indeed almoft beyond Doubt, That He would have deftroycd 
the/e likeivije if He had remembered them, is That feveral of thefe which 
remain undejlroyed are only Rudiments or rougher Sketches of what He 
afterwards reconfidered and carried on much fartlier : and which eie/i 
after fuch Revifal He ncvcrthelcfs committed to the Flames, as being Hill 
(in his Opinion) JJjort of that Perfection to which He defred and had 
intended to bring them. 

2 It 

. f! 

A PREFACE. .^iii 

It mult be o' indeed that He had formerly publiiTied a Para- 
phrase en part of the Book of Ecclesi/stes, which He bad not cor- 
rcSled. Blither that -very Reafon He was afterwards carnejlh defiroin iojhp- 
prejs it. And He likewife compofed and printed a little Latin Gram- 
mar. But this was only for the lyi; of \ns Family. The former was 
printed in the Year 1690 : The latter in 1703. 

Not long before his Death, He publillicd the ensuing Treatise, 
intitlcd " The Religion of Nature delineated;" in which 
the PiSure of his Life is vwji fully Ar^wn. There you may behold 
Him in his Real Character: in the hunible Submission and 
Resignation of Himfcif to the unerring Will of the Divine Being ; 
in his TRUE Conjugal and paternal Affection to his Family-, 
in his KIND Regard and Benevolence towards his Fellczi'-Creatures, 
according to their refpedive Stations in Life. For He Himszlf feadily 
pra&ifcd thofe Duties and Obligations which He fo earneftly re- 
commended to Others. The Public Honors paid to his Memory, and 
i^it Great Demand for THIS Book (of which more than Ten Thoufand 
wer^' fold in a very few Years) are fufficient Teftimonics of its Value. 
He had, in the Year 1722, printed off a few Copies of it for privateU/i'. 
And as foon as he had done fo, He began to turn his Tliouglits to the 
Third Question : as appears by a Manufcript intitlcd Heads and 
Materials for an Anfi'er to ^leflion 3 . ft doivn rudely and any hov.\ 
in order to be confidered, &c. after they are got into fome Order, 
fuly 4, 1723. Underneath which He has added. They are writ- 
ten at Length (not in my Short-hand) that fo if this Anfwer fould 
never be fnijked, they may however not be totally lojl. However, 
in this Dtfgn He liad Opportunity to make but a very fmall Progrefs. 
For it was jufl about this Time that, at the Inftances and Pcrfuafion of 
his Friends, He fct about m'///«j and publifing the following Work: 
wherein he had anfwcred the tii;o frf of the propofcd Qneftions : Re- 
folving, as foon as that fliould be done, to return to and finilli his Anfwcr 
to the Third Qu_estion. 


xiv A V R E F J C E. 

But in that He wms difappointed. For immediatcl/ after he had com- 
plcated the Revifal and Publication of the following Treatifc, an acci- 
dent of breaking his Arm increafed his Diftempers, and accelerated 
his Death; which happened upon the 2()tb of OSlober 1724, and 
has abfolutely put an End to the Expedtation of feeing any 
wo;vof his Works in Print. For it would be equally injurious to the 
Author and difrefpcSlful to the Public, if his Family fliould expofc his 
more imperfect Sketches in Print after his Death : when Ht Him- 
self had dejiroycd ic\&x-i\ })ioreJiniJhedF\-ECi.%y becaufe He judged them 
7iot fufficiently accurate. 

His Body was carried down to Great Finborough in Suffolk, One of 
his Eftates, and the Principal Refidencc of his now Eldeft Son and Suc- 
ceffor in his Eftate : who reprcfents the neighbouring Burrough of Ipjwycb 
in Parliament. 

From all that has been faid concerning Mr. Wqllaston, it appears 
that notwithflanding his Declining to accept of any Public Employment, 
yet his Studies were defigned tobe ofP/^^//V fT/t': And his Solitude 
was far from being employed in vain and trijiing Amujhncnts terminating 
in Hiinjl'lf alone. 

His lateft Moments were calm aiid eafy. Such as might be expe<fled 
to clofe a Life fpent like his : And He left the World, as He Jbjourned in 
it, quietly and refignedly. Both the Manner of his Life and that of his 
Death were well worthy of /w/Vi-///<J/?. 

It is fcarce worth while to take any Notice of an idle or malicious Re- 
fledion which has been caft, by fome over-zealous Perfons, upon this 
Gentleman's Memory, as if He had put a Slight upon Christianity 
by laying fo much Strcfs upon the Obligations of Truth, Reason, 
and Virtue : Or as if He could not have believed aright, becaufe He 
did not think it nccefliiry to digrcfsfrom his Subject \\\ Order to insert 
HIS Creed. Surely, a Sivxi^'xcxon thus founded caw defervc fio Regard. 
However, it may not be amifs to obferve that it has probably been in- 
creafed by a vulgar miftake that Mr. Wqllaston, the Author of the 





Religion of Nature delineated, was the fame Per/on with 
Mr. WooLSTON who wrote leveral Pieces which groflly attacked the 
Literal Truth of the Miracles of Jesus Chjiist. And this Miflake, 
which arofc originally from the Similitude of Names, might happen to be 
further confirmed by Mr. Woolston's intitling Himfelf " Late Fellow 
" of Sidney College in Cambridge" At ivhicb College Mr. WoL- 
L ASTON Himfelf and Four of his Sons were educated. 


The Religion ^/Nature delineated. 

To c/^. F. Efq; 

WAS much fuiprifcd, S I R^ when (fomc time ago) you 
foimponunatclydcfircdwy/Z'Oi^^it/i upon thcfcquclHons, 

I . Is there really any fucb thing as natural rcligion,/»/-o/>f r/y 
and truly fo called ? 

II. If there is, what is it f 

III. How may a man qualify himftlf., fo as to he able to judge, 
for himfelf, of the other religions profeji in the world > to fettle 

his own opinions in difputable matters; and then to enjoy tranquillity of mindy neither 
diflurbing others, nor being diflurbed at what faffcs among them ? 

"With what view you did this ; whether in cxpcftation of Tome little degree of 
fatisfiiftionj or merely to try my abilities > or (which I rathcrthink) out of kind- 

j n Tiers 

6 The ReligiOxV of Nature. 

nefs to amufc me at a time, when I wanted fomething to divert melancholy reflexi- 
ons, I fhall not venture to gtiefs. I fhall only fay, that could I have forcicen in due 
time, that fuch a task was to be impofed upon mc, I might have been better pre- 
pared for it. I might have marked what was fuitable to my purpofc in thofc books, 
which I have red, but fhall fcarce ever return to read any more : many more I 
might have red too, which, not wanting them for my own conviction, I have 
negleftcd, and nov/ have neitner Icifurc nor patience to pcrufe : I might ha\-e no- 
ted what the various occurrences and cafes, that happen in life, fuggelled : and, 
in gencial, I might have placed more of my time on fuch parts of learning, as 
would have been direftly fcr^•iceable to me on the prefcnt occafion. 

However, as I have not fpcnt my days without //:'/«^z«^ and reflefting fe- 
rioufly within my felf upon the articles and duties of natural religion^ and they arc 
my thoughts v:h\ch.yourt(\\\\re^ I have attempted, by recollcfting old meditati- 
ons, and confulting a few fcatterd papers, in which I had fomnerly for my own ufe 
fct down fomc of them (briefly, and almoll: folccilHcally), to give an anfwei- to the 
tivo firjl of your queflions, together : tho I muit own, not without trouble in 
adjufl:ing and comparing loofe fentiments, fiilling up vacuities, and bringing the 
(haos into the fliape of fomething like a fyftem. 

Notwithftanding wliat I have laid, in atreatifeof»^/«rfl/re//g/fl»,a fubjefb (b 
beaten and cxhaufted in all its parts, by all degrees of writers, in which fo ma- 
ny notions will inevitably occur that are no one's property, and fo many things 
require to be proved, which can fc;irce be proved by any other but the old ar- 
guments (or not fo well\ you muil not expert to find much that is new. Yec 
fomething perhaps you may. That, which is advanced in the following papers, 
concerning the nature oi moral good and evil^ and is the prevaihng thought that 
runs thro them all, I never met with any where. And even as to thofe matters, 
in which I have been prevented by others, and which perhaps may be common, 
you have them, not as I took them from any body, but as they ufed to appear to 
me in my walks and folitudes. So that they are indeed my thoughts, fuch as have 
been long mine, which I fend you ; without any regard to what otheis have, or 
have not fiid : as I perfuade my fclf you will eaiily perceive. It is not hard to 
difcern, whether a work of this kind be all of a piece j and to diltinguilli the 
genuine hand of an author from the folfc wares and patch-work of a plagiary, 
Tho after all, it would be madncfs in a man to go out of his right way, only be- 
caufe it has been frequented by others, or perhaps is the high road. 

Scnfiblchow unfinifhcd this performance is, I c.\\\ k on\y a Delineation, ov 
rude draught. Where I am dcfcdive, or trip, I hope you will cxcufc a friend, 


Of Moral Good and Evil. 7 

who has now pafTed the thrcfliold of old age ; and is, upon that and other ac- 
counts, not able to bear much ftudy or application. And thus I commit to your 
candor what follows : which, for the (iike of order and peifpicuity, I have di- 
vided into y?c?/o»i, and propofitions. 

Sect. I. Of Moral Good and Evil. 

TH E foundation of religion lies in that difference between the acts of men, 
which dillinguilhes them into goody cvil^ indifferent. For if there is fucli 
a ditFcrencc, there muil be religion ; (J contra. Upon this account it is that fuch 
a long and laborious inquiry hath been made after fomc general idea ', or fome 
rule ^, by comparing the forelaid afts with which it might appear, to which 
kind they rcfpettively belong '^. And tho men have not yet agreed upon any one, 
)et one certainly there mult be ^. That, which I am going to propofc, has always 
fccmd to me not only evidently true, but withal fo obvious and plain, that per- 
haps for this very realbn it hath not merited the notice of authors : and the ufc 
and application of it is fo eafy, that if things are but fiirly permitted to fpcak for 
themfclves their own natural language, they will, with a moderate attention, be 
fDund themfclves to proclaim their own rectitude or obliquity} that is., whether 
they arc difagrceablc to it, or not. I fhall endeavour by degrees to explain my 

I. That aHy ivhicb may be denominated morally good or evil, mujl be the atl of a 
beingcapable of dijiinguifhingy choofing^ and acting for himfelf ' : or more briefly, of 
an intelligent and free agent. Becaufe in proper fpeaking no aft at all can be afcribcd 
to that, which is not indued with thefc capacities. For that, which cannot di- 

• So, inP/4/0, Stertun requires ofEuthyphra not i'lTiii ^J. iiiaifnf T«»i. iriHuf «»' txirw a»r< 
tit®-, t> ^xrr», TO. i«-i« «r>« iVi, kt?. And again, Tauriu, Tc!n)JU UA «»r»i },ix\n tv '\^ia,t Ti; xtri ifir. 
itttSif t^taltu *jooAiT»rr, i ;e{«/^^(^ai/r^irK<it^ii''u,«ri, o 1a u'TniTeti,, •ririio-i/ ii «»:'( T(i Xf^rli), ^i, 
'irw unu- t/\^tafM TwrrcF, fui^i. Pofce exemplar honijli. Luc. •> oJA to y aei'^pcr, ic«><>i ? x«Ah 
fjMttn. Ejtrip. jUft Rcgub, ptccaiit i^ut fanai irrogtt dquas, (ays Hornet. Now by the fame r«/?, 
by which puniftimcnts ire jufllyproportiond, crimes mud be diftinguiflid amonpthcmrdves; and tJicrc- 
foTC much more, crimes from no-crimes, and crimes trom good actions. So that it is at bottom a ru'ic 
whidicando this, that is required. ' Fermiilaqu*dam cmJiitutntiAr/l : quarn (i ftqutmur 'in eomfu- 
riliont rerum, »toJ>ci» uunqitam rtctdtmus. Cic. "* ni< •<<» ti aTiK^afT* unti it, iitiufnu, tU «»•-/- 
«<e,oT«ix c. iii(.CT«m iri»e> [lacr*. ti«J Arrian. ' Ubi vitihi. ft mbil jitum tjl in iffii yiob'ii f Cic 

.-iiTO.-!' n-iim moy iji.-i - nans -pn? loi-y nitsn> nr^ C3n njinj aiN t>2> niu;->. MAim. 
HTnan N'H riunn. s»hh.,jib. 

B i llinguilh. 

8 The Religion of Nature. Sed:. I. 

flinguiHi, cannot choofc : and that, which has not the opportunity, or libcity 
oF choofing for itfclf, and acting accordingly, from an internal principle, a£ls, 
if it afts at all, under a ncceflity incumbent ab extra. But that, which a6ls tlius, 
is in reality only an iiijlrument in the hand of fomething which impofes the necef- 
fity } and cannot properly be fiiid to a^y but to be a£led. The a6l mufl be the 
aft of an agent : therefore not of his inilrument. 

A being undei' the abovc-mentiond inabilities is, as to the morality of its acts, 
in the Hate of inert and pallive matter, and can be but a machine : to which no 
language or philofophy ever afcribed »^n or mores. 

II. Hiofe propofitiom are true,, 'which exprefs things as they are : or^ truth is the 
eonformity of thofe -words or fgnSy by which things are exprejly to the things themr 
felves. Defin. 

III. A true propofition may be denied^ or things may be denied to be what they are, 
hy deedsy as well as by exprefs words or another propofttion. It is certain there is a 
meaning in many afts and geftures. Eveiy body undcrllands weeping », laugh- 
ing, llirugs, frowns, i^c. thefe are a fort of univerlid language. Applications 
arc many times made, and a kind of dialogue maintaind only by cafts of the eye 
and motions of the adjacent mufcles ''. And we read of feet, that {peak ^ j of a 
philofophcr, who anfwerd an argument by only getting up and walking '' ; and of 
one, who pretended to exprefs the fimc fentcncc as many ways by gelHculation, 
as even Cicero himfelf could by all his copia of words and eloquence ■=. But thefc 
inllanccs do nat come up to my meaning. There arc many afts of other kinds, 
fuch as conflitute the chara<5lcr of a man's conduft in life, which have in nature^ 
and would be taken by any indifferent judge to have a ftgnification^ and to imply 
fame propofition^ as plainly to be underllood as if it was declared in words : and 
therefore if what fuch afts declaie to be, is not, they mull contradiil truthy as 
mucli as any filfe propofition or afTertion can. 

If abody of foldicrs, feting another body approach, fhould fire upon them, 
would not this aftion declare that they were enemies j and if they were not enemies, 
would not this military language declare what was falfe? No, perhaps it may be 
faidj this can only be called a millake, like that which happcnd to the Athenians 

• Lacrymt fonJtra vocis habtnt. Ov. '' Ofuli, fuftrcilia, fr*nt, tultuj Jtaiqut totui, qui Ccrmo 

quiiUm lacitiii mintii tp, Sec. Cic. Khiu fgnifque loquuntur. Ov. £,J *liio quafi (crmo corferis. 
( ic. & iim. pail". ' vbj"^3 S!?10 5IM WN- Prov. '' Tli it«T«c'i^ xinmar^ Acvxco-*', afeiiTa- 

rijai. Sixt. hmp. So hitttciitmtn rcprovcJ luxury by eating on!y olivcj. D/c^. X. And others arc 
Dc-Dtiond by I'liitarch, who ilid ai/j <f»"^i « hit^fn^ir. * MAfroh, 


Of Moral Good and Evil. 9 

in the attack of Epipolje *, or to the Carthaginians in their laft incampmcnt a- 
gainlt yfgathocks in Africa ''. Suppofe then, inllcad of this firing, fomc officer 
to hxvc faid ihcy were enemies, when indeed they were friends : would not that 
lentence affirming them to be enemies be f.ilfe, notwithllanding he whofpoke ic 
\vas miftakcn ? The tnjth or falfhood of this affirmation doth not depend upon 
the affirmcr's knowledge or ignorance : bccaufe there is a certain fcnfe affixt to the 
words, which mull either agree or difagrec to that, concerning which the affir- 
mation is made. The thing is the \ery fume Hill, if into the place of words be 
fubltitutcd anions. The falute here was in nature the lakite of an enemy, buc 
fhould have been the falute of a friend : therefore it imphed a fallity. Any/peHa- 
tar would have underftood this aftion as I do j for a declaration, that the other 
were enemies. Now what is to be underftood, has a meaning : and what lias a 
meaning, may be either true ovfalfe : which is as much as can be fiid of any ver- 
bal fcntcncc. 

When Popilius Lcenas folicited to have Cicero profcribed, and that he might 
find him out and be his executioner'^, would not his carriage have fufficicntlyy?g- 
nified to any one, who was tgnorant of the cafe, that "Tuily cither w:is fome very 
bad man, and defcrved capital punilTiment > or had fome way gricvouily injured 
this man > or at leaft had not faved his life, nor had as much reafon to expe6t bis 
fcu'icc and good offices upon occafion, as he ever had to expert Tully's? And 
nil thefc things being falfc, were not his behaviour and aftions espreffive of that 
which was filfe, or contradiilions tv truth ? It is certain he aSIed as ;/thofe things 
had been true, which were not true, and ;is if thofc had not been true which 
were tnie (in this confifted the fault of his ingratitude) : and if he in words 
had faid they were true or not true, he had done no more than talk as if they were 
fo : why then fliould not to acl as if they were true or not tnjc, when they were o- 
therwifc, contradift truth as much as to fay they were fo, when they were not fo"*? 

A pertinacious objeHor may perhaps ftill fay, it is the bufinefs of foldicrs to de- 
fend themft-lvcs and their countiy from enemies, and to annoy them as opportu- 
nity permits; and felf-prefervation requires all men not only barely to dci'cnd 
thcmfehcs againll aggrcfTors, but many times alfo loprofecute fuch,and only fuch, 
as arc wicked and dangerous : therefore it is natural to conclude, that they arc 
enemies againft whom we fee foldicrs defending thcmfclvcs, and thofc men wic- 
ked and dangerous, whom wc fee profccutcil wiih /cil and anior. Not that 

' Where we find (?.>*< n (^.>«.<, r, t</\>t«( t.A.t«h 1,4 X"(«< ua.i>.ti(, iA>»'rr«^. Thucyd. ^ T»« 

i»,.m »« T./iu,i»( i,u.unrrt. DioJ.S. ' Vsl.Max. * A.«.-.^e.r., CTx ix,fh Tcrt T Jitn.'/A^rmtnt 

l^icTM <;jMif jrAi'.f. Eitrif. ^ut/i ivterfii, tiujiam, an xiJiitm. Cic. 


*o The Religion o/' Nature. Se6l.I. 

thofc acls of defending and profecutingy^f^^ or fignify fo much : but conjeftures 
arc raikd upon the commm fenfcy which mankind h;is of fuch proceedings. Anf. 
Ifitbe«a/«r(j/toconcludcany thing from them, do they not wa/wrrt//)- coavey 
the notice offomcthing to be concluded? And what is conveying the notice of 
any tiling but mtifying or llgnifying that thing ? And then again, if this fignifi- 
cation is natural and founded in the common principles and ic\-^c of mankind, is 
not this more than to have a meaning which refults only from the ufe of fomc 
f articular place or country, as that of language doth ? 

Ify/lliould enter into a compaft with B^ by which he /)row//ej and ingagcs 
never to do feme certain thing, and after this he docs that thing : in this calc it 
muftbe granted, that his aft /w/^r/er^f with his promife, and is contrary to it. 
Now it cannot interfere with his promilc, but it muft alio interfere with the 
truth of th-At propofition, which fays there was fuch a promife made, or :hat there 
is kioh a compaft fubfilling. If this propofition be true, A made fuch a certain 
agreement with B, it would be denied by this, A never made any agreement "with B. 
Why ? Becaufe the tmth of this latter is inconfijient with the agreement aflcrtcd 
in the former. The formality of the denial, or that, which makes it to be a de- 
nial, 'i%\.\\\s inconftjlence. If then the behaviour of ^ be inconfijient with the a- 
greement mentiond in the former propofition, that propofition is as much denied 
hy A's behaviour., as it can be by the latter, or any other /iro/)o/7/;o«. Or thus, 
If one propofition imports or contains that which is contrary to what is containd 
in anothei-, it is faid to contradict this other, and deirics the exillence of what 
is containd in it. Jull fo if one aft impoits that which is contrary to the import 
of another, it contradicts this other, and denies its exifience. In a word, if A by 
his aftiom denies the ingagements, to which he hath fubjeftcd himfclf, his afti- 
ons deny them ; juft as we liiy, Ptolomy by his writings denies the motion of the 
earth, or his writings deny it '. 

When the queftion was asked, TVhofefiieep arethefe ? the imfwer was, «y£'^<?«'s .• 
for he committed them to my care ^ (he ufes and difpofes of them ;is his\ By this 
aft Dam^tas underrtood them to be his ; and if they had not been his, but yil- 
phondas's or Meltboem\ ty£goH, by an aft very intcUigiblc to Damatas, had cx- 
prefled what was not tnae. What is faid here is the ftronger, becaufe he, who 
has the ufe and difpofal of any thing, has all that he can have of it ; and -v. v. he 
who has the all (or property) of any thing, mult have all the ufe ;md difpofil of 
it. So that a man cannot more fully proclaim any thing to be hiSy thimby ufing 
it, i3c. But of this fomething more hereafter. 

Of Moral Good and Evil. i r 

In the ye-wijh hiftory we read, that when Abimekk faw Ifaac fporting ^ with 
Rebekah, and taking coniugal liberties >>, he prcfcntly knew her to be Ifaac's 
wife i and if ihe had not been his wife, the cal'e had been as in the preceding in- 
ftance. If it be objeRed^ that flie might have been his milbefs or a harlot > I an- 
fwer^ that fo fhe might have been, the Ifaac had told him by words that fhe was 
his wife. And it is fuflicient for my purpoi'e, and to make a£bs capable of contra- 
dicling truth, if the)' may be allowd to exprefi things as plainly and determinately 
as words can. Certainly /Ibimelek gave grcucr cralit to that information which 
pafled through his eye, than to that which he received by the ear "^ ; and to what 
Ifaac did, than to what he faid. For Jfaac had told liim, that fhe was not his 
wife, but his filler ^. 

A certain author « writes to this purpofe, " If a foldier, who had Liken the 
" oath to Ciefar, fhould run over to the enemy, and fenx him againll C^yir, 
" and after that be taken i would he not be punilhd as adcfcrter, and aperjur- 
" ed viUain ? And if he ihould plead for himfclf, that he never denied Ctefar j 
" would it not be anfwerd, That -with bis tongue he did not deny him-, but with 
*' bis adieus (ovhy fi\£ts) he did ?'' And in another place, '■^ Let us, fays be, 
*' fuppofc fomc t) nxnt command a ChrilUan to burn inccnfc to Jupiter, without 
*' adding any thing of a verbal abnegation of Cbriji : if the Chriltian lliould 
'* do this, would It not be manifelt to all, that by that very all be denied him ; " 
(and I may add, confequcntly denied thoic propo/itions which affinti him to be the 
Chrijl, a teacher of true religion, and the like ^) ? 

When a man lives, as if he had the eftate which he has not, or ivas in other 
regards j^all fairly caft up) what he is not, what judgment is to be pafled upon 
him ? Doth not his whole conduft breath untruth ? May we not fay (if the pro- 
priety of laagaige permits), that he lives a lye 8 ? 

In common fpcech wc fay fome a6lions arc infignijicant, which would not be 
fenfe, if there were not fome that arc Jignijicant, that have a tendency and mean- 
ing. And this is as much as can be faid of articulate founds, chat they arc cither 
Jignificant or infignificant •>. 

» moo unjVDO. tuflu. » Only pn>ni piWl pjy according to Al(l,tk. ' 'ilT* ^ TPrx«- 
ri it^ttrxtirii i>'« iTiroTif* i<p:}x>iiA,ii. Htred. * That inftinccof Afwfi!fl«i and his gueft ^f.r/i«- 
Jirin Arrian, might befubjoind to thij. Etru tuTvi nVi <^.Ao^f.n«^'«< iAiiA»«, vnrtiro a> Ti»Ai'/«»r« 
orx itfBi fUm (tiT,<,. ' De Dufl. Mart. ' Something like this is that in one of Greg. Saz.'-^ 
orations. When foroe Chriiliins. who had been infbarcd by jMliao, a^cd, t*' Xf.«-«» i^it,,i(t; thry 

were anfwerd m ur* ^ xu^-n tiri/fbuM-Mri. ^ T« •^nt~^ Xf<t,'iMtT« /i«k«>. Cbryf. K«i «-a>i<r^«. 

i.rfVt, K. -/u*«, Kj fi'i/t.m, xti'.i i«/Vi*v -dki itiri, as Bsfil fpeaks : and therefore greater things muO. 
doit more. ^ At that BaiV^i tif. Diog. L. in \ Ztn, i^ 

12 The Religion of Nature^ Seel. I. 

It may not be improperly obfeived by the way, that the fignificancy here attri- 
buted to mens afts, proceeds not always from nature, but fomctimcs from cuftom 
and agreement among people », as that of words and founds mofllv doth. 
Aftsof the latter kind may in different times ;uid places have different, or even 
contnuy fignifications. The generality ofCbriftiatjs, when they pray, take off 
their hats : the jfeius, when they pray *> or % any of tlieir Berakoth, put them 
on. The fame thing which among Chriftians denotes reverence, imports irrc- 
A'ercncc among the ^fw;. The rcafon is, becaufc covering the head with a hat 
(if it has no influence upon one's health) is in itftlf an indifferent thing, and peo- 
ple by ufligc or confcnt may make it interpretablc cither way. Such acts feem to 
be adopted into their language, and may be reckond pait of it. But a6ts of the 
•former kind, fuch as I chiefly here intend, \\\\c mi unalterable fignification, and 
can by no agreement or force ever be made to cxprcis the contraiy to it. v/£gon^% 
• treating the flock, and difpofing of it as if it was his, can by no torture be brought 
to fignitV, that it ivas not bis. From whence it r.ppears, thAtfaHs cxprcfs more 
.Ibongly, even than words themfclvcs <^ ; or to contr;vdi£t any propoficion by fafts 
,is a fuller and more efteftual conti-adiftion, than can poffibly be made by words 
■only ^. JVords arc but arbitrary figns " of our idcis, or indications of our 
thoughts (that word, which in one language denotes poverty *, in another de- 
notes ricJjes b) : hut fafls may be taken as tlie cffcfts of them, or ratj-icr as the 
thoughts tbemfchcs produced into aSi ; as tlic very conceptions of the mind brouglic 

' • Aiywrl»»f -^ T* »e»« irarr* ijM>sritXi> »-o«ri «*ot(ri at^^a-tt<ri iriratlt i!9-i<e t« x<m ti^v;, xt>., 

jifftj, b _ni>uD ii;s;^a--n!?3rp niny^ n^ i^i^snon. Maim. ^ «/. paf < ©»* 

cu/eA^ySiTiJii/iKai, ToV? pijV«'5 af »>'•«'. And to ij-/«i? .io.'o^ 0i;» xart; t* tijrr> c* ro^Krt. 
Chryf. * Aiy<&-if'/!><rKiit- Piur. Res leqHitiir ipfii : qutfemfer valet ■plurin:uin.C\c. ^ttlJt/tr- 

ia oudiam, cumfrcla lideam > Id. Ai/rie /3e«T«?rf«.jin»T«, xutTvi^ini a-MxTtf. 'Buf. ' This we 

•know. For they arc different to different nations; we coin them, at wepleafc, ^c. 'Vwi ? c»ou.«-*» 
i^iVi>i», «»' 'c-ru.^ yit!i,ai <ruf/.to>.e>. Arifl . And xho Plate fcenis to be of another mind, yet when C/'jj/;'/*/ 
lavs 'O»oi<,«l®- cfCnia. umuKar^T crrai ^vo-i-ip-jKvTuv, it is much to le qucUiond whether any thing, 
more be meant than this, that fome names of things arc more natural or proper than others. For he &y s 
that this rc<ftitudc of names is the fame ;^"E».|(ri >C /3«.J<if ..< ; that it is [only] fuch as is fufficient i'ii>.if 
eroi iKu^it iVi T o>Tat ; fuch as may render them Kara t« i'uKtle' i,«.«i« — T«r? Tpayfoaru, &c. That Irfi- 
^Inm ^ ftftiijum argunientHm,-w\\\c\\ T. Uigidius. -af. A. Cell, makes ufc of toflie^v, <nr -vUeri fcjjint 
■vtrba rjfe ttainraha inagis quam ariijrariA, dcfcTVcs only to be laughd at. t Wn Heir. s vy>-> 
jirat. So A6.Ez.rA obfcrvcs that n3>< in Hti. is to will, in^r4*.to niil (thoinArai. thcword ii 
written ^3^)) : andiuanothcrpl.icc, that the /«»»» word even in thcfame language fomctimcs fignifies 
OBDl im, a thing and its contrary. And every one knows, that the greater part of our wordi 
have different fenfes and ufes. VyV in Arabic, according to Ci£geiia and Ccliur, has 70 or 80, and 

ibwe (tweitieaftj contrary the one to the pthcr, 


Of Moral Good and Evil. 1 3 

fonh, and grown to maturity •, and therefore as the nioft: natural and cxprcfs re- 
prcfcntations of them. And, bcfidc this, they bear ceitain rejfcBs to things, 
which are not arbitrary, but as detcniiinatc and immutable as any ratio^i are in 
mathematics. For the fafls and the things they rcfped ayc juft what they arc^ 
as much as any two given quantities arc j and therefore the refpcfts interceding 
between thofc muftbe as fixt, as ihc ratio is which one of thefc bears to the 
other : that is, they mull remain the fame, and always fpeak the lame language, 
till things ce;ife to be what they are. 

I lay this down then as a fundamental maxim, Tliat whoever ads as if things 
were fo^ or not fo^ doth hy his a^s declare^ that they are fo^ or not fo-y as pliinly 
as he could by words, and with more reality. And if the things are otherwifc, 
his afts contradift thofe propofitions, which aflcrt them to be as they are '. 

IV. A'b <afl (whether word '' or deed) of any being, to whom moral good and 
evil are imputable, that interferes with any true propofition, or denies any thing to 
be as it is, can be right. For, 

I . If that propofition, which is falfc, be wrong <=, that a£b which implies 
fuch a propofition, or k founded in it, cannot be right : becaufe it is the veiy 
propofition itfelf in practice. 

1. Thofe propofitions, which are tnie, and exprcfs things as they are, exprcfs 
the relation between the fubjccV and the attribute as it is j that is, this is cither 
affirmed or denied of that according to the nature of that relation. And fur- 
ther, this relation (br, ifyou will, the natiu^e of this relation^ is detcrmind and 
fixt by the natures of the things themfclvcs. Therefore nothing can interfere 
with any propofition that is true, but it mull likewifc interfere with nature fihc 
nature of the relation, and the natures of the things themfclvcs too^, and confe- 
quently be unnatural, or wrong in nature. So very much arc thofe gentlemen mif- 
takcn, who by following nature mean only complying with their bodilv inclinati- 
ons, tho in oppofition to truth, or at Icaft without any regard to it. Truth is but 
a conformity to nature : and to follow nature cannot be to combat truth ''. 

• This is Te.iS 4'rj''^- Apocal. PUtt ufcs the fime way of ipeaking. +iJJ<^, lays he, f-ntui 
ft,A^v—ju,Tt Xf/m p-:Ti i{v« "f«J»ii. The contrary to this is in Mifloili a.>.T^iii%a ifi.^M<i c« Atyoi; 
«<. x(i.i/,ra i and ci fi.» i>y,ti»u,. And in S. B. pON3 r\0*7, and DON T^n. >> Adhim gentrale 

irrhum tfi, fivt verbis jivt re t^uid agalur. Juftin. Dig. ' As it muft be, bccauic 'O'fet 

« «Ar^ii aiu. Stpli, * T» AeyiK'^ ^»* •! i-.'Tii Tfa^if xartt ^ixrir »Vi k, notTjt ^jyor (that is, ac- 

cording to truth, which it is the ollicc ofrcafon todifcovcr}. Anton. Smiquam tiliuJ raturi, aliuj 
fipicntia Jiai. Jur. 

c ?. If 

i^ The Religion 0/ Nature. Se6l. I. 

5 . If there is a fupremc being, upon whom the exiftcncc of the world de- 
pends } and nothing caii be in it but what He either caufes, or permits to be j 
then to own things to be as they are is to own what He caufes, or at lead permits, 
to be thus caufed or permitted : and this is to take things as He gives them, to go 
into His conrtitution of the world, and to fubmit to His will, rcveald in tl\e 
books of nature '. To do this therefore mull: be agreeable to His will. And 
if fo, the contrary mufl be difagrecablc to it; and, fmce (as wc fliall find in due 
time) there is a perfcft rcftitudc in His will, certainly wrong. 

I defirc that I may not be mifundcrftood in refpcfb to the aftings of wicked 
roen. I do not fay, it is agreeable to the will of God, tliat what is ill done by 
them, fliouldbe/o done; /. e. that they ihould ufc their liberty ill: but I fay> 
vhcnthey have done this and committed fome evil, it is agreeable to His will, 
that we fhould allow it to have been committed : or, it would be difagrecablc 
to His will, that we fhould deny it to have been committed. 

As the owning of things, in all our condud, to be as they are^xs direct obedi- 
ence '' : fo the contrary, not to own things to be or to have been that arc or ha\'C 
been, or not to be what they are, is direct rebellion againft Him, who is the 
Author of nature. For it is as much as to fay, " God indeed caufes fuch a 
*' thing to be, or at leaft permits it, and it is ; or the relation, that lies be- 
« tween this and that, is of fuch a nature, that one may be affirmed of the o- 
" ther, C5?f. this is true : but jet to ;;;c it fliall «o/ be fo : I will not indurc it, 
*' or a6t as if it were fo ; the laws of nature arc ill framed, nor will I t?iind 
•* them, or what follows from them: even cxiftencc iTiall be non-cxiltence, 
« when my pleafures require ". Such an impious dcclai-ation as this attends 
every voluntary infraftion of truth. 

4. Things cannot be denied to be what they are, in any injiance or manner what- 
foever, without contradi£ling axioms and truths eternal. For fuch are thefc : every 
thing IS what it is ; that which is done, cannot be undone ; and the like. And then if 
tKofb tnithsbeconfiderd as having always fubfilled in the Divine mind, to which 
they have always been true, and which differs not from the Deity himfelf, to do 
this is to aft not only in oi>'poCitionto His government or foveraignty, but to His 

• "eJ'wxi. [i 01=0 xrr'i J'iPiTK T ic«ir,u,<>v. Chiyf. * What Hierocles fays of his fyx^r^m ©i- 

t.], is true in rcfpcft of every thing. TifQi'iir »i^« m{r«itoA»(l|(»r»» in' tirt iuTB; n'lai Ti^ii^, t 

Vi'/«<«<ri. There is a pafiagc fomcwhcrc in 5. I<iqar. much like this : where it is^faid (as 1 remem- 
ber) that he, who worfhifw an Angd n't>U/ Nin HO nifO {as Being vhat bt u, tht mrjfmgtr «/ 
CcJ) IS not guilty of idolatry. 


Of <jMoral Good and Evil. 1 5 

fiftfare * alfo : which, if He be perfc(5t, and there be nothing in Him but 
\vli;it is mod right, mull: uUb upon this account be molt "jarong. 

Pardon thcfc inadequate ways of fpcaliing of God. You will apprehend my 
meaning : which perhaps may be better rcprefcnted thus. If there are fuch 
things as axioms^ which are and always have lx;cn immutably true, and confe- 
qucntly have been always /twooiw to God to be fo^^ the truth of them cannot be 
denied any way, cither directly or indirectly, but the truth of the Divine kncw- 
ledge mull be denied too. 

f . Dcfigiicdly to treat things as being what they are not is the gxcitc^poffible 
abfurdity. It is to put bitter for fweet, darknefs for light, crooked for 
Itreight, ^c. It is to fubvcrt all fciencc, to renounce all fenfc of truth, and 
flatly to deny the cxiftence of any thing. For nothing can be tmc, nothing 
docs cxift, // things are not what they are. 

To talk to a/)oy?, or otherwife treat it as if it was a ifiany would furely be 
rcckond an abfurdity, if not dtjlra&ion". ^\'hy ? becaufc this is to treat it as 
being 'what it is not. And why fliould not the conveife be reckond as bad ; that 
IS, to treat a man as a port'' j as if he had nofcnfe, and felt not injuries, which 
he doth feci ; as if to him pain and Ibrrow were not pain j happincfs nothap- 
pincfs. This is what the cruel and unjult often do. 

LaJIlyy to deny things to be as they are is a tranfgrefTion of the great /aw of 
our nature^ the law of reafon. For truth cannot be oppofcd, but reafon mull 
be violated. But of this more in the proper place. 

Much might be added here concerning the amiable nature "■, and great force *" of 
truth. If I may judge by what I feel within my fclf, tho Icall truth cannot be 

• 131 nON bJipj n^npn. in Rrfl,. hhokm. & «/. And S. Chryfojlom defines truth in the (ime 
words, which philofophcrs apply to the Deity. A>^um. to irrit i.. b "aa^h* yi «t«J»s 

eti. Ph. Jud. " n :.,*»«« «( «,/j«< 't^m is in So^h. the charafta of A^ax, when his 

head wii turned, in a fit of raving. And among the monftrous and mid extravagances of C. Ca- 
ligula one is, that he treated his horfe IncitntHt as a man. Suit. * Hor»ct argues after the 
fame manner. Si ijuij ItSic* mtid»m grflari nmet agnam ; Huic ve/lem, ut natx, pttrtt, 8cc. Intir- 
dUi» hmc omne «dm»t jus frttor, &c. ^utd, fiquij natam fra mitta devovit agni. Integer eft ani- 
mi ? nc dfacais. If it be againft truth and nature to ufc a lamb as a daughter, it will be as much 
againft truth to ufc a daughter as a bmb. ' K«*- kvrc fi: 4„ii3>' <f«JA., k) 4-,KT,;r ri 
5 iA^,, «.x« ^ .V«,„r,.. Arift. EJI qmdJn,». ,«*</>i vi ro, allidat «d frfi. nm tmolumtnto CAf 
t»n, al,<p,(,, fid tTMhtnifu* dipiit*tt : ijutd iinus. virtus, fiiniia, Veritas tfi. Cic. VXvkIj i iA,.^.,« 
a fcn.val Ciyirg in rl„t. i o ma^^^ xi, vnuMtu, he. Gic. A good man nOND nWlV 

^ * contradidcd 

i6 The Religion of Nature. Seifl L 

contradifted without much reluftance : even to fee other men difregard it 
does fomcthing more than difplcafe j it is fiocking. 

V. What has been /aid of aEls inconfiflent 'with truth, may alfo he [aid of many 
omijfiom, or negleEls to aH : that is, by thcfe alfo true propofitions may be denied 
to be true ; and then thofe omifjions, by which this is done, mujl be turongfor the 
fame reafons "with thofe affigned under the former propoftion. 

Nothing can be alTcited or denied by any a£t with regard to thofe things, 
to which it bears no relation : and here no truth can be affcftcd. And when 
afts do bear fuch relations to other things, ;is to be declaratory of fomething 
concerning them, this commonly is vifible j and it is not difficult to dctermin, 
whether truth fufFers by them, or not. Some things cannot poilibly be done, 
but truth mufl: be dire&ly and pofitively denied j and the thing will be clear. 
But the cafes arifing from omiflions are not always fo welldccermind, and plain : 
it is not always eaiy to know 'when or how far truth is violated by omitting. 
Here therefore more latitude mull be allowd, and much muft be left to every 
one's own judgment and ingenuity. 

This may be {iiid in general, that when any truth would be daiied by afting, 
the omitting to aft can deny no truth. For no truth can be contrary to truth \ 
And there may be omiflions in other cafes, that are filent as to truth. But yet 
there zrcfome neglelfs or refufils to aft, which are manifeftly inconfiiknt with 
it (or, with fome true propofitions). 

We before ^ fuppofcd y/ to h.ive engaged not to do fome certain thing, (^c. if 
now, on the other fide, he fliould by fome folcmn promife, oath, or other aft 
undertakers do fome certain thing before fuch a time, and he voluntarily ' omits 
to do it, he would behave himfclf as if there had been no fuch promife or en- 
gagement i which is equal to denying there was any : and truth is as much 
contradifted in this as in the former inilance. 

Again, there arc fome ends, which the nature of things and truth require us 
to aim at, and at which therefore if we do not ;iim, nature and truth are denied. 
If a man docs not dcfire to prevent evils, and to be happy, he denies both his 
own nature and the nature and definition o( happinefs to be what they are. And 
then further, willingly to ncgleft the means, leading to any fuch end, is the 
fame as not to propofc that end, and mud fall under the fimc ccnfure. As 
retreating from any end commonly attends the not advancing tow;u-ds it, and 

Of Moral Good and Evil. 17 

that may be confiderd as an aft, many omifilons of this kind may be turned 
over to the other fide '^ and brought under the foregoing propofition. 

It muft be confell there is a difficulty as to the means, by which we are to 
confult our own prcfcnation and huppincfs > to know what thofe are, and 
what they are with refpccl to us. For our abihties and opportunities arc not 
equal : fomc labor under difxdvantages invincible : and our ignorance of the 
tnie natures of things, of their operations and eife£ls in fuch an irregular dif- 
temperd world, and of thofc many incidents, that may happen either to further 
or break our mcafurcs, deprive us of ccnainty in thcfc matters. But Itill wc 
may judge as well as wc can, and do what we can*" > and the neglect to do this 
will be an omiflion within the reach of the propofition. 

There ;u-e omifTions of other kinds, which will dcfcrve to be annumei-ated 
to thefe by being either total, or notorious, or upon the fcore of fome other 
circum/iance. It is certain I Ihould not deny the Phasniffte of Euripides to be 
an excellent drama by not residing it : nor do I deny Cbihil-mendr to be a 
rare piece of antiquity by not going to fee it. But fhould \, having Icilure, 
health, and proper opportunities, read nothing, nor make any inquiries in or- 
der to improve my mind, and attain fuch knowledge as may be ufeful to me, 
I Ihould then deny my mind to be what it is, and that knowledge to be what 
it is. And if it doth not precifcly, into what kind of lludics this re- 
fpeft to truth will carry a man preferably to all others, how it will oblige 
him to continue his purfuit after knowledge, and where the difcontinuancc 
begins to be no offence againil truth, he mull confult his own opportunities 
and genius, and judge for himfelf ^; luell as he can"^. This is one of thofe cales 
which I faid before were not fo well determind. 

If I give nothing to this or that poor body, to whom I am under no parti- 
cular obligation, I do not by this deny them tohc poor, anymore than Ilhould 
deny a man to have a fqualid beaid by not fhaving him, to be nally by not 
wafhing him, or to be lame by not taking him on my back. 

Many things arc here to be taken into confideration (according to the next 
propofitionj : perhaps I might intrench upon truth hy doing this > and then I 
cannot by not doing if*. But if I, being of ability to afford now and then 
iomething in charity to the poor, fliould yet w^x'fr give them any thing at all, 

» In the Civil Law he is (aid to aSl, who Jots omir. S)^i,i non facit qiud fActrt Jciit, viJrtu, 
ficac aJvtrfu) t» qttd non facit. Di(;. l" E/? iptoJAm frodlrt tenui. Hor. < Difcti qu»m. 

dim vilu : t»mdiu tmttm iiUe dtbtbis, quo»d it, quAiitum frofidai, nan ftcnittiil, fays Cieera to lus. 
'.••n. * SulU xirlHi -^irtMti ccntr-^ri/t rj. Sen. 

I ilioulJ. 

i8 The Religion of Nature. Se6l. I. 

r llxoiild then certainly deny the condition of the poor to be what it is, and 
my own to be what it is : and thus ti-uth would be injured. So, again. 

If I fliould not fixy my prayers at fuch a certain /;<7«r, orinfucha ccrtainf/rt^f 
and tnamier, this would not imply a denial of the exiftcnce of God, His provi- 
dence, or my dependence upon Him : nay, there may be rcafons perhaps ;igainft 
that particular time, place, manner. But if I fliould never pray to Him, or 
worfhip Him at all, fuch a/cr^/omifTion would be equivalent to this affcition, 
'There is no God, "Jjho governs the -world, tobe adored : which, if there is fuch a be- 
ing, muft be contrary to truth. AKo generally and notorioujly to ncgledt this du- 
ty ('permit me to call it foj, tho not quite always, \y\\\favor^ if not direftly 
proclaim the fame untnith. For certainly to worfliip God after this manner is on- 
ly to worfhip him accidentally, which is to declare it a great accident that he is wor- 
iiiipd at all, and this approaches as near :is it is pofTiblc to a total neglc6b. Bc- 
fide, fuch a fparing and infrequent worlhiper of the Deity betrays fuch an ha- 
bitual difregard of Him, as will render every religious aft infignificant and null. 

Should I, in the lail; place, find a man grievoufiy hurt by fome accident, 
fain down, alone, and without />re/^«/ help like to perilli j orfeehis houfc on fire, 
no body being near to help, or call out: in this extremity if I do not give him 
myafTiilance immediately, I do not do it at all: and by this rcfufing to do it 
according to my ability, I deny his cafe to be what it is ; human nature to be 
■what it is ; and even thofe dcfires and expeftations, which I am confcious to 
my felf I fliould have under the hke misfortune, to be what they are. 

VI. In order to judge rightly what any thing is, it mufi be confiderd not only 
tvhat it is in it felf or in one refpeil, but alfo vihat it may be in any other refpe^l, 
•which is capable of being denied by fails or praSlice : and the whole dcfcription of 
the thing ought to be taken in. , 

If a man fteals a horfe, and rides away upon him, he may be faid indeedby 
riding him to ufc him :\s a horfe, but not as the horfe of another man, who gave 
him no licence to do this. He does not therefore confider him as being what 
he is, unlcfs he takes in the refpcft he bears to his tnie owner. But it is not 
ncccfliiry perhaps to conlider what he is in rcfpcft to his color, fliape or age : be- 
caufc the tliicf's riding away with him may neither affirm nor deny him to be 
of any particular coloi-,6?f. I fiiy therefore, that thofe, and all thofe proper- 
ties, refpefts, and circumllances, which may be contradifted by praftice, arc 
to betaken into confidcration. For othcrwife the thing to be confiderd is but 


Of {jMoral Good and Evil. ip 

imperfcftly funxydj and the whole compafs of it being not taken in, it is 
taken not as being wliiu it is, but as what it is in part only, and in other re- 
fpcfts perhaps as being it is not. 

If a rich man being upon a journey, Hiould be robbed and ftript, it would 
be a fccond robbery and injufticc committed upon him to take from him part 
of his then charafter, and to confider him only as a rich man. His charac- 
ter completed is a rich man robbed and abufcd, and indeed at that time a poor 
man » and dillreft, tho able to repay afterwards the afiiflance lent him. 

Moreover a man in giving aflillance of any kind to another fhould confider 
what his cx-n circumftances are, as well as what the others arc ''. If they do 
not permit him to give it, he does not by his forbearance deny the other to 
want it : but if he ihould give it, and by that deny his own or his f.unily's 
circumftances to be what they are, he would actually contradict truth. And 
fince (as I have obfcr\-cd already) all truths aie confillent, nor can any thing 
be true any further than it is compatible with other things that arc trucj when 
both parties arc placed in a right light, and the cxic properly ftatcd for a judg- 
ment, the latter may indeed be truly laid to want afllltance, but not the aflift:uice 
of the former : any more thima man, who wants a guide, may bcfaid to want 
a blind or a lame guide. By putting things thus may be truly known what 
the latter is with refpcct to the former. 

The cafe becomes more difficult, when a man (A) is under fome promife or 
compact to alllll another (B;, and at the fxmc time bound to confult his own 
happincfs, provide for his fimily, fjfr . and he cajinot do thcfe, if he does that, 
effetlually. For what muft A do? Here arc not indeed oppofite truths^ but 
there are truths on oppofite fides. I anfwer : tho there cannot be two incom- 
patible duties, or tho two inconiiftent acts cannot be both A's duty at the 
fame time ^for then his duty would be an impoflibility) j yet an obligation, 
which I will call ot/jc/, may arifc out of thofe differing confiderations. A fliould 
afliftBj buty?, rtj not to neglect himfelf and family, ^c. andyi to take c;irc 
of himfelf and family, as not to forget the other ingagement, as 'well and ho' 
r.eftly as he can. Here the importance of the truths on the one and the other 
fide fhould be diligently compared : and there mull in fuch cafes be always 
lomc exception or limitation underftood. It is not in man's power to promife 

• nyw mbO '3y ; according to that determination in a caTc fowcthing like this, which occur.i 
in Tttlpi. M»fJ. Vbt. t l/trique /imHU»nfu!tttJum eft. OaIio t^cnit j J'eJ ut ipfc net.tgtam. &c. 

'>•••' ::* tt alitrum m^lrrrfcat, nt tm uliei mi/rrent. Pliut. 


20 The Religion of Nature. Seel. I. 

ahfolutcly. He cm only promife as one, who may be difahkdhy tlic weigh: 
and incumbcncv of truths not then exifting. 

I could here infert many inftances of /)flr//a/thinlctfig, which occur in au- 
thors : but I fliall clioofe onlv to fet down one in the margin '. 

In fhort, when things are truly eitimated, perfons concerned, times, places ^^ 
ends intended <^, and effcds that naturally follow, mufl: be added to them. 

VII. TVben any acl would be "wrong, the forbearing that aH tnujl be right : 
likewife ivhen the omijjlon of any thing luould be wrong, the doing of it (i. e. not 
omitting it) tnuft be right. Bccaufe contrariorum contraria efl ratio. 

VIII. Moral good and evil are coincident -with right and wrong. For that 
cannot be good, which is wrong > nor that evil, which is right. 

IX. Every ail therefore of fticb a being, as is before dcfcribed, and all thofe 
omiffions which interfere with truth {i.e. deny any propofition to be tnie, which 
is tmc> or fuppofe any thing not to be what it is, in any rcgaid ^) are morally 
evil, in fame degree or other : the forbearing ftich a^s, and the aHing in oppofition 
to fucb omiffions are morally good : and when any thing may be either done, or not 
done, equally without the violation of truth, that thing is indifferent. 

I would have it to be minded well, that when I fpeak of acts inconfiftent 
with truth, I mean any truth j any true propofition whatfoevcr, whether con- 
taininfT matter of fpcculation, or plain fact. I would have ever}' thing taken 
to be what in faEl and truth it is «. 

> Stxtiii fccms to be fond of that filthy faying of Ztno, in relation to what is ftoried of 
focafla and Otdipus : jji-i aroTtot tiitti to jiio^m ri; foijTjoi Tf.Yai, xA. any more, than to rub witli 
the hand any other part of her, when in pain. Here only T^c\.ti is confiderd; as if all was nothing 
more, hut bitrcly r^i-^K, ; but this is an incomplete idea of the aft. For tji^is i fi^oeiv is more than 
rci^i!, by it felf : and r^i'^vj/i? ? (aoj/s •? /Aijlfo? is ftill more : and certainly r^t^ut t>i» xiif* t^ x."^' is 
a different thing from r^iZit to f/t^teUt tJ wo^U', 8cc. He might as well have (aid, that to rubarr./ 
hot piece of iron with one's bare hand is the fame as to rub one tliat is cold, or any other innocent 
piece of matter : for all is but rfi-^n. Thus men, affcifling to appear free-thinkers, fhew themfclves 
to be but half-thinkers, or Ufs : they do not take in the whole of that which is to be conlidcrd. 
^ Sunt res quulam ex tempore, (y ex conftlio, non ex fuanathra confijerandt. — ^uid tempera fe. 
tatit, ant quid perfonii dignum/it, coii/ideranJiim el, 8cc. Cic. ■•" Oci Ai'yu? ^lAoToro? t a^' ^r*,- 

SuTKcuin <ivfvT»i'>T«. Arr. Amico tgro aliquis ajjidel : frcbamus. at hoc fS btreditalis causa facit, 
Tultur efl, cada-ver expeclat. Sen. "^ Oi -^ tU tff«icri*« iV« Tjax®-. Chryf. ' Ti ntxTiru t 

i'/xfvt n i^'.dix, 1^ a 'ix<i-r&' o{®- r Ttar.^Uf. T« -^liJiJ^. Baf. 

T. It 

Of Moral Good and Evil. 21 

Tc may be of ufc alio to remember, that I have added tliol'c words /wyotttf 
degree or other. For neither all evil, nor all good actions arc equal ^ Thofc 
truths which they refpcct, tho they arc equally true, may comprife matters of 
very difftrent import;uico ^ ; or more truths may be violated one way than 
another "^ : and then the crimes committed bv the violation of them may be e- 
qually fone as well as the other J laid to be crimes, but not equal crime i '^. 
If A ftcals a book from B which was plciling and ufcful to him, it is tmc A is 
guilty of a crime in not treating the book as being what it is, the book of B, 
who is the proprietor of it, and one whofc happincls partly depends upon it : 
but llill if A fliould depri\e B of a^o^;^ ejlate, of which he was the true own- 
er, he would be guilty of a much greater crime. For if we iuppofc the book 
to be worth to him one pound, and the clVatc loooo/. that trutli, a\ iiicii is 
\iolated by depriving B of his book, is in effect violated loooo times by rob- 
bing him of his eltate. It is the ftmc ;is to repeat the theft of one pound 
I oooo times over : and thacforc if i oooo thefts (ov crimes) are more, and all 
together greater than one, one equal to loooo mull be greater too : greater 
than that, which is but the i ooooth part of it, fure. Then^ tho the conve- 
nience and innocent pleafurc, that B found in the ule of the book^ was a degree 
of happincfi : yet the h.tppincis accming to from the cjlate^ h\ which he 
was fupplied not only with neceflaries, but alio with many other comforts and 
hirmlcfs injoyments, vaiHy exceeded it. And therefore the truth violated in 
the former cafe \\-x%^ B had a property in that^ libich gave him fuch a degree of 
happitiefi : that violated in the latter, B had a property in tbat^ lijbicb gaie him 
a bappinefs vaflly fuperior to the other. The violation therefore in tJie latter 
cafe is upon this account a vaftly greater violation than in the former. Lajily^ 
the truths violated in the former cafe might end in B, thofe in the latter may 
perhaps be repeated in them of his family, who fublill: alio by the ejlate^ and 

• Norwithftinding that paradox of the Stoics, "On iVe rit iu,afTii^«T«, ti. ta Ka.Tc(^uu.xTx, Ap. 
Cie.flut. Diog. L. o> al. which might calily be conftitcd trom their own words in Cicrro. For it" 
fmning belike paiTmg aline, or limit i that is, going over or beyond that line: then, /o //h being equal 
to lomg btjond that lint, to go more Cor farther) bcj'ond that line muft be to lin more. Who (ccs 

not the fiiilky of that, ntc 6ono ztro meliortm, ntc forti fortiortm, nee Ufimit fafitntiorem btff, 

fiirit And fo on. nullum inter fcelut Qf erratum difcrimen faetre (as S. Hitr. cxprcflcs their opi- 
nion : if that cpifllc to CtUntia be hi?) is to alter or dcHroy the natures of things, 'i Sure tlut Wile- 
man v.'ai but a bad accountant, whorcckond, th uixylflw »»-.xf '«7t«eeA«>. Jix> 'i.r>u<ia(>:V«i«AiiKi>«i. 
Ap. Vlut- ' This is confrft in Cic. \Uud intertfl, t^uod inferno nicando, (i adfit injuria, ft- 

tntl ftccMur . in pairii vita violanda muUa peccantur, !tc. Muttitudine ptccaiorum pr/tftat. He. 
•' This may fervc for an anfwer lo Clrryfippus, anil them who fay, it iA^.Vy U>iiiii ft,it.„ dxirtr, 
ift i^iB^^ -ifiuim- irrtu a/i ixmrn iix»Tm iii it^ «^«f t<^»tO, »A. Ap. Ot*^. L. 

D arc 

22 The Religion o/' Nature. Seel. I. 

are to be provided for out of it. And thefe tmths are very many in refpect of 
every one of them, and all their defcendents. Thus the degrees of e^-il or 
guilt are as the importance and number of truths violated V I fhall only add, on 
the other fide, that the value of good actions will rife at Icall in proportion to 
the degrees of evil in the omillion of them : and that therefore they cannot be 
equal, any more than the oppofitc evil omifHons. 

But let us return to that, which is our main ilibjecl:, the diflinnion between 
moral good and evil. Some have been fo wild <is to deny there is any fuch 
thing : but from what has been faid here, it is manifcll-, that there is as cer- 
tainly moral good and evil as there is true and falfe ; and that there is as natural 
and immutable a difference between thofe as between thefe, the difference at the 
bottom being indeed tlie fiime''. Others acknowledge, that there is indeed 
moral good and evil j but they ivant fomc criterion, or mark, by the help of 
which they might know them afundcr. And others there are, who pretend 
to have found that rule, by which our actions ought to be fquarcd, and may 
be difcriminated > or that ultitnate end, to which they ought all to be refer- 
red ' : but what they have advanced is cither falfc, or not fufficiently guarded, or 
not comprehenfive enough, or not clear and firm'', or (io far as it is jull) re- 
ducible to my mle. For 

They, who reckon nothing to be good but what they cAX hone ft urn'', may 
denominate actions according as that is, or is not the caufc^'or ends of them : 
but then what is honeflum^? Something is flill wanting to mcalurc things by, 
and to fcparate the honefta from the inhonefta. 

They who place all in follotving nature', if they mean by that phrafe acting 
according to the natures of things (that is, treating things as being what they 

• 6)Meii paria ejfe fere pUciiit peccata, laborant Cum "vent urn adverum efl: fenfui morefiiue rtpug- 
naKtT^tque ipfr utiUtAS. Hor. '' Therefore they, who denieJ there was cither goodox eiil (^'■■'H 

iy'u^l,:, «<««ir), were much in the right to maice thorough work, and to fay there was nothing in na- 
•u'rcithcr true or falfe. V. Scxt. Emp. & Diog.L. ' ^uod [extremum, s. ultimum tonorum] 

cmnmm phdo{ophorHm fcn,em,,i tale debet ejfe, ut ad id omnia rtferri oporteat : ipfum autem r.„Jq,tam. C.c. 
" There was among the old philofophers fuch an uncertainty and variety of opinions concerning the 
flnt,6onor„m&maloru-n, that if K4rr.compHtesrightly, thenumbcr might te raifed to iSS. S.^ug. 
c 0«,i honepumefl, ,d konnm folum habendum eft. Cato ap. Cic. [ ^ui [cmr.e>] fermulta cb 

,a2 „nam caulam /..,«« ,«-^ honeftum eft. C.c. Mt is commonly placed among »:.6 : an.1 

i., conf.derd as fuch in thofe ways of fpcaking ; honeftum ejfepr.ptnfe expetendum, Cac. Fmem bene 
rum e/fe honefli vivere, ib. and the Ukc. " To fay. ^u,d Uudab.le eft, cmne honejlum e(l. or a^ 

tlun.^ like that, is to lay nothing. For how fl.aU one know what is truly lauMile ? T.A©- 

.;>. rz^»r] ri i^.X^y.1^^, (al.i«Ai^*i) rjj <f«V< ^.. ^.f Ul ««r' i..r.. ^.. 'Avi Y^ '"^ ^-'""" 
il/bui i f'jrii. Diog. L. ^^ 


Of Moral Good and Evil. 23 

in nature arc, or according to truth^ fay what is right. But this does not 
fccm to be their meaning. And if it is only that a man muft follow his own 
nature % fince his nature is not purely rational, but there is a part of him, 
which he has in common with brutes, they appoint him a guide which I fear will 
millcad him, this being commonly more hkcly to prevail, than the i-ational 
parr. At belt this talk is loofe. 

They who make right reafon^ to be the law, by which our acts are to be 
judged, and according to their confoimity to this or deflexion from it call them 
lawful or unla-wful, good or bad, fay ibmething more paiticular and precilc. 
And indeed it is true, that whatever will bc-ar to be tried by right reafon, is right j 
and that which is condemned by it, wrong. And moreover, if by right reafon 
is meant that which is found by the right ufc of our rational faculties, this is the 
Hime with truth : and what is hid by them, will be comprehended in what 1 
have fiid. But the manner in which they have deliverd themfclves, is not yet 
explicit enough •=. It leaves room for fo many difputes and oppofite right-reafonsy 
that nothing can be fettled, while every one pretends that his reafon is right. 
.Andbcfide, what Ihavefaid, extends firthcr : for we are not onlv to refpcft 
thofetnith^, which we difcover by rcafoning, hwicxcn (wch matters of faSf^ as 
are fairly difcoverd to us by our fenfes. We ought to regard things as beinq they are, which way foevcr we come to the knowledge of them. 

TTic\', who contenting themfclves with fuperficial and tranficnt vicw.s, de- 
duce the difference between good and evil from the common fenfe of mankind '', 
and ccrXMn principles « that are born with us <, put the matter upon a very infirm 
foot. For it is much to be fufpcftcd there are no fuch innate maxims as they 
pretend, but that the imprenions of education are miftalccn for them : and be- 
ll Je that, the fentiments of mankind arc not fo /^«i/o;7a ;uid conftant^ as that we 
may fifcly trull fuch an imponant dillinction upon them 8. 

• lUirr* txheminisnaiHra. Cic. It is true he adds, undiqut prrftHa (y nihil rmuirentt: hut tliofc 
words have eithfr no meaning, or fuch as will not much mend the matter. For what is niiturAun. 
diatu firftUa (y nihil rct^uirtns ! Helide, moral religion doth not confift in following naturealrcadv per. 
fc<t, but by the ptatiicc ot rtiigion v/e aim at the pcrttfting of our n.iturcs. •> CelclTatcd 

every where. ' T. ^ *» »;•> A«fii-«^ t«? kyub*^, «•{«£<?, t«< r <!f3^»» yat^tu, Xtyn, 

K. T«^ »«»>*«^ Tijumcr, u/jtSmu, ctn in -| .'»«•" rct^xfii^ii (rvu.*iaii. AnJr.Rlt. * tire felum 

fHj (f iafiiriA a natiira JijMjieafnr, ft J ommno emnU hcntjia fr turf 14. Nam comnmnis inttHigriitu 
nobis nttairti tfjicit, eaf'jut m ammii nolirit ir.rhoazir, ut bonrflA m tirtiilt [xmatttur, in vitiii titrpiA. 
Cic. K^irn^a {i^„ f i Xf«-iTT<>- ] iTkxi aiitniru lej »{»Ai)V<i>. Diog. l. ' They arc ufuallv 

ralcd principu muurt, Ux (or Ugf) n»iur4, »^«A.rtJ/^«, xtiml, or <^m-i»> m,»t, .->,<&- ^ri«i«, Jkc. 
• The let ot thcfc praAical principles (or a hal>it flowing ft om them) is, what. I think, goes hv 
Che nimc of Hjultrejii. « UaAqu<qut gtns hnr Ufim nMurx pmAt. cjiic! iliMiil. Micron. 

1) i Thcv, 

24 The Religion of Nature. Sedl. I. 

They, who own nothing to be good hnt plea fure, or what they call jacundum^ 
nothing evil but pain ", and diftinguilh things by their tendencies to this or that *'y 
do not agree in wh:it this plcafurc is to be placed '^, or by what methods and act- 
ings the moll olit may be obtaind. Thcle arc left to be quclHoiis iHll. As 
men have different tails, different degrees of fenle and philolbphy, the liime 
thing cannot be plealiint to all : and if particular aftions are to be proved by 
this tefl, the morality of them will be very uncertain ; the fame acl may be 
of owe nature to one man, and of (iwoz/j^r to another. Bcfide, unlcls there be 
Ibme flrong limitation added as a fence for \irtue, men will be apt to fink into 
grofs voluptuoufncfs, as in fa6b the generality of Epicurus's herd have done '^ 
( notwithllanding all liii talk of temperance, virtue, tranquillity of mind, (^c.) ; 
and the bridle will be ufurpcd by thofe appetites which it is a principal part 
of all religion, natural as well as any other, to curb and rcflrain. So thcfe 
men fay what is intelligible indeed : but what they fay is fiilfe. For not all 
pleafurcs, but only fuch plcafurc as is /»■«?, orhappinefs (of which afterwards), 
may be reckond among the fines, or ultima honor urn. 

He "^j who, having confidcrd the two extremes in mens pra£lice, in condemn- 
ing both which the world generally agrees, places virtue in the middle, -xnii feems to 
raife an idea of it from its fituation at an equal dillancc from the oppofitc extremes *, 

' Under which word thefedclicate men comprehend Inhor. When Epicurus, in Liician, is asked, Kjt- 
x\» <i'/y,T ;r«>ov; heanrwers, N«i'. And Mindyrides (S«,ivJV^iJ^);, ap. Herod. J; i,TiTA!r«-o» ^t ;i;>.i^>t; ii? i- 
t'r.i a-txiTi ) proceeded lb far in his averlion to labor, that ejus latiis alieno laborc condoluit — .- qui cum 
■viJiffet fodientem, (yaliiui raftrtim alUvuntem, Uffumfe fieri {ii.yi/.«.Xx%t», in Athen.) qucftus vemit 
ilium epiis in confpeclii fiiofacere. Sen. ^ Ad hue [loluptatcm, O" dolorem] (}' quifequamur, 

^qutfugiamus, refert omnia [Ari/lippu.'}. Cic. "^ Velim definias, quid fit xoluptas: de quo 

cmnii I)ilC quijlio ejl. Cic. Thedifputes about pleafurc between the Cyrenaics, Epicurus, Hitronymus, 
&c. are well known : whether the end was pleafureofbody or mind ; whether it wisioluptas inmo- 
tu, or in fiatu (fiaiilitate); qut fumilate aliquanaturam ipfrm moiet, or qui percipitur, omni doU- 
re detracio; i c* K.r^o-;, or i xara^-uiAarixfl, &.C. Cic. Diog. L. Seal. '* iVf^a; Epicurus ju- 

■ lundi vi-J pojfe, nifi cum ■virtutt -vivatur. Cic. But for all that their pleafurcs have not continued 
ro be always like thofe in the little gardens of Gargeitus. Nor indeed do ihcy fccm to be very vir- 
tuous even there. For Epicurus not only had his Ltontium (or, as he amoroufly called her, Aiorra- 
'u',) a famous harlot; but the twi't! ror? 'Etixkj (wk vtarv ch to'^x^toh. Athtn. And in his book ■ae* 
tiAb5 he is faid to have written thus, Oi -yj iy«rf "ix" '"' »»««"«' ri'/afct, iifiaijir fi rk<, 2^^. ^^i/Ai. (z«- 
A»», Athtn.) itat.t'uc. kput^ii ^ ti -rai, ei kpttita-mi, xA. See this and more in Vio^.L. ' St. 

ftrom ufcs the plural number, as if this was the prevailing notion in his time.' Phitofopliorum fententi* 
efl, ft,wiTriit<,iL(tT»<„ UTijcoAa? K«Ki«< •.'«<. ' H ^ iWifcoAn i^«f j-«>i^, ti n \)t,i-i,i<,-2^tyi'^y to 

^^ic-» Ktmu'il). •'Ecit aja v,k(nvi i^i? TfoitifiT-ixii , cm /juia-irf^ ira, ktA. Murirm 3, fuc xHxiir -f 

'fHf, KuC ■cai(U>.y.> r - icar" r^ii}-!?. Arift. Perliaps Pythai^oras (and after him Plato, and others), 
wljcn he faid {/ip. Dio£. L.) tv !t^nv i<fui»tiut utat, might have fome luch thought as this. 


Of Moral Good and Evil. 25 

could only defign to be undciftood of fuch virtues, as have extremes. It mull 
be granted indeed, that whatever declines in any degree towiu-d either extreme, 
mud be fo far wrong or evil ; and therefore that, which equally (or nearly) di- 
vides the dillance, and declines neither www, mufl be right : alfo^ that this nutiun 
fupplics us with a good direilioti for common ulc in manv cafes. But then there 
arc fcvcnil obligations, that c:u"i by no means be deri\ cd from it : Icarce more 
than luch, as refpecb the virtues couched und^r the word moderation. And even 
as to thcfe, it is many times difficult to difccrn, which is the middle point *. 
This the author himlelf was fenfible of ''. 

And when his mailer Plato makes virtue to confill in fuch a likenefi to God *=, 
as wc arc capable of (^and God to be the great exemplar), he fays what I fliall 
not difpute. But fincc he tells us not how or by what means we may attain 
this likenefs, we -.xxc little the wifer in point o^ practice : unlefs by it we un- 
derlland the practice of truth,God being truth.;xnd doing nothing contrary to it '^. 

\\'hcther any of thofe other foundations, upon which morality has been built, 
will hold better than thcfe mentiond, I much qucllion. But if the formal ratio of 
moral good and evil be made to conlill ina conformity of mens acts to the truth 
of the cafe or the contrary, as I have here explaind it, the diJlinSlion fecms to be 
fettled in a manner undeniable, intelligible, pradticable. For as what is meant 
by a true propofition and matter of fad is perfectly underllood by every body } fo 
will it be cafy for any one, fo tar as he knows any fuch propolitions and fa6bs, to 
compare not only 'a.or^/V,but alfo actions with them . A very little skill and attention 
will fcr\-c to interpret even thcfe, and difcovcr whether t\\cy fpeak truth, or not •=. 

X. If there bi moral good and evil, dijlinguifjjd as before, there is religion ; and 
fuch as may mofl properly befiyled natural. By religion I mean nothing clfe but an 
obligation to do 'under which word I comprehend nets both of body and mind. 
I fiy, to do) what ought not to be omitted, and to foicear what ought not to be 

* When he lays, it muft be taken iiTtn in «» • s'{j«« >,ey^ Tfo?-«f», it is not by tlut alccrtiiiid. 
Secbctore. >> Oiiy sasiei ?i».i'(r«i to t»«<, i^ t/o-i, xX. Therefore R. yf/^» might have (pared 

that ccnlbrc, where he blames him for cxpreiTing himftlf too generally, when he lays, iiN"\Vtf 103, 
liNin dJipoai 'iN">n ryai without tt!:ing him what that manner, time, fUce is. ' That 

man, Ciyj he, cannot be neglcftcd, who endeavours iixm'^ yi'/uo^T, k: ijirtiUuut itirn, in •»••> iiwx 
T«« itjJcTti jiMiJo^J .^liJ. And in another place, our (f'.yi atht^ is ifM^ti<rt^ .^li kut* t« huntrn 
St. AMguflm feemi to agree with him, in that Icntence ot his, RtUgiomsfHmm»tfl imit»ri qutmcolis' 

* nbj«y9f«< uuTVJui,, Ti 7e<«rir ao^fOTW ^i.' cuMur, K^n, ikt iiXiilrSiri. Slob. ' 1 here is 

rtrtainly not that ditliculty or perplexity in morality, which Cictro fecms to fupj.olc, when he fays, 
Ctn/neinde exercitAtieijHe capienjA, ut ioni ramciruiltres o^ciorum tjje ftjJimHi. 

I done. 

26 The Religio^t of Nature. Se6}. I. 

done. So that there muftbe religion, if there arc things, of which fome ought 
not to be done, fome not to be omitted. But that therc arc fuch, appears from 
what has been faid concerning moral good and evil : becaufe that, which to omit 
would be evil,and which therefore being done would be good or well donc,ought 
certainly by the terms to be done ; and fo that, which being done would be evil,and 
implies fuch abfurdities and rebellion againfk the fupremc being, as are mentiond 
under propofition the IVrh. ought moll undoubtedly not to be done. And then 
fince there is religion, which follows from the diftinftion between moi-al good and 
c\il i fmcc this diltinftion is founded in the refpcft,which mens afts bear to truth ; 
and fuicc no propofition canbetmc, which exprefles things otherwife than as 
they are in nature : fince things are fo, there mull be religion, which is founded 
in nature, and may upon that account be mofb properly and truly called x.\\c religion 
of nature or natural religion j the great la-w of which religion, the law of nature, or 
i-.ilher (as we fhall afterwards find reafon to call it) of the Author of nature is, 

XI. 'That every intelligent, aSiii-e, and. free being JJjould fo behave himfelf, as by 
»o all to contradict truth -, or, that hepould treat every thing as being what it is *. 

Obje6lions I am fenfible may be made to almoft any thing ^ ; but I believe none 
to what has been here ad\'anced but fiich as may be anfwerd. For to conlidcr a 
thing as hc'mg fomething elfe than what it is, or (which is the fame) not toconfidcr 
it as being what it is, is an abfurdity indcfcnfiblc. However, for a fpecimen, I will 
fet down a few. Let us fuppofe fome gentleman, who has not fufficiently confiderd 
thefe matters, amidil: his freedoms, and in the gaiety of humor, to talk after fome 
fuch manner as this. " If every thing mull: be treated as being what it is, what 
*' rare work will follow ? For, i . to treat my enemy as fuch is to kill him, or rc- 
'" venge my felf foundly upon him. z. To ufe a creditor, who is a fpend-thrift, or 
*' one that knows not the ufe of money, or has no occafion for it, as fuch, is not to 
" pay him. Nay further, 3. If I want money, don't I aft according to truth, if I 
*' take it from Ibme body clfe tofupply my own wants ? And more, do not I act 
" contrary to truth, if I do not ? 4. If one, who plainly appears to have a de/ign 
*' ofkilling another, or doing him fome great mifchief, ifhecan find him, fli nild 
" ;isk me where he is, and I know where he is ; may not I, to five life, fay I do 
" not know, tlio that be falfe? f. At this rate I may not, in :\.frolick, break a 
" glal's, or burn a book : becaufe forfooth to ufe thcfc things as being what they 

* What it is in nature, sj'^^ ^O '3^. fo ufe Maim.'s words. And thus that in ytrrianui is truc^ 
NiifcC^ /3i«riK«< «V" iT<&-, T« itxtXubn rji piri xf«/lsV. Omni hi rt quiJ Jit ■vert, viJire o> tittri tit- 
ret. C\c. Thij is indeed the way of truth. *' Becaufe there is fcarce any tiling, which one 
oroiker will not fay. ^»'J tnim pc:ej1 Jici it illo, qmni^ram dixit ejft nntm, (^c. hid. 




Of Moral Good and Evil. 27 

" arc, is to drink out of the one, not to break it ; and to read the other, not 
** burn it. Lafthf how {hall a man kr.civ what is true : and if he can find out 
" truth, may he not want the pcwtr of a£bing agi-eeably to it ? " 

To the f.rjl objeftion it is eafy to reply from what has been already faid. For 
if the objcftor's enemv, whom we will call E, was «or^/«^ w/wr than his ene- 
my, there might be feme force in the objcftion j but fince he may be con- 
fiderd as fomcthing clfc bcfide that, he mutlbc ufcd according to what he is 
in other rcfpcfts, as well as in that from which he is denominated the ob- 
jeftor's (or O'sj enemy. For E in the firll place is a man ; and as fuch may 
claim the benefit of common humanity, whatever that is : and if O denies it 
to him, he wounds tnith in a very fcnfiblc part. And then if O and E are 
fellow-citizens^ living under the fame government, and fubjeft to laws, which 
arc fo manv common covenants, limiting the behaviour of one man to another, 
and by which E is exempt from all private violence in his body, eftatc, i^c. 
O cannot tre-at E as being what he is, unlefs he treats him alfo as one, who 
by common confent is under fuch a protection. If he does othawife, he 
denies the exiftence of the forcfaid laws and public compafts : contrary to 
tmth. And befide, O fhould act with rcfpect to hin:fclf-x% being what he is j 
a man himfclf, in fuch or fuch circumftanccj, and one who has given up all 
right to pri-vate revenge ( for that is the thing meant herej. If truth there- 
fore be obfen-ed, the refult will be this. O mull treat E as fometbing com- 
pounded of a man, a fellow-citizen, and an enemy, all three : that is, he mnlt 
only profccute him in fuch a way, as is agreeable to the llatutcs and method*^, 
which the focicty have obliged themfclvcs to obfervc. And even as to legal 
profecutions, there may be many things llill to be confidcrd. For E may fliew 
hmifclf an enemy to O in things, that fill under the cognizance of law, which 
yet may be of moment and importance to him, or not. If they are fuch things, 
as irally affect the fafe/y or bappine/s ofO or his family, then he will find him- 
fclf obliged, in duty and fubmiOlon to tnith, to take refuge in the laws ; and 
to punifh E, or obtain fitisfaction, and at le-.ill fccurity for the future, by the 
means there prcfcribed. Bccaufc if he docs not, he denies tlic nature and fenfc 
of happinefs to be what they are ; the obligations, whicii perhaps we lliall 
(hew hereafter he is under to his family ', to be what they are ; a dangerous and 
wicked enemy to be dangoous and wicked j the end of laws, and focicty itfclf, to be 
the fafcty and good of its mcmbers,by preventing injuries,punifhing oflFcndcrs,6fr. 

* Ctrnirnift cum in JtnJa munificHtn tffr, turn in rxii;rnJc nm ttrrrtum • a UtHm vtri cuan- 

turn lirtat, Qf ''•'(<"> "> fauln flui ttiam ruam licrtu, Mifvrrrntfm.—— IJaiiniia n't auttmr/tttt rrt 
familiarij, qujim i^uiJtm ddabi Jintrt fliigitiofum rft. Cic. 


28 The Religion of Nature.^ Sect. I. 

•which it will appear to be, when that matter comes before us. But if the enmity 
of E rifcs not beyond trijlntg^ or more tolerable inllanccs, then O might xCt againft 
truth, if he lliould be at more charge or hazard in profecuting E than he can afford, 
or the thing loll or in danger is worth > fhould treat one that is an enemy in lit- 
tle things, or a little enemy, as a great one ; or fliould deny to make fome al- 
lowances, M-\<\ forgive fuch peccadillo's, as the common frailty of human nature 
makes it ncceflary for us mutually to forgive, if wc will live together. Lajlly^ 
in cafes, of which the laws of the place take no notice^ truth and nature would 
befufficicntly obfcrvcd, ifO ihould keep a vigilant eye upon the ftcps of his 
adverfaiy, and take the moll prudent mcafurcs, that arc compatible with tlic 
character of a private peifon, either to alTwage the malice of E, or prevent the 
effeftsofitj or perhaps, if he fliould only »o? ufe him as a friend ^. For this if 
he fliould do, notwithllanding the rants of fome men, he would cancel the na- 
tural differences of things, and conlound truth with untruth. 

The debtor in the feconcl objeftion, if he aftsas he Htys there, does, in the firll 
place^ make himfclf the jiulge of his creditor, which is what he is not. For he lays 
him under a heavy fcntcnce, an incapacity in effc(5l of having any ellatc, or any 
more ellatc. In the next place, he arrogates to himfclf more than can be tmc: 
that he perfeftly knows, not only what his creditor and his circumllances <frr, 
but alio what they ever will be hereafter. He that is now weak, or extravagant, 
or very rich, may for ought he knows become othcrwife. ^nd, which is to be 
confiderd above all, he dircftly denies the money, which is the creditor's, to be 
the creditor's. For it is fuppofed to be owing or due to him (othcrwife he is no 
creditor) : and if it be due to him, he h;is a right to it : and if he has a right 
to it, of right it is his (or, it is bis). But the debtor by detaining it ufes it, 
as if it was his own, and therefore uot the other's ; contrary to truth. To pay 
a man what is due to him doth not deny, that he who pays may think him ex- 
travagant, t'fc. or any other tmth ; that aft has no fuch fignification. It only 
fignifies, that he who pays thinks it due to the other, or that it is his : and 
this it naturally doth llgnify. 'For he might pay the creditor without having 
any other tliought relating to him, but would not 'without this. 

Mf. to objection the 3d. Afting according to truth, as that phrafe is ulcd in 
the objection, is not the thing required by my lule j but, lb :o act that m truth 
may be denied by any act. Not taking from another man his money by \ iolencc 
is a forbearance, wliich does not llgnify, that I do not want money, or which 
denies any truth. But taking it denies that to be his, which fby the fuppofition) 

» T»» f iAhtt' iVi iuArtk naAirr, h i( «x*f" ««o"i«i. Htf. 


Of {jMoral Good and Evil. 29 

is his. The former is only as it were filence, which denies nothing : the lit- 
ter a direft and loud aOcrtion of a falfity > the former what can contradict no 
truth, becaufe the latter docs. If a man wants money through his own extra- 
vagance and vice, there can be no pretence for making another man to pay foi" 
his wickedncfs or folly. We will fuppofe therefore the man, who wants mo" 
ncy, to want it for neccjfarits^ and to have incurred this want through fome w/'f 
fortum^ which he could not prevent. In this cafe, which is put as ftrong as 
can be for the objefkor, there arc ways of cxprelling this want, or afting ac- 
cording to it, without trcfpalTing upon truth. The man may by honcll labor 
and indullr)' fcek to fupply his wants > or he may apply ;is a fupplicant ', not as 
an enemy or robber, to fuch as can afford to relieve him } or if his want is very 
prelfing, to the firlt perfons he meets, whom truth will oblige to aiTill him ac- 
cording to their abilities : or he may Aoaiiy thing but violate truth ''> which is 
a privilege of a vaft fcope, and leaves him many refourccs. And fuch a beha- 
viour as this is not only agreeable to his cafe, and exprcllive of it in a w.xy that 
is natural ; but he would deny it to be what it is, if he did not a6t thus. If 
there is no way in the world, by which he may help himfelf without the vio- 
lation of truth fwhich can fcarce be fuppofed. If there is no other way) he 
mull e'en take it as his fite'. Truth will be trath, and mull retain its charac- 
ter and force, let his cafe be what it will. Many things might be added. The 
■man, from whom this money is to be taken, will be proved IcCl. vi. to have 
a right to defend himfelf and his, and not fuffer it to be taken from him j per- 
haps he may ftand as much in need of it, as the other, i^c. 

jinf. to obj. the 4th. It is certain, in the firjl place, that nothing may wil- 
lingly be done, which in any manner promotes murder : whoever is acccflary 
to that, offends againll many truths oi great weight. 2. You arc not obliged 
to anfwer the furiofo\ qucllion. Silence here would contnidict no truth, j. No 
one can tell, in ftrift fpc-aking, where another is, if he is not within his view. 
Therefore you may truly deny, that you know where the man is. Lajlly, if 
bv not difcovering him you iliould indangcr vouv life (and this is the hardcft 
circumdance, that can be taken into the objection), the cafe then would be 
the fame, as if the inquirer fhoiild fiy, " If you do not murder fuch a one, I 
will murder you." And then be fure you mull not commit murder; but 
mull defend your fclfagainft this, as agiinll other dangers, againll B.mditi, (^c. 
.is -j.e!l as ycu can. Tho' incrclv to deny truth bv iiords (I mean, when they 

' To Ti'> j5^ cr*. ifju*y»yu> tk. a.'««c> «».* ft< ^,Jg.0f!yi' if/x ».\i«i. JlnicyJ. *■ For '(y 

V iit'if{)y-. Htf. ' Shum cuiijHt incommoJum ftrtnJum tfl foliuj, quam it »lteriHt c«m- 

meJii Jttr»htnihm. Cic. According to Tlato, a mm fhouU choofcto die x^t S iii\»-Ct. 

E ai-e 

go The Religion of Nature. Sedl. L 

are not produftive of fa£ts to follow j as in judicial tranfadtions, bearing wit- 
nefs, or pafHng fcntence) is not equal to a denial by /afli j tho an abufe of lan- 
guage is allowable in this cafe, if ever in any j tho all fins againft tmth are 
not equal, and certainly a little trefpafling upon it in the prel'ent cafe, for the 
good of all parties ■', as little a one as any > and tho one might look on a man 
in fuch a fit of rage as mad, and therefore talk to him not a man but a mad 
-man: yet truth i$ facred^, and there arc other ways of coming off with inno- 
cence, by giving timely notice to the man in danger, calling in afliftancc, or 
taking the advantage of fome fcafonable incident '^. 

The j-th objeSlion fcemsto refpe6t inanimate things, which ifwemuft treat ac- 
cording to what they are, it is infinuated we fliall become obnoxious to many tri- 
fling obligations j fuch as are there mcntiond. To this I anpwer thus. If the 
glafs be nothing clfc but an ufcful drinking-glafs, and thefe words fully exprefs 
what it is, to treat it accordingly is indeed to drink out of it, when tlicre is oc- 
cafion and it is truly ufeful, and to break it defignedly is to do what is wrong''. 
For that is to handle if, as if it neither was ufeful to the objeiSlor himfelf, nor 
could be fo to any one elfe \ contrary to the dcicription of it. But if there be any 
reafon for breaking tlic glafs, thcnfomcthing is wanting to declare fully what it 
is. As, if the glafs be poifond : for then it becomes ■xpoifond drinking-glafs^ and 
to break or deftroy it is to ufe it according to this true defcription of it. Or if 
by breaking it any thing is to be obtaind, which more than countervails the lofs 
of it, it becomes a^/a/} isiith that circiimjlance : and then for the objeftor to break 
it, if it be his own, is to ufe it according to what it is. And if it fhould become 
by fome circumftance nfelefs only, tho there iTiould be no reafon for breaking it, 
yet if there be none againft it, the thing will be indifferent and matter of liberty. 
This anfwer, mutatis mutandis^ may be adapted to other things of this kind j 
hooks^ or any thing elfe. As the ufefulncfs or excellence of Ibme books renders 
them worthy of immortality, and of all our care to fecure them to polkrity' j 
fo ibme may be ufeu more like what they are, by tearing or burning them, 

• OttV« t^ i«!f«5 ttitKrra ilu.'xarx, >^ iittit ii'i: Max. Tyr. * To that queftion. Si 

t^uis ad te confugiat, qui mendacio fuo fojjit a morte liberari, ncn es menthurus ? S. jtiif.m anlwcrs 

in the negative, and concludes, Ke,?<«/ lit nunquAin ioni mentianiiir. ^itaiito fortih, quanta txctl- 

Irntim dices, nee prpjam, ntcmintiar. ' In fuch prefllng cafes, under imminent danger, tli« 

v/or'd is wont to make great allowances. Out i,iXi" 'ivj) ^Sr« ru •if/ji'^ Myi) ; Oil*, ii to ir»><?. 

tx! vi TO ^,Zi\^ tpUi. Sopli. Even they, who fay HWyon nDiy nblSD HP^vy nU/H, and tDnb V *0 

No!?yT >i?irj2 ib'DM rwv), and ly iDiy i5n3 -ipu/on, fiy alfo inio cmbvy c=3''o!? ^3n. 

S. Hl>and (& a!. paffX And Ab. Eara fjys of Abritham, TyV'STi "plV >3D Dn^D -!?C'3N Hm, 
In fl;ort, Ibme have permitted, in defperate cafes, mendacio tanquam -veneno uti. Scxt. Pytliag. 
'' m in>Dn3 vb3 -lavyb"— TON. S. Ilhaf. l who doth not,dctcft that thought of Cali- 

gula dt Homtri carmmiiui nboUndit, 8;c I Suet. than 

Of CMoral Good and Evil. 31 

than byprefening or rc.iding them : the number of \v!iich, large enough nhca- 
dy, I wilTi you may not think to be increafcd by this, whicli I here lend you. 

Here /wo things ought to be rcg;irdcd. i . Thu: t!io to a6b againll truth in 
any cole is wrong, yet, the degrees oi guilt varying with the imporciuice of things, 
in fome cafes the importance one way or t'other maybe loUttle as to render the 
crime evanefcent ox almojl n.ot\\mg '. And, 2. that /wrt«/ff;<3/f beings cannot be con- 
lidcrd as capable of Svrong treatment, if the refpect they bear to living beings is 
feparated from them. The drinking-glals before mentiond could not be conilderd 
as fuch, or be what it now is, if there was no drinJcing animal to own and ufc 
it. Nothing can be of any importance to that thing it iclf, which is void of all 
life and perception. So that when we compute what fuch things are, wc mutl: 
Like them as being what they arc in reference to things that have life. 

The laft and moll material objt£lion,ox quejiion rather, lliall be anpwerdhy and by. 
In the mean time I fliall only fiy, that if in any paiticulai- cafe tmth is inacceHiblc, 
and after due inquir}- it doth not appear wZ'rt/, ovhoiv thingsare, then this will be 
true, that the cafe or thing under confidcration is doubtful : and to adt agreeably 
unto this truth is to be not opinionativc, nor obftinate, butmodeft, cautious, do- 
cile, and to endeavour to be on the fafer fide. Such behaviour Ihews the cafe to be 
as it is. And as to the want of poiver to a£t agreeably to truth, that cannot be 
known till trials are made: and if any one doth try, and do his endeavour, he 
may take tohimfelf the fatisi:a6tion, which he will find in fed. IV. 

S E c T. II. Of Happinefs. 

THAT, which demands to be next confiderd, is happinefs ; as beinn- in it felf 
moll confiderable > as abetting the c.aufc of truth j and as being indeed fo 
nearly allied to it, that they c;innot well be parted. We cannot pay the refpcfls due 
to one, unlefs wc regard the other. Happinefsmuflnotbedenicdtobewhatitis: 
and it is by the pradicc of truth that wc aim at that happinefs, which is true. 
In the few following propofitions I fhallnot only give you my idea of it, but 
alio Uibjoin fome ohfervatiots^y which tho perhaps not ncceflaiy here, we may fome- 
time hereafter think no lofs of time or labor to ha\c made en pafjant : fucli as 

• The Stoici muft ccrtilniy therefore be much too fcrupulous, whet) they affirm (ifthcv were in 
carnen;, tlut a.i t i»^T»>t. i- "trvyj «■<».> iii' '« <r«t» • >.<'vC^- tTiTfiT^ CUm.AUx. Efpccully fincc 
this is, at leaft orJinarily, a thing pcrfcftly inditfcicnt by pr. ix. 

t. 4 mcr» 

3^ The Religion of Nature. Sed. II. 

men of fciencc would call, fome of them perifmata, or corollaries, and fomc 
fchclia, I fhall take them as they fall in my way promifcuoufly. 

I. Pkafure is a confcioufnefs of fomcthing agreeable, pain of the contrary : 6c v. v. 
the confcioufnefs of any thing agreeable is pkafure, of the contrary pain. For as no- 
thing, that is agreeable to us, can be painful at the fame time, andasfuchj nor a- 
ny thing difagrceable pleafant, by the terms ; fo neither can any thing agreeable 
be for that reafon fbecaufc it is agreeable^ not pleafant, norany thing dilagrec- 
able not painful, in fome meafurc or other. 

Obf. I . Pleafures andpmns are proportionable to the perceptions andfinfe of their 
Jubjecls, or the per fans affeSled with them. For confcioufnefs and perception cannot 
be feparated : becaufe as I do not peixeive what I am not confcious to my felf 
I do perceive, fo neither can I be confcious of what I do not perceive, or of 
more or Icfs than what I do perceive. And therefore, fince the degrees of plea- 
fiire or pain muft be anfwcrablc to the confcioufnels, which tlie party affcftcd 
has of them, they muft likewife be as the degrees of perception aie. 

Obf 2. IVhatever increafes the power of perceiving, renders the percipient more fuf- 
ceptive ofpleafure or pain. This is an immediate confequence j and to add more is 
needlefs : unlefs, that among the means, by which perceptions and the inwiu'd 
icnfe of things may in many cafes be hcightcnd and incrcafed, the principal are 
reflexion, and the practice of tliinking. As I cannot be confcious of what I 
do not perceive : fo I do not perceive that, which I do not advert upon. That 
which makes me feel, makes me advert. Every inftance therefore of con- 
fciouiiiefs and perception is attended with an a£t of advertence: and as tiic 
more the perceptions are, the more arc the advertences or reflexions j fo v. v. 
the more frequent or intenfe theafts of advertence and reflexion are, the more 
confciouCiefs there is, and the ftronger is theperception. Further,n\\ perceptions arc 
produced in time : time pafles by moments ; there can be but one moment prc- 
Icnt at once : and tlicrcfofc all prcfcnt perception confidcrd without any relation 
to what is paft, or future, may bclookd upon;is momentaneous only. In this 
kind of perception the percipient perceives, as if he had not perceived any thing 
before, nor had any thing perceptible to lollow. But in reflexion there is a re- 
petition of what is paft, and an anticipation of that which is apprehended as yet 
to come : there is a connexion of paft and future, which by this arc brought 
into the fum,and fupcradded to the prcfcnt or momentaneous perceptions, yfgain, 
by reflefting we praftifcour capacity of apprehending : and this praftiflng will in- 
crcafc, and a.s it were extend xhAt capacity, to a ccitain degree. Laflty, reflexion 



Of Happinefs.' 55 

doth not only accumulate moments pall: and future to thofe that are prcfent, 
but even in their paflage it feems to multiply them. For time, as well as fpacc, 
is capable of indetermmatc divilion : and the finer or nicer the advertence or 
reflexion is, into the more parts is the time divided j which, whilit tiie mind 
confiders thofe pans as fo many feveral moments, is in effect rcuderd by this fo 
much the longer. And to this experience agrees. 

Obf 3. The caufes of pkafure and pain are relative things : andin order to ejli- 
mate truly their effeSl upon any particular fuhjeSt they ought to be drawn into the 
degrees of perception in that fubjc^. When thecaufe is of the fime kind, and afts 
with an equal force, if the perception of one perfon be equal to that of another, 
what they perceive mull needs he equal. And (o it will be lilccwifc, when the 
forces in the producing caufes and the degrees of perception in the fentientsare 
reciprocal. For (which doth not feem to be confiderd by the world, and there- 
fore ought the more particularly to be noted) if the caufe of plcafure or pain 
fhould aft but half as much upon A, as it docs upon B ; yet if the perceptivity 
of A be double to that of B, the fum of tlicir plcafurcs or pains will be equaL 
In other cafes they will be unequal. As, if the caufa dolorifica fhould aft with 
the Cimc impetus on C with which it afts upon D j yet if C had only two de-? 
grees of perception, and D had three, the pain fuftaind by D would be half 
as much more as that of C : becaufe he would perceive or feel the afts and im- 
preflions of the caufc more by fo much. If it iTiould aft with twice the force 
upon D which it acts with upon C, then the pain of C would be to that of D 
as 2 to 6 : ;'. e. as one degree of force multiplied by two degrees of perception 
to two degrees of force multipUed by three of perception. And fo on. 

Obf 4. Mens refpeHive happineffes or plcafures ought to be valued as they are to 
the perfons themfelvcs, whofe they are ; or according to the thoughts and fenfcy 
which they have of them : not according to the cllimate put upon them by o- 
ther people, who have no authority to judge of them, nor can know what they 
arc i may compute by different rules j have Icfs fcnfe ; be in different circum- 
ilances ' ; or fuch as guilt has rendcrd panial to themfclves. If that prince, 
who having plenty and flocks many, yet raviflid the poor man's finglc ewc- 
lamb out of his bofom, rcckond the poor man's lofs to be not greatei", than 
the lofs of one of his lambs would have been to him, he mull be very defective 
in moral arithmetic, and little underllood the doctrine of proportion. Every;- 

* Jjufi hit fis, MLttrfmtiMs. Tct. 


q^ The Religion of Nature. Sect. IT, 

man's linppinefs is his happinefs, what it is to him ; and the lofsof it is an- 
fwerable to the degrees of his perception, to iiis manner of taking things, to 
his wants and circumftanccs ». 

Oh(.f . How judicious atjd wary ought princes^Ja'wgivers^judges^juries^and evenma' 
fierstobe! They ought not to confiderfo much what a ftout,rcfolute,obllinate, 
hardcnd criminal may bear, as what the weaker fort, or at leaft Cif that can be 
known j the perfons immediately concernd can bear : that is^ what any punilh- 
ment would be to them. For it is certain, all criminals arc not of tlic former 
-Jcind i and therefore fhould not be ufed as if they were. Some arc drawn into 
■crimes, which may render them obnoxious to public juilice, theyfcarce know 
how themfclvcs : fome fall into them through necefliry, ftren^th of tempt;)tion, 
defpair, clafticity offpiritsand a fuddcn eruption ofpailion, ignorance of laws, 
want of good education, or fome natural infirmity orpropenlion, and fome who 
are really innocent, are oppreft by the iniquity or miftakcs of judges, witneflcs, ju- 
ries, or perhaps by the power and zeal of a faftion, with which their fenfe or their 
honcdy has not permitted them to join. What a difference muff tlicre be be- 
tween the fuffcrings of a poor wretch fenfible of his crime or misfortune, who 
would give a Avorld for his deliverance, if he had it, and thofe of a fturdy vete- 
ran in roguery: between the apprehenfions, tears, faintings of the one, and the 
brandy and oaths of the other j in ffiort, between a tender nature and a brickbat ! 

Obf 6. In gorral^ all perfons ought to be very careful and tender^ "where any other 
is concernd. Otherwifc they may do they know not what. For no man can 
tell, by himfeir, or any other way, how another may be affected. 

Obf. 7. There cannot be an equal dijlribntion of rewards andpuniJJjments by any 
Jlated human laws ^. Becaufe f among other rcafonsj the fimc thing is rarely 
cither the fame gratification, or the fame puniffiment to different perfons. 

Obf 8 . The fuffcrings of brutes are not like the fuffcrings of men. Tlicy perceive 
"by moments,without reflexion upon part or futurc,upon caufes,circumffanccs,£57'r. 

Time and life without thinking are next neighbours to wo//'/'/;^, to no- time and 
no-lifc''. And therefore to kill a brute is to deprive him of a lif:, or a rcmain- 

• VclicitAs cui prdcipun fucrit homini, non ejl humani jmlicii : chn frofpcritatcm iffum alius alio moJo. 
^fimfttingenio quifque terminct. Pliny. •" It is not pofliWc (in Albo'i words) WiJ> HP? 

"oi bpvyDni mon D^\i;:iyn -lyi'pi niu;a" mu/ lo-nrt. ^ initr hominem cr btltuam 

hoc n>i>ximi imertfl, qiioAhic ad iit foliim quoil ade(l, qiioilque prxfeni rfl, ft .tccoinmcJat, paul/iluin 

4iilmodum ftntiem fntcriiiim nut futurum. Sec. Cic. S'oj-(yitiitiirotorqi4tmur(y'f>r4ltriia. Timoris 
tnim torment iim memoria rediicit, frozidcniia anticipat. Kenio tantiim frifentibu) mijer tfi. Scii. 
* rrsftns Itmpiis brfuffiimim tft, ttiieo qmdttn,' ut quibit/dirti nullum lideatur, Scc. Sen. OT«t» yj 



Of Happinefs. ^5 

der of time, that is equal to little more than nothing : tho this may perhaps be 
more applicable to fome animals than to others. That, which is chiefly to be 
taken care of in this matter, is, that the brute may not be killed unneceflarily j 
when it is killed, that it may ha\c:is few moments of pain as may be " ; and that 
no young be left to languilh. So much' by the way here. 

II. Pain confidcrd in itfelf is a real evil., pkafure a real good. I take this as a 
pjlulatum, that will without difficulty be gnintcd. Therefore, 

III. By the general idea of good and evil the one [plcafure] is in it fclf defirahk., the 
other [pain] to be avoided. What is here faid, refpccts mere pleafure and pain, ab- 
ftracted from all circumllances, confequences, (^c. But bccaufe there are fome of 
thde generally adhering to them, and fuch :is enter fo deep into their nature, that 
unlefs thefebe taken ia^ the full and true character of the other cannot be had, nor 
can it therefore be known whai happinefs is, I mull proceed to fome other propo- 
fitions relating to this fubject. 

IV. Pleafure compared with pain tnay either be equal., or niore^ orlefs : alfo pica- 
fures may be compared with otlnr pkajures '', and pains nuith pains. Bccaufe all the 
moments of the pleafure muft bear fome refpect or be in fome ratio to all the mo- 
ments of pain : as alio all the degrees of one to all the degrees of the other : and 
fo mull thbfe of one plcafure, or one pain, be to thofe of another. And if the 
degrees of intenfcnefs be multiplied by the moments of duration, there mull IhJl 
be lome ratio of the one product to the other. 

That this propofition is true, appears from the general conduct of mankind; 
tho in fome particulars they may en-, and wrong themftlves, fome more, fome 
Icfs. For what doth all this burn,' of bufincfs, what do all the labors and tra- 
vels of men tend to, but to gain f<.ich advantages, as they think do exceed all their 
trouble? Whutare all their abllincncesand fclf denials for, if they do not think 
fome plealbrcs Icfs than the pain, that would fucceed them ? Do not the various 
methods of life iTiew, that men prefer one fort of pleafure to another, andfub- 
mit to one fort of p.iin rather than to have another? And within our fclves wc 
cannot but find an indifference as to many things, not caring, whether wc have the 

• 1:1 D3n Twjra ricru; yan xy-jr\ px. Ab. tx.. 01 |nl7>i3 — C33n nnna!? -yyy nu/iy. 

S. HliAi. * The rints of thofc men, who aflcrt, y^ 3tli,<fii;it ?»«.v wwjt, ft^iiii i<iuu n ir>a.: 

nay, Ciiri iiit iiu i u')'i'„ »f. Diog. L. can lure!/ affcdt no body, who has fcnfi?, or k aJive. Nor 
that of the Steiei in ?/«/. "i «•, *• ' ' Xf^ £*" '"ii ■x,'.v't>t>fit.<^, iltX. As it an age was not 
mere duo a morncnr, and (therefore) an agc'j .'.appinefs more dun a moment's. 

1 pain 

^(J The Religion of Nature. Se£l:.ll. 

pain with the plcafure obtaind by it, or mifs the pleafure, being excufcd from 
the pain. 

V. fFhen pleafure s and pains are equal, they mutually dejiroy each other : ivhen the 
cue exceeds, the exce/s gives the true quantity of pleafure or pain. For nine degrees 
of pleafure, Icfsby nincdcgrecsof pain, arc equal to nothing : but nine degrees of 
one, lefs by three degrees of the other, give fix of the former wc/ and true. 

VI. ./is therefore there may be true pleafure and fain : fo there may be fame plea- 
fures, which compared with what attends or follows them, not only may vanifj into 

nothing, but may even degenerate into pain, and ought to be reckond as pains ' j and 
V. V. fome pains, that may be annumerated to pkafures. For the true quantity of 
pleafure differs not from that quantity of true pleafure ; or it is lb much of that kind 
of pleafure, which is true (clear of all difcounts and future payments) : nor can the 
true quantity of pain not be the fame with that quantity of true or mere pain. Then, 
the man who enjoys three degrees of fuch ple;ifure as will bring upon liim nine 
degrees of pain, when three degrees of pain arc fet off to balance and fink the 
three of plcafure, can have remaining to him only fix degrees of pain : and in- 
to thcfc therefore is his plcafure finally refolved. And fo the three degrees of 
pain, which any one indures to obtain nine of pleafure, end in fix of the latter. 
By thcfime manner of computing fome pleafures will be found to be the lofs of 
pleafure, compared with greater : and fome pains the alleviation of pain ; becaufe 
by undergoing them greater are evaded *'. Thus the natures of pleafures and p;uns 
arc varied, and ibmerimcs tranfmuted : which ought never to be forgot. 

Nor this neither. As in the fenfe of moft men, I believe, a little pain will 
weigh againfta^re^/^ra/ of pleafure <^ : fo perhaps there may be fome pains, which 
exceed all pleafures > that is, fuch pains as no man would clioofe to fuftcrfor 
any pleafure whatever, or at leaft any that we know of in this world. So that 
it is poflible the difference, or excels of pain, may rife fo high as to become im- 
menfb: and then the plcafure to be fctagainll that pain will be but a point, or 
^cypher j a quantity of no value. 

VII. Ilappinefs differs not from the true quantity of plcafure, unhappinefs of pain. 
QY,any being may befaidtohefo far happy, as his pleafures are true, 6vc. That cannot 

* Nocet (fit noxa) tmftx dolort voluptat. Hot. And— muho eorriiftA iklore ivlufiat. Id. ''As 
when that Pompiy mcntiond hy Val. Max. by burning bis finger cfcapcd the torture. ' Bcna 

a'Ciis f»rlu tun fun:, ttium fari numtre : ate UtiiU ulU minmio mxrort ftn/arula. Plin. 


Of Happinefs. 37 

be the happinefs of any being, which is bad for him : nor can happinefs be 
difigrccablc. It muft be fomcthing therefore, that is both agreeable and good. 
for the pofTcflbr. Now prcfcnc plcafiirc is for the prcfcnt indeed agreeable j 
but if it be not tioie, and he who injoys it muft pay more for it than it is 
worth, it cannot be for his good, or good for him. This therefore cannot 
be his happinefs. Nor, again, can that ple:ifurc berecko'nd happinefs, for which 
one pays the full price in pain : becaufc thefc arc quantities which mutually 
deftroy c;ich other. But yet fnicc happinefs is fomething, which, bv the ge- 
neral idea of it, muft be dcfinibic, and therefore agreeable, it muft be fome 
kind of ploifurc ■■ : and this, from what has been fiid, can only be fuch plea- 
fure as is true. That only can be both agreeable and good for him. And 
thus every one's happinefs will be as his true quantity of pleafure. 

One, that loves to make ohjeHionSy may demand here, whether there may not 
be happincls without plcifurc : whether a man may not be faid to be happy in re- 
fpc^t to thofc evils, which he efcapes, and yet knows nothing of: and whether 
there may not be fuch a thing as negative happinefs. I anfwer^ an exemption 
from misfortunes and pains is a high privilege, tho wefhould not befenfible what 
ihofe misfortunes or dangers are, from which we arcdclivcrd, and in the larger 
ulc of the word may be fWlcd a happinefs. Alfo, theabfcnce of pain or unhap- 
pinefs may perhaps be called negative happinefs, fince the meining of that phralc 
is known. But in proper fpeaking happinefs always includes fomcthing pofitivc. 
For wertf indolence rcfulting from infcnlibility, or joind with it, if it be happi- 
nefs, is a happinefs infinitely diminiftid : that is^ it is no more a happinefs, than ic 
is an unhappincfs j upon the confine of both, but neither. Atbeft it is but the 
happinefs of ftocks and lloncs'' : and tothcfe I think happinefs can hardly be in 
Ibictnefs allowd. 'Tis the privilege of a ftocktobe whatitis, rather than to be 
amiferablebeing: this we arc fcnfible of, and therefore, joining this privilege 
with our own fcnfe of it, we call it happinefs j but this is what it is in our manner 
of apprehending it, not what it is in the ftock it felf. A fenfe indeed ofbeing free 
from pains and troubles is attended with happinefs : but then the happinefs Hows 
from thcjen/i of the cafe, and is a pojitive happinefs. W Iiilft a man refledts up- 
on his negative happinefs, as it is called, and injoys it, he makes it pofitivc: 
and perhaps a fcnfe of immunity from the afllidlions and uiiferies cvciy where 
fij obvious to our oWen ation is one of ihc great e/l pleafurcs in this world. 

* 'Oiif/.t'^* fm iftrv xcc^»UitUMy^diu rij ii/gWuboix. Arid. ' Or »n»ii xa^^it/Arr*? nitrxrxrif, 

jirl,1 nf. D10J. L. 

V VIII. T!:n 

jS The Religion o/' Nature. Se6l.II. 

VI n. That heitig may be fa id to be ultimately happy ^ in fome degree or othcr^ 
the fum total of ivhufe pkajures exceeds the firm of all his pains : or, ultimate 
happincfs is the fum of happinefs^ or true pleafure, at the foot of the account. 
And fo on the other fide, that being may be /aid to be ultimately unhappy, the 
Jum of all "whife pains exceeds that of all his plcafures. 

IX. To make itfelf happy is a duty, which every being, in proportion to its ca* 
pacity, owes to itfelf •■, and that, which every intelligent being may be fuppofed to 
aim at, in general ^. For happincfs is fome quantity of true plcafurc : and that 
plcafurc, which I call true, may be confidcrd by itfelf, and fo will be jufbly 
dcfirable ^according to prop. II, and III). On the contrary, unhappincfs is 
certainly to be avoided : becaufe being a quantity of mere pain, it may be 
confidcrd by it fclf, as a real, mere evil, i^c. and becaufe if I am obliged to 
purfue happincfs, I am at the fame time obliged to recede, as far as I canj 
from its contrary. All this is fclf-evident. And hence it follows, that, 

X. We cannot a6l with refpeEl to either ourfelves, or other men, as being what we 
and they are, unlefs both are confiderdas beings fufceptive of happincfs and unhappinefs, 
and naturally defirous of the one and aver fe to the other. Other animals may be con- 
fidcrd after the fame manner in proportion to their fevcral degrees ofapprchcnfion. 

But that the nature of happincfs, aud the road to it, which is ib vciy apt 
to be miftaken, may be better underflood ; and true plcafures more certainly 
diftinguifhd from falfej the following propofitions mull ftill be added. 

XI. j^s the true and ultimate happincfs of no being can be produced by any thing, 
that interferes with truth, and denies the natures of things : fo neither can thepraEiice 
of truth make any being ultimately unhappy. For that, which contradicts nature 
and truth, oppofcs the will ofthe Author of nature (^whofccxiftcncc, 6?^- IiTiall 
prove afterwards); and to iiippofc, that an inferior being may in oppofition to 
His will break through the conflitution of things, and by fo doing make himfelf 
happV) is to fuppoic that being more potent than the Author of nature, and con- 
fcqucntly move potent than the author of the nature and power of tharvciy be- 
ing hinifclf, which isabfurd. And as to the othcrpartof the prnpofition, it is 
alfo abfuid to think, that, by the conftitution of nature and will of its author, 

* Ihis is truly Soniim /iimmum, i^ho tendimus emnei. Lucr. ' Azxitx -,•> *< iizutj iTt'v x'f" *'- 


Of Happinefs. gp 

any being fhould be finally mifcrable only for conforming himfelf to trutb, and 
owning things and the relations lying between them to be what they are. It 
is much the liimc as to f.iv, God has made it natural to contradift nature j or un- 
natural, and therefore punillv.iblc, to aft according to nature and reality. If fuch 
ablunder^excuicthe boldncfs of the word;could be, it muil conic cither through 
a defc6tof power in Him to caufc a better and more equitable fchcmc, or from 
fome delight^ which he finds inthemifery of his dependents. The former can- 
not be alcribed to the Firil caufc, who is the fountainof power: nor the lat- 
ter to Him, who gives fo many proofs of his goodncfs and beneficence. Many 
beings may be faidtobchappy > and there are none of us all, who have not ma- 
ny injoyments' : whereas did he delight in the infelicity of thofe beings, which 
depend upon Him, it mull be to Him to make them unhappy, and then not 
one of them would be otherwifc in any rcfpcdt . The world in that cafe inftead of 
being fuch a beautiful, admirable fyllem, in which there is only a mixture of 
evils, could have been only a fcene of mere mifery, honor, and torment. 

That either the enemies of truth {wicked men) fliould be ultimately happy, or 
the religious obfcr\-ers of it {good mtn) ultimately unhappy, is fuch injufticc, and 
an evil lb great, that fure no Alanichean will allow fuch -xfuperiority of his evil 
principle over the good, as is requifite to produce and maintain it. 

XIT. TIk genuine happinefs of every being mufl befomething^ that is not incompatible 
with ordeflruHi-je of its nature ••, or the fuperior or better part of it, if it be mixt. 
For inflancc, nothing can be the true happinefs of a rational being, that is incon- 
fillent with reafon. F"or all pleafurc, and therefore be liire all clear pleafurc and 
true happinefs mufl be fomct hi ng agreeable (pr. I.) : and nothing can be agreeable 
to a rcafoning nature, or (which istheflimc) to the reafon of that nature, which 
is repugnant and difagreeablc to reafon. If any thing becomes agreeable to a 
rational being, which is not agreeable to reafon, it is plain his reafon is loft, 
his nature dcprcll, and that he now lilh himfclf among irrationals, at Icaflasto 
that paniailar. If abcirg finds pleafurc in any thing unreafonable,hch:isanunrea' 
ronab:e pleafurc j but a rational nature can like nothing of that kind without a 
contradiction to itfclf For to do this would be to act, as if it was the contrary 
to what it is. LalUy, if we find hereafter, that whatever interferes with rea 
fon, interferes with truth, and to contradict either of them is the fame thing ; 
then what ha.s been faid under the former propofition, docs alfo confirm this^ 
as what has been liiid in proof of this, docs alfo confirm the former, 

• StndAt VtHS itnrfci*. Xrndi trgo qu* fcjfijti ! <jut S<.n. * n«.T.' ri s-«;l< ^tiru 

aii^tt Kdc^pu fy x«ft«^««a»'iM If*. Arr. 

1 i XIII. Tbofe 

)\.o The Religion of Nature. Se6l. 11. 

XIII. T/jofe pleafures ere true., and to be rcckond into our happpinefs^ againjl 
•which there lies no tea fori. For when there is no rcufonagainllany pleafurc, there 
is always one for it % included in the term. So when there is no rcafon for un- 
dergoing pain (or venturing it,, there is one againil it. 

Obf. There is therefore no neccfTity for men to torture their inventions in find- 
ing out arguments to jullify thcmfclvcs in the purfuits after worldly advantages 
and in joymcnts, provided that neither thefcinjoyments, nor the raeans by which 
they are attaind, contain the violation of any truth, by being unjuft, immode- 
rate, or the like''. For in this cafe there is no rcafon why we fliould not dcfire 
them, and a dircd one, why we fhouldj -viz. bccaufcthey arc injoymcnts. 

XIV. To conclude this feftion, The vjay to happinefs and the praHice of truth 
incur the one into the other <= . For no being can be ftylcd happy, that is not ulti- 
mately fo: becaufe if all his pains exceed all his pleafures, he is fofar from be- 
ing happy, that he is a being unhappy, or miferablc, in proportion to thatcx- 
cefs. Now by prop. XI. nothing can produce the ultimate happinefs of any 
being, which interferes with truth : and therefore whatc\er doth produce that, 
muftbcfomcthing which is confilknt and coincident with this. 

Two things then (but fuch as are met together, and embrace each othcr),which 
arc to be religioufly regarded in all our conduft, arc truth (of which in the pre- 
ceding fcft.) znd happinefs (that is., fuch pleafures, as accompany, or follow the 
praftice of truth, or arenot inconfillcntwith it: of which I have been treat- 
ing in this). And as that religion, which arifcs from the diftinftion between mo- 
ral good and evil, was called natural, becaufe groimded upon truth and the na- 
tures of things : fo perhaps may that too, which propofcs happinefs for its 
end, in as much as it proceeds upon that difference, which there is between true 
pleafurc and pain, which arc phyfical (or natural) good and evil. And fmceboth 
thefe unite fo amicably, and are at lad the Hunc, here is one rehgion which 
may be called natural upon two accounts. 

• Ti'hu» iArSr i^ xara Aoyw ig^cv /jutTuXawSayofS/ : .Simpl. ReiH/acit. »niin» qiuwilo ot/eqiiitur fsie ; 
quoit omnts homints factre ofortet, dum id maio fint bor.o. Phut, '' Habtbit fhilofofhus am- 

tUi cpes ; J'rd nulli dttraaas, inc. Sen. Here he fcems to ronfefs the folly of thcS/oi'a, who denied 
thcmfclvcs msny pleafures, that were honeft and almoft iiccedary ; living in tubs, fcoiiing upon raw 
herbs and water, going about in a fordid garment, with a rougii bc.ird, llaffand fatchcl, ^yc. •= &md 

rtHum fit, apfaret ; quid txfcdiat, ehfcumm eft : ittt t»mtn, ut dubitnrt ntn fcjfimui, qum M 

rmximiaiuducitKt, qutftint rcil'J^ma. Cic. 


of Rcafon, and the ways, C^r. 4 1 

Sect. III. Of Reafon, and the ways of 
difcovering truth. 

MY manner of thinking, and an ohjeclion formerly » made, oblige me in the 
next place to fay fomcthing concerning the means of knowing, what is 
true: whether there are any, that arc /wrf, and which one may fafely rely upon. 
For if there be not, all that I have written is an amufcm.ent to no purpofe. Bc- 
fidcs, as this will lead mc to fpcak of reafon, ficc. fome truths may here (as fome 
did in the former fe£tion) fall in our way, which may be profitable upon many 
occalionsi and what has been already alTcrtcd, will aUb be further confirmed. 

I. yin inteiUgent beings ftich as is vtentiond before ^, mtijl have fome immediate ob- 
je£l5 of bis under ft andtng ; or at leafl a capacity of havingfuch. FoJ" if there be no ob- 
jeft of liis intcUed, he is intelligent of nothing, or not intelligent. And if there 
arc no immediate objeds, there can be none at all : bccaufc every obje<5l muft be 
fuch fan objcdj cither in itfclf immediately} or by the intenention of another, 
•which is immediate: or of fcveral, one of which muft at leallbe immediate. 

\l. yfn intelligent being among the immediate objeBs of his mind may have fome, 
that are abJlraU and general. I lliall not at prefcnt inquire, how he comes by them 
(itmattcrs not hou).) {inccihismxx'H be true, ifthere is any fuch thing as a rational 
being. For thatreafon is fomcthing different from the knowledge of particulais 
may appear from hence ; becaufc it is not confined to particular things or cafes. 
What isrcafon in oneinltancc, isfoin another. What is reafonable with rcfpe^ 
to ^anHius^ is fo in refpc6l o't Nitvius '. Rcafon is performed mfpeeies. A ratio- 
nal being therefore mull have fome of ihcCc fpecits (I mean fpecificandabllraft 
ideas) to work with j or fome fuperior method, fuch as perhaps fome higher 
order of rcaloners may have, but we have not. 

The knowledge of a panitular/rf'ia is only the particular knowledge of that 
idea or thing: there it ends. But reafon is fomcthing univerCiI, a kind of ge- 
neral inflrumcnt, applicable to particular things and cafes as they occur. We 
rcafon about paniculars, or from them j but not by them. 

• The lift objc(flion, p. ij. ► Scft. I. prop. I, 5 ^mt htc/latuit. /fuoj tquum 

ft in ^Hi.iHium, III mi/jHum ijjt in Snxium I Cic. 


'^2 The Religion of Nature. Sedt. III. 

In fa61: wc find within our fclvcs many logical, metaphyftc.%1, mathematical ideasj 
no one of whicli is limited to any particular, or individual thing : but they com- 
prehend whole cla_fcs and kinds. And it is by the help of tliclc that wc rcafon, 
and demonlbatc. So that we know from within our felves, that intelligent beings 
not only may have fuch abftraft tineas, as arc mcntiond in the propolition, but 
thutfomc usually have them: which is enough for my purpofc. 

III. Thofe ideas orol>Je8s, that are immediate, "will be adequately and truly kttoion 
to that mind, ivhofe ideas they are. For ideas can be no further the ideas of any 
mind, than that mind has for may have) a perception of them : and therefore that 
mind mult perceive the whole of them j which is to know them adequately. 

jjgain, tliefc ideas being immediate, nothing (^y the teiTnj can intervene to in- 
creafc, diminiili, or any way alter them. And to fay the mind does not know them 
truly, implies a contradiftion : becaufe it is the fame as to (ay, that they arc mif- 
reprefcnted i ^/:?<i/;V, that there are intervening and mifreprefenting ideas. 

And /^//)', there cannot be an immediate perception of that, which is notj 
nor therefore of any immediate object othcrwife, than as it is. We have indeed 
many times wrong notions,and mifpcrceptions of things : but then thcfe things are 
not the immediate objcfts. They are things, which arc notified to us by the help 
of organs and »/c'Jw, which may be vitiated, or perhaps are defe<5tive at bcftand 
incapable of tranfmirring things as they arc in thcmfelvcs, and therefore occafion 
impcrfcft and falfc images. But then, even in this cafe, thofc images and ideas 
that are immediate to the percipient, are perceived as they are: and that is the 
very reafon, why the originals, which they fhould exhibit truly, but do not, 
arc not peircivcd as they arc. In fliort, I only fay the mind mull know its 
own immediate ideas. 

IV. IVhathas beenfaidof thefe ideas, which are immediate, mayhe [aid alfoof 
thofe relations or refpe6ls, which any ofthofe ideas bear immediately each to other : they 
tnufl he known immediately and truly. For if the relation be immediate, the idc;u can- 
not fuhfiil without it > it is of their nature : and therefore they cannot be known 
adequately, but this multbe known too. They are in this rcfpect like the ideas of 
whole and pait. The one cannot be without the other: nor cither of them not 
difcover that relation, by which the one mull be always bigger and the other lefs. 

Tofay nomore, wcmay fatisfyom-fclvcsofthetruthof tliis as well as of the 
foregoing propolltions,from the e.xpcricixcs of our own mindi; where wc find niu- 


Of Reafon, and the ways, &c. 43 

nv relations, that arc immediately Teen, and of which it is not in our power to 
doubt'. Wcarcconfcious ofa knowledge, that confifts in the /«/«;/«« of thcfc 
relations. Such is the evidence of thofc truths, which arc ufually called axi- 
mst and perhaps of fonie fhort dcmonftrations. 

V. Thofe relations or refpe^s, which ate not immediate.^ or apparent at the fir fl vica;^ 
may many times be difcoz-erd by intermediate relations; andivitb equal certainty. If 
the ratio of B to D docs not iniUntly fl\cw itfclf j yet if the ratio of B to C •> docs, 
and that of C to D "^j from hence the ratio of B to D '^ is known alfo. And 
if the mean quantities were ever fo many, the ilunc thing would follow j pro- 
vided the rcafon of every quantity to that, which follows next in the /f nVi, be 
known. For the truth of this I vouch the mat hematicians'^ : as I might all, 
that know any fcicnce, for the truth of the propofition in general. For thus 
theorems and derivative truths arc obtaind. 

\'l. If a propofition be true^ it is always fo in alltbeinjlances and ufes^ to which it 
is applicable. For othcrwifc it mull be both tmeand fdfc. Therefore 

VII. By the help of truths already known more may be difcoverd. For 
I . Thofe inferences^ which zr\(c prcfently from the application of general truths 
to the particular things and cafes containd under them, mullbcjuft. Ex. gr.TlK 
whole is bigger than a part : therefore A (^fome particular thingj;.? wort than half A. 
For it is plain that y/ is containd in the idea of whole, as half v^ is in that of part. 
So that if the antecedent propofition be true, the confcqucnt, which is included 
in it, follows immediately, and muft alfo be true. The former cannot be tnie, un- 
lefsthe other be fo too. What agrees to the genus, fpecics^ definition, whole, muft 
agree to the fpecieSt individuals, thing defined, the part. Theexiftcnccof anp^f<^ 
infers directly that ofa cau/e ; of one correlate that of the other j and fo on. And 
what is faid here holds true (lay the preceding propofition) not only in refpcfb of 
axioms and firft truths, but alfo and equally of theorems and other general truths> 
when they arc once known. Thcfcmay be capable of the like applications : and 
the truth of fuch confcqucnccs, as are made by virtue of them, will always 
be as c\idcnt as that of thofc theorems themfclves. 

' That qucftion in PUtt, Ti' «» nf i^" tiki/.i'»i« X^snioci, n'rn ifoi'o tjf rrm c« tJ Txtiin, ti- 
TK« rm-'fiuitfi}^, lixurru * :.:lfit.iiMi» or;»r »/4". «''A. may have plarc among the vclitationsot phi- 
tofophers : but a man can fcarcc propofc it fcrioufly to himfclt. If he doth, the anfwcr will attenii 



a- ' = c. "i = ac. ' V. Xicj. El. Gcom. I. J-. p. J. n. Xll. 

But the thing appcari from |^e bare infpcaion of thcfc tjuantif ics : i, nb, mi, acb, aciob, &c. 

i. .V.I 

44- The Religion of Nature. Sed. III. 

2. All thofc concluftons, which are derived through mean propoficions, that 
are true, and by jufl: inferences, will be as true as thofe, from which they are 
dcnvcd. My meaning is this : every juil confcquence k founded info-nie knoiun 
iruth^ by virtue of which one thing follows from another, after the manner of 
flcps in an algebraic operation : and if inferences are fo founded, and juft, the 
things inferred mull be true, if they arc made from true prcmiflcs. 

L,et this be the form of an argument. M = P : S = M : ergo S = P. Here if 
S = M be falfe, nothing is concluded at all : bccaufe the middle propofition is in 
truth not S = M, but perhaps S = M«, which is foreign to the purpofe. If S = M 
be true, but M = P fille, then the conclufion will indeed be a right conclufion 
from thofe prcmiflcs : but they cannot fhcw, that S = P, becaufc the fufl: pro- 
polition if it was exprell according to truth would be Me = P, which is ano- 
ther thing, and has no place in the argument. But if thcfe two propofitions 
arc both true, M = P, S = M, then it will not only be rightly concluded, but 
alfo true, that S = P. For the fccond or middle propofition does fo conned 
the other two, by taking in due manner a term from each of them (ox to {^^cx^l 
with the logicians^ by feparately comparing the predicate or major term of the 
conclufion with the viedium in the firfl propofition, and the fubject or minor 
term with it in the fccondj,thatif the firll and fccond are true, the tjiird mult 
be fo likewifc : all being indeed no more than this, Pc= M =S. For here the infe- 
rence isjuft by what goes before, being founded infome fuch truth as this, and 
refulting immediately from the application of it, ^UiSeidem^qualiafunt^ i^ in- 
ter fe funt ^qualia ; or Oi^ne conveniunt in eodem tcrtio, etiam inter fe conveniunt ; 
or the like '. Now if an inference thus made is jullifiable, another made af- 
ter the Hime manner, when the truth difcovcrd by it is made one of the prcmif- 
fes, muft be fo too 5 and fo mufi: another after that ; and fo on. And if the lall, and 
all the intermediate inferences be as right, as the firft is fuppofed to be, it is no mat- 
tcrto what length the proccfs is carried. All the parts of it being locked together 
by truth, the lall rcfult is derived through iuch a fucccfllon of mean propofitions, 
as render its title to our afTent not worfc by being long. 

Sinccalltheformsoftruey}//e|//;/;j may be proved to conclude rightly, all the 
advances made in the fyllogiflic method tov/ard the difcovery or confirma-tionof 
truth, are lb many inltanccs and proofs of what is hereaflcrtcd. So -.Ufo are the 
performances of the mathematicians. From fome felf-evident truths, and a few cafic 

• If men in their illations, or in comparinj; their ide»s, do ninny times not adtualiy make ufc ot 
fiich msxims ; yet the thing is really ihc fame. For what ihclc maxims c.xprcfs, the mind fccs 
without taking notice of the words. 


Of Reafon,' and the ways, &c^, 45 

thccrcms, vl:icli they fee out with at firfl-, to what iinmcnfc lengths, and tlirough 
what a train of proportions have they propagated knowledge! How numerous 
are their theorems :ind difcoverics now, fo far once out of human ken ! 

I do not enter fo far into the province of the logicians as to take notice of 
the difference there is between the a) ^nd fynthetic methods of coming at 
truth, or proving it ; wliether it is better to begin the difquifition from the 
fubjccfV, or from the attribute. If by the ufc of proper media any thing can be 
ftiewd to be, or not to be, I care not from what term the dcmonrtration or 
aigimient takes its rife. Either way propofitions may beget their like, and 
more truth be brought into the world. 

VIII. Tbatpo'xer, wbicb any intelligent l>cing/:as of furi-eyiaghis own ideas^ and 
comparing them; of forming to Limfclfortt of thofc^ that are immediate and abJlracJ^ 
fucb general and fundamental truths, as be can be fare of ' j and of making fuch in-- 
ferences and conclujions as are agreeable to thenty or to any other truth, after it comes 
to be knovjn ; in order to find out more truth, prove or difproz-e fome ajfcrtion, re 
fohe fome queftion, detcrmin zt/hat is ft to be done upon occafion, 6cc. the cafe or 
thing under ccnfiderationbeingfrji fairly flat ed and pi epared, is 'what I mean by the 
faculty of rcafon, or 'what intitlcs him to the epithet rational. Or in fliort, Reafon 
is a faculty of making fuch inferences and conclufions, as are mcntiond under the 
preceding prcpcfition, from any thing knotin, or given. 

The Supreme being has no doubt a direcV and perfcft intuition of tilings, 
with their natures and relations, lying as it were all before Him, and pervious 
to His eye : or at lead: we may fafcly fay, that He is not obliged to make ufe 
of our operofc methods by ideas and inferences j but knows things in a man- 
ner infinitely above all our conceptions. And a.s to fuperior finite natures, what 
other means of att:iining tothe knowledge of things they may have, is a thing 
not to be told by me ; or how far they may exccll us in this way of finding 
truth. I have an eye here chiefly to our own circumftances. Reafon mull be 
undcrftood, when it is afcribcd to Cod, to be the Divine reafon ; when to o- 
thcr beings above us, to be their rcifon ; and in all of them to tranfcend ottrs, 
as much as their natures rcfpedbivcly do our nature ''. 

G It 

, Undfr the word rraftn I comprcliend the intuition of the truth of axioms. For certainly to 
difccrn the refpcft, which one term hears to another, and from thence to condudc thcpropofition 
nKiJfarity true, is an aft ofrmfcn, tho performed quick, or perhaps all at once. '' If many 

believed, according to Stcratet af. Luc. that ir^f ii;5< t» fnytf ^ ? »«ir/*» tv iixiftx." *■?'"' ''• ^*'" 

^6 The Religion of Nature^ Seel. IIL 

It cannot be amifs to note further, that tho a man, who truly ufcshis ratio- 
nal powers, has abllracl and univerliil ideas, obtaind by reflexion ; out of thefe 
frames to himfclf general truths, or apprehends the ftrength of fuch, and ad- 
mits them, when they occur to him ; by thefe, as by Co many flandards, mca- 
furcs and judges of things > and takes care to have the materials, which he 
makes ufe of in rcafoning, to be rivctted and compared together by them : yet 
by a ba[>it of rcafoning he may come to Icrve himfclf of them, and apply them 
fo quick, that he himfclf fliall fcarcc obfeiTC it. Nay, moft men leem to reafon 
by virtue of a habit acquired by converfation, practice in bufinefs, and exam- 
ples of others, without knowing what it is, that gives thcfolidiiy even to their 
own jull reafonings : ']iii\ as men ufually learn rules in arithmetic, govern tlieir 
accounts by them all their days, and grow very ready and topping in the ufe of 
them, without ever knowing or troubling their heads about the demonjlration 
of any one of them. But ftill tho this be fo, and men reafon without advert- 
ing upon general ideas and abibaft truths, or even being aware that there arc 
any fuch, as it were by lailc or a kind of rote ; yet fuch there are, and upon. 
themxc^s the weight of reafon as its foundation. 

This, by the way, helps us to dete6t the caufe, why the generality of peoplcare to 
little under i\\c dominion of reafon : why they ftcrihce it to their interells and pafTi- 
ons lb eafily j ^i"c fo obnoxious to prejudices, the influence of their companv, -.ind 
din of a party ; fo apt to change, tho the cafe remains the very lame ; fo unable to 
iudec of things, tlvit are ever fo little out of the way > and fo conceited and po- 
fitive in matters, that are dotibtful, or perhaps to difccrning pcifons manifellly 
falfe. Their rcafoning proceeds in that track, which they happen to be got into, 
and out of which they know not one itep, but all is to them Term imognit.i ; be- 
ing ignorant of the fcienrific part, and thofeunivcrfiil, unalterable principles, up- 
on which true rcafoning depends, and to- find which and the true ufe of them 
are required roo/ hours and ■.xnbonefl application, hcCxAi: mxny preparati'ves. 

In the next place it muft be noted, that one may reafon truly from that, whicli 
IS only probable, or even falfe •■. Becaufe jull: inferences may be made from propo- 
fitions of thefe kinds : that is, fuch inferences m.ay be made as are founded in cer- 
tain truths, tho thole propofitions themfcU-es are not certainly true. But then wliat. 
follows, or is concluded from thence, will be only probable, or talfc, according to 

xMTtf 11 vuifi<P-riQ^ i~^^, T>)>.ir.«rei k, t'v i'ti'»ii,i< ii-Tf, >C 7i» dfi'.c.; <^ ^»3ia» kn<>,tyn i/*^«. 

(^i ^ -m' if**; a/j&iViw;, what may wc think of tlic God ot tlic vorU ! Tiieretorc Tully fccms to 

exprcfs hirnfil'" too boldly where he writes, Eft kommi cum Dio r.uiciui fonrtAS. Intn quos au- 

Itm ratio, inter tofdem etiAin rtch ratio communis rft. 
» Upon tills account it is, that I adJ vhc word £j-.m at the cnJ of my dcfcription of reafon. 
" I the 

Of Rcafon, and the ways, ^c, \-j 

the quality of that propoficion, orthofcpropofitionsj fiora which the inference 
is made. 

ylga'm; itlhouldbe obfened, that what I have faid of reafoning, chiefly belongs 
to it as it is an internal operation. When we are to prefent our leafonings to o- 
thers, we muft transfer our thoughts to them by llich ways as we can. The cafe is 
to be rtated in a manner fuitablc to their capacities ; a fair narration of matters of 
fact, and their circumllances, to be made j many times perfons and things to bcde- 
Tcribcdby proper fl'/.i/;/)e/?.f, and the like: all which are additional labor, and take 
up much room in djtcourfes and books, and are performed by different authors, 
upon different fubjecls, and in different kinds of writing, with an infinite variety 
of methods and forms, according to me;« different views and capacities ; and many 
times not without a necelfity of fome condefcenlions, afcititious advantages, and e- 
ven applications to the pafllons. But notwithllanding this, in Ifrift reafoning no* 
thing is required, but to lav Heps in a due order, firmly connected, and expreft pro- 
perly, without Houriih ■• j and to arrive at truth by the fi arte Jl\n& ckarefi gra- 
dation we arc able. 

Once more; perhaps difputaeious men may fay I afcribc the invcfligation of 
truth to one ficulty, when it is in re.ility the joint bufincfs of fevcral. For when 
we go about this work, we arc forced to make ufcof fubordinate powers, and c- 
ven external helps j xo dnxr diagrams^ and put cafcj in our own imagination; to 
correct the images there, compound them, divide them, abftract from them ; to 
turn over our memor}', and fee what has been enterd and remains in that regiflcr > 
c\-en to confu'it books, and ufe pen and ink. Infliort, we affembleall fuch axioms, 
theorems, experiments and obfenations, as arc already known, and appear capa- 
ble of fcrving us, or prefent thcmfelvesupon the opening and analj/isoi thequef- 
tion, or cafe before us. And when the mind has thus made its /o«r, fetched in ma- 
terials from every quarter ,and fet them in its own view -, then it contemplates, com- 
pares, and methodizes them ; gives the firll place to this, the fecond to that, and 
lb on; and when trials do not fucceed rightly, rejefts fome, adopts others, ihifts 
their order, i^c. till at lafb the fertes is fo difpofed, that the thing required comes up 
refolved, proved, or difprovcd by yu/l conclufion from proper premifFcs. Now in 
this proccfs there fccm to be many faculties concerned ; in thcfc acts of circumfpcc- 
tion, recollection, invention, reflexion, comp.iring, methodizing, judging. But 
what if all this be fo ? I do not exclude the ulc of fuch fublcrvient powers, or other 
helps, as mc neccflary to the exerting this ficulty of reafon ; nor deny the mind 

• Simplex (y niiJ* itrifai t/} lucultniicr; quia fatii ornatit ftr ft rft : ajtoqut emnmtntii txtrln- 
(erut additii fucMtn {crrumfuur : .mn.dac'Hm vera fprcie fUctt itlitna, (jr. Laflont. 

G i matter 

4.8 The Rfxigion of Nature. Seel. III. 

matter to work upon. I may allow nil the intelleftual fhcuhics their proper offi- 
ces and yet make reafon to be what I liavc defcribed it to be. 

IX. 7'hcre isftich a thing as right reafon: or, Truth may be difcoverd by reafon- 
in?'. T\\c\vori\renfon has fevcral acceptations. Sometimes itisufcd for that pow- 
er mentiond in the lall propofitionj. as when we &y, Man is a being indued tviih 
rea''on. And then the fcnfc of this propofition mull be this j that there is fuch a 
ufe to be made of this power, as is right, and will manifeft tmth. Sometimes re 
feems to be taken for thofc general truths, of which the mind pofTcfrcs it fclf from 
the intimate knowledge of its own ideas, and by which it is governed in its illati- 
ons and conclufions ; as when we fay, Such a thing is agreeable to reafon : for 
that is as much as to fay, it is agreeable to the faid general truths, and that authen- 
tic way of making deductions, which is founded in them. And then the fenfe 
of this propofition is, that there are fuch general truths, and fucli a right way of 
inferring. Again ; fmetimes it fccms to Hand only for fome particular truth, as it 
is apprchei-Klcd by the mind with thecaufes of it, or the manner of its-derivation 
from other truth : that is, it differs not from truth except in this one refpecb, that 
it is confiderd not barely in itfclf, but as the effcft and rcfult ofaprocefsof reafon- 
in"- ; or it is tmth with the arguments for our aflcnt, and its evidences about it f 
as when it is fiid, that fuch or fuch an aJJ'ertion is reafon. And then the fenfc of 
the propofition is, that there are truths fo to be apprehended by the mind. So 
all comes to this at laft ; tmth (or there arc tmths, which) may be difcovcrd^ 
or found to be fuch, by reafoning. 

If it were not fo, our rational faculties, the noblcft we have, would be \'ain. 

Befide, that it is fo, appears from the foregoing propofitions and what we know 
within our fclves. 'Tis certain we have immediate and abih-act ideas : the relations 
of thefc are adequately known to the mind, whole ideas they are : the proportions 
cxprclTin" thcfe relations are evidently known to be true: and tlicfe truths mull 
have the common privilege and property of all truth.s, to betnieinall the paiti- 
culars andufes, to which they are applicable. If then any things are notified to 
us by the help of our fenfcs, or prcfent thcmfelves by any other way or means, to 

» That way, which fome Scopiics take to prove tlic inexiflcncc of truth, has nothing in ir, unlcfe 
it be a contradiftion. If any i\i\ng, fry they, is dcmonllraied to be true, how lliall it be known, 
that tlut dcmondration is true? Ei" I'J ivisx^u'lf*?, ^dt-d^uVi^ xttXn, xZ^ ni >i rare »>,rjii( iV( j >^ 
^rui in «-^fM. Scxt. £mp~ Nor do I well comprehend St. Chryfojlom'i meaning, when he fays, Ti 
Aeyiru/cii '^■utinx^tf, xi» <tAii9-<s i,, iiiToi xAnjo^ef/'iti' rj •^i^.y^ xctfixi, "^ »'Vii .V-anr. For as no mart 
truly believes any tbing, unlcfs he has a reafon lor believing it ; fo no tealbn can be flronger than 



0} Reafon, and the ways, &c. ^p 

which thefe truths may be immediately applied, or from whence deductions may- 
be made after the forementiond manner, new tniths may be thus collected. And 
fincc thefc new truths, and the numerous defccndcnts, that may fpring from their 
loins,may be ufcd ilill in the iiime manner, and be as it were the feed of more trutli, 
who can tell at what undcfcried fields of knowledge even men may at length airivc? 
At leaft no body can doubt, but that much truth, and particulaily of that kind, 
which is moil ufeful to us in our conduct here, is difcoverable by this method. 

Thcv, who oppugn the force and certainty of reafon, and treat right reafon as a mull argue againll reafon citiier with realbn, or without reafon. In tlic. 
latter way they do nothing : and in the former they betray their own caufe, and 
cftablilli that, which they labor to dethrone. To prove there is no fuch thing as 
right reafon by any good argument, is indeed impoHiblc : becaufc that would be. 
tolhew there is fuch a thing, by the manner of proving, that there is not. 

Andfurther, ifthis propofitionbe nottruc, there is no right reafoning in £«-. 
did y nor can we be furc, that what is there demonibated, is true. But to (Iiy t his. 
I am fure is abfurd. Nor do I dcfire, that this propolkion, which I here main- 
tain, Ihould be eltccmd more certain than thofe dcmonllraccd by liim : and fo cer'~ 
tain It mull be j becaufc there canbe no certainty in them, ii'thisbe not true. 

The great objeSlion againft all this is taken from the many inftances of falfc rea- 
foning and ignorance, with which the practices, difcourfcs, writings of mankind, 
are too julUy taxed. Bur,in anf-xer to it, I would ha\e it minded, that I do not fay, 
men may not by virtue of their freedom break off their meditations and inquiries 
prematurely, before they have taken a fufficient furvey of things ; that they may 
not be prepofTefled with inveterate errors, biafled by intereft, or carried violently 
down with the ftream of a fc£h or falliion, or dazlcd by Ibme darling notion or 
bright rtune ' j that they may not be unprovided of a competent ftock ofprxcognita. 
and preparative knowledge ; that (among otiicr things) they may not be ignonint 
of the very nature of reafoning, and what it is that gives finews to an inference, 
and makes it jufl: ; that they may not want philofophy, hiltor\', or other Icu-ning 
requifitc to the undadanding and Hating o'the quclHon truly > that they may not 
have the confidence to pretend to abilities, which tlicy have not, and boldly to 
judge of things, as if they were qualified, when they are not ; that they may not 
be impotent in theirclocution,and niifrcprefent their own thoughts, by exprcHlng 
thcmfclvcs ill, even when within thcmlelvcs they reafon well j that many unJi i- 
flandings may not be naturally grofs, good lieads often indifpofed, and theablcit 
judges fomctimes ovcrfeen, through inadvertence or haftc : I fiy none of tbcfe. 

' JlanJ aUb fJiti froniar* Itffu, juam nbi fjlft rei graxis itii:tr tx-ijlit. Pliny, 


50 The Religion of Nature. Se6l. III. 

things. The contrary I confcfs is manifcft : and it is in oppofition to thofe er- 
rors, which appear in thefc cafes under the name of reafon, that we are forced 
to add the epithet right^ :uid to iliy right reafon inftead of reafon otAy ; to diftin- 
guilli it from that, wiiich wrongfully afTumcs that appellation. Nor, more- 
over, do I fay, that by rcafoning the truth is to be dil'co\ erd in every cafe : that 
would imply an extent of knowledge, which we cannot pretend to. I only 
fay, that there is fuch a thing as lught reafon, and truth difcovcrable by it. 

I might add, that he, whofc faculties are intire and found, and who by a proper 
cxcj-cife of his mind in fcicntific lludies Hrlt opens and enlarges its capacity, and 

-renders his intellectuals aftiveand penetrating ; takes care to furnifli himfelf with 
fuch leading truths, as may be ufeful to him, and of which he is alTured in his 
own breft ; and in treating any fubjeft keeps them ftill in his eye, fo that his 

■ difcourfe may be agreeable to them : I fay, inch a one is not in much danger of. 

- concluding falfcly. He muft cither determin rightly, or foon find, that the fub- 

je£t lies out of his reach. However he will be fenfible, that there arc many things 
within his fphcre, concerning which he may reafon j and that there are truths to 

-be found by this ufeof his faculties, in which he may fccurely acquiefcc. 

Thus that quelfion fuppofed to be asked p. 27. Hoiv (Jialla, man kno'w, -what is 
true ? is in part anfwerd. More fhall be added by and by : only apropofition or 
two, which ought not to be omitted, muflbe firllinfcrted. 

X. To acl according to right reafon^ and to a£} accordingto truth are in effecl the 

fame thing. For in which fenfe focver the word rcafnis taken, it will Hand cither 
for truth itfelf, or for that, which is inffrumcntal in difcovcring and proving it 

•to be fuch: and then, with refpcft to this latter fenie, whoevcris guided by that 
faculty, whofc office confifls in diilinguifliingand pointing out truth, muil be 
a follower of truth, and act agreeably to it. For to be governed by any faculty or 
power is to act according to the genuin dccifions and dictates of it. 

That reafon, which is right (by the meaning of the words) muft conclude 
rightly : but this it cannot do, if the conckdion is not true, or truth. 

That is (i'ov fo I would be undcrflood;, if the principles and prcmiifes from 
whence it refults are tme', and certainly known to be lb, theconclufion may 
be taken as certain and abfolute truth : but othcrwife the truth obtaind at the 
end of the argument is but hypothetical, or only this, that fuch a thing is fo, 
if.fuch another, or fuch others are fo or fo. 

' That manner of dcmonflration, in which it has been pretended truth is deduced direftly from 
that which is fahc, is only a v.'ay of flicv/ing, that an afll-rtion is true, bccaufc its contradiftory is 
faiffj founded m that known rule, CentradUiorU ntejimul xtiA, nee j.miil falft tjft fojfinit, &c. 

XI. r» 


Of Reafon, and the ways, &€, 5 { 

XI. to be governed by reafon is the general law iwpofedby the Author of nature * 
upon them^ -whofe uppeinwjl faculty is t eafon : as the dilates of it in particular cafes 
are the particular la-xs^ to which they are fubjecl. As there are beings, which have 
notfo much as fenfe, and others that have no faculty above it ; fo there may be 
fome, who are indued with reafon, but have nothing higher than that. It isfuf- 
ficicnt at prcfent to fiippofe there may be fuch . And then if reafon be the upper- 
moji fiiculty, it has a right to controll the rell by being fuch. As in fenfitivc ani- 
mals fenfe commands gravitation and mechanical motions in thofe inlhmccs, for 
which their fcnfes are given, and carries them out into fpontancous a<5ts : fo in ra- 
tional animals the gradation requires, that re;tlbn fhould command fenfe. 

It is plain, that rcaibn is of a commanding nature "> : it injoinsthis, condemns 
that, only allows fome other things, and will be paramount fin an old word t\ .;■/«- 
^Biwt') if it is at all. Now a being, who has fuch a determining and governing 
power fo placed in his nature, as to be eflential to him, is a being catiiinly 
framed to be governed by that power. It feems to be as much defigned by na- 
ture, or rather the Author of nature, that rational animals fliould ufc their rea- 
fon, and ftcer by itj as it is by the ihipwright, that the pilot ihould direct the 
veflcl by the ufe of the rudder he has fitted to it. The rudder would not be 
there, if it was not to be ufed : nor would reafon be implanted in any nature 
only to be not cultivated and ncglcded. And it is certain, it cannot be ufed, 
but it mull conrmand : fuch is its nature. 

It is not in one's power deliberately to rcfolvc not to be governed by reafon - 
For (here the fame way of arguing may be ufed, that was lately) if he could 
do this, he muft either have fome reafon for making that refolution, or none. 
If he has none, it is a refolution, that Ihnds upon no foundation, and there- - 
fore in courfe tails: and if he has fome reafon for it, he is governed bv rcaibn. . 
This demonflrates that reafon mull govern. 

XU. If a rational being, as fuch, is under an obligation to obey reafon, and this 
obedience, or praHice of reafon, coincides with the obfcrvation of truth, t he fe things 
plainly follow. 

More to this purpofc might be cafily colleacd. » Aiy!> i,-., Wt,, 0ii. ph. Jud. ' Ti iy,. 

/i*n«r K, u,,i,Z» -t ■i,vx'.<, y..;0-. hi. Anton. Or as it u ID tUiArch, r ■^vy.^ «»«t«)« /t.f>. frm. 
tifatus in Tnlly, Summxi in Anima grAdiu. Tcrt. 

I. That'. 

'tQ^ The Religion of Nature^ Se(5l. III. 

I . Thatwhat is Mdfc^. I. prop. IV. muflbc tme with rcfpe£b to fuch a being for 
this further caufc -, becaufc to him can be right, that interferes with reafon, 
and nothing can interfere with truth, but it mull: interfere with reafon. Such a har- 
mony there is between them. For whatcvcris known to be true, reafon cither finds 
it, or allows it to be fuch. Nothing can be taken for true by a rational being,if he has 
^ reafon to the contrary, i . That there is to a rational being fucli a thing as religion 
which may alfo upon this furthcj- account properly be called natural. For certain- 
ly to obey the law, which the Author of his being h;is given him, is rbligion : and 
to obey the law, which He has given or revcald to him by making it to rcfult froni 
the right Uic of his own natural facilities, mult be to him his natural religion. 3 . A 
careful obfervation of truth, the way tohappinefs, and tlic practice of reafon arc 
in the illlie the fimc thing. For, of the two lalt, each tails in with the firlf-, and 
therefore each with other. And fo, at lafl, natural religion is grounded upon this 
triple and llri6l alliance or union oi truth, happinejs, andrvafon; all in the (iimein- 
terell:,and confpiring by the fame methods,to advance and perfect human nature : 
aJid its trueit definition is, Tbepurfuit of bappincfs by thepratlice ofrcafun and truth. 

.Permit me here again to infcrt an obfervation obiter. 

Obf. The "f"^':?"" of right reafon and truth, or that which is to be regarded irj 
judging of right and truth is private : that is, every one mufl judge for himfelf. 
I'^or finceallrcafoning is founded originally in the knowledge of one's own pri- 
vate /^<?^.f, by virtue of which he becomes confcious of fomc firll truths, that 
are undeniable 5 by which he governs his ftcps in his purfuits after more n-uths, 
(^c. the criterion, or that by which he tries his ownrcafonings, and knows them 
to be right, mull be the internal evidence he has already of certain truths, and 
the agrcc.iblcnefs of his inferences to them. One man can no more difccrn the 
object:*; of his own underilaruding, and their relations, by the faculties of a- 
nother, than he am fee with another man's eyes, or onelliip can be guided by 
the helm of another. They mull be his own faculties and confcicncc, that 
mufl dctermin him. Therefore to demand another man's affcnt to any thing 
without conveying into his mind fuch rcafons, as may produce a fenfe of the 
truth of it, is. to cre£t a tyranny over his underllanding, and to demand a tri- 
bute which it is not pojjible for him to pay ^ It is true indeed, tho I cannot fee 
with another man's cycs,yet I may be aiiilled by another, who has better eyes, 
in finding an objcfb and the circumllances of itj and fo men may be ajfijied in 
making their judgments of things. They may be informed of things, which they 
did not know before, and which yet require a place among thofe that are to be 

"* Sitlig':o cogi r.m fotejl ,-jtrbis fotut qiiam verbtribus rei a^end* ejl, nt ft voluntas. Laft. 

confiderd 3 

O/^Reafon, and the ways, &€. 53 

confidcrJ : and they muv I>c dirciftcJ what to advcit principally upon ; how to flatc 
the queftion j how to methodize their thoiights,and in general how to rc:ii"on : efpc- 
ciallyifthcy want leaining, or have only that part of it, which is little convcrlanc 
111 clofe reflexions, and doth not teach them to reafon, or (as the cafe too often is) 
teaches them not to rcafon. But flill this is all in order to produce fiich a light ifl 
them, that by ic they may fee and judge for theinfclvcs. An opinion, tho ever fo true 
and certain to one man, cannot be transfufed into another as true andcatain By 
any other way, but by opening his underrtanding, and aflilling him fo to order 
his conceptions, that he may find the reafonablenefs of it within himfelf. 

To prevent miftakes I pray take notice here, that, tho I fiy men mud judge for 
thcmfelves, I do not fay they muft in all cafes aEi according to their private and lin- 
glc judgments. In refpc(Sl of fuch things, as arc private, and concern themiclvcs 
only, or fuch as are left open and fubjeft to every man's ownfenfc, they may and 
ought j only prefen'ing a du? deference to them, who diffa' from them, and arc 
known upon other occafions to have more knowledge and literature than them- 
fclvcs : but when a fociety is concerned, and hath detcrmind any thing, it may be 
confiderd as one perfon, of which he, who dilTcnts from the rclV, is only perhaps x 
fmall particle ; and then his judgment will be in a manner abforbcd and drownd in 
that of the majority, or of them to whom the power of judging is intruded. But I 
mull not digrels too fu" from the main bufincfs, the ways of coming at truth. 

XIII. The reports of fenfe are not of equal authority with the clear demonflrations 
of reafon, whentfiey happen todiffir. It is true, the ideas caufedby the imprcflion 
of lenliblc objects arc real ideas, and truly known to the mmd as they arc in 
thcmfelves > and the mind may ufe them, and reafon truly upon them : that is, 
the mind may make a right ufe of the ideas, which it finds in itfelf But then wlic- 
tlicr thcfcare the tme ecihpts of their originals, and drawn to the life, is m.uiy 
timcsa qucllion; and many times it is evident they are not. For that whicli has 
been anticipated under pr. III. but properly belongsto this, mull be acknowled- 
ged. They arc conveyd through media and by inltruments fufccptivc of differcni. 
difpofitionsand alterations, and may confcquently produce different repnlcntati- 
ons : and thcle cannot all be right. But luppolc thofe inftrumcnts and niedu 
to be as intirc and pure, as when intircft and purcft j yet ftill there may be jii 
many refpcdts an incapacity in the faculty to notify things juft as they are. How 
mightily are thelhapeand fizcof a vifible obje«5l varied upon us according to Its 
diltance, and the (ituation of the place, from wiience the profpccl is t.iken ? 
Now tlicfe thmgs cannot be laid of the reports, or rather determmations of rea- 
fon. For in pure rcaff)ning we ufe our own ideas for themfe'.ves, and fuch as the 
mind knows them to be, not as rcprcfentatives of things, that may be falfely 

H exhibited. 

- -\ 

54- jT/;^ Religion &/" Nature. Sedl. III. 

cxhibiccd. This internal reafoning may indeed be wrongly applied to external 
things, if \vc reafon about them as being what they are not : but then this is 
the fault not of reafon, but of fcnfc, which reports the cafe wrong ; or per- 
haps of the pcrfon, who has not been fufficicmly indullriousto inform himiclf. 

That fame familiar inflance of vifion proves further, that reafon may be appli- 
ed to over-rule and correal fenfe. For when the piftures of objects arc pricked out 
by the pencils of rays upon the retina of the eye, and do not give the tnjc figure 
of thofc objects fas they not always do, being divcrfly projefted, as the lines 
proceeding from the fcveral points liappen to fall upon that concave furfxcej j 
this, tho it miglit impofc upon a being, that has no fiiculty fuperior to fenfe, 
doth not impofe upon our reafon, which knows how the appearance is alterd> 
and why. To think the fun ' is not bigger, than it appears to the eye to be '', 
fccms to be the laft degree of ftupidity. He mufl be a brute (Co far from being 
a philofopher), who does not know, that the fame line (v.g. the diameter of 
the fun) at different diftances fubtends different angles at the eye. A fmall mat- 
ter of reafon may fer\'e to confute fcnfc in this and the like cafes. 

Ol;;. How can reafon be more certain than/?;?/?, fince reafon is founded in ab- 
ftraftions, which arc originally taken from fenfible objefts ? yiaf. Perhaps the 
mind may by being exercifed at firfl: about particular objefts by degrees find in 
itfelf this capacity o£ confidering things by their /pedes, making ab ft rations, 
^c. which it would not have done, had it never known any of thcfc particulars. 
But then after it has found this capacity in iticlf, and attaind to the knowledge 
of abftraft and general ideas, I do not fee why this capacity of reafoning by 
the help of them may not be ufcd, upon this proficicncc, to ccnfurc and cor- 
fefb the advices of fenfe concerning even fuch particulars, as firll gave occafion 
to the mind to cxcit this capacity and raifc it fclf Is it a new tiling for a fcho- 
lar to make fuch a progrefs in learning, as to be able afterward to teach the 
mailer, from wliom he received his firft rudiments? May not the modern phi- 
lofophers correa the ancients, becaufc thcfe firft flicwd them the way, and led 
them into the ftudy of nature ? If we look impartially into the hiitory of learnings 
and even of religion, we fliall find that truth has generally advanced by de- 
grees, and many times (Vciy many ; as if that was the method of introducing 
knowledge among men) rifcn out of fable and error, which gave occafion to 
thofe inquiries, by which tbenfches were detccVcd. Thus blind ignorance was. 
fucccedtxl by a twilight of fenie : this brightcnd by degrees : at laft the fun as 

• TAKtulus ille fot. Lucr. Poor creafure! •" Ncc nimio foil} major rotA TJft fottji^ 

Mjlns q^uirofinfiiu) rjj^ viJttur. Lucr. rpkurus anurn {oJ[c ftit.u etiam tmnortm tjft qnkm '<uli*- 
ftir, 8cc. Cic . , ■ 


Of Reafon, ci)icl the ways, &c. 55 

it were rofc upon fomc parts of the commonwealth of learning, and clcard up many 
things : and I believe many more will in time be cleard, which, whatever men 
think, are yet in their dark and uncttUivaled ftarc. The undedtanding, tho it 
frarts irom particulars^ in time makes a further progrcfs, tailing m generals^ and 
fuch notions logical, metaphyfical,Cs'f. as never could pofhblycomeinby thcfen- 
fes S Befide, further, the capacity itfclf of admitting and coniidering general ideas 
was originally in the mind, and is not derived from without. The intelligences 
communicated by fenfc are only an occafion of ufing what it had before *>. Juft as 
a mafter may, by theexcrcifes he fcts, excite the fupcrior capacity of his fcholar. 
In a icord, no man doth, or can pretend to believe his fenlcs, when he lias a 
rcafon againft it : which is an irrcfiagable proof, that realbnis above fenfe and 
controlls it. Bur, 

XIV. 7'he reports of fenfe may he taken for truc^ ivben there is no rcafon againjl 
it '. Becaufe when there is no rcafon not to beheve, that alone is a rcafon for 
believing them. And therefore, 

XV. In this cafe to a& according to them (/. e. as raking the informations of 
fenfe to be true) is to all according to reafon and the great law of our nature. 

Thus it appears that there are two ways, by which we may aflurc our felves 
of the tiuth of many things '^ i or at Icafl: may attain fuch a degree of certainty, 
as will be fufficient to dctermin our praBice : by reafon^ and by fenfe under the 
government of reafon; that is, when reafon fupports it, or at leall doth notop- 
pofe it. By the former we difcovcr fpeculative truths j by the latter, or both 
together matters of h6k. 

XVI. TVTjere certainty is not to he had', prohahilily mufl hefuhjiituted into the 
place of it : that is, it mufl be confiderd, which fide of the qnejlion is the more probable. 

Probability, or that, which in this cafe may incline one to believe any propofi- 
tion to be true rather than falfc, or any thing to he rather than not te he, or the 

' Katura ttum nulla docnte frofccla ab in, quorHm, ex fnma Qr inchoata intrlligeniia, gentra 
eegnmt, confirmat iffa fer ft rattontm, cT frrficit. Cic. '' Semina nobis fcientin licdit \natu- 

ra]fcienfiam nen dedit. Sen. ' Si famfitnt [finfui], ^valeiuti, cr o/.maremovtnfur, qut 

obp»nt cr imptdiiint. Cic. * Sorratti's fjying, af). Cic. nihil ft fcirt, niji id iffum, favours 

of an itTcftcd humility, and muft not U undcrftooii flriaiy. But they, vvhofollowd, went further 

(' omr.ei ftnt vtttret : qui nihil co^no/ci, nihil ftrcifi, nihil fciri foffe dixermit): and paiticularly 

ArcctiLii ntgAbat tfft quidquxm quod ffiri po/Jtl, nc illud quidcin ipfum, qttod Socrjlei fii reliqnifftt. 
And thus the ibfurdity grew to a Cic, tlut was monflrous. For no man can aft, or even I« alive, 
if he knows notliing at all. Bcfidcr, to know that one knows no thing, is a contradi(flion : and not 
to know, that Ik knows even that, is not to know, whctlicr he knows any thing or not; and that 
ii to knov/ for ought he knows. ' Sec fcirt fri rfi omni.i. Hor. 

1 1 1 contran'. 

^6 The Religion of Nature. Seel. III. 

contrary, will generally rtiew itfclf upon the application of thefc and fuch like 
rules. I • Tliat may be reckond probable, which, in the eftimation of reafon, 
appears to be more agreeable to the conptution of nature. No body can certain- 
ly foretell, that ylff-flff will come up upon two dies fairly thrown before aw^i- 
ace : yet any one would choofe to lay the former, becaufe in nature there arc 
twice as many chances for that as for ths other. If a trolling wolf fliould 
li"ht upon a lamb, it is not evidently known, that he will tear the lamb: but 
there is fuch a natural propenfion in that kmd to do it, that no body would much 
queftioii the event. ('This inftance might have been taken from amongrt men, 
who are generally as far as they can be, wolves one to another.) If a parent 
caufes his child to be inllrufted in the foundations of ufeful learning, educates 
him virtuoufly, and gives him his firlt impulfe and direction in tlic way to true 
happinefs, he will be more likely to proceed and continue in it > than he would 
be to hit upon it, and continue in it too, if he was left to himfelf to be carried 
away by his own paflions, or the influence of thofe people, into whole hands 
he mi^ht fall, the bias of the former lying towards vice, andmifcry in the end, 
and the plurality of the latter being either wicked or ignorant or both. So 
that the advantage in point of probability is on the fide of good education '. 
When Herodotus writes, that the Egyptian pfiefts reported the fun had within 
the compafs of 1 1 340 yeai's twice rifcn where it now fets, and fct where it rifes '', 
what is fit to be believed concerning the truth of this relation (as of many others^, 
is cafily difcernablc by tlws rule. Herodotus, poffibly delighting in tcratical 
ftories, might tell what he never heard : or the pafilige may be an interpolati- 
on i or it may be alterd in tranfcribing : or the priefts, who pretended much to a 
knowlcdf^e of great antiquities, might out of mere vanity, to fliew what chil- 
dren the Greeks were in icipect of them, invent fuch a monftrous relation, and im- 
pofe it upon them, whom they thought to have not muchfcience among them : 
or it might be got into their memoirs before their time, who related it to He- 
rodotus, and fo pafs upon poftcrity, as many other fictions and kgends have done. 
Thefe are fuch things, as are well known to have happend often. But that 
the diurnal rotation of the earth about her axis lliould be inverted, is tiphano- 
Tnenon, that has never been known to happen by any body elfe, cither before 
or fince j that is fevourdby no obfenation j and that cannot be without great 

. This was the opinion of a wife man HJCn -1ID' N^ ^p'' '^ ^> '^m >B by ny;^ T^jn. 

Prov. For^inn bv mPDD HDpTn »D'3 nio'bni — psn !?y mnD2 Nin nnyan 'O'D niD''^n. 

©>jA icn. Oil ;AiK{" ^^l^^i'i TO KTm n itrui, iviui c« nu> ibi^tS^, ctXt^a ::auynXv fjutL^n ;) tc »ir. 
(^jft. fc TiTftcxn iAiy«> i{ ii^i«i> T iiAiw «i«rii>.«t' i>5<» Tk rit xxTtLc^iiTtu ctifiiro i'n ixat- 

r:i>»i- xj v&«F tit ircTi*^, o»^«i'T« Hi xaraj'witi. 


Of Reafon, and the ways, ^c. 57 

akcratinn in the mundane fyrtcm, or thole laws by which the motions of the 
planets, and of our earth among the rell, are govemd. That this account then 
may be talfcis very confiilent with the humor and circumrtances of mankind : 
but that it Ihould be true is very mconfiftcnt with thofc laws, by which the mo- 
tions of the celcrtial bodies fccm to be regulated, and tend to perfevere in their 
prefent courfes and directions. It is therefore in nature much more probable, that 
this account is ftilfe. The odds are on that fide. z. VS'hen any obfervation hath 
hitherto conjlantly held true, or mojl coinmonly proved to be fo, it has by this ac- 
quired an clbblilhd credit ; the caufe may be prefumed to retani its former force > 
and the effeA may be taken as probable, if in the cai'e betbre us there doth not 
appear fomething particular, fome reafon for exception. No man can demon- 
llratc, that the fun will rife again, yet every one doth, and mufl: a6t, as if that 
was ccrtiin ' : becaufe we apprehend no decay in the caufes, which bring about 
this appearance, nor have any other rcalon to milbull the event, orthinic it will 
be otherwife a few hours hence, than it has been hitherto. There is no apodidi- 
cal argument to prove, that any particular man will die : but yet he mull be 
more th.m mad, who can prefume upon immortality here, when he finds fo 
many generations all gone to a man, and the fame cKe?>iies, that have laid them 
prollrate, ilill purfuing ihcir vici or ies. Thcfe and fuch like, thoin ftriftncfs per- 
haps not certainties, are jullly current for fuch. So great is their probability. 
There arc other obfenations, which, tho not fo infallible as thofc, dcfen-e yet 
to be thought of, and to have a fiiare in the dircftion of our judgments. 
There have been men in the world and no doubt Hill are, who, having had op- 
portunities ofimpofing falfitics upon mankind, of cheating, or committing o- 
thcr wickedncfs, have yet in fpite of temptation prefeiTed their integrity and 
virtue : but, fince opportunin,^ has fo feldom faild to corrtipt them who liave 
been in poflcffion of her, and men's inrerefis and paflions continue in general 
the fame, it is more probable her charms will Hill have the fime power and ef- 
fe£b, which they ufc to have -, which whoever doth not mind, will be wofuUy 
obnoxious to be abufed by frauds pious and impious *'. Briefly, when there is no 
particular realcjn for the contrary, what h;isoftnell happend, may from experi- 
nicc inoftrcafonablybccxpcdtcdto happen again. 3. When neither niuuicnor 
other obfcTvations pomt out the probable conjcfturc to us, we mufl be dcter- 
mind (if it be neccfiiiry tor us to be dctcrmind at all) by the reports, and 
fenfe of them, whom we apprehenJ", judging with the bell: skill we 

• iSn onjDJ abiy. *> i^n hjii (^0SJ< 'PD.Prov. (which fore one may convert thus, 

E^nn 'PS -i3-i hz'y pnson ) 

f have 

§8 The Religion of Nature. Sedl.III. 

have, tohcmo^ biotving ^ :ind hone fl <=. Of allthcfc r Ics the /;r/? is that which 
deferves the principal regard : the other two are of ufe, v/ aen nature fo utterly ex- 
cludes us from her bofom, that no opportunityisallowl of making a judgment. 
JLrt/^/yjwhennature, the frequent repetition of the famec\cnt, and the opinion of 
the bell judges concurr to mal^c any th ing probable, it is fo i \ the higheft degree. 

It appears from what has been Htid concerning the nature xnd foundations of pro- 
bability^ that the force of it refults from obfcn-ation and reafon together. For here 
the one is not fufficient without the otlicr. Reafon without obfervation wants 
matter to work upon : and obfei-vations are neither to be made juftly by our fclves, 
nor to be rightly chofen out of thofc made by others, nor to be aptly appHed, 
without the aflillance of reafon. Both together may fupport opinion and pi-a£ticc 
in the abfcnceof knowledge and certainty. For thofe obfervations upon the na- 
ture of men and things, which we have made our felvcs, we know j and our 
own reafoning concerning them, and deductions from them we know : and from 
hence there cannot but arifc in many cafes an internal obligation to give our aflcnt 
to this, rather than that > or to a£t one way, rather than another. And as to the 
obfer\'ations of others, they maybe fo cautioufly and skilfully felcfted, as to be- 
come almoft our own> finceour own reafon and experience may diredt us in the 
choice and ufe of them. The remarks and advice of old mch^, who have gone 
through variety of fcenes, lived long enough to fee the confcquences of their own 
and other peoples aftings, and can now with freedom "^ look back and tell where 
they erred, are ordinarily fure to be preferred to thofe of young and raw aftors. 
The ^wflw?^, apologues, i^c. of "duife ffief?, and fuch as have made it their bulinefs 
to beufcfulfpiesupon nature and mankind, national /'r&'yfr^/, and the like*, may 
be taken as maxims commonly true. Men in their feveral profcflions and arts, in 
which they have been educated, and cxercifed themfelves all their days, muil 
be fuppofed to have greater knowledge and experience, than others can ufually 

» Statuere enim, qui fit fitfiens, vel maximeviiletiir ejfe fapientis. Cic. '' Km niimtro lac 

judicantur, fej pcmlere, as Titllyfpezks upon another occalion. Thcrctbrc I cannot without a dcgrsc 
of indignation find a fort of writers plcaling themfelves with having difcoverd fomc uncivilized na- 
tions, which have little or no knowledge of the Deity, (^c. and then applying their obfcrv.-itions to 
the fervicc of alhcifm. As \f ignorance could prove any thing, or alter its nature by l->eing general! 
' Arijlctle's known rule is "£>Jo|«. t« icxirru, rSa-m, >) T«r? TMir'ti, « reTq o-e^ei?' )C Tifrois, n t«< 
iroFit, n Toic, :t>.iiVoi?, h «"« jU/a^ira '/'"f '/*«'? "j cVi^loi?. But itis not applicable to all ca(es. '' ioxiT 

!*•• >^'*' '^"P uvTat [TOfo-ei/T*'] viw^iai^., cinti^ Tir« eocy s-fi>iA>!Ai/.V«Tar»j n >i^ ifiiS? .c*? tnc^ xo- 

f ii/m3S . Tei'a Ti! iVi. Tlato. ' Wlica Sophocles, now grown old, was asked, n5< "tfiU »fi< 

r'ufife^lriK, he anfwerd,,ft,u, a a>5^fuzf a.<r/S^ifaM /o/i roi ii/xo axupv/er, ins-zif Xvr.iira t,i«c 

>u 'Lyfm cint nrlti "iin^pv/at. -«rr<t»«ff-i <yj T yi Tuiv-ait cv tcS v«f » "•*it "{W4 '/'"J/ "^ 'A<<(- 

S-i{i«c. P/«r«, ^ «/. ! '£' fificfiu <r9''(':>^»Tn tit t^ix'trn. Pint. 

Iv.ivc ; 


Of Reafon, and the ways, &'c, 59 

have : and therefore, if through want of capacity or honefly they do not either 
lofe, or belie their opportunities and experience, they arc in refped of thofc 
things, to which they have been bred and inured, more to be relied upon. And, 
hilly, bijlories written by credible and induftrious authors, and red with judg- 
ment, may fupply us with ex;imples, parallel cafes, and general remarks, profit- 
able in forming our manners, and opinions too. And by the hcquent perulal of 
them, and meditation upon them a dexterity in judging of dubious cafes is ac- 
quired. Muchof the temper of mankind, much of the nature and drift of their 
counfcls, much of the couife of Divine providence is vifiblc in them. 

To conclude > that we ought to foWow probability, when certainty leaves us 
is plain : becaufe then it becomes the tnly light and guide we have. For unlefs it 
is better to wander and fluctuate in abfchtte uncertainty than to follow fuch a 
guide J unlefs it be rcafonablcto put out our f^«^/f , hccaufc we have not the light 
of they/<«, it muft be reafonable to direct oiu' fteps by probability, when we 
have nothing clearer to walk by. And if it be reafonable, we are obhged to do it 
by prop. XI. When there is nothing above probability, it dotli govern: when 
there is nothing in the oppofite fcalc, or nothing of equal weight, this in the 
courfe of nature muft turn the beam. Tho a man, to refumc the inllancc be- 
fore, cannot dcmonfh-ate th^i fue-ace will come up before ambs-ace, he would 
find himfclf obliged (if he could be obliged to lay at all) to lay on that fide ; 
nor could he not choofe to do it. Tho lie would not be certain of the chance, 
he would be certiiin of his own obhgaiion, and on which fide it lay. 

i^ Here then is another way of difcovcring, if not truth, yet what in pracflice may 
be fuppofcd to be truth, 'that is, we may by this way difcover, whctha- fuch 
propofitions as thefc be taic, I ought to da this, rather than that ; or, to think 
fo, rather than the contrary. 

Obf. I have done now what I chiefly intended here. But, over and above that, 
we may almoft from the premiflcs collect, 

— ^ Fir/ly the principal caufcs of error, which I t:ike to bcfuch a* thefc. i . Want 
of faculties ; when men pretend to judge of things above thera. .As fomc (ftray- 
ing out of their proper clement, and falling into the dark, where they find no 
ideas but their owndrcams, come toj afl'ert what they have no ivafnn to afTert . 
fo others deny what there is the highcft reafon to believe, only Ix-caufe rl>cy can- 
not comprehend it. z. Want of due refiexion upon thofe ideas wc have, Or may 
have: by which it comes to pafs, that men arc drflitutc of that knowledge, 
winch is gaind by the coi^tcmplation of them, and their relations > mifapply 
names, confufcdly : and fomctimes deal in a fct of words and pbafcs, to which 
I no 

6o The Religion of Nature. Sed:. IIL 

no ideas at all belong, and which have indeed no meaning. Of kin to this is, 
5. Want of proper qualifications and f?''^«'^'"i«""-«- As, when illiterate peo- 
ple invade the provinces of fcholars j the half-lcttcrd arc forward, and aiTO- 
gate to thcmfclves what a modcft^ fludions man dares not ', tho he knows 
more j and fcholars, that have confined themfelves to one fort of literature, 
lanch out into another : unfuccefsfully all. 4. Not underftanding in what the 
nature and force of a juft confequcnce confifts. Nothing more common than 
to hear people alTcrt, that fucli a thing follows from fuch a thing ; when it 
doth not follow : /. e. when fuch a confequcnce is founded in no axiom, no 
theorem, no truth that we know of f . Defefts of memory and imagination- 
For men in reafoning make much ufe of thefc: memory is upon many occa- 
fions confulted, and fomctimcs draughts made u^ow the phantafy. If then they 
depend upon thefc, and thefc happen to be weak, clouded, perverted any way, 
things may be mifreprefented, and men led out of the way by mif-fhapen ap- 
paritions. There ought to be therefore a little dijlritjl of thefc faculties, and 
fuch proper helps ought to be ufed, as perhaps the befl judgments want thcmoft. 
<). Attributing too much to fenfe. For as neccfiary as our fenfes are to us, 
there are certainly many things, which fall not within their notice > many, 
which cannot be exhibited after the manner of fenfible objects, and to which 
no images belong. Every one, who has but jufl: filuted the mathematics and 
philofophy, mull be convinced, that there arc many things in nature, which 
fcem abfurd to fenlc, and yet mult be admitted. 7. Want of retirement ., and the 
prafticc of thinking and reafoning by our felves ''. A rambling and irregular 
life mull be attended with a loofe and irregular head, ill-connc6led notions, 
and fortuitous conclufions. Truth is the offspring of fileiKe, imbrokcn medi- 
tations, and thoughts often reviled and corredcd. 8. The ftrcngth of appetites, 
paffions, prejudices. For by thefc the underflanding may be coiTuptcd, or over- 
born : or at leall the opentions of the mind mufc be much obftnictcd by the in- 
trufion of fuch folicitors, as arc no retainers to the rational powers, and yet ftrong, 
and turbulent. Among other prejudices there is one of a particular nature, which 
you muft have obfei-vcd to be one of the greatejl caufcs of modem irrcligion. 
Whilft fomc opinions and rites are carried to fuch an immoderate Iicight, as cx- 
pofcs the abfurdity of them to the view of almoft evciy body but them who raifc 
them,not only gentlemen of the belles let ties., but l vcn men of common ll nfe, many 

■ Sicut afLx^.a. ft .':>f«<r®-, Aoyio-ffcin 3 «>"•> <Pi^ ('■ Thucyd.) tta rtila interna Jfhihlni virtcundiA, 
fervtrf* ccnfrniAt »HjttCtll. Piin. jun. * Or«. t. ,3!,A;^i>« a.f.^u .o?.cr«.. .1; if«a..a> 'i<nii. 


Of ReafonJ and the ways, &c. 6i 

times fee through them ; and then out of indignation and an cxccflive renitence, 
not feparating that which is true from that which is filfc, they come to deny both, 
and tailback into the conti-ary extreme, a contempt of all religion in general \ 
S>. Ill dating of a queftion j when men either put it wrong themfcK cs, or accept it 
fo put from others. A fmall addition or falfity Hipped into the cale will ferment, 
and fpread itfelf : an artificial color may deceive one : an incumberd manner may 
perplex one. The queftion ought to be prefented before its judge clean, and in its 
natural itate, without difguii'c or dillortion. To this lall may be fubjoind another 
caufe, nearly allied to it j nor fixing the fcnfc oi terms., and fwhich mull often fol- 
low) not rightly undcrftanding what it is, that is to be cxamind and rcfolved. 

Secondly,, the reafon why the m.iny are commonly in the wrong and fo wretch- 
edly misjudge things. The generality of people are not fufficiently prepared, 
by a proper education, to find truth by rcalbning. And of them, who have 
liberal education, lomc are foon immerfed and loft in pleafurcs, or at leaft in 
f.ilhionable methods of living, rolling from one vifit or company to another '', 
and flying from nothing fo much ;is from themfelves and the quiet retreats proper 
for meditation and rcalbning : others become involved in bulinefs and the intri- 
cate affairs of life, which demand their attention, and ingrofs their time : others fall 
into a flothful neglect of their ftudies and difufe of what they have learnt, or 
want help and means to proceed, or only dcfign to deceive life and gratify 
themfelves with the amufcmcnts and fcnlual parts of learning : and others there arc, 
whofe misfortune it is to begin wrong, to begin with the conclufion ; taking their 
opinions from places, where they have been bred, or accommodating them to 
their fituation in the world, and the conditions of that imploymcnt, by which 
tlicy are to get their bread, before they have ever confiderd them > and then 
making the fubfcqucnt bufinefs of their lives to difputc for them, and maintain 
them, right or wrong. If fuch men happen to be inthe right, it is luck, and part 
qf their portion, not the effc£t of their improvements : and ifthey happen to be 
in the wrong, the more they llud)', and the more learning they get, the more they 
areconfinnedin their eiTorsj and having fct out with their backs upon truth, 
the further they go, the more they recede from it. Their knowledge is a kind of 
negative quantity, fomuchwoife or lefs than no knowledge. Of this fort there 
are many : and very few indeed ('with refpefbtothe bulk of mankind^', whofe de- 
terminations and teneuti were ever in the form of quellions ; there could not otlier- 
wife be fo many fcfts and different denominations of men, ;is there are, upon 

• Aliii ihHhs tfi ieorum rrfftclus, »lni fuJrnJui. Plin. Sen. Tlic former part of this ob/crvilion 
u in truth the effcd"t of the bitcr. ^ Putltt Jicert frrquaiiiam fUutAiiJi, &c. Hieron. 

I the 

62 The Religion of Nature. Setfl. IV. 

the face of the earth. The fum of all in a few words is this: many qualificati- 
ons arcrequifitc in order to judge of feme truths, and particularly thofe which 
arc of greateji importance : proper learning and penetration, vacancy from bufi- 
nefs, a detachment from the interell of all parties, much fmcerity and a perfeft 
rejignation to the government of reafon and force of truth ; which are things 
not to be reconciled with the ufual ignorance, pafllons, tumultuaiy lives, and 
other circumllances which c;u-ry moll men tranfveife. 

Sedl. IV. Oj the Obligations ofimperfecl Beings 
njuith refpeH to their power of acting. 

THere remains yet another queftion, fuppofcd alfo to be propofed by an 
objeftor, which mull not be forgot > and upon which I fliall bellow 
this veiy fliort feftion. The queftion was this, // a man can find out truths 
may he not want thepozver of ailing agreeably to it ? 

I. Nothing is capable of no obligation. For to oblige nothing is the fame as not 
to oblige. 

II. So far as any being has no pozver, or opportunity of doing any things fo far is 
that being incapable of any obligation to do it : or, no being is capable of any obligation 
to do that, ivhich it has not poiver or opportunity to do. For that being, which 
has not the faculties or opportunity neceflliry to the doing of any thing, is inrc- 
fpe£t of that thing a being utterly unaftive, no agent at all, and therefore as to 
that aft nothing at all. 

To require or command one to do any thing is to require him to apply a power 
fuperiorto thcrcfiftcnce tobe met with in doing it. To require him to apply 
fuch a power is the fame as to require that his power of fuch a kind and degree be 
applied. But if he has no fuch power, then his power of that kind and degree 
is nothing : and it is notliing, that is required to be applied. Therefore nothing 
is required to be done. It is jull the fame, as if a man was commanded to do 
fomcthing with his third hand, when he has but two : which would be the 
fame as to bid him to do it with no hand, or not bid him do it. 

Without more ado, it is a truth confeftby ever)- body, that no body is obli- 
ged to impodibilitic,';. 

From hence will follow, after the manner of corollaries, the two following 
propofitioos. 11^- J"^"'- 

Of the Obligations, &c, 63 

III. Inanimate and unaElive beings are capable of no obligation: nor merely fen-- 
fitiiie of any obligation to aSl upon principles^ or motives above fenfe. 

W . The obligations of beings intelligent and aUive mujl be proportionable tt 
their faculties^ powers^ opportunities -^ and not more. 

V. To endeavour may fitly exprefs the ufe of all the opportunities andpozvers^ that 
any intelligent and a6iive, but imperfeEl^ being hath to act. For to endeavour is 
to do what one can : and this as every fuch being may do, where ever he llands in 
the fcalc of imperfefts, fo none can do more. One may exert his endeavours 
with greater advantage or fuccds, than another ; yet flill they arc but endeavours. 

\'I. The imputations of moral good and evil to beings capable of underjianditigand 
acltng muJl be in proportion to their endeavours : or, their obligations reach, as far at 
their endeavours may. This follows again from what has been faid : and fo does this» 

\'II. undhiWy^ They who are capable of difcerning truthy tho not all truths, and 
of ailing conformably to it, tho not always or in all cafes, are neverthelefs obliged to 
do thefe, as far as they are able : or, // is the duty of fuch a being fincerely to en- 
dca\oiir to pra£lice reafon > not to contradict any truth, by word or deed ; and in 
foort, to treat every thing as being what it is. 

Thus the general duties of rational beings, mcntiond in or refulting from the 
preceding fecSlions, arc brought together, and finally fixt under the correction or 
limitations this laft propofition. This isthcfum of their religion, from which 
no exemption or cxcufc lies. Every one can endeavour : c\cry one can do 
what he can. But in order to that cvciy one ought to be in carne;?, and to ex- 
ert hi mfclf Afar///)' > not ftifling his own confciencc, not dilTcmbling, fupprefs- 
ing, or neglecting his own powcn. 

And now ncedlefs to me fecm thotb difputes aliout human liberty, with which 
men have tired theTnfclvcs and the world. The cafe is much the fiime, as if a 
man Ihould have fome great reward or advantage offcrd to him, if hewouKlgct 
up and go to fuch a place to accept it, or do fome certain thing for it, and he, 
inftcad of going or doing any thing, falls intoa tedious difquifition about hisowu 
freedom ; whether he the power to Itir, or whether lie is not chaind to his 
feat, and ncccflltatcd to fit flill. The fliort way of knowing this certainly is to 
try. If hecando nothing, no labor can be loftj but if he is capable of afting, 
and doth not aft, the confequcnccs and blame mult be juftly chargeable upon 

I i himlelf. 

(54 The Religion of Nature. Sedt. IV". 

himfclf. And I am perfuaded, if men would be ferious, and put forth them- 
felves », they would find by experience, that their wills are not fo univerfally 
and peremptorily determind by what occurs, nor prcdcftination and fate fo ri- 
gid '', but that much is left to their own condud: '^. Up and try ''. 

Sure it is in a man's power to keep liis hand from his mouth : if it is, it is alfo in 
his power to forbear excefs in eating and drinking. If he has the command of his 
own feet, fo as to go either this way or that or no whither, as fure he has, it is in 
his power to abftain from ill company and vicious places. And fo on '. 

This fuggefts a verj' material thought : th-xi forbearances^ at Icaft in all ordinary 
cafes, arc within our power *"> fo that a man may if he will, forbear to do that, 
which contradifts truth : but where afting is required, that very often is not in his 
power. He may want abilities, or opportunities ; and fomay fcem to contradict 
truth by hisomifilon, which, if his infirmities and diliidvantagcs were taken into 
the account, and the cafe was rightly ftatcd, he would be found not to do. 

• Ta x"^''' »~ir«^iS«> J'' yi'/^iirx-dj'}/-, Oux. oxtovSj^u cX' '' /* ii»V'*5 "^"i "^^ Eurip. b nXQ 

in jlrabic is to die : and from hence the word fatum fcems to come (as mmy Latin words do from 
that and other EaJlerH languages), death, if any thing, being fat^il and ncceflary. Yet it doth not fol- 
low, that therefore the time or manner of dyin^ is unmovcably fi.xt. OO^avrx xx^a^Zf iS'i a/*/:;>V- 
(Jijir li iiiJbii^i^ti -zS&iixi, «»" i™ KoL^!i?M. Plut. Chryfipfnt ap. A. Gell. fcems to explain himfelf much 
after the fame manner. The ancients moreover fcem many times to make fate conditional. Similii 
fi atra fuiffet, Nee pater omnipoter.s Trojam, nee fata letabant Stare, ere. Virg. c what 

the Vharijeei fay, according to Jefephus, fcems to be right. Oi f^ it <l>u^i(rai:ii ti»» >C i rdtTo. -Ss 
iii/,u.cihf>r,i ilvxi Xi'/xint !«'/»'• '"'** A' '<? '«'"'»'i ^x'^i', <rvu,cai't{ii Tt li. i •/ 'Kp^. R. Alio, in rela- 
tion tO human aftions (and the confequent events), explains this opinion thus. J—tin-ria ipypo 

toy mTinni m^nn jo nm'yo ;nvpoi nm:/TD ;ni'pDi. But for men to charge their o\vn 

feults upon fate or fortune has been an old prafticc: i3-f/.«x«>£i,<ra>r«« — js-i t«. xeiw i«i>»:» l^-nAoiat 
xitTct(fi-j-/ii't, kA. Luc. '' DimiJiiimfaili, qui cocpit, habet. frptre aude. Hor. Ari/lotit goes 

further tlian tJiat old adagial faying (if;t;i ^i.^^tw nutTct). His words are Acxu^mTcv H to 'nu,i(n t; 

^rxyrsi (i>at o. xpxt. ' Quia ■fi irru xxxui (runnTxxTxi T •i'v;,y,> «;(;«»7*>, iifi io*AbrT®- av- 

t5 Tfoiiwi ni^xi, ii <p6iyfi^ yXarlxt, kA. Flnt. That in Tibullui, Ciim bene juravi, pes tamm ipji 
redit, is a little poetic fally. i "OA»»« 5 '»'" «("/"'» 'b "="" '■''j;»e"i! ^i»h«i «>" if/^-fK-'e*' •"» 


Truths relating to the Deity. 6^ 

Sect. V. Truths relating to the Deity. 0/ his 
exijience, perfection, providence, &c. 

IHavefhewn in what the nature of wer^/^oc^ and fwVconfillsj viz. a confor- 
min- or difagrcancnt to truth^ and thole things that arc coincident with it, rca- 
fon and bappinefs : allb, how truth is difcovcrd •, by fcnfc.^ or rea forty or both. I flmll 
now ipccify fomeof thofc truths^ which arc of grcatcft importance and influence, 
and require morereafoning to difcoverthem ; leaving the reft (common matters of 
faftj to the common ways of finding them. They rcfpcd principally cither the De- 
ity, or ourfelves, or the reji of mankind. The firft fort are the fubjeft of //^;j fc6bioi>, 

I. Tl'here there is afubordination of caufes andeffeEls., there mufl necejfarily be a 
caufe in nature prior to the refi^ uncaufcd. Or thus, IVhere there is a feries, in 'which 
the exiflence of 6ne thingdepends upon another.^ the exijience of this again upon fame 
other f and fo upwards^ as the cafe fliall be, there mufi be fome independent beings 
upon "whom it doth originally depend. 

If Z (fome bodyj be put into motion by Y, Y by X, and X by \V, it is 
plain that X moves Y, and Y moves Z only as they are firll moved, X by W 
and Y by X ; that Z, Y, X arc moveds, or rather Z more Y more X, taJccn to- 
gether ', arc one moied : that W Hands here as the firll mover, or author of tlie 
motion, unmoved by any other : that therefore without W there would be a 
moved without a mover., which is abfurd *> : and laftlv, that of what length foever 
thcy^r;?j may be, the cafe will be ever the lame ; i. e. H' there be no Firji mover ' 
unmoved, there nuift be a moved without :i mover. 

Further, if W, whom we will fuppofe to be an intelligent being, and to have 
a i[inwcT o( beginning morion, hath this powcv originally in himfclfand independently 
of all others, then here not only the firfl mover in this feries^hui a Fir/I being aijd 
origiaal caufe is found. Becaufc that, v. hich has a power of beginning motion in 
dependent of zny other, is a mover independent > and therefore is indepen/icnt or has 
an independent cxillcnce, finccnotliingcanbeamovcr without ^r//;^. But if W 

• -. 1 I ; ••.. ' One might with the lTi««-iSr«. (fo a^loihj AriJIoth, up. s. Zmp.) as wclj 

deny, that there ij any fucb thing u motion, a fiy there is mothn without a moirr, or, which is 
tic lime, a/r/? f n,»T.» /*•':«?«»«. {Uit. Afxi «'»'>l»? iT«(r»t Ul. Hjaroicrv. Arijl. 

- has. 


66 The RtLiGiOM of Nature. Seel. V. 

has not this power independently in himfclf, then he mufl: receive it from fomc o- 
ther, upon whom he depends, and whom we will call V. If then V has a power of 
conferringa faculty oi producing motion originnUy and independently in himfclf, 
here will be a Firft^ independent caufe. And if it can be fiippofcd, that he has it not 
thus, and that the /fnV; fliould rife too high for us to follow it; yet however we 
cannot but conclude, that there is fome fuch caufe^ upon whom this train of beings 
and powers mult depend, if wcreafonas in the former paragraph. For, 
^ Univerfally^ if Z be any effeEl whatfoevery proceeding from or depending upon 
y asthef««/eofits cxiilence, Y uponX, X upon W, it is m anifcll: that the ex- 
iftence of all, Z, Y, X docs originally come from W, which Hands here as the 
Supreme caufe, depending upon nothing: and that without it X could not be, 
and confcqucntly neither Y, nor Z. Z, Y, X, being all effccbs (or dependents;, 
or rather Z more Y more X one effect^ without W there would be an effcft without 
a caufe. Laftly, let this retrogrclllon from effects to their caulLs be continued ever 
fo far,thc fime thing will Itill recur, and without fuch a caufe as is before mentiond 
the whole will be an cffcft without an efficient, or a dependent without any 
thing to depend upon ; /'. e. dependent^ and not dependent. 

Ohj. The feries nuyaiccnd infnitely'y and for that reafon have no ;?r/? mover or 
caufe. j^nf. If a feries of bodies moved can be fuppofed to be infinite, then taken 
together it will be equal to an infinite body moved : and this moved ^\\\ not lefs re- 
quire a mover than a finite bodv, but infinitely more. If I may not be permitted 
to place a firlt mover at the top of ihey?/7c/, becaufeit is fuppofed :o be infinite, 
and to have no beginning j yet ftill there muftofneccility he fome caulc or author 

• The greateft men among the ancients denied the polTibility of fuch an afcent. OiiVi -^ rieX c'x 
rui'i S'luntTt) titxi in aricer. Arijl. If there coulJ bc fuch a procefs, then all the parts of it but the 
laft would bc ///iV* : and then t^Tij uu/i^ir iVi ri rear or, 'nXuca'iTiot s^iv tTt, "cA. To fuppofronethinj 
moved by anotljer, this by another, and fo «t' aiti^ot, is to fuppolc irio «Vi» ahnartr iht ^ i/rc^i 
in xuit i>«M i(Ti xitufS/jtt, ^u striii kex^ "^ Ki>»ir>i;. Simpl. Not only thoft Arabian philofbphers 
•ailed Hebr. CJn^nt:, Arab. \mb'2T\r:b-ii, but many of the elder ^firj have agreed with the Grttiti 
in this matter, and added arguments ot their own. Of the former fee A/or. nebok (y at. particularly 
S.Kox.ri: where their lirft argument feeras to be ftrong (andmuchthcfamewith the fourth in S.Emii. 

noth). pN r-iNin nyn ny q?inn joia □>xyo:n 3ivi/'i<n nan n^WNt ^^ j's n^'n n\T :i3n 

byisn bjJ NV vb n^b^n l!? (>biu; noi urh n^b^n. For tho, as Mufiatus oblcrves, thcfe rca- 
fonings of the Mt.Ubbenm rmi)DnJ V^ob" TTl (IVlb sb ; y<^t ffiof^ certainly let the feria of caulc.i 
•nd effefts be what it wil), it is juft as long Jawn-aard as tifwarJ; and if they arc mrinite and inc.v- 
haufliblc one way, they mart be fo the other too: and then what Saad.Ca. fays, takes place Nt5 qjj 
1:31 niD) Nt* 13'PN r\^\r\r\ yjn. There is another argument of this kind in Juftin M. which de- 
fcrvcs odticc, what ftrefs foever may bc laid upon it. hi re /u,i»o> |U.i«^- 2 x,("''t ^X' he, btk if »" 
n* ^ t^Ti yt'ms iAii(&' ^xt"" ^(' ^ yoi^ /i/i»w lit uf» »ri six >i» to yiysri? /*>{^ f Xi'"' 

f Of 

Truths relating to the Deity. 6j 

of the motion', different from :ill thefe bodies, becaufc tlicir being (by the 
fuppofition) no one body in the feries^ that moves the next, but only in confc- 
quence of its being moved hrll itfelf, there is no one of them tlut is not movcd^ 
and the whole can be conliderd together but as an infinite body moved, and 
which muft therefore be moved by fomtthing. 

The fame kind of anfwer holds good in refpeft of all cffe£ts and their caules 
in general. An infinite fuccefHon of cflcfts will require an infinite efficient, or 
acaufe infinitely cjf'eflive. So far is it from requiring none. 

Suppofeaf/ja;«'' hung down out of the heavens from an tt«X'«0'a;« height, and 
tho every link of it gravitated toward the earth, and what it hung upon was 
not vifiblc, yet it did notdeicend, but kept its fituation; and uponthisaqucfli- 
on fliould arife, /Fbat fupporled or kept up this chain : would it be a fufficient an- 
fwer to fiy, that the firft (or lowcltj link hung upon the fecond (or that 
next above it), the fecond or rather the firft and fecond together upon the ibird^ 
and io on ad infi.nitum ? For what holds up the lubole ? A chain of ten links would 
fall down, unlels fomething able to bear it hinderd : one of twenty^ if not flaid 
by fomething of a yet greater llrength, in proportion to the increafe of weight: 
and therefore one of infinite links certainly, if not fuftaind by fomething infi- 
nitely itrong,and capable to be.xr up an infinite weight. And thus it is in a chain 
of caufcs and ctTccts ' tending, or as it were gravitating^ towards fome end. 
The lafl or loweft) depends, or (as one may fayj is fufpended upon the caufe a- 
bove it : this again, if it be not the firfl caufe, is fiif^pcnded as an effeft upon 
Tomcthing above it, l^c. ^. And if they fhould be infinite, unlcfs (agreeably 

• AriftotU himfelf, who aflerts the eternity of motion, afTerts a]fo the necefTity of a firft and 

eternal rxner. ^ Zitt>.t x-^j<rtJui i^ i^r>^^tt . Horn. Auren He coelo — funis is menciond 

too by Lucr. ' r-l'b~P Tb^ Sn *71^yi ."— iVo V^V ^^':TWW 1U;BN >N. S. Iqqar. 

WlKtc more may be fcen of this nii^'^tT^yn out of I6n Sinai, Maim. (^c. <i The 

chain muft be fatknd a6« pVo. Oi/Atfuot*. Initnietur, fays Macrobius, frtjjiiu intutnti a fummo 

Dec ufc^He ad ul:im*-n rerum ftcem ctnnexio: {^ htc eft Homeri catena aures, qUAtn ftnJtre d* 

coilo m terms Dtum ^xjpjfe commemorat. This matter might te liluftratcd by other iimilitudc* 
(even .—("^pn r~'pWc might fervc for one) : but I ft.all fct down but one more ; and in that in- 
dixd the motion is iavatol, tut »hc thing is the fame taken cither way. It occurs in Hho6. hallei. 
and afterward in Re/h. hhokm. Suppofe a raw of blind men, of which the laft bid his hand upoa 
the fhouldcr of the man next before him, he on the ftioulder of the next before him, and fo on till 
the forcmoft grew to be quite out of light ; and fomc body asking, what guide this ftring of Wind 
men had at the head of them, it ftiould be anfwerd, that they had no guide, nor any head, but one 
held by another, and fo went on, adinfin. woukl any rational creature accept this for ajuft anfwer? 
Is it not to {ay, that infinite blindacfs (or biindncis, if it be inAnitr) fupplics the place of fiehr, or 
of a guide .> 


68 The Rkligion of Nature. Seel. V, 

to what has been Hiidj there is fomc caufe upon wliich all hang or depend, they 
would be but an infinite efFeft without an efficient : and to ali'crt there is any 
fuch thing, would be asgieatan (^zZ'/^/r^/Vy, as to lay, that a finite or little weight 
wants ibmething to fuftain it, but an infinite one or the greateji does not. 

II. A Caufe or Beings that has in nat/tre nofuperior caufe^ and therefore ('by the 
termsj isalfo unproduced^ and independent, muft le felf-exifent : i. e. cxiflence mufl 
be ejfential to hint; or., fuch is his nattire, that he cannot but be^. For eveiy be- 
ing mufl; cither cxift of it f If, or not of itfelf : that which exifts not of itfclf 
mull dcri\e its cxiilencc fiom fomc other, and fo be dependent : but the Being 
mentiond in the propofition is'fuppofcd to be independent, and uncaufed. There- 
fore He mufl: exill, not this way, but the other. The root of His exiftencc 
can be fought for no where, but in His own nature: to place it any where 
elfc is to make a caufe y/.'/fncr to the Supreme. 

III. 11:eyenmjl be fuch a Being. For (T^cfide what has been faid alreadyj if 
there was not at lealt one fuch Being, nothing could be at all ''. For the uni- 
verfe could not produce itfelf " > nor could any part of it produce itfelf, and 
then produce xhtrejl : becaufe this is fuppofing a thing to aSi before // is. 

• So Arijlotle fays of the Firft mover, Oiy. <:!t^tx.trxi <«»»? txi'' «| «'«.'x>)? «Vi, xA. And af- 
ter him the Argbic philofophers, Maimonides, Alio, ^ al. pajf. teach .ill tlut Go<l cxifls necej/linly. 
1~nyn IpVin JD: to fuppofehimnotto beimpliesa falfityj or, He cannot be fuppofcd not to be. 
This fecms to be the import of that name, by which God calls himfelf in Mofes's hiftory ; "iWM n'nx 
rrrivj ; or in one word, riTlN ; which in the mouth of one who fpeaks of Him in the third pcrfon 
is ri^r\^ or nin-. So PhUo explains it ; Eirai x^^vkx. So Abarbandi O H^HNU/ nuyia .THN '3i» 
"'0:/J'3 n'pn T'^ITn ^^bn TnM-'YD J^N; adding moreover, that it iV.cwd God to be not, like other 
Ixrings, niN^yon nWE'N, but lOi'y nvo niN'ynn 3"in0, iSeceffary being. And foR. L. h.Gerfli, 
iniDVyD NyD> -iU/n NVO^H N^HXI; awn nt n-\l\ I omit others, who write after the fameman- 
rer. There have been even Heathens, who feemd to think, that fomc fuch name as this Wongd to 
the Deity, and for the fame reafon. For as nin>J and thence niH' are ufed abo\e, fo flutarch 
lays, that in addreffing to Him the fecond perfbn Ei" (n>nn, or ninn j is iuroxiA,? J e.i xfvrxyi.- 
fiStiiri? ti, ^w(pan:irii : and that by this compclbtion we give Him iAn^S »^ «H'<<'»>i "t fwiu* ««'»» 
n-«(niicKO-«/ Try? iTiai x^trxyi-^jny. 'Hu-nr uifi yl ctTt/f ^ umi u,tTiftf ii'ir it 'S " <"'>" *; a'/inircir 

>£ «ip9-«fr« that is iWiv? iV. ' " Something muft be niN^VDH D^inC, otherwife .-i^n^ >>5b 

b'PD H'J'OJ 12T : every thing cannot be r—llN'VD 1Vi;3N . &t. A^<"'- "f^- & "'• ' This 

needs no demonHration. But there is a very old one in ,9. Emttn. and after in Hlicb.hMeb. nu'iy 

,NDn':\i;i m^in inN in m^n D^p lOify r^ nvryw xy-\y^ owe ^nND wbn^ ^^ n^V pn 

IV. Such 

Truths relating to the Deity. 6g 

IV. Su:b a Bein^, as is he/ore defer ibedy niufl not only be eternal ^ but irifmte_ 
Eternal He mull be, bccaulc there is no way, by which luch a Being can either 
begin or cea/e to be, cxiftcnce being of His cHence. And infinite He mufc be, bc- 
caulc He can oe Umitcdhy no other as to his cxiftcnce. For if there was any being 
able to limit Him, He muft be inferior to that being. He muft alfo in that cafe 
he dependent : bccaufc he muft be beholden to that being for his being ivhat He 
iSy and that He is not confined within narrower Vimits. Befide, if His prefenee 
(whatever the manner of it is) was any where excluded. He would not be//;frf .- 
andif ?;5/ there, He might be fuppolcd to be Kot elfeivhere : and thus he might 
• be fuppofed mt to be at all. But fuch a Being, as is delcribcd in the II. prop, 
cannot lb much as be fuppofed not to be. 

V^ Such a Being is aboze all things, that fall under our cognizance : and thcre- 
. fore hii manner of exiflence is above all our conceptions. For He is a neceffary cx- 
iftcnt: but pothing within our comprchenfion is of this kind. We know no 
being, but what wc can imagine not to be without any contradi6bion or repug- 
nance to nature : nor do we know of any befide this Supreme being himfclf For 
with refpect to Him indeed wc know, by rtafoning, that there »;///? be One be- 
ing who cannot be fuppofed not to bej Juft as certainly as we know there is 
any thing at all : tho wc cannot know ///w, and how he cxifts. Adequate 
ideas of eternity » and infinity are above us, us finites ''. 

• what relation or anaJogy there is between time (a flux of moments) and tttrnnl (unchangeable) 
cxiftcnce i how any being (houU be not older n»w, than he wai j-ccc years ago, ^c. are ^cula- 
tions attended with jnlu^ablc diificuliics.' Nor are they at all cleard by that of Timtus ap. plat. 

d with inlupaablc diificuliics. Ni 
:< .'ifw-j .ttj.». }, ■., • f..v 

OitaT nifin TxfccJi.-/u,tc T i/xrixtt k4^u.» til •>«>»; *y»ftic.Ti)> irrwt m vfit iTMMMity^K T aitmtt 'ft 
Xfii^"iv' <uru^ i^u.iwiyi^r i orthat it\>Ff>ilp, Aitrt im'/fiipiTai if >«iir» $i&- Ktr/tia, af<i tn6ir,rm 
, X»*^' Many philosophers therctorc have! thought thcmi'cives obliged to deny, that Cod cxitU vt 

timt. , T», T lm,,Tt,,T M'*!*^*?!* -/iV»>»T©- !»<>!, (flftTTIC, >M<^ U.t a fUft tit I Trt ut^iCT icitCT, CtTX. iftif, K>.. ^ 

Plato. ''E«-i» » ©l«j, xt^ ^»'»i, i tf ""■ «(^i»« Xf"" «*« K«Ti« T i,iSt» r it».r<!r«», i' ix}'"' ^ tit'lKX' 
r», c H xfiTtfti, iSi< iVi», i^l vttfn ii\ ri*Tif«r «*' li? tn eVi ra »« to ««' ^iy>.ifiiKt, x^. Tlut. 
)31 join ;i31 O'i DH' fN n'7yr»' □U'n. Maii/t. ;»:13 ^ViD iTN- IJ- -^'^0 has a whole Chap- ^■ 
ter to Diew ^cn r~inp Va'iJ Vi'Vj ■>"ntr;. But then he owns, that their ItakUs do nOfinean ~ 

ni^ua iDtn, oi' cstd i»3*, t* that rr^'vo czn'p .—i^nu; ^u/cn t-^-m -lyuro^ -^00) 'niJa 
"■'■^bi "7a?jn, but >'^'^ m'jvL'a nir'«^ t3»3Di tid N-\p3 '?a^jn ryunD -lyvi'cn |on. inflwrt. 
.they^ reckon (to ufc R. GeM's words) JOT >n7D )3'N 1U/oni n"\33 Nin 'PcnH (oiw. And i'o 
wha: they fay, doth not include iJl the prclcnt difficulty, lime in their ufc of the word lying cohfi- ^ 
' ned to she duration ofthis world, whithaccordingro them it new. Yet fee b. ». r. 19. t< N '"UTI -^ 

CDl^yn N-ia^s T^ninvnotn -pn'o^n 1^ n>n\i> noo cdv.t [ot iri' ib <r«u) r':>v ■toN'w 

^.J,'^, t't(t. T< J T»* in. •'<("«. So Chrjftfttm. ' • • ■■ V 


IvHw/t \}: 'A- lVM.vt " . V/vV 'WW.. * 

'1*1: 'J; • \^Av 

<.< kf^ » L*A 

yo The Religion of Nature. Sed.V. 

In inquiring after the caufes of things, when we find (ox fuppofc) this to be 
the caufc of that, another thing to be the caufe of this again, and fo on, if we 
can proceed, it may always be demanded Avith rcfpeft to the laft caufe that we 
can comprehend, IVhat is the caufe of that ? So that it is not poffible for us to 
terminate our inquiries of this kind but in fomcthing, which is to us incompre- 
benfible. And therefore the Supreme caufe mult certainly be fuch". But tho 
it is impoifible for us to have an adequate notion of his manner of cxiftcncc, 
yet we may be fure that, 

W.Heexljisinamanner^ which is per fc6l. ForHc, whoexifts of himfclf, de- 
pends in no regard upon any other,and (asbeing a Supreme caufe) isthc fountain 
of cxillcnce to other beings, muft exift in the uppermo/l and bejl manner of cx- 
illing. And not only fo, but (fince He is infinite and illimitcd) He muft exill 
in the beft manner illimitedly and infinitely. Now to exift thus is infinite good- 
nefs of exiftencej and to exift in a manner infinitely good is to be perfelt. 

VII. There can be but One fuch Being ^ That is, as it appears by prop. III. 
that there muft be at leaft owe independent Being, fuch as is mentiondinprop. I. 
fo now, that in reality there is but One ". Bccaufe his manner of exiftencc 
being perfect and illimited, that manner of being ('if I may Ipeak fo) is exhaujl- 
ed by Him, or belongs folely to Him'^. If any other could partake with Him 
in it. He muft want what that other had > be deficient and limited. Infinite 
and illimitcd inclofe all '. 

If there could be /we Beings each by himCclf alfolutcly perfect, they muft be 
eitherof the7^Jw^,or o( different natures. Of the fame they cannot be j bccaufe 
thus, both being infinite^ their exiftences would be coincident: that is, they would 
be but the fame or one. Norcan they be of <///tTf«/ natures: becaufe if their na- 
tures were oppofite or contrary the one to the other, being equal (infinite both and 
every where meeting the one with the other), the one would ]u(t defray or be 

• Simonidts had good reafon ftill to double upon Hiere the number of days allowd for anAvering 
that qucftion, &^hiJ, ant quale /it Deui .' Ap. Cic. '' >-'« I'i" qutd^Ham fimilt aut/ctan- 

Jum. Hor. ' In Mor. net. MaimoniJei having provd, liiat ihcrc muft bcfotnc Being, who 

erifts r.ecrjfarily, or whofc cxiftcnce is ntctlf»ry lOW nrn^n, proceeds from this neccftity ot cxi- 
ftcncc to derive incorfortity, MoMC jimfUaty, ftrfelii<">- and particulnrly nmty, niN>yon a"inOn 
W1 13n n!?1 non t^i> h'i'O movun in -iU'SN 'N. * Therefore by rtato He is caCcd 

'O IK, tht Out. ' Dtus, fi ftrftilui tfl,- ut tffe itbit, r.on pettji tjft r.iii tatus, ut in 

te jini omnia. If there could be more (Jods tlvitt one, ta'iiMm jinpilii Jetrit, qiiAmum in cdieru 
fiurit. Laft. 

1 the 

Truths relating to the Deity. ji 

the negation of the other ' : and if they arc fuppofed to be only different, not op- 
pofitc, then if they differ as difpamtes, there muft be fome genus above them j 
which cannot be : and however they differ, they can only be Hiidat moftto be 
beings pcrfcft in their reCpcnhe kinds. But this is not to be ahfohitely perfcft ; 
it is only to be perfect xwibis or that rcfpcct : and to be only thus impUcs im- 
perfection in other rcfpects. 

What has been here faid is methinks fufficient to ruin the Manichean cnufe 
and exclude the independent principle of e-jil. For if we cannot account for the 
exiftence of that cvi/, which we find by experience to be in the world, it is but 
one inflanceout of many of our ignorance. Tliere m.iy be reafons for it, tho wc 
do not kno-jv them. And certainly no fuch experience muft make us deny axioms 
or trtubs equally ceitain ''. There are, befide, f?me thing: .dating to this fub- 
ject, which dcfcrvcour attention. For as to moral good and tvi:, they fecm to 
depend upon ourfclves"^. If wcdobut endcavoui, the moft wc can, to do what 
we ought, we fliall not be guilty of not doing it (fc£t. IV .) : and therefore it is 
our fault, and not to be charged upon any other being ^^ if guilt andewV be in- 
troduced by our neglect, or abufc of our own liberty and powers =. Then as to 
/Aji/ra/cvilj without it much phy ileal ^oo(/ would hclo(t,thc one necefTiirily infer- 
ring tlr: other T Some thingsy^f ;« to be evil, which would not appear to be fuch, 
if we could fee through the whole contexture of things 8. There are not more e- 
vilthan good things in the world, butfurcly more of the latter ^\ evils of 
this kind, as well :is of the former^ come by our own fault ; fome perhaps by way 
ofpuni/iment ; fome oirhyftc ' ; and fome as the means to happincls, not otherwifc 
to be obtaind. And if there is a future llate, that which feems to be wrong noiu 
may be reftiiied hereafter. To all wliich more may yet be added. As, that matter 
is not capable of perfection > and therefore where that is concernd, there niuli be 
imperfections, and confcquemly evils ''. So that toiu>k, why God permits evil, is 

• As light and darknef- are. An -/j iJiTa^orrse a»,'.>.ii', tcxr' cVetrr/wo-ir ^J«t*Ti»« ir«' T«>T«n Tr{ 

i».fiXtit ru;tirttit. Baf. There can be no fuch hw between them, as is laid to be among the Hea- 
then deities. 0i«i<ri *•,' it^ ix,i »«/*^. OiJJiij <!swa>r« /!«AiI«i ^fftAv/tiU Tj ? SiAwt©-, kX, Eurif, 

* 'Axi>M>.ti i «>j|.^it', iTii ro ivrvp^ut; I J. « Irvxnt txii i-jTilicim- ti f-> k«t« yinn' 

itu>*»Txnn, in mctk tv/Ju, xttniiut,, »A. Cyr. Hier, * '1I> <ii/To< n' >.u(i®-, Ttrtit tu(, »(/i'if 

fjkr ^iT>!c>i iritu'tu. S. Bt*A ' Mul Otd txtinguij!} fun, moon, and Jlan, htcaufe jome fto- 

fle vcrfhif tliem f Miflin. Auri ri i>.nii/,!i «c>'ti'«, 0i3< iraiVi^-. hSax T. ' H J.4'« ." «■*- 

fMtri T«j«<nii<.K^it ihnt Teri, k>.. hUx. T. This obfcrvition might be extended a great way. If 
there was, r. g. no fuch thing as foverty, there could be no richei, or no great benefit by them, 
there would be lorcc any arii or fcicnccs, eye. At y> uuAy, T«r kvU\ H v.» Tr.» iruTUTt, 

uiSKu, atratrit', xX Chryf. ' T<e U'I(>| Tftf <(«ra t< tXu fit rx<THV, it rt/fi^tim ^ ic^/jutr trru 

««iiMr (wiih more to this purpolc). Plgt. '' V. Mor. nclok- J. ii. 1 neAvufin i 

i WiJ >«TfiKi, Simfl. *■ Kieri'a li>.irriu,» r v>.m. Tlut. 

K i ' to 

72 The Religion o/" Nature. Sed. V. 

.If)'--:; ••■:;. -;o.:i''; [)■■:.; • 
to nsk, why he permits a wz^/ma/ world, or fudia being as is ' ; indowd in- 
deed with fomc noble faculties, but incumberd at the flime lime with bodily paf- 
fions and propenfions. Nay, I know not whether it be not to ask, why He 
permits any imperfcft being ; and that is, any being at all : which is a bold de- 
mand, and the anfwer to it lies perhaps too deep for us. If this world be de- 
{ignd ior :ipal<eftra^ where men '' arc to exercife their faculties and their virtues, 
and by that prepare themfelves for a fuperior flate*^ (^uid who can fiy it is not ?) 
there mufl: he difficulties and temptations^ occafions and opportunities for this ex- 
ercife. Laftly, if there are evils, of which men know not the true origin j yet 
if they would but ferioufly refledb upon the many marks of reafon^ •wifdom and 
"oodnefs evciy where to be obferved in inllanccs, which they do or W(?v undcr- 
ftand, they could fcarce doubt but the fame things prevaild in thofe, which 
they do not underrtand. If I fliould meet with a book^ the author of which I 
found had difpoied his matter in beautiful order, and treated his liibjcfts with 
reafonand exadncisj but at laft, as I red on, came to a/ew leaves written in a 
language which I did not know : in this cafe I fhould clofe the book with a full 
perlliafion, that the fame vein of good fcnfe, which fliewd itfelf in the former 
and much greater part of it, ran thro the other alfo : cfpccially having argu. 
ments a priori^ which obliged me to bclie\'e, that the author of it all was the 
fame pcrfon. This I fliould certainly do, rather than deny the force of thofc 
arguments, in order toaflcit two authors ofthey^wf book. But the evil prin- 
ciple has led mc too far out of my way, therefore to return. 

VIII. All other beings depend upon that Being mentiond in the foregoing propoji. 
tions for their exijience. For fince there can be but one perfe£b and independent 
being, the reft mull; be impcrfeft and dependent : and fincc there is nothing 
elfe, upon which they can, ultimately^ depend bcfide Him, upon Him they 
muft andi^o depend. 

IX. lie is therefore the Author of nature : nor can any tkingbe, or be do»f, but 
what He either caufcs (immediately^ or mediately)^ or permits. All beings (by the laft) 
depend uponHimfortheircxlftence: upon whom depends their exiftence, upon 
him alfo muft depend the intrinfic manner of their exiftence, or the natures of thefe 

• To that queflion. Why arc wc not lb made, Sin yniii /3ii>it/a/iatf i/Mt \jzTifyj>t t« iciMtfraitir^ 
S.Bafll anfwcrs, Bccaufi: ajir-i c'x s-f«aifi<rift/< x^ cine i| «»a/«iic yi>iT«i. And he who blames the Dei. 
ty becaufe we arc not impeccable, B^i» iTifor >■ rrt uXtyn q>uctt -t Aoyixit; TjoTi/ta, tC td> iuunirn xj 
tuafu/nri' "f TfMUfiTixii? <? //*TfaxrK. * A^XiTiit iffxiis, as tbtlo. ' In Chryfo^tm'i 

iylc, ifiTi!< iirifbiXt'o^, (t Ku^az-tf c* xetXairpx irl f T«f«r©- fiie iiytniC,:^, 'm .«7 rt Xv^nai to 

bemgs : 

Truths relating to the Deity. 73 

beings . and again upon whom depend their being and nature, upon Him depend 
the Kece£'ary effcHs and confcquencei of their being, and being fuch as they are in 
themfelvcs. Then, as to the acls of fuch of them as may he free agents., and the ef- 
fects of them, He is indeed not the Author of thofc j bccaufcbv the terms and 
fuppofiiion they proceed from agents, who have no ncceflity impofed upon 
them by Him to aft cither this or that way. But yet however thefc free agents 
mult depend upon Him as fuch : from Him they derive their power of afting : 
and it is He, who permits them to ufe their hberty > tho many times, through 
their own fault, they ufe itamifs. And,laltly, astothe nature of thofc reiatiotjs, 
which lie between ideas or things really exifiifig^ or which arife from fafts already 
done and pa ft ^ thefe lei'ult from the natuies of the things themfelvcs ; all which the 
Supreme being cither caufes, or permits (^as before). For fince things can be but 
in one manner at once, and their mutual relations, ratio's, agreements, dilagrec- 
ments, cfi"- are nothing but their manners of being with refpcd to each other 
the natures of thefe relations will be detemiind by the natures of the things. 

From hence now it appears, that whatever expreflcstheexiftencesor non-ex- 
iftcnces of things, and their mutual relations^; ihcy are., is trucby iheconflitHlion 
of nature: and if fo, it mull aUbbc agreeable to His perfeft comprehenfion of all 
ti-uth, and to His w/V/, who is at the head of it. Tho the aft of A (fome free a- 
gent) is the effcft of his liberty^ and can only be faid to he permittedhy the Su- 
preme being; yet when it is once donc^ the relation between the doer tindthc deed^ 
the agreement there is between A and the idea of one who has committed fuch a 
faft, is zfixt relation. From thenceforward it \!'\\\ always he prcdicable of 
him, that he was the doer of it : and if any onefliould deny this, he would go 
counter to natureand that great Author of it, whofe exiftence is now proved. 
And thus thofc arguments in feft. I. prop. IV. which turned only upon x fap- 
pcfition that there was fuch a Being, are here confirmed znd made abfolute. 

X- Th: onefufrcme and pcrfeEl Beings upon ubom the exiftence of all other beings 
and their poroers originally depend., is that Being, ivhom 1 mean by the "xord G O D. 

There are other truths ftill remaining in relation to the Deity, which we may 
kno'ju, and which arc necej/'ury to be known by us, if we would endeavour to de- 
mean our fclvcs toward Him according to truth and what He is. And they arc 
fuch, as not only tend to rcftify our opinions concerning His nature and attri- 
bute? } but alfo may fervc at the fame time as further proofs of Hisexiftejice, and 
an amplification of fome things touched perhaps too lightly. As, 


74 The Religion of Nature. Seel. V. 

XI. GOD cannot be corporeal : or, time can be no corporeity in God. Tlicre 
arc many things in matter utterly inconfiftent with the nature of I'ucha Being, 
as it has been dcmonftratcd God muft be. 

Matter t.-s.\^% in parts y everyone of which, by the term, is imperfefl * : but 
in a Being abfolutcly perfect there can be nothing that is imperfeft. 

Thefc parts, tho they are many times kept clofcly united by fome occult in- 
fluence, are in truth fo many diftinSl bodies, which may, at lead in oui- ima- 
gination, bedisjoind or placed otherwife: nor can we have any idea of matter, 
which does not imply a natuial difccrpibilitv and fufceptivity of various lliapes 
and modifications : ;. e. mutability Iccms to be ejfcntial to it. But God, cxift- 
ing in a miuincr that is perfe£t, cxills in a manner that mufl; be uniform, always 
one and the fame, and in nature unchangeable. 

Matter is incapable of acting, pajjive only, and Jlupid : which are defects, 
that can never be afcribed to him who is the Firll caufc or Prime agent, the 
Supreme intellect, and altogether perfect. 

Then, if He is corporeal, where ever there is a vacuum. He muft be excluded, 
and fo becomes a being bounded, finite, and as it were full of chafms. 

Laflly, there is no matter or body, which may not be fuppofcd not to be ; 
whereas the idea of God or that Being upon whom all others depend, involves 
in it cxiftence. 

* XII. Neither infinite fpace, nor infinite duration, nor matter infinitely extended, 
or eternally exifiing, nor any, nor all of thefe taken together, can be God. For, 

Space taken fcparately from the things, which pofTcfs and fill it, is but an 
empty fccnc or vacuum : and to fay, that infinite fpace is God, or that God is 
infinite fpace, is to fay that He is an infinite vacuum : than which nothing can 
be more abfurd, oxblafphcmous. How can fpace, which is hut a vail void, ra- 
ther the negation of all thing.s, tlianpofitivcly any thing, a kind oi diffufed no- 

* Ta' ffufii iVi. ^Jirti ^ (riiitciT^ ftiifiZ/tj^i ii; T^i.w, i«cr«> "' fbtfii ^ii to iar« iimi (f. i,-«n) Til 

«>.», fays Tktinus even of the Soul. '' .liJuxrai ;) ><J on (luiytl^ iJ'ii cirJ'i;>;ij i^^' Tc-.i'.-iir 

J L^' iiriecr ic^* uiJuipn >^ isiaiJiTo^ if it. Arijt. 

Truths relating to the Deity. 75 

thing; how can this, I /iiy, be the Fiift caufc, i^c. or indeed any caufe ? 
W'liut attributes befidc penetrability and cxtcnfion, what excellencies, what 
perfeftions is it capable of * ? 

As infinite ''■pace cannot be God, tho He be excluded from no place or fpacc j 
{b tho He is eternal, yet eternity or infinite duration itfclf is not God ■>. For 
duration, abftracted from all durables, is nothing adbually exilling by itfdf : 
it is the duration of a beings not a being. 

Infinite fpjce and duration^ taken together, cannot be God : bccaufc an inter- 
minable fpace of infinite duration is Hill nothing but eternal fpacc > and that 
is at moll but an eternal •vacuum. 

Since it has been already proved, that corporeity is inconfiftent with Divine 
perfedion,tho«rt//frl'liould be infinitely extended.^ or there fhouldbe an infinite 
quantity of it, yet Hill, where ever it is, it carries this /«fo«/r/?f«ff along with it. 

If to matter be added infi.nite duration, neither does this alter the nature of it. 
This only fuppofcs it to be eternally what it is, ;. e. eternally incapable of Di- 
vine perfection. 

And if to it you add the ideas of both infinite extenfion ('or fpacc) and dura- 
tion too; yetllill, fo long as matter is matter, it rrwx'ii always ^nd every where 
be incapable of Divinity. 

Laftly, not the univer/'e, or fum total of finite beings, can be God. For if 
it is, then every thing is divine, everything God, or of God j and fo a// things 
together muil make but one being <^. But the contrary to this we fee, there be- 
ing evidently many beings diltinct, and fcparable one from another, and inde- 
pendent each of other. Nay, this dillinftion and feparation of cxillcncc, be- 
fidc what we fee without us, we may even feel within ourfclves. We ^rcji- 
veraltj confcious to our fclves of the individuation and dillinction of our own 

• They, who call God CJipO, do ir lOipo b^D l^NI 'vjn Cmpo !StinU/ 'D"?. JhiJIibi. 
rW. Anuin. from the ancients, lOipD loiny J'ni D^iy h'U; CDipD n y^TS. oi ^ ■zK'>x"tt.i [i 
€>••<], aiux -acMij;; ^; ^at. Ph. Juil. By which ways of fpcaking jtho there is a Cabbaliftic reaibn 
alTigncd too; they intend chiefly to cxprcfs his omniprefcncc and immenfity. That m AB. Af.. 
fcm$ to be ot the fame kind, £> ityri yj l^uf^, (^ »i>iiurt3-«, k»i i<r^. i Such things as 

thefi:, how incongruous and wild focvct they are, have bin affirmed ; that God ii infinite du. 
ration, fpjce, q-c. What can be meant by that, Ka/i? «> >iv«ira i <<.«r iii><,. io Tiotmus .' 
<■ Were not they, who convafc with l<xjks, accuftomd to fuch trials, it would be fliocking to find 
hAli/Hi in Cirnt afTcrtiDg, tfft mundum drum : and yet in another place, that it is qiiafi commums de- 
OTHm, siijut k(in)ii.nin domus, eui urLs uirorumque ; and deorum, hcmir.umque cau/a fadus: inaao- 
ther, fniidtnti* ntorum mwidHm, (jy crmits mnndi partes (j- initio imjiitums tffe, (j> emni ttmfcrt 
aJmmifltATi: io another, mnnditm if/itm iiafHrii ^dminijlran : with otlier like inconJirbnccs. 

76 The Religion of Natujele. Sed. V. 

minds from all other : nor is there any thing, ot which we can be more cer- 
tain. Were we all the fame beings and had one mind, as in that cafe we 
muft have, thoughts covild not be private, or tlic peculiar thoughts of any one 
pcrfonj but they mull be common acts of the whole mind, and there could be 
but one confcience common to us all '. Befide, if all things conjunctlv are God 
or the Perfect being (I dread the mention of fuch things, tho it be in order to 
refute them), how comes this remarkable inflance of imperfection, among 
many others, to cleave to us, that we ihould not know even our felvcs, and what 
we are '' ? In fliort, no colleSlion of beings can be one being > and therefore not 
God. And the univcrfc itfelf is but a collection of dirtinct beings =. 

XIII. // is fa far from being true that God is corporeal, that there could be no 
fuch thing as either jnatter or motion, if there was not fome Superior being, upin 
•whom they depended. Or, God is juch a being, that "without Him there could be nei- 
ther matter nor motion. This muft be true of matter : becaufe it has been proved 
already, that there can be but one independent being ; that he is incorporeal j 
and that the cxiftencc of all other beings muft depend upon Him. But the fame 
thing may be proved othenvife. If matter (I mean the exiftence of it) does 
not depend upon fomcthing above it, it muft be an independent being ; and if 
an independent being, a neceflary being > and then there could be no fuch thing 
if. :i vacuum : but all bodies muft be perfectly folid; and, more than that, the 
whole world couldhc hut one fuch bodv, five times as firm asbrafs, and incapa- 
ble of all motion. For that being which cxijls necejfartly does neceffarily exifl : 
that is, it cannot not exijt. But in ^vacuum matter does not exift. 
• Moreover, if?»i?//^r be an independent, ncceflary being, andexifts of itfelf, this 
muft be true o( every particle oi if . and if fo, there could not only he no vacuum 

• 'Artrrm ii fl/ik i ijijn \j^iiX''] *& ■< "'^^ «»*• «>Jf«» ^ »,«'5 iii&afoA^'a, y^ «»»» inS-aKcSj, >^ »'- 

>m iij.erxtut Yfjuv^ ti Tf»5 i,».ii\v-., >C TpU To tm. Plot. Here this author is clear, tho at fome other 
times very dark. *> Cur quiilquam ignoraret animus hominis, ft efftt Deus! Cic. ' The 

fyftcm of Sfinofa is (b apparently talic, and full of impieties and contradiclions, that more needs not 
be faid againft it : tho much might be. What Vdlews lays in Cicero, is not only true, Si mundui efl 

deui, iti membrn partim ardentia partim refrigtrata eticenda funt : tut, if there is but one fub- 

ftancc, one nature, one ieing, and-thij being isGckl, then all the follies, niadnrfP.cs, wiikcvlneflcs that 
are in the world, are in God; then all things done and fufttrd arc both done and i'ufTierd by Him; 
He is both caufe and cffeft; He both willes and nillcs, affirms and denies, loves and hates the fame 
things at the fame time, grf. That fuch grot Athcil'm as this<hou!d ever be fafhionablc! Athtifin: 
'or certainly \vhcn we inquire, whether ihtrc ii n God, we do not ini^uiro, whether we ourfelvcs 
and all other things which are vifible about u'; do txifl : fomcthing different from thtm muft be in- 
tended. Therefore to fay, there is no God difftrcnt from them, is to fay, there is no God at all. 
f but 

Truths relating to the Deity. 77 

but every particle muft be every where. For it could not be limited to occupy only 
a place oi fuch certain dimenfions by its own nature ; fincc this confinement of 
exillcncc within certain bounds implies non-cxiftencc in other places beyond 
thofc bounds, and is equal to a negation of exiilcnce j and when cxiJleNcchcfTcn' 
tial to any being, a negation of exijicnce cannot be fo. Nor, in the next place, 
could its cxillence be limited by any thing el/ey becaufc it is fuppolcd to have its 
cxiftcnce only of itfclfj /. e. to have ^principle of cxillence in itfclf, or to have 
an cxillence that is not dependent upon or obnoxious to any other. 

And I may add llill, if matter be felf-exiftcnr, I do not fee, not only how it 
comes to bereftniind to a place of fome certain capacity, but alfo how it comes 
to be limited inother rcfpeEls; orwhyit fliouldnot exift in a manner that h in all 
refptds perfect. So that thus it appears, matter mull derive its exiilcncc from 
fome other being, who caufcs it tobejuft what it is. And the being, who can 
do this, muft be God. 

It is tonopurpofe to obje^l here, that one c^Jinox. conceive^ how the exiftencc 
of matter can be derived from another being. For God being aboie our concept ionsy 
the manner in which He operates, and in which things depend upon him, muft 
alfo be unconceivable. Rcafon difcovers, that this vifible world muft owe its cx- 
iftcnce to fome invifible Almighty being > /. e. it difcovers this to be Eid, and we 
muft not deny ficls becaufe wc know not how they are eflfefted. It is far from 
being new, that our faculties lliould difclofe to us the exiftencc of things, and 
then drop us in our inquiry how they arc. Thus much for matter. 

As i'oT motion; without a Firftcaufe, fuch as has been dcfcribed, there could be 
none : and much \eCs/uch motions as we fee in the world. This may be immediately 
deduced from the foregoing paragraphs. For if matter itfclf could not be without 
fuch a caufe, itisccitain»;o//o«, which is an affccbion of matter, could never be. 

But further,thcre could be no «;o//c;;,unlcfs either there be in matter itfclfa pow- 
CY oi beginning it ; or it is communicated from body to body in an infinite fucceffion^ov 
in a «rc/f, and fo has no beginning} or elfe is producedhy fome incorporeal being, 
or beings. Now as hardy as men arc in advancing opinions that favor their vices 
tho never fo repugnant to rcafon, I can hardly believe any one will afTert, t a par- 
cel ofmere matter flet it be great or fmall, of any figure whatfoever, Scc.j left alto- 
gether to itfclf, could ever of itlclf ^^'j^/w to move. If there isany fuch bold ariertor, 
Icthim fix hiscyes upon fome lumpof matter, f^r. ^r. a7?o«f, y^iccc of timber^ or a 
cled Cclcard of all animals' , and pcrufc it well ; and then ask himfclf fcriouHy, whe- 
ther it is polTiblc for him in carncft to believe^ that that fione^ log, or clod, tho no- 
thing corporeal or incorporeal ftiould excite or meddle with it, might fome time or 
oihu of itlclf begin to creep However, to be iliort, a ipowcr of bcginni/jg motion 

L is 

78 The Religion of Nature. Seel. V. 

is not in the idea of matter. It is pafllve, as we fee, to the imprcflions of mo- 
tion, and fufccptive of it } but cannot produce it. On the contrary, it will al- 
ways pcrfift uniformly in its prefent fiate, either of reft or motion, if nothing 
ftirs, diverts, accelerates, or ftops it. Nor is there any thing in all phyfics bet- 
ter fettled than that, which is called r/\f ineriiie^ or the inertia of matter. 

The propagation of motion from body to body, without any Firji mover, or 
immaterial caufe of motion, has been proved impoffible, prop. I. 

The fuppofition of a perpetual motion in a circle is begging the qucftion. For 
if A moves B, B moves C, and fo on to Z, and then Z moves A j this is the (lime 

as to fay, that A moves A, by the intervention of B, C, D, Z: that is, 

A moves itfelf, or can begin motion '. 

It remains then, that all corporeal motions come originally from fome mov-er 
incorporeal: which muft be either that Supreme and felf-cxifting fpiiit himfelf, 
who is God } or fuch, as will put us into the way how to find, that there is 
fuch a Being. Turn back to p. 6^. 

If wc confider our/elves., and the voluntary motions begun by us, we may 
there fee the thing exemplified. We move our bodies or ibnie members of 
them, and by thefe move other things, as they again do others ; and know thefe 
motions to fpring from the operations of our minds : but then we know alfo, that 
we have not an independent power of creating motion. If we had, it could 
not be fo limited as our loco-motive fiiculties arc, nor confined to finall quan- 
tities and certain circumftances only : we fiiould have had it from eternity, nor 
could wc ever be deprived of it. So that we arc neccfiltated to look up and 
acknowledge fome Higher being, who is able not ov\y to produce motion, but 
to impart z faculty of producing it. 

And if the petty motions of us mortals afford arguments for the being of a 
God, much more may ihok greater motions we fee in the world, and the phtcno- 
mena attending them : I mean the motions of the planets imd heavenly bodies. 
For thefe mull be put into motion, cither by one common mighty Mo\er, aft- 
ing upon them immediately, or by caufes and laws of Hir. appointment > or by 
ilieir rcfpeftive movers, who, for reafons to which you can by this time be no 
ftrangcr, muft depend upon fome Superior, that furnifiid them with the power 
of doing this. And granting it to be done either of tliefe ways, we can be at 
no great diflance from a dcmonftration of the cxiflcnce of a Deity. 

• Wliat Cf«7in'««j charges upon miny great men (but upon fome of ihcin furcly unjuflly) is tonic 
unintelligible. He fay.";, they believed /fW/'fr htmines fiiijfc, ^c. and then, liaqiit (yomiimm, ^w^ in 
(cmpitcrtm ifto mundo ftmfer fuerunt, futuraqut funt , aiuni frincif'mm fuijft nullhrn; (rd orbim ffft 
KHe/njAmgintrammw, Kafamiumqiie, in quo umtifaijiifqtie geniti initiiimfmii! O'Jim, ejft -.ijtntnr. 

a It 

Truths relating to the Dcity."^ 79 

It may perhaps be laid, that tho matter has not the power of moving itfclf, 
yet it hath an attra^iive force, by which it can move other parts of matter: fo 
that all matter equally moves \\r\A is moved. But, allowing thofe things which 
arc now ulually alcnbcd to attratlio-'i^ \vc ihall ilill be ncccflitatcd to own feme 
Superior being, whofc injiuence mixes icfelf with matter, and operates upon it » 
or at Icaft who, fome way or other, imparts this force. For attranioti^ accord- 
ing to the true fcnfc of the word, fuppofcs one body to aft upon another at a 
diftancc, or where it is not ; but nothing can be an agent, where it is nut at all. 
Matter can aft only by contjfl, impelling contiguous bodies, when it is put 
into motion by fomething elfc, or relilHng thoi'e which Ibike ag;unrt it, when 
it is at rell. And this it does as matter; i. e. by being impenetrable to other 
matter : but atti-aftion is not of tlic nature or idea of matter. So that what is 
called attraclion, is fo called only becaufe the fame things happen, as if the parts 
of matter did mutually attraft : but in truth this can only be an effeft of fome- 
thing, which afts upon or by matter according to a certain law. The parts of 
matter fecm not only to gravitate tou-ards each other, but many of tliem to 
Jly each other. Now thcfc two contrary motions and fceming qualities cannot 
both proceed from matter qua matter j cannot both be of the nature of it : and 
therefore they mull be owing to fome external caufc, or to fome other being, 
which exitcs in them this, as it were love and difcord '. 

Bcllde, as tn the revolution o( a planet about the fun, mere gravitation is not 
fufficient to produce that efteft. It mull be compounded with a motion of/)ro- 
Jefliort, to keep the planet from falling direftly into the fun, and bring it about ; 
and from luhat haftdy I defire to know, comes this other motion (or dircftion) F 
"Who imprcfTed it? 

^\'hat a \afl field for contemplation is here opcnd ! Such regions of matter a- 
bout us, in which there is not theleafl partic/e that does not carry with it an ar- 
gument nf God's exillencc ; not the /eaji iHck or Itraw, or other tri^e tlvAi falls 
to the ground, but llicwsitj not the flightell motion produced, tlie lealt whif- 
per of the air, but tells it. 

XIV. Tbe frame and conjliltuwn of the -worlds tbr aflonifiing tiiagmfucme of 
ity the various ph<enomcna and kinds of beings., the unifo)mity obfervcd in the pro- 
duilions of things., the ufes and ends for which tkey ferve.,lj!c. doalifljew that there 
is fome /ilmigbty defigner., an infinite ivijdom and power at the top of all theft things : 

triftion inJ avcrfion (centripetal anJ renrrifuqal forrts) ftctn to have bcfn 
cjlol by Imftdodts : <ft>>m 5 rv/»flnMt [» « rufcim'], f mnO- a. Dio^. L. jr. Emf.) V. Arifl. 

( 1: /•' A, 

I> - fncb 

8o T'^e Religion (9/' Nature. Sed. V. 

fuch marks there are of both'. Or, God is that Beings without whom fuch a 
frame or conjlitution of the world^ fuch a magnificence in it^ 13 c could not he. In 
Older to prove to any one the grandnefs of this fabric of the world, one needs 
only to bid him confider i\\z fun with that infiipportable glory and luitre that 
llirrounds it : to demonftrate the vail diflance^ magnitude^ and heat of it : to rc- 
prefent to him the chorus of planets moving periodically, by uniform laws, in 
their feveral orbits about it j affording a regular variety of afpe£ls ; guarded 
fome of them by fecondary planets, and as it were emulating the flate of the 
fun } and probably all polTcil by proper inhabitants : to remind him of thofc 
furpriling vifits the comets make us j the large trains, or imcommon fplen- 
dor, which attends them ; the far country they come from ; and the curiofity 
and horror they excite not only among us, but in the inhabitants of other 
planets, who alio may be up to fee the entry and progrefs of thefe minillers 
of fiite '' : to dire£b his eye and contemplation, through thofc azure fields and 
vaft regions above him, up to the fi.xt Jiars, that radiant numberlefs holl of 
heaven i and to make him undcrftand, how unlikely a thing it is, that they 
{hould be placed there only to adorn and befpangle a canopy over our heads 
('tho that would be a great piece of magnificence too), and much lefs to fupply 
the places of fo many glow-worms, by affording a feeble light to our earth, or 
even to all our fellow-planets : to convince him, that they arc rather fo many 
other funs^ with their feveral regions and fets of planets about them: to lliew 
him, by the help of glaflbs, ftill more and more oir thefe fixt lights, and to be- 
get in him an apprehenfion of their unaccountable numbers, and of thole /w- 
menfefpaces, that lie retired beyond our utmefl reach and even imagination : I 
fay, one needs but to do this, and explain to him fuch things as are now known 
almoft to every body > and by it to fliew that if the world be not infinite, it is 
infmitofimilis «= j and therefore fure a magnificent ftrufturc, and the work of aa 
infinite Architcft. But if we could take a view of all the particulars contauid 
within that aftonifhing compals, which we have thus baftily run over, how 
would wonders multiply upon us ? Every corner, every part of the world is as 
It were made up of other worlds. If we look upon this our feat (T mean this 

• So far is :hat from being true, Nequaquam — divinitui ijfe crt»tam Ntturam inundi, que tMtaeJl 
prtdiia culpa. Lucret. Menraflily (impioufly) ccnfurc what they do not unJcrilami. Like thjt king 
ofCaJlilf, who fancied himfclt able to have contrived a better fyfteinof the work) ; bccaufc he knew 
not what the true fyrtcmis, but took it to be as afcril>ed to him by R. If. no. Sid, and other aftrono- 
mcrs of thofc times. •> Since they have, or may have gri-at efFffts upon the feveral parts of 

thcfolarfyflcm.onemay fpcak thus without tailing into the fupcrftition of the multitude, or racaning 
*vhat is intended by that, Sioi^uAm c*h/((ilaii4m immune comettn (io Claud.), or tic like. ' f<- 

niiHi, (^ infinitt Jimilii. PUn. 

Truths relating to the Deity. 8 c 

carthj, what fcopc is here for admiration ? The great variety of mountains, hills, 
vallcvs, plains, rivers, feas, trees, plants ! The many tribes of different animals^ 
with which it is llockcd! The multifarious inventions :ind a-trX-jof oneof thcfcj 
that is, of us men^ S>:c. And yet when all thcfc ,hea\-en and earth) are furveyd as 
nicely as they can be by the help of our unallillcd fenl'es, and even of telcfcopical 
gla/Tes, by the alllllonceof good miciofcopes in very /mall parts of matter as ma- 
ny nciv wonders * may perhaps be dilcovcrd, as ihofc already obfcivcd j new 
kingdoms of animals j new architecture and cunofity of work. So that iis before 
our feni'cs and even conception fainted in ihol'c vaji journeys we were obliged to 
take in conGdering the expanfe of the univcrfe > fo here again they fiiil us in our 
rdcarches into the /)r//»«//fi and conllituent parts oF it. Both the beginnings and 
thcfW/ of things, ihc leajlznd the grealejl, all confpire to baffle us ; and which 
way ever we profccute our inquhics, we Hill fall in with frejb fubjedts of amaze- 
ment, and freJJj reafons to believe that there arc indefinitely ftill more and more 
behind, that will for ever efcapc our eagcrcft puifuits and deepeft penetration. 

This mighty building is not only thus grand, and the appearances ftupendous 
in it, but thcmanner m which things arc cffcclcd is commonly unintelligible, 
»nd their caufcs ito profound for us. There are indeed many things in nature, 
which we know ; and feme, of which we feem to know the caufes : but, alas ! 
how few are thefe with refpccc to the whole fum ? And the caufes which we al'- 
fign, what are they ? Commonly fuch, as can only be exprefled in general 
terms, whilll the bottoms of things remain unfathomable. Such, as have been 
colle£bed from experience^ but could fcarcely be known beforehand, by any ar- 
guments a prior iy to be cap.ible of rendering luch effcfts; and yet till caufes 
arc known after that manner, they arc not thoroughly underllood. Such, as 
feem difpropoitionate and tco little., and are fo infufficient and unratisfa(5lory, 
that one cannot but be inclined to think, that fomcihing immaterial and invi/i- 
ble muft be immediately concerned. In fhort, we know many times, that fuch 
a thing will iiavc fuch an effect, or perhaps that fuch an effed is produced 
by fuch a caufc, but the manner how we know noti or but grutly, and if 
fuch an bjpoibefis be true Jt js impcfliblc for us to come at the true prin- 
ciples of things, or to Ice into the occonomy of ihc fmejl part of nature 
and workings of the firfi fprings. The taiifcs that appear to us, are but 
efecls of other cnulcs : the vej/ilsy of which the bodies of plants and ani- 
mals confift, arc made up of other, /mailer veflcls : the fubtilejl pans of matter, 
which wc have any notion of (as animal fpirits, or particles of light), hivc their 
farts, and may for ought we know be compound bodies : and as to the /ubjlances 

* tltl>ii>JI ^*u/4,»Tllf/l» Plot. 

£ them- 

82 The Religion of Nature.' Seel. Y. 

themfelves of all thefe things, and their internal conftitution., they are hid from 
our eyes. Our philofophy dwells in the furfacc of nature. 

However, in the next place, we ourfelvcs cannot but be witnefTcs, that there 
.xxt Jiated vielhods, as fo many fct forms of proceeding, whicli things pimctu- 
ally and religioufly keep to. The fame caufeSf circuniftanccd in the lame man- 
nei-, have always the fame fuccefs : all the fpecies of animals^ among us, are 
made according to one general idea ; and fo are thofe of plants alfo, and even 
ffiinerah: no neiv ones are- brought forth or arifcn any where: and the old arc 
prefcrved and continued l^y^hc c/d loajs. 

Laftly,it appears I think plainly enough in the parts and model of the world,that 
there is a contri-vaticc and a.rc{]pcd: to certain reafonsand ends. How the /«« is po- 
fitcdncar the middle of our fyftemforthe more ««^'<'»;>K/di^pcnfu^g of his benign 
influences to the planets moving about him ; how the plain of the earth's te^jua- 
tor interfcfts that of her orbit^ and makes a proper angle with it, in order to 
diverfify the year, and create a ufeful variety of fcafens, and many other things 
of this kind, tlio a thoufmd times repeated, will always be plcaling meditati- 
ons to good men and true fcholars. Who can obfcrvc the vapors to afcend, 
efpccially from the fea, meet above in clouds, and fall again after condenfition, 
and not underftand this to be a kind of dijlillation in order to clear the water 
of its groflcr filts, and then by rains and dews to fupply the fountains and rivers 
with frcfli and whoUbm liquor; to nouriili the vegetables below by fliowcrs, 
which delcend in drops as from a watering-pot upon a garden, i^c. who can 
view the /Impure of a plant or animal; the indefinite number of their fibres 
and fine vcllcls, the formation of larger vclTels and the fcvcral members out of 
them, and the apt difpofition of all thefe ; the way laid out for the reception and 
dilhibution o? nutriment ; t\\teffe^ this nutriment has in extending the veflcls, 
brinfTinfT the vegetable or animal to its full growth and expanfion, continuing 
the motion of the fevcral fluids, repairing the decays of thcbody, and prcfcning 
life: who can take notice of the icvc\-x\ faculties of animals, their arts of laving 
and providing for themfelves, or the ways in which they are provided for; the 
tifes of plants to animals, and of fome animals to others, particularly to man- 
kind ; the care taken that the feveral fpecies lliould be propagated out of 
their proper feeds (without confufion^), the fbong inclinations implanted 
in animals for that purpofe, their /ow of tbcir youngs and the like: I fay, who 
can do this, and not fee a dcftgn, in fuch regular pieces, fo nicely wrought, and 
fo prcfeiTcd? If there w;is but o«f animal, and in that cafe it could not bcdoubi- 

• If anyone, fitting upon mount Idit, had fccn the GrtiU army coming on in proper order [^irW 
To»S xio-y,» i T«{i4,iT<>;« si«itt? Tfto-.Jo-a.], he ought moft certainly, notwithli.inding what ."Tf-v/. 
Zwtfr.fiys, to have concluded, that there was fomc commander, under whofc conduct they moved. 

Truths relating to the Deity. 83 

ed but that his eyes were made tint he might fee with them, his ears that he might 
hear with them and fo on, through at lead the molt confidcrablc parts of him j 
if it can much Icfs be doubted, when the fiimc things are repetedin the individuals 
of all the tribes of animals ; if the like obfervations may be made with rcfpeft 
to vegetables^ and other things : and if all thefc kinds of things, and therefore 
much more their particulars.^ upon and in the earth, waters, air, arc unconceiv- 
ably numerous ('as mod evidently they are^, one cannot but be convinced from 
that, which is fo very obvious toe\ery undcrlbmding, and plainly runs through 
the wfWfr parts of the vifiblc world, that not only they, but other things, even 
thofc that fecm to be lefs noble.^ have their f»i/j too, tho not fo well undcritood. 

And now fince we cannot fuppofe xhcparts of matter to have contrived th.h won- 
derful form of a world among themfelves, and then by agreement to have taken 
their refpcftive ports, and puriiicd conftant ends by certain methods and mea- 
furcs concerted (bccaufe thcfe arc acts, of which they ;;re not capable), there murt: 
be fome other Being, whofe wifdom and power are equal to fuch a mighty work, 
as is the JlruHure and prefervation of the world. There muft be fome almighty 
Mind, who models and adorns it } lays the caufes of things fo deep j prefcribes 
them fuch unifonn and fteady lawsj deftinesand adapts them to certain purpo- 
(es J and makes one thing to fit and anfwer to another ^ 

That fuch a beautiful fcheme,y«fZ> a juil; and geometrical arrangement of things, 
compofcd, of innumerable parts, and placed as the offices and ufes and wants 
of the feveral beings require^ through fuch an immenfe extent, fhould be the 
cffctt of chance only, is a conceit fo prodigioufly abfurd, that certainly no one 
can efpoufc it heartily, who underllands the meaning of that word. Chance feems 
to be only a term, by which wcexprefs our ignorance of the caufeof any thing. 
For when we fay any thing comes by chance, we do not mean, that it had no 
other caufe -, but only, that we do not know the true caufc, which produced 
it, or intci-pofed in fuch a manner, as to make that fall out which was not ex- 
pected. Nor can I think, that any body has fuch an idea of chance, as to 
make it an agent or really exilling and acting caufe of any thing, and much 
Id's furc of all things. Whatever events or effefts there arc, they muil pro- 
ceed from fome agent or caufe, which is c'lxhcv free or not free fthatis, ncccHa- 
ry^. If it be free, it wills what it produces : and therefore that which is pro- 
duced is produced v''- '•;;7, not by chance. If it ads ncccllarily, the event 
muft necefj'iirily be, cforc it is not by accident. T'or that, which is by 

accident or chance only, might not have been j or it is an accident only, that 

thing at thi« dodi not come by acridcnt. 

84. The Religion of Nature. Sed. V. 

it is. There can be therefore no fuch catife as chance. And to omit a great deal that 
might yet be faid, matter is indefinitely divirible,and the firft particles (or atoms^ 
of which it conrilbmuflbcfmall beyond allourapprchenfion j and the chances, 
that mull all hit to produce one individual of any fpecies of material beings (if 
only chance was concerned}, muft confequcntly be indefinitely many : and if 
/pace be alfo indefinitely extended, and the number of thofc individuals (liot to 
lay of the fpecies themfclvcs^ which lie difpcrfcd in it indefinite, the chances re- 
quired to the produ£tion of them all, or of the univcrfc, will be the rc<51:anglc 
of one indefinite quantity drawn into another. We may well call them infinite. 
And then to %, that any thing cannot happen, unlefs infinite chances coincide, 
is the fime as to fliy, there arc infinite chances againll the happening of it, or 
odds that it will not happen : and this again is the fame as to iay, it is impojjibk to 
happenj lince if there be apoflibility that xtmay happen, the hazard is«o/ in- 
finite. The world therefore cannot be the child oi chance '. He mud be lit- 
tle acquainted with the works of nature, who is not fcnfiblc how delicate and 
fine they are : and the finer they arc, ihc ^(^rojj . r were thofc of Epicurus ^. 

If it ihould be objcfted, that many things fecm to be ufelefs, many births 
arc monfirous, or the like, fuch anfwcrs as ihcfe may be made. The ufes of 
fomc things arc known to fame men, and nor to others : the ufcs of fome are 
known now., that were not known to any body formerly : the ulls of many 
may be difcoverd hereafter : and thofc of fome other things may for ever re- 
main unknown to all men, and yet ie in nature., as much as thofc dilcoverd were 
before their difcovcry, or arc now in rerpe£l of them who know them not. 
Things have not therefore no ufes, becaufc they are conceald from us. Nor is na- 
tttre irregular, or without method, becaufc there are fomcy^fw/V;^ deviations from 
the common rule. Thefe are generally the effects of that influence, which free 
agents and various circumftances have upon natural productions j which may 
be deformed, or liurt by extcmal impreffions, heterogeneous matter introduced, 
or difagrccablcand unnatural motions excited : and if the cafe could be truly pur, 
it would no doubt appear, that nature proceeds as regularly (or the laws of na- 
ture have as regular an cffe(5t),when a monfler is produced, as when the ufual iflue in 
common cafes. Under thefe circumftances the monfter is ihc genuine iflue ; that is, 

'Hoc tjui txiffimat fieri potuijje, non intcUigt cur nm iittm fultl. fi mnumerabilti tinius (^ lipnti 

formt iittrarum, aliqu'o ccnyci/tntur, pojfe ex his in lerram txcitjjis antijlei Ennij, ut demctfi Itgi 

fcjfint, effici: tjuoJ ntfcioanni in uno quiJtm xtrfu fcfft tantum laltre ftrruna.Cic. But alls, what 
are Enniuj'sannils to fuchawork as the world is! '' He was »«/i/v(«<^*TaT©-, xarrci(vrif3y\. 

>()^ir(^ ;tA)i5ii fiiflXi'vt. D. L. But that part of his phyfics is here meant, in which he treated of the 
origin of the world; or rather of infinite worlds ^ which makes his thought the groller ftill. For in- 
finirc worlds require infinite chanccj infinitely rcpctcd. 


Truths relating to the Deity." 85 

in the {iimc circumihinccs there would always be the (lime kind of produftion. 
And therefore if things are now and then mil-lhapcd, tliis infers no unllcadinefs 
or miftakeinnature. Bcfidc, the magnificence of the world admits of (bme 
ptriurbattons j not to liiy, requires fomc variety. Tiic qucftion is, Could all 
thofe things, which we do know to have ufes and ends, and to the producftion 
of which fuch wonderful contrivance and the combinations of fo many things 
arc required, be produccd,and method and regularity be prcfciTcdyo/ar <i;i/ is 
if nothing but l/limi chance prcfided o\ crall ? Are not the innumerable inllances 
of things, which ;u-c undeniably made with reference to certain ends, and of 
thofc which are propagated and repetcd by the fame conltant methods, enough 
to convince us, that there arc ends propofed, and iiiles obfer\'ed, even where wc 
do not fee them. And, laltly, if wc ihould dcfcend to paiticulars, what are thofe 
feemingly ufclefsormonllrous productions in rcfpccl ofthcrr/?, th.\t plainly de- 
clare the ends, for which they were intended, and that come into the world by 
the «/i/<j/ ways, with the »///«/ perfcftion of their leveral kinds? If the com- 
parifon could be made, I verily believe thefe would be found to be almolt infi- 
nituple of the other ; which ought therefore to be reputed as nothing. 

They, who content themfelves with words, may alcribe tiic formation of the 
world to fate or nature^ as well as to chance, or better. And yet fate., in the firfl 
place, is nothing but ayrr/ff of events, confidcrd as ncceflarily following in fomc 
certain order; or, of which it h;\s always been true, that they would be in their 
determinate times and places. It is called indeed a ferics oi'caufcs ' : but then 
thc)'arc fuch caufcsas arc alfo effcSls, all of them, if there is no F'irftcaufe; and 
may be taken for fuch. So that in this dcfcription is nothing like fuch a eaufe, 
as is capable of giving this form to the world. A fcties of events is the fame 
with events happeningyma//;/;.- which words declaie nothing concerning tlic 
eaufe of that concatenation of events, or why it is. Time, place, manner, nc- 
ceflity arc but circum/lances of things that come to pafsj not caufcs of their ex- 
illencc, or of their being as they are. On the contrary, fomc external and fupe- 
rior caufc mull: be fuppofed to put the fcties in motion, to project the ordci', 
to connecl the caufcs and eflects, and to impofe the nccefllty ''. 

• Merits imfltx* oufArum. Sen. '' Serica fays himfclf, thnt in this fcries God is frim» 

tmnium cimfa, ex nu» ctltrt ftvjent. Indeed it ij many times difTirult to find out what the in- 
cicnts meant by fati. Sometimes it (ccms to follow the motions of the hmitnly iejin and their 
afpcd?. Of this kind of fate is that pafTigc in Suf.oniui to lieundcrftood, where he ftys that Tibe- 
rmt was MjJiclMi mMthrmatici, fnfuajiomftfut pltnuj cunila fate agi. Sometimes it i« confoumicd 
vfith fortune. So in LucUa wc find r^t ioy,v x<<<{«cz> tk fA-tw. ', t^ » i\ ii'X'", iii«r» iti- 
KXiiQin, And fometimei it is the fame with God : as when the Sleici fay, ir ti •«•• 3^.i< i^ >»» li 
iii^j^v K. &.», Af. Ditg. L. and the like clfcwliere. 

M Then 

86 The Religion o/' Nature.' Se6l. V. 

Then for nature^ i . If it be ufcd for the intrinftc manner of exifting > that con- 
ftitution, make, or difpofition, with which any thing is produced or born^ and 
from which rcfiilt thofe properties, powers, inclinations, pafTions, qualities, and 
manners, which are called natural (and fometimcs w«i/«rf}, inoppofitiontofuch 
as are acquired^ adventitious, or forced ('which ufe is common^ : then to fay, 
that nature foiTned any thing, or gave it its manner of cxiftencc, is to fay, that 
it formed itfelf, or that the effect is the efficient'. Bcfide, how can wrt««fr ('man- 
ner of exifting) bethecaufeof exifting, or properly do any thing. An agent 
is an afling being, fome fubftance, not a -manner of being. 2.. If it be ufed 
in that other fenfc, by which it ftands for the ideas of things, what they arc in 
themfelves, and what in their circumftanccs, caufes, confcqucnccs, refpefts ; or, 
in ftiort, that which determines them to be of this or that kind fa-- when welay, 
the nature. oi juftice '' requires this or that j /. e. the idea of juftice requires or fup- 
pofes it : a crime is of fuch a nature j that is, bears fuch a refpedt to the law, 
and is attended with fuch circumftanccs, or the like) : then none of the/e lenfes 
can do an athcift any fervice. 3. If it be ufcd for the world •= (as, the la>vsof 
nature maybe underftood to be the laws of the world, by whicli it is govern- 
ed, And the phienomcm in it produced; after the fame manner of fpcaking as 
when we fay, the laws of England, France, &c.j then it ftands for that -very 
thing, the former and architeft of which is theobjeftof our inquiry; and there- 
fore cannot be that aixhitcft i'filf. Under this fenfc may be comprelicnded 
that, when it denotes reality of exijlence, as when it is faid that fuch a thing is 
not in nature (hot to be found in the ivorld). 4. If it fignifies the forementiond 
laws themfelves; or that courfc, in which things by virtue of tliefe laws prc« 
ceed (as when the cffcfts of thcfc laws are ftyled the works of nature) : then, 
laws fuppoic fome Icgiflator, and arc pofterior to that of which they are the 
laws. There can be no laws of any nation, till the people are of which that 
nation confifts. f . If it be ufcd after the fime manner as the word habit fre- 
quently is; to which many things ajc afcribcd (juft as they are to narurc\ though 
it be nothing exifting diftinft from the habits, wliich particular men or beings 
contract : then nature is a kind of abJlraEl notion, which can do nothing. Per- 
haps nature may be put for natures, all natures, after the manner of a collective 
noun i or it may be mcntiond as an agent, only as we pcrfonify virtues ;;nd at-- 
tributes, either for variety, or the ftiortcr and more convenient exprcfling of 

, As when Srrale Lamfi. accardinj; to TuUy, Jotrt tmnia tfft tfftHk ntitura. * \'is <J» 

natiira jujlitu. Cic. ' AInioft as if it fiood for nata, or rei ».i/4 ; all things, that arc pro- 

duccii, [So fiiurn /ccms to be put fometimcs for fuiu.) Snnt, qui emwA H»tHr4 tumini ifft!- 
If/It; •—~- lerforu, (^ inane, ^ hi) aauUnt, Cic. 


Truths relating to the Deity." 87 

things. Laflly, if it denotes the Author cfnatarf, or God • (the efe& fecming, 
tho by a hard metonymy in this cafe, to be put for the efficient) : then, to Him 
it is that I afcribc the fonnation of the world, ^c. To all which I muft fub- 
join, that there is an unaccountable likerty taken in the ufe of this word ; and 
that frequently it is ufed merely as a tvord, and nothing more, they who ufe it 
not knowing themfclvcs, what they mean by it"*. However, in no fenfe can it 
fuperfedc the being of a Deity. 

X\^ Life, fenfe, cogitation, and the faculties of our oivn minds fljcx the exijience 
offonie fupertor Being, from whom they are derived. Or, God is that Being, with' 
out whom neither could thefe be, any more than the things before mentiond. That 
they cannot flow from the nature of any matter about us as matter, or from any 
modification, fize, or motion of it, if it be not already apparent, may perhaps 
be pro\ cd more fully afterwards. And that our fouls themfelves arc not felf- 
cxiftcnr, nor hold their faculties independently of all other beings, followj 
from pr. IV. and VII. Therefore we muft neccflarily be indebted for what wc 
have of this kind to fome great Bcnefa£bor, who is K\\t fountain of them. For 
fincc we arc confcious, that we ha\-e them, and yet ha\-c them not of our 
felvcs, wc muft have them ixomfome other. 

A man has little reafon, God knows, to fancy the fuppofitum of his life fenfc 
and cogitative faculties to be an independent being, when he confiders how 
tranfitoryznA uncertain at beft his life and all his injoyments arc ; what he is 
whence he came, znd whither he is going "=. The mind a6ts not, or in the moft 
iiTiperccptible manner in animalcule, or the feminal ftatc of a man > only as a 
principle of vegetation in the ftate of an embryon ; and as a fcnfitivc foul in the 
ftatc of infancy, at Icaft for fome time, in which we arc rather below, than a- 
bovc, many other -.uiimals. By degrees indeed, with age and cxcrcile and pro- 
per opportunities, it fcems to open icfclf, find its own talent s^ and ripen into a 
rational being. But then it rcafons not without labor, and is forced to take ma- 
ny tedious ftcps in thepuifuit of truth ; finds all its powers fubje<5b to great eclip- 

* SAtwa, inifuit, hdc mihi fnftat. Ktn inulhgii tt, cam htc dicis, tnutare nomen Dro f <SuiJ 
tnim aIiuJ tjl Saiura, tjuam Dtui, cr dizina ratio. Sec? Sen. When it is {aid, Ntcejji rji munJum 
iffui), naiura admimjirari, a[>. Cic. what fcnic arc thofc words capable of, if' by nature be not 
roll) meant CcJt For it mud be fomething different from tlic worU, and (bmtihing able to go- 
vern it. * Alii naturam cenfint tffe \ im quanjam fine ratione, cientttn mttut in corfcriius 
uec' . ■«> See. fijri BmUuj in Cic. What can this -vit be : vit by itfclf. without the mention of 
e> in which it inheres i or of any caufc, from whence it proceeds ' A fi>ul of the world, 
'-•. hjUrchu principle, ^ylD ^'2^, and the like, arc more iiUclligibIc liuil that. < yi 
O^ ir-in — ir>» |N>1 r-|>Q I'ND. r.Ab. 

M i /« 

88 The Religion of Nature. Se^l. V. 

fes and diminutions, in the time of flccp, indifpofition, ficknefs, ^c. and at 
bed reaching but a few objefts in refpeft of all, that are in the immenfity of 
the univcrfe ; and, lailly, is obnoxious to many painful fcn(;itions and reflexions. 
Had the foul of man the principle of its own cxiilcncc and faculties vjithinit- 
felf, clear of all dependence, it could not be liable to all thefe limitations zndde- 
feSiSy to all thefe alterations and removes from one ftate to another : it mull cer- 
tainly be conilant toitfelf, and perfill in an ««;/or«? manner of being. 

There may be perhaps who will Hiy, that the /cv/, together with life, fenfe, 
C5?f. are propagated by traduSiion from parents to children, from them to their 
children again, and fo from eternity » : and that therefore nothing can be collcft- 
cd from the nature of them as to the exigence of a Deity, yfnf. If there could be 
fuch a tradudion, yet to fiippofe one traduced to come from another traducedy 
and fo al/ a'tenio^ without any further account of the original of mankind, or 
taking in any author of this traduftive power, is the fame as to fuppolc an in- 
finite feries of moveds without a mover, or of tf/"?i?; without ncaufe: the abfur- 
dityof which is lliewn already prop. I. Bat concerning this matter I cannot but 
think, further, after the following manner. What is meant by tradux anim^ 
ought to be clearly explaind : for it is not eafy to conceive how thought, or 
thinking fublbnces, can be propagated after the manner of branches, or in any 
manner that can be analogous to it, or even wairant a metaphorical ufe of that 
phrafe ^. It flrould alfo be told, whether this tradudtion be made from one or from 
both the parents. If from one, from vjhich of them is it "i And if from both, 
then the fiime /rrt^«^ or branch muil always proceed from two ftocks : which is 
a thing, I prcfumc, that can no where eUe be found, nor has any parallel in na- 
ture. And yet llich a thing may much better be hippofed of vines, or plants, 
than of /^{'/w/t/w^ beings, who are iimple and uncompounded fublLmces'^. 

* For I cannot think that any body will now ftanj by that way of introducing men firft into 
the world, which is mentiond by HioJorus Sic. but alTcrtcd by Lucretius. Uii qiixifue loci regia 
ep'ortunr. Jabatur, Crefctbant ut'.ri ttm radicibm itpti. See. b W kit by Tertitllian in one 

place is called arumt ex AAam tradux, in another is velut fur cuius qiiulam ex matrice Adam in frt- 
fagintin JediUla, and equally unintelligible. Nor doth he explain himfelf better, when he confeflcs 
there to be dKai /pedes femittis, corfcralcm o> unimalem jal. corporis fenien c?" animt): or more fully 
femcn anim.tle ex unirni diftillatione, f.cut ^ -virus illud, corforale femen, ex carnis Jef<cati<me- 
• According to the fore-cited author the ibul is derived from the fr I her only, {^ senitalibus fdimi' 
ti* foveis commendxta: and all fouls tVotn that of Adam. Ttefin'mms, fiys he, Dei u na- 
inm, ex tina reusaiUantem : anil in another place, ex HtiQ hcmine tota hit itnimariim rejimd.iitti.mgi- 
itir. But this doth not wcD confift with his principal argument for tradu«>ion, that rhi dren take 
after their partnts. For betide what will here be laid by and by, if there is a traiiuftion of all men 
from one man, and traduction aulis likencfs ; then every man mud be like the firft, and (confc- 
^ucntly} every other. 


Truths relatiing to the Deity. 89 

This opinion of the fraduflton of fouls fcems to mc to ftand upon an unfound 
foundation. For I take it to be grounded chiefly on ihcfe two things ; the 
fimilitude there is between the features, humors, and abilities of children and 
thofc of their parents ■• ; and the difficulty men find in forming the notion of 
a /pint *». For from hence they are apt to conclude, that there can be no other 
fiibftance but matter : and that the foul refulting from fomc difpolition of the 
body, or Ibmepart of it, or being fomc merely material appendix to it, mult 
attend it, and come along witli it from the parent or parents ; and as there is 
a derivation of the one, \o there mull be alio of the other at the fame time. 

Now the former of thcfc is not always true ; as it ought to be, to make the 
argument valid. Nothing more common than to fee children differ from their 
p.irents, in their underltandings, inclinations, lliapcs, complexions, :iiid(/ar» 
fure) one from another. And this dijjimilitude h;is as much force to prove there 
is not a traduction, Jisjimilitude^ whenever that happens, can have to prove there 
is. Bcfidcs, it feems to me not hard to account for fome likenefs without the 
help of traduction. It is vifiblc the meat and drink men take, the air they 
breath, the ob)cfts they fee, the founds they hear, the company they keep,^<r. 
will cvcztc changes in them, fometimes with refpcct to their intelledluals, fome- 
timcs to their paffions and humors, and fometimes to their health and other cir- 
cumftanccs of their bodies : and yet the original ft aniina and fun<.lamcntal parts 
of the man remain ftill the fame. If then i\\cfemina, out of which animals arc 
produced, are (as I doubt not) animakula already formed *^i which being dif- 
tributed about, efpecially in fome opportune places, are taken in with aliment, 
or perhaps the very air } being feparated in the bodies of the males by llraincrs 
proper to every kind, and then lodged in their fcminal velTcls, do there receive 
{ome kind of addition and influence } and being thence transferred into the 
wombs of the females, are there nourirtid more plentifully, and grow, till they be- 
come too big to be longer confined '' : I fay, if this be the cafe, why may not 


• UhJe, t'O tt, (jys the (arne author, fmilitHi'mt »n\m* tfuoqut parentiius Jt ingeniis re^ponjt- 

mui, fi nm tx »nimt ftm:ne tJutimur ! Then to contirm thi^, hcirpies likra father indeed, thus: 

m illtiffo zolnf talis ultimo t/lu cjuo genitalt virni txpellilur, nonnt aliquiJ Jeanima qucque fentimut 
txiri I I am aflumed to tranfcrilx more. •" Therefore the laid father makes the foul to 

be rorporci!. « This might fccm to he fiyord by them Who holJ, all fouls were crea- 

ted in the beginning (an opinion mcntiond in Sahh.ab. df a!, often), did not the lame authors de- 
rive the lody nnno nia^O : as may be fccn in P. ytti. (y faff. Particularly R. D. ^imhlii (ai » 

of man, na^M lo'jnvu'vi; ny tsyo Via» au/oi ai? ^B.■^n iu/n y-\n no'ioD ^^-l33 1013- 

* This account dcftroys that argument, upon which Cinforinui fays many of the old philofcpheri 
afleitcvi ihc ctcroity of the woiiii : quod neitr.t tmmnt [ojft reptrin, AVifnt natr, an tva geatrat* 


96 The Religion of Nature. Sed. V. 

the nutritmnt received from the parents, being prepared by their veflels, and of 
the (lime kind with thnt with which they themfelvcs are nourifhd, bcthef,imc 
in great mcafure to the anima/cula :ind embryo that it is x.oihetn^ and confcquent- 
ly very much aflimil.ite their young, without the derivation of any thing clfe from 
them? Many imprcHlons may be made uponthe/<i'/w, and m,any tinctures given 
to the fluids communicated to it from the parents ; and yet it, the animal itfclf, 
may not be originally begun in them, or traduced from them. This hypothefis 
(which has long been mine) iliggcits a reafon, why the child is fomctimcs more 
like the father^ fomctimcs the mutber : viz. bccaufe the velTels of the animalculum 
are difpofcd to receive a greater proportion of aliment fometimes from the one^ 
Tometimes from the other : or the fluids and fpirits in one may fciTnent and ope- 
rate mote [Irongly than in the other, and fo ha\-e a greater and more fignal effcfV. 
(Here it ought to be obfcrved, that tho what the aw/wj/a/Z^w receives from the 
father, is in quantity httle in refpeft of all that nutriment, which it receives by 
the mother} yet the former, being the firft accretion to the original 7?rt;«/«i7, ad- 
hering immediately, and being early interwoven with them,maya(fc£tit more.) 

Since there cannot be a proper traduction of the child {one mind, and one bo- 
dy) from both the two parents, all the fimilitude it bears to one of them mufl 
proceed from fome fuch caufe as I have afligned, or at leail not from traduHion. 
For the child hcmg fometimes like the father, ^nd fometimes the mother, and 
the traduftion either alivays from the fuher, or akvays from the mother, there 
muft fomctimcs be fimilitude, where there is no traduHion : and then if the 
child may rcfemble one of them without it, why not the other too ? The ac- 
count I have given, appears, manv times at Icafl, to be true in plints, which 
railed from the flimc feed, but in different beds and foil, will differ. The dif- 
ferent nutriment introduces fome divcrfity into the feed or original plant, and 
aHimilates it in fome meafure to the reft raifed in the fame place. 

The other tiling, which I take to be one of the principal fupports to this doc- 
trine of /r.W/:/(?7/o« (a fuppolltion, that the foulh merely m.itcrial, or but the 
refult of fome difpolition in matter) has been undertaken to be refuted hereafter. 
But I may premife this here : tho we can have no image ofufpirit (becaufcno 
being can be portraid or reprefented by an image, but what is material^, yetwc 
jiiay have reafon to afTert the exillcncc oCfuch a fubllance ^ Afitter is a thing, 
which we conveife with, of which we know pretty ■well the nature, and pro- 

fmr ; turn (y> ozum /an nve, c* t"ji' fmi ovo gigni mn fofflt. This qiicftion was once much agitated 
in the world, as may lie Iccn by Mficrohiui and Vliitarrh ; who calls it, to «Tofii> iC to)A« r/a-, u,«*« 

• This it as much as Etichrm had to £iy tor his atoms : for they were only o-*/*«t« Aey* dtu- 

fry*, KA, Jufi, M. 

4 pcrtics > 

Truths relating to the Deity. pf 

pertics ; and fince we cannot find among them any that are cogitative^ orfuch a 
thing as lift, but fevcral things inconfiflent with them, we arc under a neccHlty 
of contbrting that there is feme other fpccics of fubilancc bcfidc that which is 
corporeal, and that ouv fouls are of that kind ('or rather of one of thofc kinds, 
which arc not merely corporeal : for there mult be more than one ), tho we can 
draw no image of it in our own minds. Nor is it at all furprifing, that wc fhould 
not be able to do this : for how can the mind be the objeft of itfclf '? It may 
contemplate the body which it inhabits, may be confcious of its own a(5ls, and 
reflcft upon the ideas it finds : but of its ownfubllance it can have no adequate 
notion, unlefs it could be as it were object Mid /heilator both. Only that per- 
fcft Being, whofe knowledge is infinite^ can thus intimately know himfelf. 

They, who found the traikiBion of the foul upon this prcfumption,thatit is 
material., and attends the body as fomepart or affedion of it, fccm further to be 
moftwofully miftakcn upon this account: becaufc the body itfelf \s not propa- 
gated by traduction. It pades indeed through the bodies of the parents, who af- 
ford a tranfitory habitation and fubfiftence to it : but it cannot be formed by the 
parents, or grow out of any part of them. For all the vital ;md effential parts of 
it mull be one coeval fyltcm, and formed at once in tlie firlt anicle of thenalccnc 
animalculum > fince no one of thefe could be nourifljd, or ever come to any thing 
without the rell : on the contraiy, if any one of them could prevent and be be- 
fore the rcll, it would foon wither and decay again for lack of nourifliment re- 
ceived by proper vcflcls j as we Ice the limbs and organs of animals do^ when 
the fupply due from the animal oeconomy is any way intercepted or obltruCted. 
And fince an organized body, which requires to be ihns fimultaneoufly made (fa- 
fhiond as it were at oneltrokej cannot be the effcft of any natural 2.nA gradual 
proccfs, I cannot but conclude, that there were animakula of every tribe origi- 
nally formed by the almighty Parent, to be thc/ffc/ofall future generations of 
animals. Any other manner of production would be like that, which is ufual- 
Iv called equivocal or fpontancous generation, and with great rcafon now gene- 
rally exploded. And it is certain, that the analogy of n.ature in other inllances, . 
and microfcopicalobfervat ions do alict what I have i:\iil jlrongly. 

Laltly, if there is no ra« of men that hath been from eternity, there is no man 
who is notdcfcended from two firjl parents : and then the louls of thole two firfl 
parents could be traduced from no other. And tint there is no kich race fnonc 
that has been upon this earth from eternityj, is app.ucnt Ironi the face of earth- 
ly things, and the binary of mankind", arts, and fciences. \\ hat is objected' 

* Oi! -yi u ri ^Miriiia^m T« di«>>ir>. Plof. ^ Si khIU fuit gtnitalii erigi Ttrrsi (y- ttli — 

Cur Jufru irltum Jtiti/initto O" Ji*ntr» Trtjt i!«n aliai aUi ^m«^m( rt; ctcinert fett*. Lucr. 


512 The Religion of Nature. Sed. V. 

aqaiiifl: this argument from fancied inundations^ conflagrations, l^c. * has no weight 
V'ith mc. Let us fuppofc fomc fuch great calamity to happen now. It mull be 
either univerfil, or not. li univcrfal, (o that no body at all could be favcd, then ci- 
ther there muft never be any more men, or they mufl: begin againin Come firfl pa- 
rents. Ifit was only /o/);V«/, affecting fomc one tract of the globe, or if the tops 
of mountains more eminent, or rocks more firm remaind unaffcclcd, orif there 
were a»j natural means left by which men might cfcapc, confidcrable numbers 
mufl: certainly y«rw''i'^." and then it cannot be imagined, that they fhould all be 
abfolutely fo ignorant of every thing, that no one ihould be able to give an ac- 
count of fuch things as were common ; no one able to write, or read, or even to 
recollect that there were fuch things as letters > none, that ur.dcrltood any trade j 
none, that could tell what kind of habitation^ they had, how they ufcd to be 
clothed, how their meat drefl:, or even what their food was : not can it be thought, 
that ^// books, arms, manufadurcs of every kind, fliips, buildings, and all the 
produft of human skill and indultry now extant in the world ihould belb//«/- 
verfally and a/Zfr/y abolifhd, that no part, no i-efligium of them ihould remain j 
not fo much, as to give a hint toward the fpecdy reftoration of ncccflaiy arts at 
Icalt. The people cfcaping muft furc have clothes on, and many neceflarics a- 
bout them, without which they could not cfcapc, nor outli\c fuch a dreadful 
fcenc. In fhort, no conflagration^ nojluod^ no rt'f/?r«fi'/o»canfciTethcobje£tois 
purpofc, to reduce mankind to that ftate, which by ancient memoirs and many 
undeniable fymptoms wc find them to have been in not many thoufindsof years 
fincc } I fay, no dcftruftion can fcn-e his purpofe, but fuch an one as makes 
thorough work, only fparing two or three couples, itript of every thing, and the 
moft Itupid and vericfl: blocks ■> to be picked out of the whole number : natunil 
fools, or mere homines fylveftres would retain habits, and fill to their old way of liv- 
ing, as foon as they had the opportunity to do it. -\nd fuppofc they never fhould 
have fuch an opportunity ; yet neither would this fcrvc him cffc6tually : fiiKC with- 
out Comcfupernatural Power interpofing fuch a revolution could not be brought a- 
bout, nor the naked creatures prclerved, nor the earth reformed out of its allies and 
ruins after fuch a calcination, ordiflblution,fuch a/o/a/dcmolitionofcvery thing. 
To this give me leave to add, that tho many inundations, great earthquakes, vul- 
cano's and fiery eruptions have been in particular countries j j'ct there is no memo- 
ry or teftimony of any fuch thing, that has ever been univerfal '^, except per- 

•noMjCi yC KXTX TcJi^x ^^c'cci yiyiyxm ici^»oixan, fC ttrctrttt, tt/#i u >^ vikri ^lyt^at. P'atf, 
* Tm uyfcifjufjMTiK >C i^Kc-B?, as P '*to fpcaks. « For what has 1-tin faiJ only in RCiicrjl, 

and prcfiimptivcly, to (crvc a caufc, fignifies nothing: no more than that icftimony in ArKtbiiu, 
where he fecms to allow, tha' there have been iinivenal conflagrations, ^unndo, J;iys he, munJms 
iottnfus io faxillns £?• tincrti difftlMiu tft ! Stn anti n»i I 

I haps 

Truths relating to the Deity. pg 

haps of one deluge : and as to that, li the goilus of the language in which the 
relation is dcliverd, and the manner of writing hillory in it were well under- 
ftood, fome labord;uid moliminous attempts to account for it might have been 
prevented. And befide that, the fame record, which tells the thing was, tells 
alfo how immediately God was concernd in it j that fomc pcrfons atlually were 
favedj and that the people who then pcrilhd, as well as they who furvivcd, all 
defcended from two fir Ji parents: and if that authority be a fufficicnt proof of 
one part of the relation, it muft be fo of the reji. 

We may conclude then, that tlie human foul with its faculties of cogitation, 
&c. depends upon a Superior being. And who can this be but the Supreme hc- 
ing, or God ? Of whom I now proceed to affirm, in the next place, that, 

XVI. Though His ejfence and manner of being is to us altogether 
ble, yet tve may fay with ajfurance, that He is free from all defers : or One, from 
vibom all defeats muft be removed. 

This propofition hath ineffe£t been proved already '. However I will take 
the libcity to inlarge a little further upon it here. As our minds are/«/Vf, 
they cannot without a contradiction comprehend what is infinite. And if they 
were inlarged to c%'er fo great a capacity, yet fo long as they retain their ge- 
neral nature, and continue to be of the fame kind, they would by that be only 
renderd able to apprehend more and more finite ideas > out of which, howfoevcr 
increafed or exalted, no pofitive idea oi the perfection oi God can everbcfoiin- 
cd. For a Perfetl being muft be infinite, and perfedly One : and in fuch a 
nature there can be nothing finite, nor any compofition of finites. 

How fhould we comprehend the nature of the Supreme incorporeal being, 
or how He exills, when we comprehend not the nature of the moft inferior 
fpirits, nor have any conception even of matter itfelf diveftcd of its acci- 
dents ? How fhould we attain to an adequate knowledge of the Supreme au- 
thor of the world, w hen we are utterly incapable of knowing the extent of the 
world itfelf, and the numbcrlefs undefcricd regions, with their fcvcnd ftates 
andcircumftances, containd in it, never to be fiequcnttd or vifitcd by ourphi- 
lofophy j nor can turn our felves any way, but we are ilill accofted with fomc- 
ihing above our underftanding? If wc cannot penetrate fo far into effeds, as to 
difcovcr them and their nature throughly, it i?? not to be cxpedcd, that we 
fliould, that wc can c\cr be admitted to fee through the myllericsof His nature, 

• Pror. V, VI. 

N who 

94- The Religion of Nature. Seel. V. 

who is the Caufe, fo far above them all. The Divine perfcftion then, and man- 
ner of being mufl be of a kind different from and above all tliat we can conceive. 

However, notwithflanding our own defects, wc may pofitively affirm there 
can be none in God : fince He is perfcH^ as wc have fcen, He cannot be defective 
or imperfeEl. This needs no further proof But what follows from it, I would 
have to be well underftood and rememberd : viz.. that from Him mud be re- 
moved want of life and activity., ignorance.^ impotence.^ aEting inconfiflently with 
reafon and truth., and the like. Becaufe thefc arc defects \ defcdt of knowledge, 
power, i^c. Thefeare defcfts and blemiflies even in us. And tlio his perfection 
is above all our ideas, and of a different kind from the perfeftions of men or 
any finite beings > yet what would be a defeft in them., would be much more 
fiich in ///»/, and can by no means be afcribed to Him ■". 

Though wc underftand not His manner of knowing things ; yet ignorance 
being uniform and the fame in every fubjeft, we underfland what is meant by 
that word, and can literally and truly deny that to belong to Him. The like 
may be fiiid with refpe6t to His power, or manner of operating, Sec. And 
when we fpeak of the internal effential attributes of God pofiti\cly, as that 
He is omnifcient, omnipotent, eternal, 8cc. the intent is only to fay, that there 
is no objcft of knowledge or power, which He does not know or cannot do. 
He exifts without beginning and end, £cc. and thus we keep IHU within the 
limits allowd by the propolition ''. That is, we may fpeak thus without pre- 
tending to comprehend His nature. And fo, 

XVII. PFe may confider God as operating in the produdlion and government of 
the worlds and may draw conclufions from His -works., as they are called, notvuith- 
fianding an) thing which has beenfaid". Becaufe this we can do without com- 
prehending the manner of His exiftence. Nay, the contemplation of His 
works leads us into a nccellity of owning, that there mufl be an incomprchen- 
fible Being at the head of them. 

Though I do not comprehend the mode, in which the world depends upon Hiiu 
and He influences and difpofes things, becaufe this enters into His nature, and 
the one cannot be undcrltood without the othcT : yet if I fee- things, which 
I know cannot be yc//-f.v//?f«7, and obfen'c plainly anofCOMow) and defign 'mi)\c 
difpofition of them, I may conclude that there is fomc Being, upon whom 
their exiftence doth depend, and by whom they arc modcld ; may call this 

If that in Terence had been (not a qucflion, as it is there, but) an affirmation, £f» homuncio 
hoc nonfaccrem, what a bitter reflexion had it been upon the heathen deity? '' A»y.,u^ i 


Truths relating to the Deity. 95 

Being GOD, or the Author and Governor of the world, i^c. without con- 
tradiHing my Iclf or truth : as I hope it will appear from what has been faid, 
and is going to be faid in the next propofition. 

XVIII. Gcd^ who gives exijletice to the "juorld, does alfo goiern it by His pro- 
vidence. Concerning this grand queftion, Whether there is a Divine providence, 
or not, I ufc to think, for my felf, after the following manner. 

FirJ}, The world may be faid to be governed ('at leaft cannot be faid to be 
•"•^■rrr^, or left to fluctuate fortuitouflyj, if there are /iJw;, by which natural 
caufes a£b, the fcvcral phieHO!}:e>:a in it fuccecd regularly, and, in general, the 
conltitution of things is preferred : if there arc rules obicned in the production 
of herbs, trees, and the like ■ if the feveral kinds of animals are, in proportion 
to their icveral degrees and rtations in the animal kingdom, furnilhd with fa- 
culties proper to dire& and determin their actions ; and when they a6t accord- 
ing to them, they may be laid to follow the laiv of their nature : if they arc 
f laced ^nd provided for fuitahly to their rcfpe6bivc natures and wants ', or 
('which amounts to the fame thingj if their natures arc adapted to their cir- 
cumftances '' : if, lallly, particular cafes relating to rational beings are taken 
care of in fuch a manner, as will at lilt agree belt with reafou. 

Secondly, If there arc fuch laws -.ind provifions, they can come originally from 
no other being, but fiom Him who is the yfuthor of nature. For thofc laws, 
which refult from the natures of things, their properties, and the ufc of their 
faculties, and may be faid to be written upon the things thcmfelvcs, can be 
the laws of no other : nor can thofc things, whofe very being depends upon 
God, exift under any condition repugnant to His will j and therefore can be 
fubjeft to no laws or difpofitions, which He would not have them be fubje6l 
to J that is, which are not His. Bcfidc, there is no other being capable of 
impofing laws, or any fcheme of government upon the world ; becaufe there 
is no other, who is not himillf ^jr/ of the world, and whofe own exiltencc 
doth not depend upon Him. 

Thirdly, By the providence of God I mean His governing the world by fuch 
laws, and making fuch provifions, as are mentiond above. So tliat if there 
■x\Q fuch, there is a IDiivinc pro\ iJencc. 

■ U-O 'i"3 ny CT;*^-! ■'npr, .t; the "Jt-r:, fpcik. I" I fliall not pretend here to meddie 

with p.irtifuhr cjfcs relating; to xnnnimnt or irrmionxl beings ; fuch as ire mcnriond in Ale iriot. 
(a leaf I tailing from a tree, a fpidcr's catching a fliejC^r.) and which arc there (aid to be ~>1)3^ n~^p03. 
Tbo it i( hard to fq>aratc tlicfc niany times from the cafes of rational beings j as alfo to compre- 
Itcnd what ->i»3J .""npO, tirftLl ncddtnt, is. 

N 2 Lafily^ 

95 The Religion of Nature.^ Se6l. V. 

Lajlly^ It is not impojjibk, that there fhould hcfuch : on the contray, we have 
juftrcafons to believe there arc. It would be an abfiird aflcrrion to fiiy, that 
any thing is impojjibie to a being whofe nature is infinitely above our comprc- 
hcnfion, iF the terms do not imply a contradi£lion : but we may with confidence 
allert, that it is impojfible for any thing, whofc exijience flows from fuch abeing, 
ever to grow fo far out of His reach, or be fo emancipated from under Him, 
that the manner of its exigence fhould not be regulated and detcrmind by Him. 

As to inanimate fub fiance i^ we fee the cafe to be really juilas it was fuppofed 
before to be. The heavenly and greater bodies keep their ftations, or perfeverc 
to go the fame circuits over and over by a certain law. Little bodies or particles, 
of the fimc kind, obferve continually the fame rules of attrafting, repelling, fjff . 
\^'hcn there are any feeming variations in nature, they proceed only from tlie 
different circumftances and combinations of things, afting all the while under 
their ancient laws. We are fo far acquainted with the laws of gravitation and 
motion, that we arc able to calculate their effefts, and ferve ourfclves of them, 
fiipplying upon many occafions the defect of power in our fclves by mechani- 
cal powers, which never fail to anfwer according to the efiablijiiment. Briefly, 
we fee it fo far from being impojfible, that the inanimate world fhould be go- 
vernd by laws, that all the parts of it arc obnoxious to laws by them inviolable. 

As to vegetables, we fee alfo how they are detcrmind hy certain methods -pvc- 
fcribed tliem. Each fort is produced from its proper feedj hath the fame tex- 
ture of fibres j is nourifhd by the fame kind of juices out of the earth, digell- 
cd and prepared by the fame kind of veflels, i^c. Trees receive annually their 
peculiar liveries, and bear their proper fruits : flowers arc drell, each fa- 
mily, in the fame colors, or diverfify their falliions after a certain manner pro- 
per to the kind, and breath the fame eflences : and both thefe and all other 
kinds obferve their feafons > and feem to have their fevcnil profefllons and trades 
appointed them, by which they produce fuch food and manufactures ('pardon 
the catachrefti), as mzy fatisfy the wants of animals. Being fo very necefiary, 
they, or at leaft the moft ufeful, grow eafily : being fixt in the earth, infen- 
fible, and not made for focicty,thcy are generally «f>i'<>»iiAi« : being liable to a 
great confumption both of them and their feeds, they yield great quantities of 
thefc in order to rcpau- and multiply their race, t^c. So that here is evi- 
dently a regulation, by which the feveral orders aie prefer\'ed, and the ends of 
them anfwerd according to their firft eflablifijmeHt too. 

Then as to animals, there are laws, which t^iut. mutand. arc common to them 
with inanimate beings and vcgctablcs,or at Icall fuch as refemble ' their laws. The 

• r//ny in his chapta D* oriine Mturt in/Aiii, 8cc. treats of trees in terms taken from animils. 


Truths relating to the Deity. 97 

indiviJuds of the fcveral kinds of thofc, as of thcfe, have chc fame (general) 
fhape and members, to be managed after the fatne manner : have the fame vcflcls 
replcnilh J with the /ame kinds of fluids, and furnillid with the fame glands for 
the feparationanddiilribution of fuch parts of them, as anfwcr the pw;<? inten- 
tions in them all : are ftimiilated by the fame appetites and uneafinenes to take 
m their food, continue their breed, (5?f. And whatever it is, that proceeds thus 
in a manner fo like to that of vegetables, according to Jixt methods, and keeps 
in the fimc general track as they do, may be fuid to obferve and be under fomc 
like rule or law,, which cither operates upon and limits it a^ extra^ or was given 
it with its aiture. But there are, moreover, certain obligations refulting from the 
fcveral degrees of reafon and fenfe, orfenfconly, of v,hich we cannot butbecon- 
fcious in our fclvcs, and obfer\e fome faint indications in the kinds bclows us, and 
which can be lookt upon as nothing lefs than laws, by which animals are to move 
and manage themfelves: that is, otherwife exprcll, by which the Author of their 
natures ^orf>-«i them. 'Tis true thffe laws may not impofc an abfolute nccefTity, nor 
be of the fame rigor with thoit of inanimate and merely pafTive beings, becaufc the 
beings which are fubjectto thefe ('men at leaft) may be fuppofed infomemeafure 
free,and to a£t upon fomc kind of principles or motives : yet iHll they may have the 
nature of laws, tho they may be broken j and may make a part of that providence by 
•which God admmijiers the affairs of the world. Whatever advantages I obtain by 
my own free endeavours, and right ufe of thofe faculties and powers I have, I look 
upon them to be as much the effects ofGod'sprovidence and government, as if they 
were given me immcdtatcly by Him, without my acting > fince all my faculties and 
abilities ^whatever they are) depend upon //;w, and areas it wcixinflruments of 
His providence to me in rd'pect of fuch things as may be procured by them ». 

To finilli this head : it is fo far from being impojffible, that the feveral tribes of 4- 
nimals fhould be io made and placed, as to find proper ways of fupporting and 
defending themfelves I mean, fo tar as it is confiltcnt with the general oeconomy 
of the world : for fome cannot well fubfill w ithout the dcllruftion of fome others), 
that, on the contrar)', we fee men, beafts, bnds,firhcs, infects all have organs and 
faculties adapted to their rcfpective circumftances and opportunities of finding 
their proper food or prey, {5?^. e\'en to theaftonillimcnt of tiitm who attend to 
the hiftor)- of aature. If men, who feem to have more wants than any other 
kmd, meet with difficulties in maintaining life, it is becaufc they themfelves, 
not contented with what is decent and convenient only, have by their luxuries and 
fcandalous neglect of their rcifon made life cxpenfivc. 

• Therefore if thole Ejjrnti in Jofifhui, who ire (aid ix\ ^ ©*? <M»T«AiTHi t« xmr*, excluded 
iiunun endavoui.', tbey mufl be much in the wrong. 


98 The RelksiOxV of Nature. Se6l-. V. 

The wcrldihcn being not left in a itatc of confufion or ;is a chaos, but reduced '\n- 
to or Jcr, md methoJizetl i'ovAgCiyto corrn: ; theicvcral fpccicsoFbcings having their 
ofFicesandprovincesrt^/^w^thcm; plants and animals fubliilenccyf; out for themj 
and as they go off, CucceiTors appointed to relieve them, and carry on t\\tfchcmey 
&CC. tha.tthe poJil;i/!ty only ofa^fwwrt/providcnccfhouldbeallowd, is certainly /t* 
wc^/?/? a demand. Wcicc, or may fee, that in fa£l thcrcis fucb a providence''. 

The great difficulty is, how to account for that providence, which is called par- 
ticular ; or that, which refpects ('principally) particular men. For rational beings 
and free agents are capable of doing and deferving well, or ;//. Some will make a 
right ufc of their faculties and opportunities, fome "will not : the vicious may, or 
may not repent, or repent and relapfe : fome fall into evil habits through inadver- 
tence, bad examples, and the like, rather than any defign : and thefe want to be re- 
claimd: fome may be fuppofcd to worlhipGodand to erase His protection and 
blefling, £s?i:. andthenapropcr anfwer to their prayers may be humbly expected. 
Hence many and great differences will avife, which will require from a governor 
fuitabk incouragements, rewards, coireptions, punifliments j and that fome fliould 
be protefted and fortunate, others not, or lefs. Now the good or ;// llatc of a 
man here, his fafety or danger, happinefs or unhappinefs depend upon many 
things, which feem to be Icarce all capable of being detcrmind by providence. 
They depend upon wliat lie does bimjelf, and what naturally follows from his 
own behaviour : upon what is done by others, and may either touch him ut the lame 
time, or reach him afterward : upon the coiirfe of nature, v%'hich mult affect him : 
and, in fine, upon many incidents, of which no account is 10 be given ''. As to what 
be does himfelf, itisimpofllblefor him, as things arc in this maze of hfe, to know 
always what tends to happinefs, and what not ; or if he could know, that, which 
ought to be done, may not be within the compafs of liis powers. Then, if the 
actions of other men are free, how can they be detcrmind to be only fucb, as 
may be either good or bad (as the cafe requires) for fome other particular man j 
fince fuch a determination fecms inconfillent with liberty ? Bclidc, numbas of 
men a£ting every one upon the foot of their own private freedom, and the 
fcveral degrees of fenfe and ability wliich they re/peclivc'y have, their aces, as 
they either confpire, or crofs and obliquely impede, or perhaps dircc'tly meet 

* Ui fquis m Jomiiin aliquam, aiil in gyinnnfium, aut in forum venerir, cum vidcat omnium mum 
rationtm, tnoilum, difciflmam, non fojptia/ine caufa fieri jtiJicare, fej ejfe aliqutm inteUigat, qui pro- 
fit, (y CHI pureatur, !kc. Cic. '' Little things have many rimes untbrciccn ami great effects: 
0> contra. The bare fight of a fig, nic%vn in the llnatc.houfc at Home, occaliond C.irthitge to be 
dcftroyd ; quod non Trebia, aut Trafymtnut, ntn Cannn iujlo injignes Rom»ni nominis perficire potutre . 
ntn c/ijlrn Punica aj lerlium lapijcm laliua, [orlique Collint adcquitam iffe Hunr.iinl. Plin. 


Truths relating to the Deity. pp 

and Dpi''ofe each other, and havediflPcrcnt efFcds upon men of different makcs^ov 
in different circumjlaticcs, murtcaulc a llnuigc cmbarras, and intanglc the plot'- 
And as to the courfc ofvaturc^ if a^oa</nianbe paflingby an infirm building, juit 
in the article of filling, can it be expected, that God lliould fufpcnd the force 
of gn\itation till he is gone by, in order to his deliverance j or can \vc think 
it would be increafed,- and the fall hailend, if a had man was there, only that 
he might be caught, crufhd, and made an example ? If a man's fafety or profpe- 
rity fliould depend upon winds or rains, mull nez: motions be impreil: upon the 
atmofphere, and nev) directions given to the floating parts of it, by fomc ex. 
tract diiijr;, and Kft:; influence from God ? Muft clouds be fo precipitated, or 
kept in fufpence', ;is the cafe of a p;u'Cicular man or two requires? To which 
add, that the differing and many times contrary interefts of men ai-e fcarce to 
be reconciled. The w ind, which carries one into the />«//, drives another back 
to fea ; and the rains, that are but julHufficient upon the /j ills, may drown the 
inhabitants of the valleys •^. In fhort, may we expect miracles ' ; or can there 
be a particulai- providence, a providence that fuits the fever al cafes ^x\d prayers of 
individuals, without a continual repetition of them, and (ovcc frequently com- 
mitted upon the laws of nature, and the freedom of intelligent agents ? For 
my part, I verily believe there may. For, 

I . It feems to me not impofjible, that God fhould know -Jihat is to come : on 
the contrary, it is highly rcidonablc to think, that He docs and mufl: know 
rhings/«/«r^. \\'hatcvcr happens in the world, which docs not come imme- 
diately from Him, mull either be the effeft of mechanical caufcs, or of the 
motions of living beings ■xxsA free agents. For chance we have feen already is 
no caufe. Now as to the fonner, it cannot be impoffible for Him, upon whom 
the being and nature of every thing depends, and who therefore mull intimate- 
ly know all their powers and what effects they will have, to fee through the 
■whole tram of caufes and cffefts, and whatever will come to pals in that 

• While every one pufties his own dcfigns, they murt interfere, and hinder one another. ytJfum- 
mumfucctdtri henortm CertMntti, iter iTtfejlum feciri xiai. Lucr. t Or is it not more like 

Iv, -<: »<r«t iiiL*itu.liCi, T yjstrtm'.na. t-jnbatM, i xm»s ^cr tct i, (in Plotinuj's words) ? » Some. 

th:n^ more than this wc rr.cct with in Onq.'s paraphrafc, where it is ^lid, that upon A/c/J/'s prayer 
C-iy-iN "7y >^C0 t4b D^m mm NT-D. Which fame ^hcc RA/J,i explains after the ramemaijncr, 

y-iNb lyin ^«*'7 imsq vn-:/ (mx ci>'i- I ny-iN] yun &>»> libdJ- <« in £#«m«. r,:- 

irAiwTW • fi^ fl*n»f 1-JxrT' ixiXtiuFtci- i -, MTef e j yitif/nnTU iiTct i \ ua^il>(, kAiw. « Some 

have tiikcd to this porpofe. So R. Alio (ays of (bme prophets and hkifidim, 15* V'^V^Ty UW 
tr:-»OV:i .—DPU,-'- So R. if. Muf>. that the jood or evil, which happen* to a man in thi5 world 
by way of reward or puniftiment, .""INlin '2 nnvn' npDJ D) t^lDI Ojn .""lOyoa pi HT [»M 

C3Piy b^y onjo Ninti/. So Mart. oi irnavpna D'yairn .-ijvyo no 'h^nti r'^o'n. And 
accordingly ia Std. ttfh. v/c find this thankfgiving : I30y a?' h'^yv TD3 h'y— -IjnjN O'liO. 

f Tvay 

100 The Religion of Nature. Seel. V. 

ivay : nay, it is Impojfibk^ that He fliould not do it. Wc our fclvcs, if wc 
arc fatisfied of the goodnefs of the materials of which a machine is made, and 
underftand the force and determination of thofe powers by which it is moved, 
can tell what it will do, or what will be the cfFcft of it. And as to thofe things 
which depend upon the voluntary xnoxxom of free agents, it is well known, that 
men (by whom learn how to judge of the rell) can only be free with rcfpcct 
to fuch things as are within their fpbere j not great, God knows : and their free- 
dom with refpect to thefe can only confift in a liberty either to act, without 
any incumbent ncccfllty, as their own reafcn and judgment iTiall dctermin them j 
or to negleEl their rational faculties, and not ul'c them at all, but liiffer themiclves 
to be carried away by the tendences and inclinations of the body, which left 
thus to itfclf acts in a manner mechanically. Now He, who knows what is in 
mens power, whatnot} knows the make of their bodies, and all thc»;ff/.;^«i/»; 
and propeniions of them j knows the nature and extent of their underllandingSj 
and what will determin them this or that way j knows all the proccfs of natu. 
ral (ox fccondj caufes, and confequcntly how thefe may work upon them *> : He, 
I (iiy, who knows all this, may know iihat men will do, if He can but know 
this one thing more, vix. whether they nvill ufe their rational faculties or not. 
And fince even wc our felvcs, mean and defective as we arc, can in fome meafure 
conceive, how fo much as this may be done, and feemto want but one ftep to 
finifh the account, can we with anyfhcwof rcalbndcny to a Perfect being this 
one article more, or think that He cannot do that tooj eipecially if we call to 
mind, that this very power of ufing our own faculties is held of Him "^ ? 

Obfen'e what a lagacity there is in fome »»(?«, not only in relpect of phyfi- 
cal caufes and effects, but alfo of the future actings of mankind ; and how 
very cafie it is many times, if the pcrfons concernd, their ch-.iracters, and qix- 
cumftanccs arc given, to forefce what they will do : as alfo to foretcl many 
general events, tho the intermediate tranfiictions upon which they depend are 
not known '*. Confider how much more remarkable this penetration is in 
fome men, than in others : confider further, that if there be any ruinds moie 
perfect than the human, (and who can befo conceited of himfelf as toquefti- 
on this ?) they mull have it in a iHll more eminent degree, proportiona- 
ble to the excellence of their natures : m the lall pl.icc, do but allow 

» What Stntca fays of the Gods ("in the heathen ftylc), may be faiJ of the true God. iiot*iftilli 
of eris fui /tries : omniHrnque lUi rerum fir matiui funs tturarum fcitntia in aptrto ftmfer tjl ; ncbn ex 
»Ldito /ubit, (ye. '' O yj ^«o?rA«<-i!; Sks ixkmrxt rx i»v-,i tuiXZi, ittjji,i)ifyr,f'iLTit. Vh.jHd, 

' ;/>yi no^ht vcluntates in caufariim orJine funr, tjiii cerlui eft Dri, rjufque frtfcitntm continttur, (yc. 
S. Aurt. '' Et/i nutm txituni aciei hahiiura Jit, divinare ntmo fottft ; tamen ittli txilum 

viJtc, (^c. and after, a^ucm e^o tarn viilco untmo, qiiarn e», qnt ocHlit ttraimuj. Cic. 

Truths relating to the Deity. lor 

(as you muftj this power of difccrning to be in God proportlonMe to His nature, 
as in lower beings it is proportionable to theirs, and then it becomes infinite i 
and then again, the future actions of free agents arc at once all unlocked, and 
expofcxi to His view. For that knowledge is not infinite, which is limited to 
things />J;? or prejent or which conic to pafs necejfarily. 

After all, what has been laid is only a feeble attempt to fliew, how fiir even we 
can go toward a conception of the manner., in which future things may be 
known : but as we have no adequate idea of an infinite and perfedt Being, His 
powers, and among them W'\% power of knowing, mull infinitely pafs all our un- 
dcrftanding. It mult be fomcthing different from and infinitely tninfcending 
all the motlcs of apprehending things, which we know any thing of'. 

We know matters of faCt by the help of our yf»y?j, the ihength of memory, 
imprcllions made upon />/;rt«75', or the rf/»or/ of others (tho that indeed is compre- 
hended under fenfts. For that, which we know only by report, in proper fpeak- 
ing we only know the report of, or we have heard it) ; and all thefc ways do fup- 
pofe thofe matters either to be prcfent, or once to hwje been : but is it therefore 
impojfibte, that there fliould be any other ways of knowing? This is fo far from 
being true, that, fincc God has no organs of fcnfiition, nor fuch mean faculties 
as the belt of ours are, and confequcntly cannot know things in the way which 
wc know them in, if He doth not know them hyiomc other way, He cannot 
know them at all, even tho they were prcfent : and therefore there mull be o- 
tber ways, or at leall another \i^y of knowing even matters of fa£l. And fincc 
the difficulty wc find in determining, whether future matters of fadl may be 
known, arifes chieHy from this, that wc in reality confider, without minding 
it, whether they may be known in our way of knowing} it vanilhcs, when wc 
recollect, that they arc and mull be known to God by lomc other way : and not 
only fo, but this mull be fomc way, that is perfect and woithy of Him. Future, or 
what tous is future, may be as truly theobjeft of Divine knowledge, as /rir/?«/ is 
of ours : nor can wc*" tell, what rcfpeft pafi,prefent, to eome, have to the Di\ inc 
mind, or wherein they differ. To deaf men there is no fuch thing ■x% found, to 
blind no fuch thing as H^ht or color : nor, when thefc things arc defined and cx- 
plaind to them in the belt manner, which their circumllanccs admit, are they ca- 
p.vblc of knowing how they are apprehended. So here, we canr.ot tell hov: futin-c 
things aic known perhaps, any more than deaf or blind people wliat founds or co- 
lors arc, and how they arc perceived > but yet there may be a way of knowing tbofe., 

• i3nvr>T i^njo nj/'T ht t'sj. u»tm. it differs not nx'y>;n |>oa Sn^ -xx) icyDai 3"\a. Jd. 

* IgnAri, nuid i[Htxl tffi, ^md anjMt/it : to ufc Lttcriliui'i words more properly. 

O as 

102 The Religion of Nature. Seel:. V. 

as well as there is of perceiving ihefe. As they want a fifth fcnfe to perceive 
founds or colors, of which they have no notion : fo perhaps we may want ay7.v/6 
fenfe, or funic faculty^ of which future events may be the proper objcfts. Nor 
have we any more rcafon to deny, that there is in xiwtuxc fnch a fenfe or faculty, 
than the deaf or blind have to deny, that there is fuch a fenfe as that of hearing 
cr feeing. 

We can never conclude, that it is iwpoj/il^le for an infinitely pcrfcft Being to 
know what a free agent wiWchoo/e to do, till we can comprehend all the powers 
of fuch a Being, and that is till we our fclves are infinite and perfcft ". So far 
•arc we from being able to pronounce with any fhcw ofreafon, that it '\simpo£:ble 
there fliould be fuch knowledge in God. 

In the laft place, this knowledge is nor only not /»;/)ff^Wf, but that which has 
been already proved concerning the Deity and His perfedioii doth neceflarily 
infer, that nothing can be hid from Him. For if ignorance be an imperfcfti- 
on, the ignorance o? future a£ks and events mull be fo : and then if «// imper- 
fections are to be denied of Him, this miifl. 

There is indeed a common prejudice again lithe pre/ciettce (as itisufually call- 
ed) of God ; which fuggells, that, if God foreknows things, He foreknows 
them infallibly or certainly : and if fo, then they arc certain ; and if certain, 
then they arc no longer matter of freedom. And thus prcfcicncc and freedom arc 
inconfillcnt. But fare the nature of a thing is not changcdhy being known, or 
known before hand. For if it is known truly, it is known to be what it is ; and 
therefore is notalterdby this. The truth is, God forefccs, or rather fees the actions 
of free agents, becaufe they will be -, not that they will be, becaufe He forcftcs 
them''. If I fee anobjeft in a certain place, the veracity of my faculties fup- 
pofed, it is certain that objeft is there : but yet it cannot be faid, it is there becauCe 
I fee it there, or that my feeing it there is the caufiioi its being there: but hi- 
caufe it is there., therefore \ fee it there. It is the objeft, that determins my feu- 
fat ion : and fo in the other cafe, it is a future c/jo/Vc of the free agent, that uct(.r- 
niins the prei'cicncc, which yet may be infallibly true <^. 

Let us put thefe two contradiftory propofitions, 5 (fomc particular manjit/// 
go to church next Sunday., and B will not go to church next Sunday ; and kt us fup- 

• To attempt ro comprehend the manner of God's knowing i.': the fame as to emlcavour n\T3\i; 
nin i3n:i<. M.tir». •> iynt:D~iu;D!A"i i2nn i>i'vi' t-t!? n^nivunoa inyn\ Maim. Much 

might Ix: iiillitcd upon this Tubjcft (out of Mitri. particularly) which I fliali omit. ' Sitm 

enim tu memoria tna noneogis falln tjji qM fr*t(rierH»t i fie Dtits fmfcUntia /h4 nun cept fttiend* 
OH*, futura funt. S. Auft, 


Truths relating to the Deity. 103 

pofe wkhall, tIutBis/r«, and that his going or not going depends merely upon 
his ozvn will. In this cafe lie m;iy indeed do cither, but yet he can do but ofte of 
thcfe two things, either ^o, or not go; and one he murt do. Oneof thcfc pro- 
pofitions therefore is now true ; but yet it is not the truth of th.u propoluion, 
which forces him /5 do what is containdin it : on the contniiy, the truth of the 
propofition arifes from what he lliall c!:oofe to do. And if tiiat truth doth nor 
force him, the forcknovikdge of that truth will not. We may fure fuppofe B 
himicyi to know certainly before hand, which of the two he will choolcto do, 
whether to go to church or not (^1 mean fo far as it depends upon his choice on- 
1)^ : and if io, then here is B's own forekno~ji:kdgc conlillent with his freedom : 
and if wc can but, further, fuppofe God to know as much in this refpcd as B does, 
there will be God's foreknowledge confident with E's freedom. 

In a word, it involves no contradiSiion to aflert, that God ceitainly knows 
what any man will choofe; and therefore that he lliouki do this cannot be fiiid 
to be im^bjfible. 

1. It is not impoj/ihle, that fuch /awj of nature, and fuch ay^nVjof caufesand 
cflfcds may he originally defignd, that not only general provillons may be made 
for the feveral fpccics of beings, but even particular cafes, at leafl: manyof them, 
may alfo be provided for without /«ho"j.t/;9«j ot: alter at io;t> in the courfc oi na- 
ture '. It is true this amounts to a prodigious fcheme, in which all things to 
come are as it were comprehended under one view, eftimated, and laid together : 
but when I confider, what a mafs of wonders the univerfe is in other regards > 
what a Being God is, incomprebenftbly great and perfect ; that He cannot be igno- 
rant of any thing, no not o( ihc future w ants and deportments of /a/7 /V///(7r men j 
and that all things, which derive from Him as the Firll caufe, mult do this fo as to 
he confiflent one with another, and in fuch a manner, as to make one corfipacl fy- 
Itcm, befitting fo great an Author: I fay, when I confider this, I cannot deny 
fuch an adjujiment of things to be within His power ''. The order of events, pro- 
ceeding from the fettlement of nature, maybe as compatible with the due and rca- 
fonablc fucceis of my endeavours and prayers (as inconfidcrable a part of the world 
as I am 0> ^ with any other thingorpbienimenon how great focvcr. 

• Things COmctopifs ^ kxtu purttul; imf^lt^'xi i KtCTX >iyci- and CVCn t<« r/AiKfiTifx i'ua-ui'Ti- 
T«x-^«i « e-uvi^uija, •c/i.i^iK. plct. That in Seneca looks fomcthing like this : Hotdico, fulmmj. 
von mini a Jrje, fed fic tmma difpo/ita, ut ea eiiam, qm ab ilto non fi'unt, nmeii fine r At tone neu 

SAnl : qut illiiii efl. Sam etji Jufiter ilia nunc non fadi, fecit utfierni. ' Thisiccms 

to be what lufetins means, when he iay.s, that Divine providence docs (among otiicr thinp) T«r: 
e«Ti; cvitt&XitnTi m i,ite-xt r*\n i^ti< . « Tv -^ i'itmx'tv iwxvti a>irfi7) lu^x^ci, in Philo'i 


O i Perhaps 

104. The Religion 0/ Nature. Se<51:. V. 

, Perhaps iny meaning may be made move intelligible thus. Siippofe M (fomc 
man) ceitainly to foreknovj fome way or other tliat, when he fliould come to be 
upon his death-bed, L would petition for i'omc particular legacy ; in a manner fo 
carnell and humble, and with fuch a good difpofition, as would render it pro- 
per to grant his rcqucll : and upon this M makes his lajl -will, by which he de\ifes 
to L that which was to be asked, and tlicn locks up the -iVill; and all this many 
years before the death of M, and whilil L- had yet no expectation or thought of 
any fuch thing. When the time comes, the petition is made, and granted ; not 
by making any neiv will, but by the eld one already made, and without altera- 
tion : which legacy had, notwithilanding that, never been left had the petition 
never been preferred. The grant may be called an effect of a future act, and 
depends as much upon it, as if it had been made after the act. So if it had 
been forefeen, that L would not fo much as ask, and had therefore been left 
out of the will } this preterition would have been caufcd by his carriage, tho 
much later than the date of the w ill. In all this is nothing hard to be admitted, 
if M be allowd to foreknow the cafe \ And thus the prayers, which good men 
offer to the yUl-knowing God, and the neglc£ls of others, may find fitting efFc6ts 
already forccafled in the courfe of nature. Which pofflbility may be extended 
to the labors of men, and their behaviour in general. 

It is obvious to every one's obfervation, that mfacl particular men are very com- 
monly (at leail in Ibme meafurej rewarded orpunifhdby thc^ewra/ laws and me- 
thods of nature. The natural (thonotconflant) attendents and confequences of 
virtue are peace, health, and felicity j of vice, lofs of philofophical pleafures, a 
difeafcd body, debts, and difficulties. Now then, if B be virtuous and happy, C ^•z- 
tious and at lalb miferablc, laboring under a late and fruiclels remorfcj tho thrg 
comes to pafs through the natural tendence of things, yet thefe two cafes, being 
fuppofed fuch as require, the one that B fliould be favord, the other that C 
Ihould fuffer for his wickednefs, are as c^cctuxWy pro-vided for, as if God ex- 
erted his power in fome peculiar way on this occafion. 

5. It is not impofible, that men, whofe natures and actions are foreknown, may 
be introduced into the world 'm{\ich times, places, and other a>r«w/?^«rf/, as that 
their acts and behaviour may not only coincide with the general plan of things, but 
alfoanfwer mTiny private cafes too ''. The planets and bigger partsof the world 

• Tlie cifc here put may perhaps fupply an anfwcr to that, whicli is iliiJ in Mijlm. mtjf. Berak. 
01 NIvynt'Dn 11 nn-iDy\l;b pyiV. '> if rlato liad not been born in the time of Socr/itts, in 

all probability he had not been what he was. And therefore, with Laliantius's favor, he might luvc 
rcafon to thank God, quoj jiihcnicnfa [nattis ept'], crquodteir.poribus Socniis. Juft as M. Antom- 
nui afcribcs, gratefully, to the Gods 7« v>ii«i AToMvartw, 'Vufix-n, M«fiu.e>. 

4 V'C 

Truths relating to the Deity. 105. 

wc cannot but fee are difpofcd into fuch places and order^ that they together 
make a nohlc/y/few, without having their natural powers of attraction (or the 
force of that which is equivalent to attraftionj or any of the laws of motion re- 
[Iraindov alterd. On the conixxvy ^beiiigyightly placed^ they by the obfcrvation of 
tkffe become fubfcnient to the main dcfign. Now why may there not be in 
the Divine mind fomcthing like a projcftion of the future hijiory of mankind, 
as well as of the order and motions and various afpefts of the greater bodies 
of the world ? And then why iTiould it not be thought pojjlhle for mcn^ as well 
as for them^ by fome fccret law, tlio of another kind, or rather by the prcll- 
dence and guidance of an unfeen governing power, to be brought into their 
places in fuch a manner as that by the free ufe of their faculties, the conjunftions 
and oppofltions of their intercfls and inclinations, the natural influence and weight 
of their fcveral magnitudes and degrees of parts, power, wealth, fjfr. they may 
confpire to make out the fchcme B And then again, fincc generals confift of par- 
ticulars, and in this fchcme arc comprehended the actions and cafes o^ particular- 
men, they cannot be fo fituatcd refpcftively aniong the reft of their fpcciesasto 
be ferviceable to the principal intention, and fall properly into the general dia- 
gram of affairs, unlefs they and their feveral aftiiigs and c;ifes do in the main cor- 
rcfpond one to another, and fit among themfelves, or at leaft are not inconfiflent. 

Here is no implication of any contradinion or abfurdity in all this : and therefore 
it may at leall be fiir]y fuppofed. And if fo, it will follow, tlrat a particular 
proiidence may be compatible with the nxtux-xX freedon of mens actions. Such 
a fuppofition is certainly not beyond the power of an almighty^ perfe8 Being ; 
it is moreover worthy of Him, and what they, who can dwell a while upon 
thofc words, and take their import, muft believe. 

The ancients I am perfuadcd had fome fuch thoughts as thcfe. For they 
were generally /j/a///;, and yet do not fecm to have thought, that they were 
not maflers of their own actions'. 

4. It is x\ox.i>npofflble (for this \sall that I contend for here', that manv things, 
fuitable to fcveral cafes, may be brought to pals by means oi fccret and Ibnic- 
timcs fudden influences on our minds'", or the minds of other men, w hofc aft.?- 
may. affect us. For inftancc > if the ca(c fhould require, that N ihouldbcdt- 

• Tlalo and the Sfoict, af.tlut. mske fate to he rvuirXttun uinu* riricy lO/lLi, ci ppt/^TAmjf >C r, 
»aV i.a,i^■ mrt T« f^ ii^«j.9-«i, T« ;> a.uiij>»Kt*i. *> Tiic H.-af licn were of this opinion : othn 

wiie Homer couU have had no opportunity of introducing their Deities as he doth. T» «!' Kf it, 

^M-i 5;.i >ii« vAsm^TK 'A^iinr 'A»« T.< uJutirur T{i-.J i ^(ixf- and thelikcofteiJ. PllitArtheXfhW.'- 
thde pailages thuj. Oi!« amu/vrra «■•(« r'0|»iif^3 T Sim. «»« «i»5rr« Tut TfMCiffe-i>- »=',' •?,««•«« 'f ' 

•/•C'^^"' *''''" ^«rr«ci'«< tfu.ui u'/uyin' and aftnwards the Gods arc iaiJ to hc'p men, -f '^vx''i " 


io6 The Religio>t of Nature. Se6]:. V. 

liverJ from fomc threatening r»/«, or fiom fomc misfortune^ which would cer- 
tainly befall him, if he ihoulJ go fuch a way at fuch a time, as he intended: 
upon this occalion feme new reafons may be prefented to his mind, why he 
ilinuld not go at all., or not then^ or not by that road; or he may forget to go. 
Or, if he is to be deliverd from Ibme d ingerous encmy^ either fome new turn 
given to his thoughts may divert him from going where the enemy will be, or 
the enemy may be after the fame manner diveitcd from coming where he fliall 
be, or his [the enemy's] relcntment may be qualified^ or fomc proper method 
ofdefe}!ce may be fuggelled, or degree of refolution and vigor excited. After 
the lame manner not only dclivcnmces from dangers and troubles, but advanta- 
ges and fucccflcs may be conferred : or on the other fide, men may, by way of 
punilliment for crimes committed, incurr mifchicfs and calamities. Ifay, thcfe 
things and fuch like may be. For fince the motions and aftions of men, which 
depend upon their wills, do alfo depend upon their judgments, as thcfe again do 
upon the prcfcnt appearances or non-appearances oith'mgs in their minds j ifa ne^v 
profpect of things can be any way produced, the lights by which they are fccn 
alterd, new forces and direftions imprcft upon the fpirits, paflions exalted or 
abated, the power of judging inlivcnd or debilitated, or the attention taken off, 
without any fufpenfion or alteration of the ftanding laws of nature, then with- 
out that new volitions, defigns, meafurcs, or a ceflation of thinking may alfo be 
produced, and thus many things prevented, that othenvifc would ^f, and many 
brought about, that would not. But that this is far from being impo(Jib!e,kcms 
clear to me. For the operations of the mind following in great mcafure the prc- 
fcnt difpofition of the body, fome thoughts and defigns, or abfences of mind, may 
proceed from corporeal caufcs, afting according to the common laws of matter 
and motion themfclvcs ; and fo the cafe may fall in with n. z. or they may be oc- 
cafiond by fomcthing Hud or done by o/Z^er «/f»i and then the ealemay be brought 
under n. 5. or they maybccaufcd by the lliggclHon, andimpulfc, or other filcnt 
communications ot fomefpiritual being ; perhaps the Deity himfclf. For that fuch 
imperceptible influences and iHll whifpcrsmay be, none of us all can pofitivcly 
deny: that is, we cannot know certainly, that there are no iuch things. On 
the contrary, I believe there are but few of them who have made obfcrvations 
upon themfclvcs and their affairs, but mull, when they rcfleft on life pad and 
the various adventures and events in it, find many inlhnccs, in which their ufuul 
judgment and fenl'c of things cannot but fcem to themfclvcs to have been ozrr- 
ruledi they knew not by what, nor how', nor why (i.e. they have done things, 

ifihxi, fays Culliiitmid*!, who dclignd the poifon for rioeoJerui, in Luctiui. 

' ' . which 

Truths relating to the Deity. loj 

•which iiftcrwards they wonder how they came to do) ; and that thefc actions 
have had confcquences very remarkable in their hirtory '. 1 fpeak not here oi 
men dcmentated with wine, or inchamed with feme temptation : the chjng 
holds true of men even in their fobcr and more coniidcring Ic-albns. 

That there may be po£lhly fuch inlpiracions of new thoughts and couaiels 
may perhaps further appear from this > that we fo frequently find thoughts a- 
riling in our heads, into which we are led by no difcourfe, nothing we re-ad, no 
clue of rcalbning > but they fui-prife and come upon us from we know not what 
quarter '». If they proceeded from the mobility of fpirits, llraggling out of or- 
der, and fortuitous affections of the br.iin, or were of the nature of dreams, why 
are they not as wild, incoherent, and extravagant as they are ? Not to add, that 
the world generally acknowledged, and therefore feems to have experien- 
ced fomc allillance and directions given to good men by the Deity ; that men 
have been many times infatuated, and loll to thcmfelves, (yc. If any one 
fhould objeft, that if men arc thus over-ruled in their aftings, then they are 
deprived of their /;^fr/j. Sec. the anfwer is, that tho man is a free agent, he may 
not be free as to every thing. His freedom may be reltraind, and he only ac- 
countable for thole afts, in refpe£t of which lie is free. 

If this then be the cale, as it feems to be, that men's minds arc fufccptiveof 
fuch infmuations and imprejffions, as frequently by ways unknown do affbft them, 
and give them an inclination toward this or that, how many things may be 
brought to pals by thefc means without /.v/«^ and rcjixing the laws of nature: 
any more than they are unfixt, when one man alters the opinion of another by 
throwing a book, proper for that purpofc, in his way? I lay, howmany thjngs 
may be brought about thus , not only in rcgaid of our felves, but other people^ 
who may be concerned in our actions, cither immediately ', or in time through 
perhaps many intermediate events ? For the profperity or improfperity of a man, 
or his Hite here, docs not intircly depend upon his own prudence or impiTjdcnce, 
but in great meafure upon his /ituation -iniong the re It of mankind, and what 
ibey do. The natural clfccb of his management meeting with fuch things, as 
arc the natural cfFcfts of the actions of other men, and being blended with them, 
the rdult may be fomething not intended or forefeen. 

f. There pojfibly may be, and moft probably arc beings invifibJe, and fupe- 
rtor in nature to us, who may by other means be in many rcfpcfts minijleis of 

» When Hanniial wu in fight of Rtme, ntn aufus tft obfidtrt. S. Iliir. Srd relifione qh.Ujm 

aiftinuir, ijucJ Jictrtt, c»fimJt urbit mojo nim iari xoluntattm, piodo nm iIaki fjcultatim, lit te/ltiur 
{j. Orcfini. Schat. •> Sort tuiin cuiquam in fottfitre rjl quid teniAt in mentmi. S. Aud. 

t They who call'J Simenido out from Scoim tad hi3 company, a« it it wac to fpcak V.'it)i him, 
Ovcd his lii'c. The ftory kr.own. God's 

io8 The Religion of Nature. Se61:.V. 

God's providence, and authors under Him of many events to particular men, 
without altering tlic laws of nature. For it implies no contradiHion or abfurdt- 
ty to fay there are fuch beings : on the contiaiy we have the greatell reafon to 
think what has been intimated already j that fuch imperfeft beings, as wc are, 
ai'C far below the top ofthefcale. Tho piSlures of fpiritual beings cannot be 
drawn in our imagination, as of corporeal ; yet to the upper and re-afoning part 
of the mind the idea o? fpiritual fubftance may perhaps be as clear, as tlut of 
corporeity^. For what penetrability is, mufl: be known jull as well as what/w- 
penetrability is : and fo on. 

Andfince it has been proved Cp-77, 78), that all corporeal motions proceed 
originally from ibmething/wor/orf^/, it mult be ascertain, that there are incor- 
poreal fubftanccs, as that there is motion. Bcfide, how can we tell but that there 
maybe above us beings of greater powers, and more perfect intellects, and capa- 
ble of mighty things, which yet may have corporeal vehicles as wc have, hut fi- 
ner and itrjifibk ? Nay, who knows but thjt there may be even of thcle many 
orders., rifmg in dignity of nature, and amplitude of power, one above ano- 
ther ? It is no way below the. philo/ophy of thefe times, which feenis to delight 
in inlarging the capacities of matter, to aflert the pojfibility of this. But how- 
ever, my own defects fufficicntly convince me, that I have no pretenfion to 
be one oithcfirfi rank, or that which knext under the All-perfect. 

Now then, as ive our ft Ives by the ufe of our powers do many times interpofe 
and alter the courfe of things within our fphere from what it would be, if they 
were left intirely to the laws of motion and gravitation, without being fitidto 
alter thofe laws; fo may thdc fuperior beings likewife in rcfpcct of things with- 
in their fphcrcs, much larger be furc, the lead of them all, than ours is : only 
with this difference, that as their knowledge is more cxtcnfive, their intellects 
purer, their reafon better, they may be much properer inltruments of Divine 
providence with refpect to us, than we can be with refpect one to another, or 
to the animalshdow us. I cannot think indeed, that tiie power of thefe beings 
is fo large, as to alter orfufpendthc general laws oithc world; or that the world 
is like a bungling piece of clock-work, which requires to be oft fet backward or 
forward by them j or that they can at plcafure change their condition to ape us,or 
inferior beings i and confequently amnotapthallily to credit llorics opponents, 
&c.fuch as cannot be true,unlcfs the natures ofthings and their manner of being be 

• Th'ry, who believe there is nothing but what they can hanillc or fee («i »Ji> «»o <i9i^« irriti j 

i xt il'tu\) i-fi| TciTt }i^i;(ui AwfiiiJj, -it j ri iifitTcf CW4 iino'i^itO/jti ii( c'r iriat f'if) arc by 

.tiJtto reckond to be void of all philofophy, kfiiCnrti, e-xAisfoi, irriVi'Tfi, ,i*«A' li ««.»«-oi. 


Truths relating to the Deity. 1 09 

quite rcnvcrfcd : vet (\ will rcpc-At it again} as men may be fo placed as to become, 
e\cn by the free excvciic of their own powers, injfruments of God's particular 
providence to other men (oranimalsj; fo may we well fuppofe, that thcfe /j/g^fr 
beings may be fo fl'//7r;^K/ir(/ through the univerfe, and fubjcct to fuch an occo- 
nomv(tho I pretend not to tell what that is},as may render them alfo inllrumcnts 
of the fmie providence} and that they may, in proportion to their greater abi" 
lities, be capable, confijlently ivlth the laivs of nature^ fome way or other, tho 
not in our way, of influencing human affairs in proper places. 

Lajlly^ \\\\M I have ventured to lay before you I would not have to be foun- 
derftood, as if I percinptorily ajj'ertcd things to be juft in this manner, or pre- 
tended to impofe my thoughts upon any body elfe : my defign is only to fliew* 
how I endeavour to help my own narrow conceptions. There muit be vther 
laays Sbovc my underftandmg", by which fuch a Being as God is may take care 
of prii'ate cafes without internipting the order of the univerfe, or putting any 
of the parts of it out of their channels. Wc may be fure He regards every 
thing as being u-hat it is ; and that therefore His latvs mull be accommodated to 
the true genius's and capacities of thofc things, which arc aflTcfted by them. 
The purely material part of the world isgovernd by fuch, as are fuited to the 
ftateof a being, which is infenfihk^ pafjive only^ and every where and always 
the fame : and thcfe feem to be fimple and few, and to cany natural agents 
into one conllant road. But intelligent affizr, /r a- beings muftbc under a govern- 
ment of another form. They mufl:, tiuth requiring it, be confidcrd as beings^ 
who may behave themfclvcs as they ought, or not j as beings fufceptive of plca- 
fure and pain > as beings^ who not only owe to God all that they arc or have, but 
arc ('or may bej fenfibleof this, and to whom therefore it mull: be naturahx-^on 
many occafions tofupplicateHim for mercy, defence, direction, afliftance; lailly, 
as beings^ whofe cafes admit great variety : and therefore that influence^ by which 
He is prcfent to them, mull be different from that, by which gravitation and 
common pbanomena arc produced in matter. This feems to be as it were a pub- 
lic influence, the other private, anfwering private cafes, and prayers; tiiis to o- 
pcrate directly upon the bod)', the other more efpcciallv upon the mind, and up- 
on the body by it, 6f<^. But I forbear, led I ihouldgotooraroutof ray depth : on- 
ly adding in gtncral, that God cannot put things fo far out of His own pow- 
er, as that He fliould not for e'jer govern ti-anfadions and events in His own 
world ; nor cm perfect knowledge and power e\'cr want proper mcMs to atclucve 

P what 


I lo The Religion of Nature. Sed. V. 

what is fit to be done. So that, tho what I have advanced fliould ftand foi" 
nothing, there w.'zjftillbe a/»(?r/;V«/^r;)ro':);Vf«f? notwithftanding the forcmcn- 
tiond difficulty. And then, iF there w^j ^^ one, it will unavoidably follow, that 
there is one: becaufe in the dcfcription of providence, p. pf, nothing is fuppo- 
fed with rcfpcft to particular cajes^ but that they fhould be provided for in Rich a 
manner as will Aihll agree bejl with reafon ; and to allow, that this may be done, 
and yet fay, that it is not done, implies a blafphcmy that creates horror ; it is 
to charge the PerfcB being with one of the greateft imjierfeSlionSy and to make 
Him not fo much as a reafonable being. 

I conclude then, that it is iis certain, that there is a particular prozidence^ as 
that God is a Being of perfeEl rcafon. For if men are treated according to reafon, 
they mull be treated according to what they are : the virtuous, the juil, the com- 
pafTionate, i^c. as fuch, and the vitious, unjull, cruel, i^c. according to "what 
they are : and their feveral cafes mull be taken and confiderd as they are : which 
cannot be done without/z/c^ a providence. 

'^ Againlt all this it has been, as one might \vcll c>(-pci^. ohjeUcd of old, that 
things do not feem to be dealt according to reafon^ virtuous and good men very 
oft laboring under adverfity, pains, perfccutions, whilll: vitious,wicked, cruel men 
prevail and flourifh ^ But to this an anfwer (m which I lliall a little further ex- 
plain my fclf ) is ready. It miglit be taken out of that, which has been given 
to the Manicbean objection under prop. VII. But I lliall here give one more 
dired : and let that and this be mutually affifting and fupplements each to the 
other. I . Weare not always certain, wlio are good., who ivicked ''. If we trull to 
fame and reports, thefe may proceed, on the one hand, from parti;U friendlhip, 
or flattery J on the other, from ill-nacured furmifes and conllruftions of things, 
envy, or malice ; and on either, from fmall matters aggrandized, from mil- 
take, or from the unskilful relation even of truth itfelf Oppofite parties 
make a merit of blackening their adverfaries % and briglitening their friends, 

* si CHrent[^Dij] homines, ienc ioiiii fit, /nalitnulis: qiioJ nunc abeJI. Afi.Cic. Thejcrrs, who 
call this cafe li? 21161 yU)~i l"? yil p^iT, have written many things al>out it, to be iecn in their 
books; Mo.ntbok. S. Jqquar. Men. hamma. iiahh. ab.^c. So have the Heathen philofophers tooi 
Seneca, Plutarch, Plctmui, Simfliciits, at. But the anfwcrs of neither are always juft. God forbid 
that O.ould bethought true, which is aficrted by Glance, nf. Plat, that thcjuft, if they had Gy^eii 
ring, woulddoastheunjuft, andirieo^.i? i>car^^KM®'. u.».x ^tttyr-x^'Mt®- , r_>. Or that inS.Hhafiil. 
and Mm. hamma. yWI !3 pll^ ''^ V~*'' P'"*^- Ihc rcafon afl'igncd for this cafe in another place 
is fomething better : p^lV H'H ill? nailSD HM Ni? DN iiDN' N^VV no. But the way of falving 
iv in Nilliii. hhaiy. by miDirjn bub-i, or what the Cabbalifts call "MD'V, is word of all. '' CnJit 
O-Riphtuj, jultilTimus iinm ^iiifnil in Taicrii, (^ ferimtiffimiii tqiii. Dis alitcr vifum. Virg. 

' Virtusts if/hi invert imui. Hor. 


Truths relating to the D eity. 1 1 1 

andtfer'ved!) and unmcafurably : and ro idle companions and golTlps it is divcrfi- 
on, and what makes the principal put of their convcrlation % to rchcarfc the 
charaftci-s oFmcn, drcll up out of their own ihcams and inventions. And bcfidc 
all this, the good or bad repute of men depends in great mcafurc upon mean 
people, who carry their ilories from family to family, and propagate them very 
felt: like little infects, which lay apace, md t\\z Icfs the f of! er. There arc 
few, very few, who have the opportunity and the will and the ability to rcprc- 
fent things truly *>. Bcfide the matters of facb thcmich-es there aie many cir- 
eumjlancei which, before lentence is pafled, ought to be known and weighed, 
and yet fcarce ever can be known, but to the pcrfon kimfclf who is conccrnd. 
He may have other views, and another fenfcof things, than his judges have; and 
what he under Hands, what he feels, what he intends, may be a y^trr/ confined 
to his own brell. A man may through bodily indifpofitions and faults in his 
conllitution, which it is not in his power to correct, be fubje6b to JIarts and 
inadvertencies^ or obnoxious to //j^re^, which he cannot be aware of j or through 
want of inlbrmation or proper helps he may labor under iniincible errors, and 
a£t as in the dark : in which cafes he may do things, which are in themfelves 
wrong, and yet be innocent, or at lead: rather to be pitied, than cenfured with 
feverity. Or perhaps the ccnfurer^ notwithftanding this kind of men talk as if 
they were infallible, may be miltakcn himfclf in his opinion, and judge that to 
be ivrongy which in truth is right <=. Nothing more common than this. Igno- 
rant and fuperltitious wretches meafure the adtions of ktterd -^nd philofophical 
men by the tattle of their nurfes or illiterate parents and companions, or by 
the falhion of the country : and people of differing religions judge and con- 
demn each other by their own tenents j when both of them cannot be in the 

n /*.»•»< i^zt/JMci, l(P' tit i <PiMT kAi'ttio^ «; t« «■•»« i, iAii3-ii«. Grtg. Kaz. •> Therefore, with 
Stcrates in Flato, we ought not much to care what the multitude [" To«r,] fay of us, <i«v' », ti s 
iTtt.'wt •!!€< T iuucmt, i i^<it*», ii;, £ ui,T>i y aA>,3'iiit. ' Or, V. V. he may judge that to be right, which 
\% vrmg. This fams to be pretty much the cafc in tint enumeration of good men, who fuferd, 
af.Cic. Cur duo Scifwnts, fortijjlmoi ci" optmos ziroi, in Hipania PocnHs opfrfjjit ! Cur Maximus tx- 
tulit f.lium con/ularim > Cur Marcetliim Anmbal interemit , crc. For here they are reckond boni, only 
becaulc they vKtefortrs; that is, becaulc they had been zealous and fuccefsful inftruments in conquer, 
ing and deftroying them, who happend to be !o unfortunate as to Ix: neighbours to the Romani, 
upon various pretences indeed, but in truth only to inbrge their own territories. Is this fohegoodf 
Doth it dcferve furh a particular obfervation, tlut F. A//»jr;OT«/ buried a Ton, after he ludbetn Conlijl 
too? Mow doth it appear, tliat Maretllus was a better man than Haniiiiall Is it fuch a wonder, if 
they, who fpcnd their lives in flaughtcr, (hould at length be Dain themfelves? If th« margin permit- 
ted. ■ ■ t be matle upon this catalogue; as alfo Ibmc upon that, which follows in 
Cyc -i ., , ^uibiiiimfToiii oj'tim' nenit. 

V 1 right, 

112 The Rf.ligion ©jT Nature. SetH:. V. 

right, and it is well if either of them are. To which may be added, that the 
true characters of menmufl: chiefly depend upon the unfeen part of their lives j 
iince the trucft and bcft religion is mofl: private, and the grcatcft wickcdnefs 
endeavours to be fo ^ Some arc modcft, and hide their virtues : others hypo- 
critical, and conceal their vices under fliews offanctity, good nature, or fome- 
thing that is fpecious. So that it is many times hard to difcern, to which 
of the two forts, the good or the bad^ a man ought to be aggregated, z. It 
rarely happens, that we are competent judges of the good or had fortune of o- 
ther people ''. That, which is didigreeable to one, is many times agreeable ta 
another, or diHigreeable in a lefs degree. The mifery accruing from any in- 
fliction or bad circumftance of life is vo be computed as in p. 32, 33 : or ac- 
cording to the refiftcncc and capacity of bearing it, which it meets with. If 
one man can carry a weight of four or five hundred pounds as well as another 
can the weight of one hundred, by thcfe different weights they will be equally 
loaded. And fo the fame poverty or difgrace, the fiime wounds, ^c. do not 
give the fame pain to all men. The apprchenfion of but a vein to be opend is 
worfe to fomc, than the apparatus to an execution is to others : and a ivordm-^y 
be more terrible and fcnfible to tender natures, thmzfword is to the fcnfclefs, 
or intrepid breed. The fame may be faid with refpect to injoymcnts : men have 
different tafts. andthcufc of the fime things does not hcgct equal pleafure in alL 
Befidcjwc fcarce ever know the whole cafe. Wc do not fee the in-xard ftings 
and fccret pains, which many of thofe men carry about them, whofe external 
fplcndor and flourifhing eftate is fo much admired by beholders "=: nor perhaps fuffi- 
cicntly confidcr thc/,V«/pleafurcs of a lower fortune, ariHngfrom temperance,., 
moderate defires, eafy reflexions, a confcioufncfs of knowledge and truth ; with o- 
ther pleafurcs of thc»;/«c/,much greater many times than thofe of the body ^. Before 
one can pronounce another happy or otherwife, he ihould know all the other's 

* Viu pojlfeen'ia celant iinLlicr.) mny be aptly applied to the wicked. Multi famam, confcitntiam 
pattci verentur. Plin. jun. '' Neqi m/ila vet bona, que. zulgus piitut : multi, qui confiicUri 

Aitverjis vidontur, beati ; ac fltriq; quanauam magnas per cpcs, miferriwi, o-c. Tacit. ■ Tdi- 

ciortm tu Mcanatem pittas, cui amoribus anxio, cj> moroU uxoris qiionJiana repuM.i Jefienti, fomiius 

per fymphonixrum cantitm, ex Icngmqno bene refonantium, qiurnur r hiero fe licet fofiat, j turn 

'vigikbit in pluma, qiiamille [Rcj«/«j] in cruce. ut dub!um\>ion]Jit, anelellione f.ui plurci. 

Heguli najci, quhm MecdHiUes lelint. Sen. Ifii, quos pro felicibus afpicitii, fi non qiM cc.urrtiiit , fed 
qua Litem, •vJcritis, tnifcri funt. Id. '' Archimedc:. having found the way of folvinga proMtm 

(examiiimidi, an coro':a niirea pror/iii tjfet), ran in an ccflafy out of the balh, crying tij-ixa : but who 
tvt. heard of a man, that after a luxurious meal, or the injoymcnt of a woman, ran out thus, cry- 
ing ^i^fUKX, or Tli<^iAK<i» ? rlut, 


Truths relating to the Deity. 1 1 o 

injovmcnts and all his fufFcrings ". Many misfortunes arc compenfatcd •> by 
fome larger indowmcnts, or extraordinary felicities in other rcfpcfts. But fup- 
pofc the plcafurcs of fome, and thefuffcrings of fome others, to be jull as they 
appear : llill we know not the confeqtiences of them ". The pleal'urcs of thole men 
may lead to mifcries greater than thofe of the latter, and be in reality the greater 
misfortune : and, again, the fufFerings of thcfc may be preludes to fucceeding 
advantages ''. So that indeed we know not how to name thefe outward appea- 
rances ot particular men, nor which to call Z>iJ/)/i/«e/}, which xhc contrary; un- 
lets wc knew the inward fenfe of the peifons themfclves, all their truecircum- 
llances, and what will be hereafter confcquent upon their prefent fuccefs or 
advcrfity. 3. Men ought to be coniiderd as members of fiimilics, nations, man- 
kind, the univcrfc, from which they cannot be fcparated : and then from the 
veiy condition of their being it will appear, that there mull be great inequali- 
ties ■= i that the innocent cannot but be fometimes involved in general calamities or 
puniihments, nor the guilty but iTiare in public profperities'"} and that thcgood 
oiihcivhole focicty or kindisto be regarded preferably to the prcfcnt plcaku-eof 
any individual, if they happen to clalli £. Lajl/y, if the virtuous man has under- 
gone more In this life, than it would be rcafonablehc Hiould fufflr, if there was 
mother; yet thofe fuffl rings may not be unrcafonablc, if there is another. For 
they may be made up to him by fuch injoymcnts, as it would be rcafonable for 
him to prefer, even with thofe previous moitifications, before the pleafures of 
this life with the Ir/s of them. And moreover, fometimes the enfy way to the 
felicities of a better Hate may lie through dark and difficult paflcs, difci- 
pline to fome men being ncccdaiy, to bring them to reflccl-, and to force 
them into fuch methods as may produce in them proper improvements j fuch 
as othcrwifc and of themfelvcs they would never have fain into. On the o- 
thcr fide, if vitious and wicked men do profper and make a figure > yet 
it is poffible their fufferings hereafter may be fiich, as that the exce/s of 

• Fjtij cmirtrit fata rtfendens. Virg. Sec what P//«jf writes of A^rifp»y the other great favorite 
ind miniftcr of Aiigufiui, whom he reckon!; to be the only indance of felicity among ihem who 
were called Agnfft. '.t qiuq; aJvtr/a {ttliim xalelHdine, trnftra juxcntA, exercilo tt/o mttr arma 
mirufqiie, — iitfelict ttrris fiirft omm,— prtiertx brt-.iiatt txi,— in tormtntis aJulttTtorum fofijufis, 
locrti-j, frdgrAvi /tnilio, luiffe aiigunnm frtpoprinatatutxij imatur. '' '0<f5«>.«,«, ^' i»ifo-, 

/./» * ■ v^.iai ieiJv. Hem. ' Zeno rcckond he made a good voyage, wlicn he was fl:ir- 

v/-.v-!.cxI.D/»j.I. '' If a good nun biws under poverty, lickncfs, or the like, .'niya.^j, t, 

7 ' v.r,- ,, (»,r, i i V^>ai«T., (or how can he be ncglcsflcd of God, who fludics according to hi-,> 
poor abilities to be like Him ? PUto. ' V.'ho blames a Jrama, tccauR- all ihe peribns are not 

h'Tcy.' ' Plot. ' n^-» ■^^.^^ pTj a?iy,-<. Ai^ri. & pjf. ^ ai,{2> ^^y i,^ i>„ 


1 14 The Religion of Nature.' Seel. V. 

them above their paft injoyments maybe equal to the juft mulcl of their villanies 
and wickedncfs. And further, their worldly pleafures ('which muft be fuppofcd 
to befuch as arc not philofophical, or moderated and governed byrcafon and ha- 
bits of virtue^ being apt to fill the mind, and ingrofs the whole man, and by that 
means to exclude almoft all right reflexions, with the proper applications of 
them, may be the veiy caules of their ruin > whilft they leave them under fuch 
dcfefts at the end of their day s^ as we fhall fee afterward tend to unhappincis. 

If what is objcfled be in many inftanccs true, this only infers t\\cmce£iiy of 
a future ftatc : that is, if good and bad men arc not refpeftivcly treated ac- 
cording to reafon in this life, they may yet be fo treated, if this and another to 
follow be taken together into the account ". And perhaps it is (as I ha\e been 
always apt to think) in order to convince us of the certainty of a future itatc, 
that inllanccs of that kind have been fo numerous. Vox he mull not only be 
guilty of blafphemy, but reduced to the greateft abfurdity, who, rather than 
he will own there is fuch a ftatc, is forced to make God an unreafonable Be- 
ing ^ : which I think amounts to a ilrong dcmonltration, that there is one. 
But of that more hereafter. 

XIX. Jf 'we luiiild behave ctirfehes as being 'what ue cannot but be fenfible -we 
are, towards GOD as being what He is according to the foregoiig propojitions ; or, 
;/ we would endeavour to behave our /elves towards him according to truth, we 
rnuji obferve thefe following and the like particulars. 

I . IJTe viufl not pretend to reprefent I Jim by any pi&ure or image whatfoevcr <=. 
Bccaufc this is flatly to deny his incorporeity, incomprchenfible nature, (^c '^ 

i. H-^e ought to be /o far from doing this, that even the language we ufe, when 
we [peak of Him, and efpecially of His pofitive nature and ejfential properties, 
ought not only to be chofen with the utmoft care, but alfo to be underflood in the fubli- 
viefl fenfe : and the fame is true with refpcn to our thoughts, mut. mutand ^ Or thus : 

• Divine providence and immortality of the foul muft ftand and tall together. ©arif«i »» 'n-«» 
'Mtt.>.i.r.ui ayaifcfTX ^lirtfev. rlitt. •" Tjro tuutcv iri to f/^x i>iir^u.i iiwi Our >i etrci u,ri ^foteiTf n 

trfsjoifTcc ftrti iy«3-'oir Ii»at ^ ^Ua^et. Hierocl. ' Sure no body ever did in reality pretend to do this. 
According to Biog. L. the tgyftians fct up k'/i.,.fiaTcc in thc-ir temples rZ ^n iianai tik -j ©is iMf- 
<pn : for that very rcafcn, bccaufc they did not know his Ihapc; or, how to reprefent Him. Their 
images fcem to have been fymbols or hieroglyphics, cxprcfling ibmething ot their fcnfe or opinion 
concerning Him. For, i% Maiinonitles obfcrvcs, no man ever did or ever will worfhip an idol, made 
of metal, flonc, or wood, as that Being who made heaven and earth ^ Nen tfl dubinm. quia 

rlligio nulla fit, tibicmq; fimuUctirMtn tjl. Laft. ' "ii? '{' '{•/•' e->i//,xr<S>- to <r«//A»7-iK;« t< iti- 

Ti^.ivai, KTV >j •\"'X.'i >(Y<»rii TxT<; c«r«'ici; rit; ct'i<rx.iinc^ 9«>7-«o-.'«5 TiA<!o-ii(fy?ir«i »>< SiA^, i'.' >C t'x: 


Truths relating to the Deity. \ 1 5 

wc muft endeavour to think and /peak of Him in the moft reverent terms and 
molt proper manner ue are able ' ; keeping withal this gcnenl conclufion, and 
as it were habitual reflexion in our minds, that, tho we do the bell we can, 
He is ftill fomething al/oze all our conceptions ; and defiling, that our faint ex- 
preflions may be taken as aiming at a higher and more pioportionable meaning. 
To do otherwifc implies not only, that H's mode of cxillence and cirential at- 
tributes arecomprchenfiblc by us, but alio (which is morcj that our wordsand 
phrafes, taken from among our felves •» and the objects of our faculties, are ad- 
equate expreflions of them : contrary to truth. 

To explain myfelfby a few inftanccs. When we afcribcwfrc; toGod, or im- 
plore His mercy, it mufl: not be underllood to be n:ercy like that, which is called 
compajjlon in us. For tho this be a vei-y dillinguilliing affc£^ion in human nature ''a 
to which we arc made fubjeft for good reafons, the conrtitution of the world 
and circumilances of our prcfent ftate making it neccfTary for us to compajfio- 
«j/? each the fufFcrings of another > yet it is accompanied \\''\i\\uneafinefi, and 
muft therefore not be afcribed ftriftly to God in th^tfenfe, in which it is ufed 
when afcribed to our felves. It perhaps may not be amifs to call it Divine mer- 
cy, or the likcj to diflinguilli it: and to fliew, that wc mean fomething, which, 
tho in our low way of fpcakingand bytvay of analogy we call it by the fame 
name, is yet in the perfccb nature of God very different. Or we may confidcr 
it in general as the manner, in which God refpcSls poor fuppliants and proper 
objc£ls for their good. For certainly the re/pe^ or relation, which lies hctwcen 
God, confiderd as zn unchangeable Being, and one that is humble and fupplicates 
and endeavours to qualify himfelf for mercy, cannot be the /iime with that, 
■which lies between the fame unchangeable God and one that is obftinatc, and 
will not fupplicate, or endeavour to qualify himfelf '^: that is, the fame thing, 
or Being, cannot refpefc cppo/ite and contradictory charafters in the fmie man- 
ner} him who docs behave himfelf ;is before, andhini who does not. Therefore 
when wc apply to the mercy of God, and beg of him to piiy our infirmities and 
wants, thedefign is not to move His affeSions, as good fpeakcrs move their audi- 
tors by the pathetic arts of rhetoric, or hearty beggars theirs bv importunities and 
tearsi but to exprefs our own kiife of our felves and circumlbuices in I'uch a mannei> 
as may render us more capable oi the emanations of Di\ine goodncfs, and// 

• ©irrftTi; «<ri(>r« pwri<. S.Chryf. *> Wc ufc them (and fpcak, as the Jews everywhere 

ioculcate, □n>< 'J^ pWi>>) only irefwt lUwt^ irf»rr,'/tfi»i tu o>o^kt>it(w' <'u,7tuyctriiit,f. 

ij( u.Ta<Jifcrj-i«. riot. ' Mo'.ljftma cord.i Humjno gtrifri lUrt ft natur* fiiritiir. '■^u* /j- 

rhrym/n dtuit, htc nejlri f»ri eflimA jm/uj. fefarat hoc noi a grrgerwwxorum, (^c. Juv. ■" T he 

M/i* Oi'G to M f M '5 ditTcrent from that of G to M— ij : and yet G rcmaias unalterJ 

1 v<> 

1 1 6 The Religion of Nature^ Sed. V, 

to receive fucli inftaiices of His beneficence, as to us mny fccm to be the cfFctbs of 
compajfion^ tho they proceed not from any alteration in the Deity. For it may be, 
and no doubt is agreeable to perfect rcafon akvays and •without alteration, that he 
who labors under a fenfc of his own dcfcfts, honeftly ufcs his bell endeavours to 
mend what is amifs, and famong other thingsj flics for relief to Him, upon whom 
his being and all that he has do depend, fhould have many things granted hinty 
which are not given to the carclcfs, obdurate, unasking ' part of mankind j tho 
his cxprcflions and manner of addrefs, with all his carcy are ftiU inadequate, and 
below the Divine nature. In ihort, by our applications we c;uinot pretend to 
produce any alteration in the Deity, but by an alteration in our felvcs we may al- 
ter the relation or refpeft lying between him and us. 

As God is a pure, uncompoundcd Being, His attributes of war)', jujlice, Sec. 
cannot be as we conceive them : bccauie in him they are one. Perhaps they 
may more properly be called together Divine rcafon: which, as it exerts itfcif 
upon this or that occafion, is by us varioujly denominated. 

Here it mull not be forgot, that mercy or mercies arc many times taken for ad- 
vantages or benefits injoyd by us : and then they are properly afcribed to God, 
from whom they proceed as the efFcfls of His beneficence and providence. 

When we fpeak of the knowledge o( God, we muft not mean, tliat He knows 
things in the way that ive do : that any intention or operation of His mind is re- 
quifiteto produce it: that He apprehends things by any imprcflions made upon 
Him: that He reafonsby thehelp of ideas: or even that the knowledge, which 
in us is moft intuitive and immediate, does in any degree come up to the mode 
in which He knows things. We mufl: rather intend, in general, that there is 
nothing, of which He is, or can be ignorant : which h:\s been iiiid alread)' j 
and is, I am afraid, as much as we cun/afely fay. 

Whenglory, honor, prai/e ^ are given to God ; or He is faid to do any thing for 
His ownglory, or wc to propofe theglory of His name in what we do ; thofe words 
fhould not be taken as Handing for that kind oi^oxy and applaufe,which is fo indul- 
trioufly fought, and capricioufly "^ dillributcd among us mortals, and which I will 
take this opportunity to handle a httle more largely,\n order to give here a fpccimcn 
of the world, and favc that trouble in another place. Among us fome ai'c celebrated 

* n^$ ai ihiri rd n'«'$ TUi i^f/tui, iivTi\>STiif //m air£frr< i }l}ctxi TK^ioutf 0i«f ; Hierccl. ^ Tat 

a^irtn GVK i5-i» 'iT«(>©^, i».u fttit^ir rt J'j /3iAr>6F. Therefore o Oioj »i riyailit arc a'oovcpraiic. Arjjl, 
Ot TK5 ^£K? tT«irS>T(5 yiX'.T^i iKTif iu.Tt uvntf ih<rufTii. Andron. rIj. ' CIccn, only a fongftcr 

[»iji<], had a flatuc at Thebti, kept as ftacid, when P«;(/.ir himfclf Jiad none. See tlie flory in 

z for 

Truths relating to the Deity, 1 1 7 

for fmall matters, either through the ignorance of the multitude, the pirtiaHty of 
a faction, the advantage of great friendfliips, the ufual deference paid to men in 
eminent llations, or mere good luck ' ; and others for atchicving/«f/& thingSy as if 
they were duly weighed, and people were not impofcd upon by falfe notions^ firfl: 
introduced in barbarous times, and fincc polilhd and brought into falliion by hif- 
torians, poets, and flatterers, would appear rather to be a difgrace to favages than 
any recommendation of rational and fm//;;:?^ natures. Strength, and courage, and 
beauty, and parts, and birth are foUowd with encomiums And honors, which, tho 
they may be the felicities and privileges of the poffcnbrs, cannot be their merit, who 
received ihcmgratiSy and contributed nothing ^ thcmfclves toward the acquificion 
of them : whilllreal virtue and induftry ('which, even when unfuccefsful,orop- 
prcft by ill health or unkind fortune, give the truejl title to praifcj lie difrcgarded, 
Thirll after glon,', when that is dchrcd merely for its own {like, is founded in 
ambition and vamty « ; the thing itfclf is but a dream, and imagination j fuice, ac- 
cording to the differing humors and fentiments of nations and ages, the fame thing 
may beeithcr^/ono«i or inglorious : the effeiloi'k, confiderd flill by itfelf, is nei- 
ther more health, nor eibte, nor knowledge, nor virtue to him who has it j or if 
that be any thing, it is but libat mtt/l ceafe when the man ''dies : and, after all, as 
it lives but in the breath of the people, a little fly envy or a new turn of things 
cxtinguillies it % or perhaps it goes quite out of itfelf ^. Men pleafc thcm- 
fclves with notions of immortality, and fancy a perpetuity of fame fecured to 
thcmfclves by books and tcllimonics of hillorians: but, alas ! it is a ilupiddelu- 
lion, when they imagin thcmfclves prefent, and injoying that fame at the read- 
ing of their ftory after their death. And, befide, in reality the man is not 
known ever the more to poflerity, becaufe his name is tranfmitted to them: he 
doth not live, becaufe his name docs. When it is faid, J. Cxfar fubdued Gaul^ 
beat Pompey, changed the Roman commonwealth into a monarchy, ^c. it is 
the fame thing, as to fay, the conqueror of Pf^OT/f)-, &c. was Cajar : that is, 
Cffar and the conqueror of Pompey are the fame thing; and C<efar is as much 
known by the one dcfignation as by the other. The amount then is only this: 
that the conqueror of Pampey conqueid Pompey > or I'ome body conquei d Pom' 

• V hat StntcA (jys of AltxanJer, is true of miny an other hcroc: fro i.iitiitt erat felix timtri- 
tMs. ^ Tumti alto DruJerHm fangumt, lAnqham Ftctrit ifft aliquij, (yc. Juv. ' Clt- 

ri» qujntAiiifl auid eril, fi gleria Unlum eft t Juv. •' 'n QrH "^3p3 "inOI \iO CZlVn 

no'T inOi. S.Hh»f. ' Kt'^u^* »-^«Ai;»rr«Te>. Ph. J$4,t. • Even the great f/ymmiJ 

in Ely ft, tho it ftiJl remains, hath not been able to prclcrvc the trne namt of its builder j which it 
WQ, one may juflly wouIct how. 

1 1 8 The Religion of Nature. Seel. V. 

pey ', or rather, fince Pompey is as little known now as Ctcfar^ fame body con- 
querd/owe body^. Such zpoor bu/tnefs is this boafted immortality ^ : and fuch, 
as has been here dcfcribcd, is the thing called glory among us ! The notion of it 
may fcrvc to excite them, who having abilities to Ibn-e their country in time 
of real danger, or want, or to do fomc other good, have yet not philofophy 
enough to do this upon principles of virtue, or to fee through the glories of the 
world (juft as we excite children by praifmg them > and as we fee many good 
inventions and improvements proceed from emulation and vanity) : but to dif- 
ccrning men this fa-mc is mere air, and the next remove from nothing'} what 
they defpiie, if not lliun. I think there are two confidcrations, which may 
juflify a defire o?fome glory or honor : and fcarce more. When men have per- 
formed any virtuous aftions, or fuch as fit eafy upon their memories, it is a 
reafonabk pleafure to have the tciHmony of the world added to that of their 
own confciences, that they have done well '^ : and more than that, \i thcrepw 
tation acquired by any qualification or aftion may produce a man any real com-^ 
fort or advantage (if it be only protcftion from the infolencies and injuftice of 
mankind; or if it enables him to do by his authority more good to others), to 
have this privilege muft be a great fatisfaftion, and what a wife and^oci/man 
may be allowd, as he has opportunity, to propofe to himfelf But then he pro- 
pofesit no farther than it may be ufeful: and it can be no farther ufeful than he 
wants it. So that, upon the whole, glory, praife, and the like, arc either mere 
'vanity, or only valuable in proportion to our defers and wants. If then thofe 
words are underftood according to the import and value they have among men, 
how dares any one think, that the Supreme being can propofe fuch a mean end 
to Himfelf as our praifes ? He can neither want, nor -valne them, yllcxan- 
der, according to his tafte of things, it may well be fuppofed would have 
been proud to have heard that he fliould be the fubje£t of feme i'econd Homer % 
m whofc fhects his name might be imbalmed for ages to come j or to have 
been celebrated at Athens, the mother of fo many wits and captains : but furc 
tven he, with all his vanity, could not propofe to himfelf as the end of all lus 
fatigues and dangers only to be praifed by children, or rather by worms and 
infeils, if they were capable of fliewing fome faint fcnfc of his great- 

» Ta inf)joLr», x «■«/«» veXw/ZtniTuf tut Tfixat ti>« 7>,»ioji;^t« iVi. M. Anton. ' M(«{4» 

i fimiufr, 'ufifc<PnfK,M, ,g itrrii 'j tuiTct ^ia^c}cv arB-fa/T*(!»it Tu)ciT» Ti3Ti){«/«.iF*r, i^ in ititTmiii ituni^, 
if !■» yi Tct Tf oT«A«i TiBtr.xiTit. Id. ' ExpfTiJe Hanoibalem : quot libras in ducefumme Inxinin f 

* Mi;j;ji tSoi 01 trxtttt utucm' iio-|», tif tret «» e iT«in«/*ir^ ytufil^f tKart' T Aiyeiiifuf rjer^i itvrx- 
re ijvTff t5t«, m^ot^iw, k>. Luc. ' M«x«{ir«< irri» ["A;^t«ii«] in >i ^«nr fiAST>r«> ><j ru/au- 

Tirm fitiyixtt xf'ji/*^ %-nyj. Pint. 


Truths relating to the Deity. 1 1 9 

wfs*. And yet how fhort is this compaiifon ! In conclufion therefore, tho 
men have been accurtomd to Ipcak of the Deity in terms taken from princes^ 
and fuch things as they have, in their wealinefs, admired j tho thefe arc now 
incorporated into the language of Divines j and tho, confidering what defciSbs 
there arc in our ways of thinking and fpealiing, we cannot well pait with them 
all : yet we muft remember to exalt the fenfe of them, or annex fome mental 
qualification to the ufc of them. As, if God be faid to do things for His own 
glory, the meaning 1 humbly conceive muft be, that the tranfcendent excellence 
of His nature may be coUedted from the form of the world and adrainiftra- 
tion of things in it j where there occurr fuch marks of inexprefllble wifdom 
and power, that He needed not to have given us greater, had He only intend- 
ed His own glory : or fomcthing to this purpofe. Or if the glory of what we 
do, be afcribcd to Him-j by this mull be fignified, that no glory is due to us, 
who have no powers, but what originally depend upon Him j and that wc 
defire therefore to acknowledge Him to be the true author of all that, which 
is laudable in us ''. 

When we thank God for any deliverance or injoyment, this muft not be fo 
underftood, as if He couldvalucHimfclf upon our ceremonious acknowledgments^ 
or wanted complements, or any return from us. // is rather a profcflion of 
the fenfe we hai-e of our wants and dtfeds, of the beneficence of His nature, 
and the greatnefs or feafonablenefs of the mercies received ; an effort of a poor 
dependent being, who defircs to own things, as far as he is able, to be what 
they are 'j and efpecially to beget in himfelf fuch a difpofition of mind, as he 
ought to have towards his Almighty benefa£lor. 

When we are faid to he fervants of God., or loferve Him, or do Him fervice, 
thefe phrafes are not to be taken as when one man is faid to be fervant of ano- 
ther, or to do him fcrvicc. For here it implies the doing of fomcthing, which ii 
ufeful and beneficial to the man who is fervcd,and what he wants, or fancies he 
wants : but nothing of want can be fuppofcd in God, nor can we any way be pro- 
fitable or fcrviceable to Him. To ferve Him therefore muft rather be to worjhip 
or adore Him fof which fomcthing by andby^. And thus that word inanother 
language, of which our ferie is but the tranflation, is frequently ufcd : -.Vitoferi-e 

' As ?fafhonvn% cclcbratfd by the iirdi, '^nging Miya; Sk< ya^wF. M. Tyr. ^ Honori- 

ius Muiii ■ ciim Mil graiiat agimus, turn nihil noflrt UuJi ajfunifium ariilramur. Cic. 

Oti «> iyx^n xfurlyi i'i ©«» ifoxi/i/xi. A faying of hut af. Divg. L. ' E<' <^ i^ ^n 

cir>uu.u;u ««t' i{i'«» T»Ti T»T» T»i?«-«u,— — •*' cf-»; TV r-UTtt iinitfttu itiuf/xitt iv^^^irM' »i'«»<«» «* . « 


1 20 The Religion of Nature. Sedl. V. 

a graven image "" is to luorjhip the image ; but cannot fignify the doing of any thing, 
which may be fci-viceable or ufcful to the dead ftone. Or to fer-ve God may be un- 
derilood in a fcnfe fomcthing hke that : Sewe the king of Babylon ^. For they were 
faid to fcrvc the king of ^^Z-j/ow, whoowndhis authority, and hvcd according to 
his laws, tho they did nothing, nor had any thing perhaps, which could be yxni- 
cuhrly ferviceablc to him : and fo they may be faid to ferve God, or to be His fer- 
vants, who live in a continual fenfc of His foveraign nature and power over them, 
and endeavour to conform thcmfclves to the laws which He has impofcd upon 
them'. In thefe fenfcs we pray, that wemayhve to ferve Hitn : that is, we 
pray, that we may live to worfliip Him, and practice thofe laws of reafon and 
virtue, to which rational natures are by Him fubjefted ''. 

Many more reflexions might be made upon epithets and ways offpeakingy intro- 
duced by cultom, from rude antiquity, or by ncccfllty following from the nar- 
rowncfs citha- of men's minds, or their language. It is plain, that love, anger^handsy 
eyesy SiCc. when afcribed to God, cannot import fuch bodily parts or paflions as 
are found in us. Even the pronouns my, thy, his (as His people. His houfe, (^c.) 
require much temper in the ufe of them ■•■. 

5 . 1'Fef jail find curfelves bound to worfliip Him, in the befl manner we can. For 
by worfhipping Him I mean nothing but owning Him to be what He is, and 
ourfclves to beic;/j(?/ we are,hy hmt move fukmn and proper aft: that is, by ad- 
drciling our fclvcs as His dependents to Him as the Supreme cauf, and Governor of 
the worW, with acknowledgments of what weinjoy, petitions for what we really 
want, or He knows to be convenient for us *, and the hke. As if, ex. gr. I fhould 
in fome humble and compofed manner s pray to that Almighty being, upon whom 
depends the exijlence of the world, and by whoj'e providence Ihave beenprefervedto this 
moment, and injoyd many undcfervcd advantages, that He would gracioujly accept my 
pralefulfenfe and acknowledgments of all His beneficence toward me: that he would 
* deliver me from the evil confequences of all my tranfgreffions and follies : that He would 

indue me with fuch difpofitions and powers, as may carry me innocently and fafely 

* nnmy TTI Cnnib^OS ns< : *7DD naly b~, ^ fm. pajf. Dcut. n. mention is midc of the 
pbccs, 1J'C3'On DU/nDV Itt'iJ: 'mChM.far. in>3, 5fff. >AciTfi!-«ra» (in the ecclrfiifticaJ fenfc), 
Vulg.v. colucruiit. i^ ban T^'O r-|N nny. ' P/^/o applies the word yfrx# even to 

the laws thcmfclves in that phrafc, ^<i?iivitf rcTi .i^e.?. '' Eici.-j, ian ti- ^.AcA(rr«Ti« •>.*,u,« 

Kic(i-/,c>Tii. Vh.Jud. ' r^' bowo. ' Care muft be tikcn how we pray, left we fl.oukl 

ask what may be hurtful to us. Oinc-av i\>xt~ jro»« ■Xfuwtil^tUi yi a-fse-JiiaJS, «»»< ^ AjicTf TH ianu 
i>.;i;iu/i>®- iH'ty «■>.•». xaxk, itxMj i' u'/it^u. Pla o. Eirrltrt domes total, oftnntibui ifjis, D'i faciU], 
<^f. is a poet's o! fcrvation. The author of S. Hhaf. adds, that we fliould no: pray for that 

nivyyb -lU'DN ^Nur, or yaan ^33 nu-yj pNU', or ^ini U'nv, or Dbiy 'u^fa dj n apn nwyw ^ j 

Truths relating to the Deity. 1 2 1 

through all future trials J and may inable me upon all occafion: to behave my Jelf cotf 
formally to the laws ofreafoit^ pioufly^ and wifely : that He would fuffer no being to in- 
jure me, no misfortune to befall me, nor me to hurt myfelfbyanyerrorormifconduilof 
my own : th.U He would vouchfafc me clear and diflin£l perceptions of things i with 
fo much health and profperity, as may be good for me : that I may at Icaflpafs my time in 
peace^with contentment, and tranquillity of mind: and that, having faithfully dif- 
charged my duty to my family and friends, and endeavourd to improve myfclf invir- 
tucus habits and ufeful knowledge, I may at lafi make a decent and happy exit, and 
then find my felf tn fame better flat e. Not to do this, or fomething like if, will 
certainly fall among thofecriminaJ omifjions mcntiond led:. I. prop. V. For never 
to acknowledge the injoyments and privileges we have received, and hold of God, 
is in efteft to deny that we receive them from Him ; not to apply to Him for 
what we want is to deny, either our wants, or His power of helping us ; and fo on : 
all contraiy to truth '. 

ItmuilevcrbcownJ, that no worfliip can be proportionable to the Divine na- 
ture and perfections ; but yet that we arc obliged to do what we can : therefore 
I added thole woriis in the befl manner we can. And it mull be acknowledged 
further, that thofe words do not oblige us to be always at our devotions neither ''. 
For as in the worfliip of God we own Him to be what He is, fo mull we do 
this as not denying our felves to be what we are : beings not capable of be-aring 
cojitinual intention of mind j beings, that arc incompailed with many wantSy 
which by the conftirution of our nature require to be fuppUed, not without care 
and aSlivit) joind to our prayers j beings, that are made for many harmlef injoy- 
ments •■, beings, that have many offices to perform one for another j and beings 
in whom, all things confidcrd, it would be /cy} refpeEl to be conllantly in the for- 
mal aft of devotion, than it is to addrefs our felves to Him with prepared minds, 
at certain limes, or upon certain occafions. To be always thus ingagcd, if it 
could be, would be lo make God what He is not : fincc it feems to fuppofc 
that He wants it and we merit of Him by it j or that He is bound to give what 
we ask, without our endeavouring > or, atlcall, that He is a Being obnoxious 
to importunity and teafing. For thefc rcafons I have alfo in the expUcation o^^ 
my mc-aning infcit:d that limitation, by fome Jolcmn and proper atJ. 

Tno every man knows bell his own opportunities and circumllances, and there- 
fore may be moll able to judge for himfclf, how he may bejl perform this duty j 

• nnj-i;nn fo nynoo ti'V ribnrry.AlU. 131 ib^'yion'jDnnu; [^on' nnau,Ti2 ^o^J'^ V^. 

Id. * LiVcihoCe'Afifi,riT'aiaiCon/latiiincfle particuliily, wlio continued divine fcrviccnighr and 

isifwiiheitt initrmijfun. Or the SttfftUnni perhaps d'^J/O, 'i.<jyjtx,), who placed (or pretended t» 
, pUcc; all religion in prayer, i/,;^ v"-.^,"" rij Tpiri:';^'! r^^'rjuiiy.utt V. Suit. . . ^ • i /Jim va,U.M 

122 The Religion o/' Nature. Se6l. V. 

yet in general it may be {iiu' that to the doing of it/o/fww/j'and in the beft man- 
ner \vc can thefc things arc i "quired : an intent mind ^, proper times and places., 
a proper fonn of words, anu a proper pojltire. For if the mind be abfent, or 
attends not to what is faid, i; is not the man that prays : this is only as it were 
the noifeof a machine, which is put into motion indeed, but without anycon- 
fcioufnefs of its own a6b. To repeat one's prayers with moving ///>;, but ?i\i- 
cmtcd thoughts., is not to pray in the bcjl manner we can : becaufe it is not in a 
manner agreeable to what we are, or to truth. For this is to do it only Asjpeak- 
ifig, and not as thinking beings. 

Upon this account it will be certain, that allumcs and places cannot be equal- 
ly proper ''. Some times are ingrofled by the bufinefs of life, and fomc places 
lie expofed to interruptions. Thole of retreat and//f«fe ought to be fought, 
und, as far as fiiirly it may be, contrived. And for this fuither rcafon, becuufc 
the fartlier we are removed from the notice of others, the clearer we ftand of 
all oJJentation : that is, the more we do it upon the fcore o^ truth and duty^ and 
this is again, the more tritely and dutifully we do it. 

Our next care is a proper /orw^ of words. All prayer muft either be vocal, oi 
mental. Now even that which is called mental can fcarce be made without words <= 
or fomething equivalent '*. (I believe, that even the deaf :ind dumb form to them- 
felvcs fome kind of language : I mean fomething, which fupplies the room of 
language.) For thoughts in their naked llatc, develled of all words, and taken 
merely by tbemfclves., are fuch fubtlc and fleeting things, as ai'e fcarce capable of 
making any appearance in the mind j at kaft of being detaind, compared toge- 
ther, and ranged into fentences. If a fentcncc may be fo made up of fcnfible ideas 
as to fubfill: in the mind by the help of thofc images which remain in the phantafy, 
after the manner of a fentencc expreft in pictures, ov by hieroglyphics: yet fuch a 
ientencc mufl: be very imperfeft, through the want of grammatical inflexions, 
panicles, and other additions neceflary to modify and conned: the ideas, of which 

« n^Sn nVN HJIIDD HJ^'S^W n!?an bo. Maim. aVn n>l?n n!?snn. S. nhaf. and the Hkewcry where. 
^ This in general is true : notwirhftanding v/hich I do not deny but there may bcoccafions, when ielt 

KtiXuii TOT©-, ««' ff</Tcj.^:i y.xifi<i- u»\* xit yi-.XTU u,t x-Xt'f'.t iiamuf S^t witut ixi^iltv, ^i^wr,, t» 

Ttai iTi!fT«r«5 tJs ivx/,',' «|<s-' ^ ytnouK.a. nXxKartf Ktclixurat >^ iVi(fy5<r«» ira^Aii}/*! u\ t« vfioct rji 

oi'^evT* ivx'ai TeiirtJj Urinii, r.X. S. ChryC « "O /Ai. AoySK- if/*u>iV5 ha.<ina.!, r.^zt, ir9-p*,T»«- « it ^,a- 

>cM yi'r«T«i TM >.iyv xk jTf ii< to 5«o». f A. JhJ. "* Cogitation itfclf, according to Plato, is a kind 

of fpccch of the mind. For he calls t« <Ji«>eir^ (cogitation) Aoyer, « ii/rn s-^i^ uitk* h •i'i>x}> ^"i'f*'- 
TKi, ■osi u) !C> e-JMj.Tj. AndfoP/or/H/W, "O c» <pu>^ A»y(d>- ;*/«,»«,* fcV 4«'A;it- 

Truths relating to the Deity. 123 

(particles, ^c.) there can be no images » j and indeed little more than a fet of dis- 
jointed concepuons^ fcarce exhibiting rtwyy^w/f without the aflillanccof language 
to fill up the blanks : and bcfide that, a. prayer cannot be made out of I'uch fenten- 
ccs as thole. It is by the help of -a'om, at Icall in great mcafurc, that wc even rea- 
fon and dilcouric witliin our fclvcs, as well as communicate our tlioughts and dif- 
courlc with others: and if any one obferves himfelfwcll, he will find, that he 
t/jinksyis well as fpe^ks in fome language, and that in thinking he fuppofcs and runs 
over filcntly and habitually chofe founds, whicliinfpeaking he aftually makes. 
This is the caufe, why men can fcarce write -weli in any language but ihcir own : for 
whililthcy think in their own, their llyleand fpcech, which is but the portraiture 
of their thoughts, mult have the /«r« and ^f«/«i of their own language, to what 
language focver the particular words belong. In fliort, vjords feem to be as it were 
bodies or z-ebicks to the fenfe or meaning, which is the fpiritual part ^, and which 
without the other can hardly be fixt in the mind. Let any man try ingenuoul?- 
ly, whether he can think over but that fhort pmyer in Plato^ t* /«,» f'<&Ai«, xta. c^ 
abftrafted quite fromthofe and all other -uords. One may apply his mind to the 
words of a prayer pronounced by another, and by taking them in make them his 
otvn; orhemay be as it were his own reader, and pronounce them A;w/^//"i or he 
may lay before him a prayer in writing, and fo cariy his eyes and his mind toge- 
ther through It i or he may go over a form of words imprinted on his memory ; 
or he may put words together in his mind ex tempore : but Hill in all thcfe ways 
words and language arc ulcd. And fince to tbink over a fet of words cannot be 
a more adequate manner of addrefling to God (who neither fpeaks, nor thinks 
Uke us) than to /peak it over and tbink too ; and moreover, fincc the very found 
of the words affecbs us, and, when the form is ready prepared, and the mind 
freed from the labor of com pofing, doth really help attention^ : I fav, fince this 
is the cafe, it muft be better, when we have opportunity, to pronounce a pray- 
er ', than only to think it over. But then it fhould be I poken no louder (I mean 
when we pray privatelyj, than juil to make it audible to our/elves •". It is not 
upon God's account that we fpeak, fince he would know even our thoughts : 

• Multafuntrtrlm, qut, tjua/iarticu'i, cenntclunt mtmbra oraticnii, ijiit formtri fmilitHdinr ntJlu 
ftgiinl.Ck. 'nOU/J Nb2 nUJ HJI^Nba nt'DP. N«/;A.«A. ' y(Ui6. i. «> 1303132 NinmsiOT 
Ainri.ThitinS.HhartJ.ciuolcdoxitofp'CD expbins this thus: njlO 1^N3 H^DI nbo bsipnpT 

OOint. t Ut t»j [Jtoi, in the ftyl; of the Heathens] ftnifer fur» mentt (y xoti-vintrtmur. Ch. 

XJt rilf i(^»r ^ttiiintt vi, LUrxtTn^x^nTinnyt'/nxjjkM.TitT^ TVffa iwAeviu ^I'/jt-.iij-ijTit TfiTii, Ijys bViV- 

mm in his prayer af. Jof. » This wc find often among the Binim of thcjeioi. "jny |!?13 nm3n 
•TO^NNi.-ivy r^rivr^ybv'•OV}■'^.Ma■<m. AndR.lUz.Azqu»ri havingcited this pafTage, adds 10^3D-| 
'Ol SJWbrJTNby'CVfnN^QNU/ D'pDiE.Tan. siMMor.Uei in nnothcr fhcc cxprcffcs himlc;! 

thus; wnba vjtn'? you/Di vpawa a'-ianninno ts»l?>j na^m^a '7^Bn> s>»>. (That la"? 

I iniertcd from Shulhh.anik.) The fame occurs in Or UjuJajIi, (^ fxji. 

4 but; 

124 The Religion of Nature. SecH:. V. 

hut it is upon our own account, and to make our adorations, iho imperfe£b at the 
bcfl, as complcat as we arc able. ('Which, by the way, is an anfwcr to thcm» 
who object againlt prayer the impertinence of talking to God.J This being prc- 
mifcd, and it being found that we mufl make ufe of jpwy/j, it cannot be denied 
tliat we ought to ufe the beft and properefl we can. This cannot be done in extern' 
poraaeous effufions : and therefore there muft be forms premeditated ; the l>ejl, that 
we are capable of making or procuring, if we would worfhip God to the beft of 
our capacity. Asa prayer ought to have all the marks of ferioufncfs and being in 
earncli, it ought to be the piaineji, and at the fame time is perhaps t\\c hardejl of 
all compofitions. It ought to take in a general view of what we have ihjoyd, what 
we iMKt, what we have done, ^c. and every thing ought to be exprelt with 
methody in phrafes that are grave and pointing, and with luch a />7<f eloquence, as 
ingages all our attention,and reprefents our deep; fi fenfe, without a fetation or need- 
lefs repetitions. Thcfc confiderations have caufed me many rimes to wonder at 
thofe men, whodifpute againft pre-conccived forms of prayer. Th:.y, who talk 
fo much of the ipirit of prayer, fcem to know but litilc of it. 

As to ibepojlure, that is beft, which beft exprejfes our humility, reverence ', and 
earneilnefs, and affefts us moft. Tho perhaps fome regard is to be paid to the cu- 
ftoms of thc/i/<jfffwhcrewcare> orof our own «««//•;■, to which we h.ave been 
moft ufed. Several nations may denote the lame tiling by different gcftures : 
and we may take thcfe, as we do their words ; i. c. as having that fignification 
which they put upon them. 

Tho I hive not hitherto mentiond it, there ought to be alfo a public -worJJnp 
of the Deity. For a man may be confiderd as a member of a fociety, and as fuch 
he ought to worftiip God (if he has the opportunity of doing it : if there arc 
proper prayers ufed publicly, which he may rcfort to ; and his health, i^c. pcr- 
mitJ. Or the yoaV/j may be confiderd iisowAoi^j, that has common interefts and 
concerns, and as fuch is obliged to worlhip the Deity, and offer one common 
prayer. Befide, there are many, who know not of themfelves, hotxi to prayj 
perhaps cannot fo much as read. Thefe too muft be taken as they are, and con- 
fequently fome time and place appointed, where they may have fuitable prayers 
red to them, and be guided in their devotions. And further, toward the keep- 
ing mankind in order, it is necc£'aryx.\\cxc ihould be lome religion profcft, and 
even ellabhftid J which cannot be without fome public woi-fhip. And were it not 
for that fcnfc of virtue, which h principally prefcn'cd (fo far as it is prefervedj by 
national /owi and habits of religion, men would foon lofeit alt, run wild, prey 
upon one another, and do what ellc the worll of linages do. 

»'i3i n;iD3ny3vy i^sisaivyn^— h'^cnon. or lihi»y. 


Truths relating to the Deity. 125 

But how docs thh public woriliip, it maybe demanded, comport with that re- 
treat znd privacy recommended above ? ^nf. I fpokc there of prayer ;;; genera.', to 
"which thofc circiimftanccsgive a great advantage: but then they are recommend- 
ed no fan her, than they can be had, and the nature of the prayer admits of them- 
Excufe a iTiort reflexion here, which if it be not directly for tiic purpofc, is not al- 
together foreign to it. Tho he who reads the form of public prayer reads it to 
all it the fame rime, that all may unite in one common acl:, which otherwife 
they could not do: yet ll:illevciy/'^r/;V«/(/> pcrfon, who minds the prayci-s at all, 
has a feparate perception of the words in his w;W, and tbcre he offers them, or 
the fenfe containd under them, with more or lefs application and ardor. And fince 
DO man can be C\id to pray any further than he dees this ; and it cannot be known 
to any body in the congregation befide himfclf, how fir he doth do it ; his prayer 
is in reality as private, as if he was inclofcd within a thoufand walls. So that, though 
there are rcafons for a public worfhip, yet I will venture to affirm, that all true 
YnycTisprivate: and the true feat of it being in the tftind, toward the intcrefting 
of whofc powers all the circumltances of worfliip are mainly dcfigncd to con- 
tribute, it may be faid upon that account to be always made in the moll retired and 
undifcerned of all retreats ' : nor can more be lliid in refpecc of a worlliip, which 
by the terms is in other refpefis public. A man may be prcfcnt in a congrega- 
tion, and either pray the fimc prayer in which others fccm to join, or fomeo- 
ther, or none at all >>, for ought any body there can tell befides himfclf. 

I am not infenfible how much I may expofc myfclf by thcfc things to the laugh- 
ter of fome, who are utter ftrangers to all this language. What a Itir is here, fay 
they, about praying ? Who ever obferved, that they who pray are mo\x fuccefsful or 
happy, than they are who do not ? ylnj. All obfcrvations of this kind muft be veiy 
lubricous and uncertain. We neither hioiv what other men arc inwiirdly and really '^, 
nor how they pray^, nor what to call fucccfs ■=. That, which is good for one, 
may be bad for another : and that, which feems good at prcfcnt, may at length 
be evil, or introduce fomcthing which is fo <". And as to the pro/perity of thcmj 

* ■£> ri ttctt «»> tiZ. plot'm. S.Chryfofom fiys fome arc fo unmindful of whatihc)' arc 
abour, that they know not fo much as what they lay thcm(elves. 'Eiri'^"''''" "»«»=' =♦ '"jj iiuc/iiri«> 
r^ fJif^joTTBi, K, ix'cisaci ti iixcr tsc X"^1 "iiirrai, r ei inn itic ir-Kii ' The very 

Heathens thoughf, that t.hc Gods would not hear the prayers of wicked men. Bitis happening to be 
with fome fuch in the fame (hip, when a great ftorm aroie and they (being now frighted) began 
to invoke thcirdciies, erics out, Siyjerr, ^ii (tK&wmn ««>«? i»^«ai :T>.isirxi D.L. ^ CCedius 

»f. Tac. fayi, frinciprs qtiijtm inflar Jcoriim tfft : fcJ ntrnt a diii n:f jit'ai fiiffliciim prects andiri. 
* Sometimes tAw ufAio-i/ s«rro<: that is, as Plalo paraphrafcs ihot; wordsof He/ieJ, T« tiynrv 5" 
x«n-<f xc)t.itxn {fi tAiw, ixirat i| r< //<<> iAw >.iiyjZimf l^/iuiiidt',, kA. ( ^iiiJ ^MfJ ijll CmL 

culi c»nJcrt UhJiiiui diti tri£!rtrm mali hAluit ! ^iaw mullos accrfta nffixert iniftri4 I qsuim multot 
itna ftrdidtrt, (j* nllmil mtr^irt [ufflicml Piin. 

R who 

126 r/j^ Religion o/ Nature. Sed:. V. 

who endeavour to worfliip God inn proper and reafonable manner, ivhatever it 
is, perhaps it might be /?/}, if they did not ; or their misfortunes might be greater : 
who can be certain of the contrary ? If thefe gentlemen have any way of difco- 
vering it, I wifli they would impart their fecrct. In the mean time fure they 
cannot cxpeft, that even in the moft imperfect sketch of natural religion the 
ivorfitp of the Deity fhould be omitted : tliat very thing, which hath been 
principally intended by the word religion '. 

4. And lartly, to deliver what remains, fummarily j Rational beings, or they^ 
to u-hom reafon is the great law of their nature, if they 'would behave them/elves as 
above, Jhould confuler in earnefl, ivhat a mighty being He is, 'who by the conjiiiu- 
iion of their nature has laid them under an obligation of being governed by it, and 
'whofe laws the diclates of right reafon may be faid to be. They ought to keep it 
well impreft upon their minds, that He is the being, upon whom their very ex~ 
(/7f«f? depends : thatitis Hcwhofuperintends and adminiflers the affairs of the 
the world by Was providence : that the eft"e(5l:s of Wis power and influence are vifible 
before their faces, and round about them, in all the phenomena of nature, not 
one of which could be without Him : that they are always in Hisprefence : that 
He is a. hcing of perfe6i reafon : that, if it he reafonable, that the traufgredbrs 
of reafon fliould be punifhd, they will moft certainly, one lime or other, be 
puniflid,^^- And then, if they do this, it is cafy to fee what efFed it muft 
have upon all their thoughts, words '', and anions. 

By what is faid here, no fuperflition is intended to be introduced : it is only 
the practice of reafon and truth, which is required : and any thing, that is not 
inconftflent with them, may be freely done, though under the infpcction of our 
great Lawgiver himfclf. 

• Religio dcorutn (iiItH p!o cotttinetHr. Cic. ^u'l omnia, qut a J cultum dt»rum ftrtincrent, Jiii- 
genter retrnHarmt, & tanqHAm rdegertnt, funt McH religio/i, &c. Id. ^ Particularly wirh 

refpeft to ciiflomnry fnearing; which, bcfidc the ill confcqucnces it has in making oaths cheap, t^v. 
is a great inftancc of difregard and irreverence. For they, who ufe themfclves to it do, tit leaji, niaJtc 
the tremendous name of God to fcrvcfor an expletive only; and commonly to rude, palTionatc, or dc- 
bftucbcd jlifcourfc (A«ywK«r«T/i)f«'f(i» jreii^itoi to (C'/io-.viToi Kj H-uct ctoy,*. Vh.Jud.) 


Truths refpeHingM^nldndj &c, 127 

Sect. VI. Truths refpe^ing Mankind in ge- 
neraly antecedent to all human laivs. 


N this and the following fcdions I fliall proceed as in the foregoing. 

I. Every man hat b in him/elf a principle of indhiduation^ which dijfinguijhes and 
feparatei him from all other men in ftich a manner ^ai may render him and them capa- 
ble of dijlincl properties inthings {ox diJiinSl fubjeEls ef property). That is, B and C 
arc fo dillinguifhd, or cxift fo diJlinBly, tlut if there be nny thing which B can call 
hisy it will be for that reafon not C's : and v. v. what is C's will for that re;ifon 
not be B's. The proof of this I put upon every man's own confcicnce. Let us 
fee then whether there is any thing, which one man may truly call his. 

II. There are fome things, to -which (at leaji before the cafe is alterd by voluntary 
fubjeclion, compa&^ or the like) every individual man has, or may have, fuch a na- 
tural and immediate relation, that he only of all mankind can call them his. 

The life, limbs, 8cc. of B arc as much his, as B is himfelf '. It is impofllble 
for C, or any other to fee with the eyes of B : therefore they are eyes only to B : 
and when they ccafc to be his eyes, they ceafe to be eyes at all. He then has the 
fole property in them, it being impofliblc in nature, that the eyes of B lliould 
ever be the eyes of C. 

Further, the /d^orofB cannot be the labor of C: becaufe it is the application 
of the organs and powers of B, not of C, to the efrc<fting offomcthing ; and thac- 
fore the labor is as much B's, as the limbs and faculties made ufcof arc his. 

Again, the effect or produce of the labor of B is not the efftcl: of the labor of C ■ 
and therefore this cffeft or produce is B"s, not C's -, as much B's, as i\\c labor was 
B's, and notes'*. Becaufe, what the labor of B caufcs or produces, B produces 

• 'Ovitt uTn i/MTtfit iri', •« »j*ii< i/Mt an/r.".;. Xtn. '' Anil therefore the produce of « 

nun's hhoT it often ftill called his Liicr. So 'V'Jl' Dni 1X3' ; inj ^D>4r' "J'S^ V'A\ /;, rfilm. ^ 
»l. f»lfim. llintliimtiiK laior vrjlej. Virg. 

R .'. br 

128 The Religion 0/ Nature. Sedl. VI. 

by his labor J or it is the product of Bby his labor: that i5, it is B's produft, 
not C's, or any other's. And if C fhould pretend to any property in that, which 
B only can truly call his, he would aft contrary to truth ^ 

Lallly, there may be many things, which B may tiaily call his in fomc fuch/ew/?, 
or upon fome fuch account, as no other can ; and to which C has no more right 
than D, norD thanF, i3c. x\\Q. property oi \^\\\c\\ will therefore be inB. Becaufe 
C has no more title than D, nor D than F, 13 c. and that, to which every one 
befides B has an equal title, no one belldes B can have any title to at all'', their 
pretences mutually balancing and dejlroying each other, whilll his only remains. 
And in this cafcafmdl matter, being oppofed to nothing, will be flrong enough 
to maintain the claim of B. 

III. Whatever is inconfijlent ivith the general peace and -welfare (or good) of man- 
kind, is inconftjlent-ivith the laws of human nature, wrong, intolerable. Thofe max- 
ims may be eftecmd the natural and true laws of any particular fociety, which 
are moll proper to procure the happinefs of it. Becaufe happinefs is the end of fo- 
ciety and laws : othcrwife we might [upTp^fe unhappine/s to be propofcd as the 
right end of them} that is, unhappinefs to be defirable, contrary to nature 7md 
truth. And what is faid of a particular fociety is not lefs true, when applied to 
the univerfal fociety of mankind . Now thofe things are mojl apt to produce hap- 
pinefs, which make the mofl men happy. And therefore thofe m;L\ims or princi- 
ples, which promote the general tranquillity and well being of mankind, if thofe 
words exprefs the ^^/)/)/'wf/} of mankind, muft be the true laws of humanity, or 
the bafis o}^ them : and all fuch praftices, as interfere with thefe, muit alfo in- 
terfere with thofe. It is contradidtory to fay, that any thing can be a general law 
of human nature, which tends only to favor the pleafurcs of feme particulars 
to the prejudice of the reft, who partake of the fame common nature j and cf- 
pecially if th. (c pleafurcs are of the lower and brutal kind. As a million of men 
aie more than one ; fo in fixing the public laws of human nature, and what 
ought to be, or not to be, they muil in reafon be more regarded by a million of 
times : for here we confidcr men only as men. 

It will be cafy now to ihew, that the tranfgreffion of thefe laws, conducing to - 
the general good of the world, is wrong and morally evil. For if mankind may be 
faid in general to be a rational animal, the general welfare of it muft be the wel- 
fare of a rational nature : and therefore that, and the laws which adv;mcc it, 

• If B works for another man, who pays him for his work, or labor, that alters not the cafe. He 
may commute them for money, becaufe they arc his. ^ Tuaqitam Spnrti iW fodarum, fie ft 

'riviotm JHguUnt, HI nemo r.v oifinitin rrffri, as LnHaotiiu fays in another ciie. 


Truths refpeHing Mankind, &<:. 129 

mufl: be founded in reafon ; nor can be oppofcd by any thing, but what i? op- 
poiuc to reafcr.^ and confcqucntly to irutb. 

Let us fuppofe fome rule, by which if all mankind would agree to govern 
thenifelves, it would be in general good for the world : that is, fuch a pniiftice 
would be agreeable to the »a/«re and arf««;/?.iw« of mankind. Ifa//mcnlhould 
tranfgrefs this rule, what would be the confcquence of fuch an nniverfal 
revolt ? A general ez-il^ or fomcthing diiagrccablc to our nature and the 
truth of our circum fiances : for of contrary practices there mufl: be con- 
trary cffcds } and contraries cannot both be agreeable to the fame thing. 
This then would be ivrcng by tlic terms. And as wrong it would be in any 
one man : becaufe all the individuals have equal right to do it, one as much as ano- 
ther} and therefore all as much as any ow. At leall it is certain, that whoever 
lliould violate thatr«/f, would contribute his fhare towards the introduftion of 
univcrfal diforder and mifery j and would for his p;u't deny human circumftancts to 
be what they are, public happinefs to be what it is, and the rule to be what it real- 
ly is, asmuchasif all others confpircd with him in this iniquity and madncls. 

With what fiice can any /)ar//V«/,«>- man put his own humor or unreafonablc 
plcafurc into the fcalc againfl: fuch a weight of happinefs as that of all the world ? 
Does not he, who thus centers mbimfelf^ difregards the good o^ every body elfe.^ 
and intirely feparates his injoymcnts andintcrclls from thofc oi xhc public ; does 
not he, I fiy, ftrike himfclf out of the roll of mankind » ? Ought he to bcownd 
as oncofthern? Ought he not rather to be repelled, and treated as an <?//V« and e- 
nemy to the common happinefs and tranquillity of our /pedes ? 

IV. IVbatever is either reajonable or unrcafoKable in B iiiith refpeSl to C, 'would 
bejttft the fame in C with refpeEl to B, if the cafe was inverted •>. Becaufe reafon is 
univerial, and rcfpccbs cafes ', not perfons. ('See fc<5l. III. pr. II.j 

Cor. Hence it follows, thatagood way to know what is right or wrong in re- 
lation to other men^ is to confidcr what wc fhould take things to be were wc in 
their circumllaiiccs **. 

V. In a flats of nature men are equalin refpeEl of dominion'. I except for the prc- 
fcnt the cafe oi parents and their children j and perhaps of fome few other near relati- 

• 'AiSftrToiMf^M 3i|.-.o.. Th.fuJ. ' Sie tnim dquus jutltx diitm Je fua, aliitm de 

alitna ctuta, jtnltnttAmfirt. Sen. - "AiiraaT* ^fejyir Uvrif yimrxt. Ifocr. ^ \'''V\ ^N 

lOipo"? J/'JTIU; ny -p^n. p. ALoth. Eo Uco nos conJlitHAmHi, qu* ille tjl, cm ir»[cimHr. Sen. 
' llewija mere flatterer, who toLl Cjrui, 6««-iAiv; ^» i^«i yi itx-iic, ri> firo-'i ■xx'^-jhuih iii> r.ilw "■ 


1 30 The Religion of Nature, Seel. VI. 

ons. Here let me be underftood to mean only thofc, bc-t\vccn whom there is 
no fiimily relation for between whom all family relation is \'anilTid). 

In ;i Itate, where no laws of fociety make any fubordination or dillinftion, men 
tan only be confiderd as me»^ or only as individuals of thefAmefpecieSy and equal- 
ly fharing inone commonVJefinition '. And fincc by virtue of this /lime definiti- 
on B is the fame to C, that C is lo B > B has no more dominion over C than C 
reciprocally has over B ; that is, they are in this regard equal. 

Perfonal excellencies or defects can make no diflferencc here : bccaufe, i . Who 
muft jndge^ on which lidc the advantage lies ? To fay B (ov D, or any body elic) 
has a right to judge to the diladvantagc of C, is to fuppofe what isinqueltion, a 
dominion over him i not x.o prove xt. z. Great natural or acquucd /Wou'Wfw/; 
may be privileges to them who have them : but this does not deprive thofe, who 
have lefs, of their title to what they havej or, which is the fame, give any 
one, who has greater abilities, ti right to take it, or the ufc of it from them. If 
B has better eyes than C, it is well for him : but it does not follow from this, 
thatClhould not therefore fee for himfelf, and ufc hiseyes^ as freely asB may/^/x. 
C's eyes are accommodated by nature to his ufc, and io ai-e B's to his j and each has 
the folc property in his own : {o their rcfpcftivc properties are equal. The cale 
would be parallel to this, if B lliauld happen to ha\e hciicr intcUcclual faculties 
than C. And further, if B fliould be flrongcr than C, he would not yet for that 
reafon have any right to be his lord. For C's lefs degree of llrength is 
as much his., as B's greater is his : therefore C has as much right to his, 
and (which h the natural confcqucnce) to ufe his, as B has to ufc his : 
that is, C has as much right to rrfif^ as B has to impofe or command^ 
by virtue of his flrength : and where the right ('tho not the power) of 
refifling is equal to the right of commanding, the right of commanding or^o- 
minion is nothing. 3. Since llrength and power are mofl: apt to pretend a title 
to dominion '', it may be added further, that potver and right., or a power of 
doing any thing, and right to do it, arc quite different ideas: and therefore they 
maybcfcparatcd, nor does one infcrr the other. Lajlly., i? poiver., qua power, 
gives a right to dominion, it gives a right to every things that is obnoxious to it > 
and then nothing can be done that is wrong. (For no body can do any thing which 
he has not the poiier to do./ But this is not only contrary to what h;is been pro- 
ved in i'eci. I. buttoaflcrt it would be to advance a plain abfurdityox coutradiElion 

* X/AW (T,? umim imi tarn fimile, tarn par, quam omnes inter no/met iffos fHrnns. ^lucimt^i 

tft hotr.inis ici\n\uo, una in omnes v^Ut. Cic. '' When the, in Lixy, asked the Calls, 

Sijtodnain i,l jiu ejfet, agriim a I'OjfcJforibut petere, aut minari arma, they anfwcril, /r w urinii ja, 
fcrre, (y omnia fortium virorum ejfe. Like baibarians indeed ! 


Truths refpecilng Mankind, &c. i ^ i 

rather. For then to oppofc the man who has tliis/oxrer, as far as one can, or (which 
is the fimcj asfiu- as one has the /'0'::fr to doit, would not be wrong: and yet fo 
it mull be, if he has a right to dominion, ortobe not oppofed. Moreover, that 
a man fhould have aright to any thing, merely becaufc he has the poiver to take 
it, is a do£lrine indeed, which may ferve a few tyrants, or fome banditi and 
rogues, but dire(5bly oppofitc to the peace and general good of manland > and 
thcieforc to be exploded, by prop. III. It is alfo what the powerful themfclves 
could not allow, if they would but imagine themfelvcs to be inthcftateof the 
weak and more defcncekfs; and therefore unrcafonable, by prop. IV '. 

VI. No man can have a right to begin to interrupt the happinefi of another. Be* 
caufc, inthcfirft place, thisfuppofes a dominion over him, and the mod abJoJute 
too that canbc. In the next, for B to begin todifturb the peace andhappinefs 
of C is what B would think unreafonabk^ if he was in C's cafe. In the la(t fincc 
it is fuppofed, that C has never invaded the happine(s of B, nor taken anything 
from him, nor at all meddled with him, but the whole tranfaHion begins origi- 
nally from B (forallthisis couchdinthe word begin), C can have nothing that is 
B'sj and therefore nothing, to which C has not atleall as good a //V/easBhasj 
or, inotherwords, nothing, which C has not as much right to X:ff/> us B to claim. 
Thefe two rights being then at leaji equal, and counterpoifing each other, no al- 
teration in the prefent ftate of things can follow from any fuperiority of right 
in B : and therefore it muft of right remain as it is -, and what C has mull, for any 
right that B has to oppofe this fcttlcment, remain with C in his undi^ ur bed poi- 
fefllon. But the argument is ftill llrongeron the fide of C : becaufe he fcems to 
fiave fuch a property in his own happinefs, as is mentiond in prop. II. fuch a 
one as no other can have ''. 

\' II . Tvo no man can have a right to begin to interrupt another man's happinefs^ or 
to hurt him > yet every man has a right to defend himfelf and his againfl violence, to re- 
cover -what IS taken by force from Lim, and even to make rep) ifals, by all the means that 
truth and prudence permit '. We have fccn already, that there arc Ibme things,which 

• y»/tfhiu when he fays, »«^w y' ,«"' "f'!^. ^ ^icf» &rfir.'» «'^i/«3T«T«r, i »r«f« <i..:ff4,Toi?, uxut 
TcTi aa/.«T«rTi;«i!, can only mein, tha: nccsfTity, or perhaps prudence, oiligei to dothisj not anyjavv 
in the ftrifter (cnfc of tlut %vorJ. i" Socit/ntis [inttr Iximint)] arilij/l'miim xmculHm eft math 

»riitrAn tfft BAiuram, komintm homini dtiriihert.fHi commodi canf*, qiiim omnm inrommpiLt 

fitiirt, &c. Cir f Ail this is fuppofed to be ia a ftate of nature and the abkncc of human 


a man; 

r^i The Religion of Nature.' 8e6l. VL 

a man may truly cull his ; and let us for the prefent only fuppofc, that there may 
be more. This prcmifed, I proceed to make good the propofition. 

To deny a man the privilege mentiond in it is to aflert, contrary to truth, cither 
that he has not the fiiculties and powers, which he has ; or that the Author of na- 
ture has given them to him in vain. For to what end has he them, if he may not 
ttfe them ? And how may he ufe them, if not for his ownprefervation, when he is 
attacked, and like to be abufcd, or perhaps deftroyd. 

AW animalsh-ivc a principle offelf-prefervation, which exerts itfelf many times 
with an uncontroulablc impetuofity. Nature is uniform in this, and every where 
conllant to itfelf E\en inanimate bodks, when they are a£ted upon, read. And 
one may be fure, that no pofition can have any foundation in nature, or becon- 
fillent with it and truth f'thofc infcparable companions^, which turns upon nature 
jtlelf, and tends to its deJlru£tion. 

Great pait of the general happinefs of mankind depends upon thofe?w^«j, by 
which the innocent may be liivcd from their cruel invaders : among which the op- 
portunities they have oi defending themfclvcs may be reckond the chief There- 
fore to debar men of the ufe of thefe opportunities, and the right of defending 
themfelves againft injurious treatment and violence mull be inconfiltent with the 
laws of nature by prop. III. 

If amanhasno right to i^/f«ir/himfelf andwhatishis, he can have no right to 
any thin" (the contrary to which has been already in part, ;md will by and by be 
more amply proved^ j fincethat cannot be his right, which he may not maintain 
to be his right. 

If a man has no right to defend himfelf againft infults, l^c. it muft be bccaufc the 
aggreflbr has a right to ajfail the other, and ufuip what is his : but this prctenfion 
has been prevented in the foregoing propofition. And, more than that, it includes 
a great abfurdity, to commence an injury, or to Ae^/« the violence, being in nature 
more than only to repell it. He, who begins, is the true caufe of all that follows ; 
and whatever fills upon him from the oppolition made by the defending party, is 
but the effc£t of his own a61; : or, it is that violence, of which he is the author, re- 
flected back upon himfclf It is as when a man fpits at heaven, and the fpittle falls 
back upon his own face. 

Since he, who begins to violate the happinefs of another, docs what is rjrong, 
he, who endeavours to obviate orputaltop to that violence, does in thatrcfpetl: 
what is /7g/'/, by the terms. 

Lartly,finceeveiy man is obliged to confult his own happinefs, there can be no 
doubt but that he not only ?;/«;•, but even ought to defend it (fcd.ll. prop. IX.)i 


Truths refpecJi}7g Mankind, &:, 1^5 

in fuch a manner I mean, as docs not interfere with truth *^ or his own dcfignof 
being happy. He ought indeed not to zCtraJIjly^ or do more than the end propof- 
cd requires : that is, he ought by a prudent carriage and wife forccall to lliut up, ;/ 
he carty the avenues by which he may be invaded j and when that cannot le done, to 
ufc arguments and perfuafivcs, or perhaps withdraw out of the way of harm : but 
when thefe meafures arc ineffcclual or imprafticablc, he mufl: take I'uch other as he 
can, and confront/o;Tc with/orf<r. Othcrwife he will fail in his duty to himfclf, and 
deny happinefs to be happinefs. 

By the lame means, that a man may </f/<r«iwhatishis, he may certainly endea- 
vour to r^ro'i'fr what has been by any kind of violence or villainy taken from him. 
For it has been lliewn already, that the po:vcr to take any thing from anothergives 
no rigl't to it. The right then to that, which has been taken from itj owner againll 
his will, remains Hill where it was : he may flill truly call it /jis : and if it be /;/;, he 
may ufe it as bis : which if he who took it away, or any other, fhall hinder 
him from doing, that man is even here the aggrefibr, and the owner docs but 
defend himfelf and what is his. Befides, he, who ufes any thing as /;;/, when it 
is bis, acts on the fide of truth : but that man, who oppofes him in this, and 
confcquently afTcrts a right to that, which is not his, a6ts contrary to truth. 
The former therefore docs what cannot be amifs : but what the latter does, is 
WTong by that fundamental propofition, feft. I. prop. IV. 

Then further, if a man hath flill a right to what is forceably or without his con- 
sent taken from him, he mufl have a right to the value of it. For the thing is to him 
what it is in value to him : and the right he h;is to it, may be confiderd as a right to 
a thing o( fucb a value. So that if the very thing which w;is taken be dellroyd, o'' 
cannot be retrieved, the proprietor nevcithclefs retains his right to a thing oi' fuch 
a value to bim j and fomething muft be had in Iteu of it : that is, he has a right to 
make reprifals. Sinceeveiy thing is to every man what it is //; value to him, things 
of the f ime value to any one may be reckond as to him the fame, and to recover tlie 
ef«itvj/f«/thefameas lo icco\cr the i hi ngii/i If : for othcrwife it is not an equiva- 
lent. If the thing taken by way of reprilal lliould be to the man, from whom it is 
taken, of greater value th.\n what he wrongfully took from the recoverer, he mufl 
charge himfelf with that lofs. Ifinjuflicebcdonehim, it is done by himfelf, the 
other has no more than what he h;is a right to. To which add, that :is a man has a 
right to recover ivbatii his, or the c<juivalcnt, from an invader j fohefeemsfor tlic 
fame reafons to have a right to an equivalent for thcexpenfe he is at in recovering his 
own, torlhclofsof //OTf andy«/f/, uni for the treul/le,bazards, iir\d dangers under- 

* For ii« ifjiii tutxii TtiiT, iintxtim nuiuiiiiif nrln TtiiT »«»«(, m> u/MtiiTti. ifax. T. 

S ' gono : 

134- The Religion o/" Nature. Se61:. VI. 

gone; beciufc all thcfcarc the effects of the invafion, and therefore to be added 
to tlic invader's account. 

WW. The firjlpojjejjion of a thing gives the pojjejfor a greater right to it, than any 
other man has, or can have, till he and all, that claim under him, are extinH. For, 
I . till then no other man can be xhefirjl pojfejfor again : which is more than nothing \ 
fince he comes into it by God's providence, and as xt-wext donation, z. That, which 
no man has yet any title to % the finder may take without the violation oi any 
truth. He doth not deny that to be another man's, which is another man's : he doth 
not begin to interrupt the happinel's of any body, £5? r. Therefore to poffcfs hirr.- 
felf of it is not 'wrong. So far from it, that, fince every man is obliged tc confult his 
own happinefs (that is, his own intercft and advantages, whenever he can do it 
withourthc violation of truth) not toa£t confonantly to this obligation isanomif- 
fion that would be ■zt'row^j. What he does therefore is n_g/;/. And then if hcdoes 
right in taking poflcfllon of it, he muft from thence be the rightful pojfeffor j or, it 
becomes his. 5 . There are many things, Vv'hich cannot be poffcft without cultiva- 
tion and the contrivance and labor of the firft pofTenbr. This has generally been 
the cafe of lands : and thefc are indeed more eminently meant by the word poffejji- 
ens. Now to deprive a man of the fruit of his own cares and fwcat, and to enter 
upon it, as if it was the effe6l of the intruder's pains and travel, is a moft mani- 
feft violation of truth. It. is affcrting in faft that to be his, which cannot be 
his. See prop. II. 4. The contrary doftrine, viz. x.\\-\x. prime occupancy gwes 
no right, interferes with prop. III. for it muft certainly be inconfiftcnt with 
the peace and happinefs of mankind in general to be left in endlefs wars and 
Ihugglcs for that, which no man can ever have any right to. And yet thus it 
mull be, if thatdoftrine was true: becaufe it has been dcmonftratcd, \.\\m power 
confers no right > and therefore the fir ji right to many things can only accrue 
from the firil poflcflion of them, f . If B lliould endeavour by force (or fraud) 
to c\cSt C out of the poflcflion of any thing, which C injoys, and obtaind 
without expelling or difiurbing any body, he would certainly do that, which he 
himfclf would judge unreajonable, were he in C"s place. Therefore he afts, as 
if that was not re-afon with rcl'pcft toC, which would be reafon in refpcftof B; 
contrary to the nature of reafon, and to prop. I\'. 6. To endeavour to turn a man 
violently out of his poffcfllons is the fame as to command him to leave them, upon 
pain of fuffcring for non-obcdicnce. But this is ufurping a dominion, which he has 
no right to > and is contrary to prop. V. 7. No man can cxpcU another out of his 

• Ham fro^i*. ttllurii hemm nittKra ritq; ilium, Isttmt, mc iuinnui>m flatuit. Hor 


Truths refpecling Mankind, ^c. 135 

polTcfllon without beginning to intcmipt his happincrs : nor can any one do this 
without contravening the truth containJ in prop. \'l. This therefore fccurcs 
the polTcllbr in his poficiTion for ever : tKat is, it confirms his right to the thing 
poflcll. Laji!)^ the frjl poj/ej/or, of whom I have been fpcaking, has undoubt- 
edly a right to defend his perfo-i, and fuch other things as anonly be his, againfl: 
the attempts of any aggrciror (fee prop. II.): therefore thcfe no one can have a 
right to violate. Ana therefore again, if he cannot be forccably difpofTell: 
witliout violoncc oftcrd to thc/cy no one has any right to difpolfefs him. But 
this muil be the cafe, where the pofleflbr docs not quit his pofTeflion ivilUng- 
ly. The right confequently mull remain iolely in him, unlcfs he confcnts to 

quit if. 

N. The fuccej/ors of an invader, got into poflcflion wrongfully, may acquire 
a right in time ", by the failure of luch, as might claim under him who had the 
right. For he, who happens to be in pollcilion, when all thefe arc cxtin6t, is 
in the place of a prime occupant. 

IX. ^ title to many things may be transferred by compact or donation •>. If B has 
the fole right in lands, or goods, no body has any right to the difpoGilofthem 
befidcs B : and he has a right. For difpofing of them is but ufing them as his. 
Therefore the aft of B in exchangingxhcm forfomc thing clfe, or beflo"j:ing them 
upon C, interferes not with truth : and fo B does nothing that is wrong. Nor 
docs C do any thing againll truth, or that is wrong, in taking them : becaufc 
he treats them as being •a/j.-j/ they are > as things, which come to him by the aft 
of that pcrfon, in whom is lodged the fole power of difpofing of them. Thus 
C gets the title innocently. 

But in the calcoffow/)a(?7 the rcafon,on which thistranfaftionftands, is more evi- 
dent ftill. For the contraftors are fuppofed to receive each from other the r^.vrja- 
Unt of that which thev part with, or at leait what is equivalent to them refpe£lively, 
or perhaps by each party preferable. Thus neither of them is hurt : perhaps both 
advantaged. And fo each of them treats the thing, which he receives upon the 
mnoccnt exchange, as hcmgwhat it is : better for him, and promoting his con- 
vcnicnccand happinefs. Indeed he, who receives the value of any thing, and 
what he likes as well, in cffeft has it rtill. His property \s not diminiflid : the 
lituation and matter of it is only altcrd. 

f/..^»T... Ifecr. •" To this may be reduced that title to tiling:, which Tully mentions .is con. 

♦erred by fonic bw (/rj*h and even t hole, which accrue ««U///<;nf, or y^r/f. Fori fuppofc the go- 
vernment to luvc a right of giving them thus. 

S i MiUiJund 

I '^6 The Religion of Nature. Seel. VI. 

Mankind could not well fubfifl without bartering one thing for anotlier : 
therefore whatever tends to take away the benefit of this intcrcourfc, is incon- 
/ fillent with the general good of mankind, ijc. If a man could find the neceja- 

ries of life without it, and by himfclf, he muft at leaft want many of the com- 
forts of it. 

X. J'/jere is then fuch a thing as property, founded in nature and truth ' ; or, 
there are things, which one man only can, conftflently with nature and truth, call 
bis: by prop. II, VIII, IX.''. 

XI. Thofe things, which only one man can truly and properly call his, mufl remain 
his, till he agrees to part with them {if they are v.b, as he may part with) by com- 
pa^ or donation J or fwhich muft be undcrftood) till they fail, or death cxtin- 
guifl^es him and his title together, and he delivers the lamp to his next man. 
Becaufe no one can deprive him of them without his approbation, but the de^ 
priver muft ufc them as his, when they are not his, in contradiction to truth. For, 

XII. To have the property of any thing and to have the fole right of ufir.g anddif- 
pofing of it are the fame thing : they are equipollent cxprej/ions. For when it is faid, 
that P has the property, oi:that fuch a thing is proper to P, it is not faid, that 
P and QjDr P and others have the property (proprium limits the thing to P onlyj : 
and when any thing is faid to be his, it is not fiid that part of it only is his. P has 
therefore the all or all-hood <= of it, and confcquently all the ufe of it. And then, 
fincc the all of it to him, or all that P can have of it, is but the ///^and difpofal 
of it '', he who has this has the thing icfclf, and it is his <=. 


• Which muft not give way to opinions of jitnefs, &c. The maftcr was in the right, who cor- 
rcfted Cyrus tor adjudging the great coat to the great boy, and the little one to the Httle. He was 
not t5 asfjiorioT®' x~i7Ki, but ot properly. Omnium, qiu in hominum liocloritm ilifptitationf Ter/an- 
titr, rt'ihil ej! profiHo prtjlaiilius, qiiam pUni intelligi vos ad jtijlitiam tjji natos, ntqiie opinione, 
fed natur;! conjlitutiim ejfe jus. Cic. " There is another way of acquiring a title 

mcntiond : which is, by the right ot war, as it is called. Sunt privata nulU natura: fed autve- 
ttri ccciip-uhne, ut qui qitondnm in -vacua itnerimt ; aut xicioria. ut qui hello pctiti funi, &;c. 
Cic. And fo in Xenophon it is faid to bean eternal law among men, tlut if a city be taken in war. 
the bodies aiid goods of the people in it are the conqueror's! and they may poflcfs them as their 
own, not iw'^f". But fure this wants limitations. '■Allodium. "»»»»<«.( lyiVc-* 

i,a:^,t*i i>ayi>6i«-K»i. }.f/a<rcti i ^i»» /*■» •A;""" "•" ^Kmcriiat T iyfS', « ri« «ik.«<, ti,. (Ti ;t;f?o-'» 

«»>. ndcrrti '^ Tut x(vm txi't^tt, <Ji(rT»Ti'i«» Ji Mi. ^ UirTt', ^ UKttTH c* ry TiAiM-ij x«f«. 

;C<.-ji(r6<*i» »Ti)on, TV xfltTii K*^-u<r»t^im /*<l.or. S. Cliryf. Tvrnf /*" <f cirii b^i»5 <V/AfF xi^ji.., fj'^» i\ 

Truths refpectlrig Mankind, ^c, i 37 

Laws indeed have introduced a way of fpcaking, by which the property u\Ji 
the ufufru^ are dirtingiiillid ; but in truth the ulufruftuary has a temporary^ or 
limited property j and the proprietary has a /)tT/f//<.t/ ufufrud, cither at prcfcnr, 
or in revcrfion. Propriety without the ufe (if the ufc is never to come to the 
proprietary) is an empty found. 

I have before upon fomc occafions taken it as granted, that lie, who ufes 
any thing as his^ when it is not his., acts againll truth., Svc. but now I fay fur- 
ther, that, 

XIII. lie, 'who ufes or difpofei of any thing, does by declare it to be his. Bc- 
caufe this is all, that he, whofe it really is, can do. Bcrroiving and hiring af- 
ford no objection to this. When the borrower or hirer ufes the thing borrowd 
or hired, he ufes what is his otvn for the time allowd : and his doing fo is only 
one of thofe ways, in which the true proprietary difpofes of it. 

XIV. To ufurp orin-jade the property of another man is injujiice: or, more ful- 
ly, to take, detain, ufe, deJJroy, hint, or meddle ' with any thing that is bis without 
bis allowance, either by force or fraud or any other way, or ei-en to attempt any of 
tbefe, or ajftjl them, -who do, are aEis of injujiice. the contrary j to render and 
permit quietly to every one what is bis, isjujlice. Def. 

XV. He that would not violate truth, mujl avoid all injuftice : or, all injujiice 
is wrong and evil. It interferes with the truths ^ here before laid down, and per- 
haps more. It denies men to he fubjeHs capable of dirtincb properties: in fomc 
cafts it denies them to have a property even in their own bodies, life, fame, and 
the like: the practice of it is incompatible with the peace and happinefs of man- 
kind : it is what every man thinks unreafonablc in his own cafe, when the inju- 
ry is done to himfclf : to take any thing from another only becaufe I think I 
want it, or becaufe I have power to take it, and will have it, without any title 

i iixiiyj^ rir y^'icn u.vrZt ii', ccuiru riifx>.a//,$ia(irTti, iM'/ty^iuti ci<rT3T«i ttfiti^ifbiB-u. icurtiiut n 
Kte'jiVfMX xstft'/Jtf Ti;»iKivT» TXf»>.ufn ««©- iinXuiiu ri cti/juxr^. LuC. • <3)ui te pafcit 

Mgir, luusifttiac. B»r»ce, alluding to this truth. Hifi -urrU, Ctys Plato, 'i» iifiiBt) toi«Vi cTiTiMu,!- 

f*«r fi,»Mt Tl{'" Tan ii>t,tT(!n u,r,oii* fAr.JiwIpitui jJ^itai avi«»- and tFlcn prOCCcds, filj' "'J Xt'i'^ t^l'iH 

T«j S" TiA««, i«i fii xnrv, T-.> xiKir.fhiw, xtA. In Plutarch the t!;iag is carried farther : where it is 
laid, that a nun palTing by another man's door ought ^n iSAi»ii» .'irw, kA. according to a faying of 

Xtnocratts, u.)ion ai«^i<ii> >i 7^<; -mxi, n rtn iiph a,>.)j,iti i>< ttAarr/ar ciai«> ri5»<(i. 

• Furtum f.i, cum quii ahmam rrmimito Jomino contrcdat. Jufl. infl. •■ On the contrary 

PObl nu/yj i T TWlVi. A faying of i* 2n. And Cictro more than once ufts vtruin lot jujluin, 
and xtrttm for bonitat or frtbitAt, 


1 38 The Religion of Nature. Se6l. VI. 

to it, is the highcfl: pretence to dominion^ and denial of our natural equality : 
it is fcttin"- up a right to begin to dilhnb the happinefs of others : and laftly, ic 
is to deny there is any fuch thing as property^ contrary to truth. 

Briefly, if there be any thing which P can truly and properly call bis, then, 
if T takes or ufcs it without the confent of P, he declares it to be bis (for if 
it wMS bis he could do no inorcj when it is not bis, and fo ads a lie • : in which 
confilb the idea and formal ratio of moral evil. 

The very attempting any inftanccof injuflice, or ajjijling others in fuch an at- 
tempt, fince it is attempting and promoting what is wrong, is being in the 
wrong as much as one is able to be ; or doing what one can to achieve that 
which is evil: and to do this, by the terms, mull be -ivrong and evil. 

Even the deftre of obtaining any thing unjuftly is evil: becaufe to defire to 
do evil, by the terms again, is an evil or criminal deftre. If the aft follows 
fuch a defire, it is the child and produft of it ; and the defire, if any thing 
renders the fulfilling ot it impra6l;icablc, is the aft obllruclcd in the beginning, 
and itiflcd in the womb. 

Let it be obl'ervcd here by way o? fcboUon concerning the thing called cove- 
toiifnefs, that there fccm to be three forts of it. One is this here mentiond : 
a defire of getting from others, tho it be unjufily. This is wrong and wicked. 
Another is an immcnfe defire of heaping up what one can by jult methods, but 
without any reafonable end propofed'', and only in order tokeep'^, and as it were 
bury it ^ : and the more he accumulates, the more he craves *. This alfo in- 
trenches upon truth, and fcems to be a vice. But to covet to obtain wliat is 
another mm'shy jujl means, and with his confent, when it may contribute to 
the happinefs of our felves or families, and perhaps of the other perfon too, 
has nothmg furely that looks k«/7;V«£//j upon truth, oris blameable, in it. This, 
if it may be called covetoufncfs, is a virtuous covet uufnefs. 

" Account TO (ro» /«.<><» (ro» iivai, ro ^i a,».(iTcin, icrrsj fVir, i»oroi£r. Epicl.'s WOrds. ynjiitli prl- 
tntim miinm eft, ut ve ciii quii noceat, n'ift laeejpiiis injuria ; deindt, ut communtbus fro communibui 
utatur, frivatii ut fuis. Cic. This is to ufc things as being what they arc. " Blefjlas i Ji,. 

Kirn?, in Lucian, dies of hunger (Aifttl uS^M®^ tAiys-o iTKntAnKoa.). Ridiculous enough. c Qr 

only 3-ft5 TO ifi3-/Aiif, as Anacharfis faid of fome Greeks. Athen. ^ f^s that man, InAthe- 

ntus, indcavourd literally to do; of whom it is reported, that, being much in love with his money, 
before he died hcfwallowdas much of it as he could {%»TxiTtn-» ix, ixiym xi^-Ht, tin^Au'.,) . « Of 
fuch it is, that Diogenes \iicA to fay, 'Ou-o's? t^c <Pi>M^/ut)n to?? l^fti-:iK%i%, x.x. Stob. The Mumftulim, 
incntiond in N/thh. Ab. compare them nnW^U/ niy bD'Da^ri'bon Q^'DHn nnu;'«/ t^Oi'^J 

I XVI. IVhen 

Truths refpeCling Mankind, &c. 1 39 

XVI. TVben a man cares not what fufferings he caiifes to others^ andefpecially if 
be drlights in other men's fufferings and makes them bis fpott^ this is what I call 
cruelty. And not to be affeSled 'with the fufferings of other people.^ tho they proceed 
not from k;, hut from others, or from caufes in ivhich ive are not concerned, is un- 
mercifutnefs. Mercy and humanity are the revet fe of thefe. 

XVII. He, "jchoreligioufly regards truth and nature, will not only be not unjuJI, 
but (more) not unmerciful, and much lefs cruel. Not to bcafFcftcd with the aff.icli- 
ons of others, fofar as \vc know them, and in proportion to the fcvcral degrees 
and circumlhinces of them, tho wc arc not the caufes of them, is the Hime as 
to confider the affliftcd as pcrfons not in affliction ; that is, as being not what 
they are, or ('which is the I'.xmcJ as being what they arc not: and this contra- 
dicts matter of fact. 

One can fcarce know the fufferings ofanothcr without having at leaft fome image 
of them in his mind : nor can one have thefe images without being confcious of 
them, and as it were feehng them. Nexttofuffcringitfelf istocarry thcreprelen- 
tation of it about with one. So that he, who is not affected with the calamities of 
others, fo far as they fall within his knowledge, may be fiid to know and not to 
know J or at leaft to cancel his knowledge, and contradict: his ownconfcience. 

There is fomcthing in human nature ' rcfulting from our very make and conftitu- 
tion, while it retains its genuin form, andis not^//fr.'/by vitioush;ibits> notper- 
wr/e^ by tranfports of revenge or fury, by ambition, company, orfalfcphilofo- 
phy •> i nor oppreji by ilupidity and neglecting to obfcrve what happens to others : I 
fay, there is fomething, which renders us obnoxious to the pains of others, caufes us 
to fympathize with them, and almoll comprehends us in their cafe. It is grievous to 
fccor hc-ar(and almoll to hear of) any man, or even any animal whatever, in /or- 
ment. Thhcomp.ifjion appears eminently in them, who upon other accounts are 
jurtly reckond amongft the beft of men ': in fome degree it appears in almofl all j nay, 

• Properly called humanity i tccaufc nothing of it appears in brutes. rnUUrim mspo nVN Hona 

nn~\2n -\yva. S.Hhaf. ' \l\imStntc» fays, Clemintiam omnts ieni frtjlahunt, mije- 

ricQrdi»m autem xitahunt, he ftcms only to quibble. He has many other weak things upon this (ub- 
]c€t. 1\aX., fuceurrtt \^f»fitni\aUtnii Ucl>rymij, nonaccfdtt, owns one u/t of tears: they obtain fuc- 
coure%'en from a Stoic. ' 'Aya^oi U-.tvu-xnn ktifn. They, who of all writers undertake to imi- 

tate nature mod, oft introduce even their heroes weeping. (See how Homtr reprcfents Uly/ff)Oi\.'. 

«fi. », 7. — 8.) Thetearsof men arc in truth very different from the cries and cjulations 

of children. They itefiltni flrtami, and flow froir other caules ; commonly fome tender, or pcrh.ips 
philofophical, reilcxion. It is eafy to fee how lurd hearts and dry eyes come to be fafliionallc. But 
for all that, it is certain the glanJuU lacr^malti are not mode for nothing. 


140 The Religion of Nature. Sedl:. VI. 

even fomctimes, when they more coolly nttend to things, in thofe hardened and ex- 
ecrable monjlers of cruelty thcmfclves, who feem juft to retain only the leafh tinc- 
ture of humanity that can be. The Phciiean tyrant, who had never wept over any 
of thofe murders he had caufed among his own citizens, ivept when he faw a trage- 
dy but a£bed in the theatre " : the reafon was, his attention was caught here, and 
he more obfei-ved the fufFerings o? Hecuba and Andromache^ than ever he had 
thofe of tlic Pheraans ; and more impartially, being no otherwife concerned in 
them but as a common fpeftator. Upon this occafion the principle oi compajlion,, 
implanted in human nature, appeard,overcame his habits of cmelty, broke through 
his pctriHi£tion, and would fhew that it could not be totally eradicated. It is there- 
fore according to nature to be afFc6ted with the fufferings of other people ; and 
the contrary is inhuman and unnatural. 

Such arc the circumjlanccs of mankind, that we cannot (or but very few of us, 
God knows^ make our way through this world without encountering dangers and 
fufFcring many evils : and therefore fmce it is for the good of fuch, as are fo expofed 
or aftuallyfmarting under pain or trouble, to receive comfort and afliltance from 
others, without which they muft commonly continue to be mii'erable, or pcrilh, it 
is for the common good and welfare of the majority at leaji of mankind, that they 
fhould compajjionate zni\ help cxch. other *". To do the contrary mult therefore be 
contrary to nature and 'u;reng by prop. III. And belidc, it is by one's bcha\iour and 
a6tions to affirm, that the circumftances of men in this world are not what they are ; 
or that peace, and health, and happinels, and the like, are not what they ai'e. 

Let a m^n ful>Jl it ute himfclf into ihe room of fomc poor creature dejected witJi 
invincible povert)', dillrafted with difficultics,or groaning under the pangs of fome 
difeafc, or the anguifh of fome hurt or wound, and without help abandond to want 
and pain. In this diftrefs what reflexions can he imagine hejbould have^ if he found 
that eveiy body ncgledtcd him, no body fo much as pitying him, or vouchlafing to 
take notice of his calamitous and fad condition? It is certain, that what it would 
bereafonablcorunreafonable for others to do in refpccl of /'/w, he mull allow to 
be reafonable or unreafonable for him to do in refpc<Sc of them^ or deny a manifell 
truth in prop. IV. 

If unmercifulnefs, as before defined, be wrong, no time need to be fpentinpro- 
ving xXwt cruelty is fo. For all that is culpable in unmcrcifulncis is containd in cruel- 
ty, with additions and aggravations. Cruelty not only denies due regard to the fuffer- 

* Flitt. ^ A generous n.ature pities even an cnem)- in diflrcfs. 'Brtturifti i\i «» t^vrv- 


Truths refpecilng Mankind, fe'c. 141 

ings of others, but caufes them ; or perhaps delights in them, and (which is the 
moll infolent and cruel of all cruelties^ malces them a /V/7 and fubjedt of r.iillciy. If 
the one be a //f/fif? of humanity, theother isdiamctrically oppoficc toit'. If the 
one docs nogood^ the other docs much evil. And no man, how cruel focvcr in rea- 
lity he w;is, has ever liked to be recksnd a cruel man : fuch a confcHion of guilt 
docs nature extort j fo univerdilly doth it rcjcft, condemn, abhor this chara6ter. 

XVIII. The praRice of jujlice and mercy is jtijl as rights as injujiice^ unmerci- 
fulne/sy and cruelty are wrong. This follows from the nature of contraries. Bc- 
fide, not to be juft to a man is to be not jull, or unjuft to him : and fo not to 
be merciful is to be unmerciful, or perhaps cruel. 

Here 1 might end this fcdtion : but pcihaps it may not be improper to be ti 
little more particular. Therefore, 

XIX. from the foregoing propojitions may be deduced the heinoufnefs of all fuch 
crimes^ as murder^ or even hurting the perfon of another any how^ when our own 
necejfary defence does not require it (it being not poflible, that any thing ihould be 
more his, than his own perfon, life and limbs) ; robbing., Jlealing, cheating, be- 
traying; defamation, detruHion ; defling the bed of another man, et c<et. with alt 
the approaches and tendencies to them. For thcle arc not only comprifcd wiihiii 
the definition of injuftice, and are therefore violations of thofc tniths, which 
a'c violatal by thatj but commonly, and fome of them always, come witliia 
the dcfcription of cruelty too. All which is evident at firll fight with rcfpccb 
to murder, robbery, cheating, flandcring, {^c. cfpecially if a man brings him- 
felf into the call", and views himfclf in his own imagination as rcnderd fcanda- 
lous by calumniators and liers j ftript by thieves j ruind in his fortunes andun- 
dofic bv knaves > ftruggling to no purpofe, convulfcd and agonizing under the 
knife of fome truculent rutliani or the like. 

The lame is altogether as plain in the cafe of adultery ^, when any one "^ infnares, 
and corrupts the wife of another j notwithflanding the protection it gains from 
falfc notions, gri ai examples '', and the commonncis of the crime '^. I'or (the na- 
ture of w/rj/r/wow^' being for the prcfent fuppofcd to be fuch, as it will appear by and 
by to he) the adultcicr dcni.s the property a husband hr.s in h's wilcbv compact, 
the moll exprefs and lacred can poffihly be made: he docs that, which 

* E^t honiwum naturt, i^uam fti^ui iltltmui, iii^tximi mimic»CTuJiUl»s. Cie. ''AiiMf/*'«r 

« uXixm, i»" iy: Itrm •« • y-u^-n Chryf. One of the Sn6fijJorti alitnorum matrimeni- 

ortim, M they arc calW in Val. M/t>:. -^ Palr.m af}»ret, aJhuc *:«tt Dhi Hitrtnymi aJu!- 

ttrium tafilt fo'.rrt fwiiri: nunc wa^rtttum Infill fft. 'U/iol.m S. llitr. <• For hence followc 

impunity, tyr. amn a'>3 17JO3 3'D>»0 13^^'•D. sii^U. 

T tend? 

14.2 The Religion (^Nature. Sed.VI. 

tends to fubvcrt the peace of fiimilics, confounds relation, and is akogcthcr in- 
confiitcnt with the order and tranqnillity of the world, ;tnd therefore witli the 
laws of human nature : he does what no man in his wits could think reafombky 
or even tolerable^ were he theperfon wrongd* : briefly, he impudently treats a 
woman as his own woman (or wife ''}, who is r.ot his, but anD:hcr's, contrary to 
jujlice, truth md faB ". Nor is this fimplc injuftice only, but injuflice, for which 
«o reparation can be made if the injured man thinks fo j as Ik generally does 
(fee fed. II. prop. I. obf.4.) injuftice accompanied with the grcateft cruelty, fo 
complicated, as fcarce any other can be. The husband is for ever robbed of 
all that pleafure and fatisfa£lion, which ariles from the wife's fidelity and af- 
feftion to him '' ; prcfuming upon which he took her to be not only the partner 
of his bed, but the companion of his life, and {barer in all his fortunes « : and 
into the room of them fuccecd painful and dcftruftive paflions. The poor ivoman ^ 
herfelf, tho fhe may be deluded b, and not fee at prcfcnt her guilt, or the con- 
fcqucnccs of it, ufually pays dear for her fecurity and want of guard, the hus- 
band becoming cold ^ and averfe to her, and flie full of apprehenfions and fears ', 
with a panicul;u- dread of his further refentment. And their di/j/rx,in this disjointed 
and diitra£i;ed condition, arc neglcftedj innocent children {Wghtai, and kft unpro- 
vided for,without fo much as the comfort of any certain relations to pity them'^jf^'f • 
The adulterer may not be permitted to extenuate his crime by fuch impertinent 
/w/Vf'sandrakifli talk, as are commonly ufcd for that purpofe '. When any one 
wrongs another of his property, he wrongs h'\m of what it is to him, the proprie- 
tor : and the value mull be fet according to what he cilccms it to be, not what 

* ;/, qui r.ullius non uxorem concupifcit, idem uxorem fuam afpict nan vul: : c? fii^'' acerrimus 

txaclor, e^ ferjulus: Sc mendich perfequitur, ipj'e perjurus. Sfn. " IPWN, t,. ta.<ni vi>i.ic«. 

< What amonfter in nature muft he be, who, as if it was meritorious to dare toaftagainft allthefe, 
(to ufc 5m*«'s words ig3xn)fatis juftam caufam putat amamli, quod ulttna tft [«A.-(»r].' *"Otoi yj 
.-*t" i>i«-i' »'■""'». ^5 TO crifta ///o>o» iM(p^ticirai r'm i/,ciX,aof)An', y-Mtux^i, a».' it i'u rx^ri^ti iirm, i 
J^ ' „.), tS FUfbur®- ii"4 (i»ii>rfi'«ir(» i^i'^trah ixS' ■xct.rit v^a-n >^Tci<{ti^ )^ fXivin T "sfof, 
- Jrlsi «» ^» ^«"". '• '■'" ^''■'r®- hihUfVTC »/Aip««5, xtA. Vh.Ju.l. e Marriage is Mituua T«>r.i ? 

^/y^ eixiicTij* ^ //i.uX'" T «»»>» Q>t»i»w»i»»]. Ificr. ' 'As-«A3» ^a». S. Baf. ' F.T!ir«<, 

iitdu-i'xt, fays tlie penitent woman in Soph. ap. Pint. '' -i-'-Jz;"" Tx;xyx.i>.iirf>.a Tw^ xsko 

4wiwO-. Sofh. ' ^ujj emm falvi tjt mulieri, amijfa pujicilial Livy. " O." /^t^ir li,^,KI|. 

xirti iij-^«t ir«'^»? f*"^' "'S'!' '/"" srjixru^Sflnt* <^»<t/*K«i, /*ii n tJ ri yxftarr©-, pi Ti -i t5 

-_ j,f,. J. 1 Such as ^riflippui ufcs to Diogents, ap. Athm. "Af* v» ,«'i ''» <r«' «t»tw 

/oK«rIi>xi Aif'/W «'<"«' «'»''". " ^ ^iiriict c'xvTat i»^M ; i y) tPn. rt -j ,ivf, ci ;' xi*" TiT/it/K«(rii ; 

bJi rSreV^ir. iVwf . Senfclcfs fluff. Nor is that of the adulterous woman in Frov. S. better; 

where HCbya ~i3i T>1 is placed with the way of an eagle in the air, of a fcrpent upon a rock, and 
of a fliip in the fca. nyw -\nN l^r OWn HD nu;y' Nbll'i and therefore Ihc >V H^Q rnJpO 
ntOC, Mid then thiiucs that PN 'n>yO Ni» -iDl!? ^3in ni -iHN. Scc ^.ti vtn^qi. 

. the 


Truths refpeciing Mankind, S^c. 14.3 

the injurcr, who perhaps has no taftcof virtuous plcafures, may think it to be. 
(Sec p. 35. obf. 5,4.) Nor may thdc thefts be cxculcd from their ibcrecy. For 
I . the injullicc oi the fiift is the fame in itfelf^ whether known, or not. In either 
cafe rrw//; is denied : and a lie is as much a he, when it hivhifperd, as when it is 
proclaimd zt the market- crofs. 2. It hasbecnfhewd(fc6t.II.) that the rc6litude of 
our aftions and way to happincfs are coincident ; and that fuch a6bs, as are difa- 
greeable to truth, and wrong in thcmfelvcs, tend to make men ultimately unhappy ■. 
Things arc fo orderd and difpofcd by the Author of nature, or fuch a conftituiion 
of things flows from him, that it muji be fo. And fince no retreat can be impei-vi- 
ous to his eye, no corner fo much out of the way, as not to be within his plan, 
no doubt there is to every wrong and vitious a(5la fuitable degree of unhappinefs 
and puni/Jjme/it wMncxt.) which the criminal will be lure to meet with fame time or 
other ^. For his own fake therefore he ought not to depend upon thedarknefsof 
the deed. But lajily, it can haidly be, but that it mufl: be di/coverd'^. People ge- 
nerally rife in vice, grow impudent and vain and carclefs, and difcover thcmfelvcs ^: 
the opportunities contrived for it mull be liable to obfervation : fomc confidenti 
mull be trullcd, who may betray the fecret, and upon any little dillailc probably 
will do it: and befide, love is quick of apprchcnlion =. 

It will be cafily perceived from what has been faid, that if to murder, rob^ 
Sec. arc unjuiland crimes of a heinous nature, all thofc things which have any 
tendency toward them, or affinity with them, or any way countenance them, mufl 
be in their degree criminal: becaufe they are of the fame complexion with that 
which they tend to, tho not of the famegrov/th, nor matured into thegrofsa£l, 
or perhaps do not operate fo prefently, apparently, or certainly. Envy, malice, 
and the like, are conatus's toward the dellruftion or min of the perfon, who is 
the objcft of ihefe unhappy paflions. To throw du/l B upon a man's irputation 
by innunendo's, ironies, (j'c. may not indeed fully it all at once, as when dirt is 
thrown, or ^ro/i calumnies; yet it infeds the air, and may dcflroy it by a lin- 
gring poilbn. To expo/e another by the flrcngth of a jelling talent, or 
harder temper of face, is to wound him, though it be in an inviftble 

a Stmt muluiftUx : minimi cerrufler, cj-f. Juv. •> 'A"iric^tCT&' yJ i ^h®- m/*!^. FUi. 

< K«i •/' u> -x^-gtiT.xx xfiii' i, i/fij» i<py<,Tf Ifacr. M«fTffr'r»rii . i K^iiij »i i Xo^'S'- i Miy«Ti-- 

5if«. Luc. * 'hUu fHf y- iTJt»T«n i>«^oiu-«T«». rhto. ' ^Hid non ftntit »mor > Ov . 

' 'Ayahi, i r't ft^ Ithxitr, »*» ti lAhii i^i>i.f. A gnome of Dtmocmtts. •■ yiH (IVfiJ p3N. 

T i place '. 

144- The Religion of Nature. Se6l:. VI. 

place ^ Many freedoms and reputed civilities of barbarian extraft, and cfpcci- 
ally gallantries ^^ that proceed not to confuinmatc wickeJnefs, nor perhaps are 
intended to be carried ib far, may yet divert peoples affeftions from their proper 
objeft, and debauch the mind ". By /lories or mfinuaUons to fow xhc feeds of dif- 
cord and quarrels between men is to murder, or hurt them, by another liand. 
Even for men to intermeddle in other peoples afFliirs, as bufy bodies and <i».»Tf«.- 
ijiVxiCTu do, is to aflunie a province, which is woMhcirs j to concern ihemfclves 
with things, in which they are not concernd j to make that public, which in 
itfelf is private; and perhaps to rob theperfon, into whofebufinefs they intrude 
themfelvcs, of his quiet, if of nothing elic. For indeed this intermeddling 
looks like fetting up a pretence to fomethmg further j like an unjull attack be- 
gan at a diftance. All which declares what an enemy, and how irreconcilable 
to truth, this pragmatical humor is. Andfo on. 

If thefe things arefo, how guilty mult they be, who arc defigncdly the pro- 
moters or infrtments of iniuitice and wickednefs ; fuch as mercenaiy fwearers, 
and falfc witnefles ; traders in fcandal ; folicitors in vice ; they who intend by 
their converfation to relax mens principles too much, and (as it fcems) prepare 
them for knavery, lewdnefs, or any flagitious enterprise <^. 

There arc other crimes, fuch zs. infidelity to friends or them who intruft us with 
any thing, ingratitude, all kinds of wilful perjury, and the like, which might have 
been »;f«;/o«^inthepropofition, being great inllances of injuflicc: but becaufe 
they arc vifibly fuch, and their nature cannot bcmiilaken, I compriicthem in the 
et c£t. there. Any one may fee, that he, who afts unfaithfully, afts againlt hispro- 
raifesand ingagcments, and therefore denies and fins againil truth j does what ic 
can never be for ihcgood of the -aiorld fhould become an univerfal pnidtice j does 
what he would not have dene to himfelf; and -wrongs the man, who depends 
upon him, of what hejuftly might expeft. So the ungrateful m:in treats hisbe- 
nefaftor as not being zchat he is, &c. And the falje-fwearer rcfpccts neitlici- 
things, nor himfelf, nor the peifons affected, nor mankind in general, nor God 
bimlclf a-s being uV^rf/ they are. All this is obvious ^ 

« ':ir^yb p'?n ib I^N nn^nin n^an >33 p^^on. Maim.o>fm. pajf. For, according to the 

Jcwini doftors, he who does this breaks thcfixth commandment. Ai.ire>. * Sec how chart the 

Romans were once, ^uo matronali Jicus ■vtrecundu munimento tHtiiis egct, in jiu rocanii mMro- 

nam corfui fiti aliingtre mn fnmi/trunt, ill iniiolau mamii alicnt lanti flolarelinquerftur. Val.M. 

Audit istoUof P.Minius, ihix trijli extmflo frtcefit Ifiiis fut'], ut r.on jcli4miirgm<iattm iilibatam. 

ftd tmm ofcUaJ virum/incera pcrftrret. Id. ' ^nanto aulem fnpntior rjl animus cor- 

tort, tanto Jctltrnliiu corrumfitur. S.Auft. •» 'uvrci .ix.. o< A.i^i. <• ri ',h« «««« hi s-«.r«, 

uyil <(>,M,„Ki>T,<^, kA. S. Baf. ' Omnes enim immemortm itneficii ojtrunt. Cic. And the fame 

mav be fiiJ of the unfaitliful, perjured, (yc 

2 bECT» 

Truths ref peeling particular Societies, ©"c. 145 

Sect. VII. Truths r ef peeling particular 'S^OQi^iiQS 
of^jMen^ or Governments, 

I- "X M J K is A facial creature : that is, a fingk man, or family., cannot fuhfif, 
I V 1^ or not well, alone out of all fociety. More things arc ncccfTary to fuf 
tam\iic, or ;U Icifttomakeit inanydcgrec plcafant anddcfir.iblc, than it ispof- 
fible for any one man to make and provide for himfclf merely by his own labor and 
ingenuity. Meat, and drink, and clothing, and hoiife, and that frugal furniture 
which is abl'olutely requifite, with a little neccdaiy phyfic, fuppolc »;««) arts an.l 
trades, many heads, and many hands. If he could make a fhift in time of health to 
live as a wild man under the protection of trees and rocks, feeding upon fuch 
fruits, herbs, roots, and other things, as the earth fhould afford, and happen to 
prcfcnt to him , yet what could he do xnficknefs, or old age, when he would not 
be able to llir out, or receive her beneficence. 

If he ihould take from the other fex fuch a help, as the common appetite might 
prompt him to feek, or he might happen to meet with in his walks; vet iHll if 
the Adw^i arc doubled, the -zi-dw/j are doubled too : nay more, additional wants, 
and great ones, attending the hearing and education of children. 

If we could fuppofc all thefe difficulties furmounted, and a family grownup 
and doing what x fmgle family is capable of doing by it felfj fupporting them- 
fclves by gardcnmg, a little agriculture, or a few cattle, which they have fomc 
how got, and tamed ftho even this would be hard for them to do, having no mar- 
kets, where they might exchange the produce of their husbandry, or of their 
little Hock, or herd for other things > no fliopsto repair to for tools ; no fcr- 
vant, or laborer to alllH: j nor any public invention, of which they might fervc 
ihcmfelvcsin the preparation of their grain, drerting their meat, manufacturing 
their wool, and the like) ; yet ftill it is only the cortex of the man, which is pro- 
vided for: what muft become of the interior pan, the minds of thefe people ^ 
How would thofe be fed, and improved " ? y/r/; and fciences, fo much of them 
as is nccefTary to teach men the ufe of their faculties, and unfold their rcafon, 
arc not the growth of finglc families fo imployd. And yet for men to lay out 

» JluiJ ergo, tnima riulUnt l/Atct alimtntH frofria .' an ejui f/c/i fcientia nobis '.iJttiir ! S. Auft. 

146 7*/?^ Religion (j/' Nature. Seel:. VII. 

all their pains and time in procuring only what is proper to keep the blood 
and humors in circulation^ without any lurthcr views, or any regard to the 
nobler part of themfelvcs, is utterly incongruous to the idea of a being fomi- 
cd for rational t\crc\(es,. 

If all the ewe/ifiow againll thisfeparatc way of living could be removed} yet 
as mankind increafcs, the little plots ^ which the feveral families poflcfs, and cul- 
tivate, mull be inlarged, or multiplied : by degrees they would find thcmfelves 
Uraitend : and there would foon be a collifion of interells, from whence difputes 
and quarrels would enfue. Ochcr things too might minifter matter for ihefe. 
And bcfide all this, fomcmen -axz naturally troublcfomc, vitious, thievilTi, pug- 
nacious, rabid > and theie would always be dillurbing and flying upon the next 
to them ; as others are ambitious, or covetous, and, if they happen to have 
any advantage or fuperiority in power, would not fail to make themfelves yet 
greater or ftrongcr by eating up their neighbours, till by repeated incroachments 
they might grow to he formidable '. 

Under fo many wants, and fuch apprebenfsons, or prefent dangers, ncccffity 
would bring fome families into terms oi friendjhip with others for mutual com- 
fort and defence: and this, asthereafonofit increafed, would become ftronger, 
introduce llrifter ingagements, and at lajl bring the people to mix and unite. 
And then the weak being glad to fheltcr thcmfelves under the protedion and 
conduct of the more able, and fo naturally giving way for thefe to afcend, the 
feveral forts would at length fettle into their places, according to their feveral 
weights and capacities with rcfpeft to the common concern. And thus fonic 
form of xfociety muft anfe : men cannot lubfill othcrwife. 

But if it was poffible for a man to prefervc life by bimfeif, or with his petit 
■company about him: yet nobody can deny, that it would be infinitely better 
for him, and them, to live in a fociety, where men are feniceable ro thcm- 
felves and their neighbours at the fame time, by exchanging their money, or 
goods, for fuch other things as they want more j where they are capable of do. 
inggood efices each for other in time of need ; where they have the proteSiion of 
laws, and a public fccurity againlt cheats, robbers, aflafllncs, and all enemies 
to property j where a common force or army is ready to interpoic between 
them and foreign invaders -, and where they may injoy thofe difcoveries which 
have been made in arts and learning, may improve their faculties by converfu- 
tion and innocent conflids of rcafon, and (to i'peak out^ may be made raen. 

* Alitr inalitriut txitmrn levi comptndit Jucitur. Sen. 


Truths ref peeling particular Societies, &c. 1 4.7 

If, when wc have the prhilege oi ibcicty and laws, wc can fcarcc prcfcrve 
our own, or be fafc, what :i woful condition (hould we be in -without them ; cx- 
pofed to the infults, rapines, and violence of unjult and mcrcilcfs men, not 
having zny fan£luar).y any thing to take refuge in ? So again, if notwithiland- 
ing the help of friends and thofc about us, and fuch conveniences as may be 
had in cities and peopled places, wc are forced to bear many pains and melan- 
choly hours, how irkfome would life be, if in Ikkncfs or other trouble there 
was no body to adminiftcr cither remedy or cor.folalion ? 

Laftly, fociety is what men generally defire. And tho much company may be 
attended with much vanity, and occafion many evils • yet it is certain, that ab- 
foluteand pcrpetualyo/z/W? has fomcthinginit very irkfome and hideous ''.Thus 
the focial life is natural to man ; or, wiiat his nature and circumftanccs require. 

W.The end of fociety is the common luelf are and good of the people affociatcd. This 
is but the confequcnccof what has been jull faid. For bccaufe men cannot fubCit 
aW/, ornot /o aW/, fcparately, therefore they unite into greater bodies: that is, 
the endoi their uniting is their better fubfiltcnccj and by how much their manner 
of living becomes better, by fo much the more effectually is this end anfwerd. 

III. A fuiety^ into which men enter for this end, fuppofes fome rules or laws, ac- 
cording to which they agree all to be governed, "juitb a power of altering or adding to 
them as occafion fliall requite. A number of men met together without anyr«/fj, 
by which they fubmit to be governed, can be nothing but an irregular multi- 
tude. Every one being i[^\\\ Jut juris, and left intirely to his own private choice, 
by whatever kind of judgment or piifTion or caprice that happens to be de- 
termind, they mull needs inter jere one with another : nor can fuch a concourfc 
of people be any thing different from an indigclled chaos of diffenting parts, 
which by their confufed motions would damnify, and dcfboy each other. This 
mull be true, if men dtffer in the fize of their underflandings, in their man- 
ner of thinking, and the feveral turns their minds take from their education,. 
way of hving, and other ciicumltancesi if the grcatcll part of them arc un- 
der the direction of bodily affeHtons \ and if thefc differ -is much as their ihape?,, 
their complexions, their conllituiions do <^. Here then we find nothing but 
confufion and unhappinefs. 

• An,'otU lays a good man would be neither «^iA(^-, nor t.AkV.a:^. This is juft. Therefore SenttA 
ferns to go a little too far, when he v/ritcs. Omnts tmicos hubtrl Qftrofum tffe, fatis tfft mmuos 
nan hattre. ' '/-icj rtw»yi?MfiKct i ctttfut'^. S. Buf. >■ Mail is, in G'^f . Xji.'s 

words, T« Tf^.vTfcTwrnTw 7 ^^f, i£ruKi>.uT»Tt7, 


14-8 The Religion of Nature. Seel. VII. 

Such a combination of men therefore, as may produce their common good and 
happimfs^ muil be fuch a one as in tlic firft place, may render them compatible 
one with another: which cannot be without rtiles^ that may dircft and adjull 
their fevcral motions and carriages towards each other, bring them to fome de- 
gree of uniformity, or at lead reftrain fuch excurfions and enormities, as would 
render their living together inconfiftcnt. 

Then, there mull: be fome exprcfs declarations and fcita to afcertain propcrtiei 
and titles to tilings by common confent : that fo, when any altercations or difputes 
fhall happen conceriiing them fas be fure many mufl: in a world fo unreafonable and 
prone to iniquity^, the appeal may be made to their ownfcttlements; and by the 
application of ^ general tindifputed rule to the /).7r//V«/i3rc;'.fe before them it may 
appear, on which Jide the obliquity lies, the controvcrfy may be /rt/V/> decided, 
and all mouths eternally flopped. And then again, that they may be protc6ted and 
pcrfevere in this agreeable life, and the injoymcnt of their relpedtivc properties 
be fecured to them, fevcral things mufl: be forccafled by way of precaution a- 
gainll foreign im-a/ions ; punifhmentsmufl be appointed for offences committed 
amongll: themfelves, which being known may deter men from committing 
them, (^c. Thefe rules, method?, and appointments of punifhments, being in- 
telligibly and honeflly drawn up, agreed to, and publifhd, are the »;///«<?/ com- 
pafls " under whicli the fociety is confederated, and the luii.-s of it. 

If then to have the members of a fociety capable of lublilling together, if to 
have their rcfpective properties afcertaind, if tobe7^/fand^//;>/ inthepoffeflion 
of them be for the ^fwfr^/ _gW of the fociety, and thelc things cannot be had 
wiiliout laws ; then a fociety, whofc foundation and cement is the public good, 
multhavcllich laws, or be iuppofedat lealt to dclign fucli. 

Asto the making of any /«r//.;fr laws, when the public intercfl: and welfare re- 
quire them,that is but repeating ihc/ame power in other in(1:ance«,which they made 
ule of before in making their firll laws : and as to altoiug ov repealing, it is certain 
the power of making and unmaking here are ecjual. Rcfide, when men are incorpo- 
rated and live together for their mutual good, this end is to be confidcrd at one time 
as much as at another ; not onlv m their firil conlKtution and fctclcment. 

W .Thefe laws and detertninalions mufl be fitch, as are not ir.confiflcnt with natural 
jnflice. For i. To ordain any thing that interferes with truth is the lame as to or- 
dain, that what is true iliall he falfe ; or v. v *>. wliich is abfurd. 2. To pretend 
byu law to make that to he Jufl, which before r.n.l in itfclf was unjufl, is the 
fame as to ordain that which interferes v. iiii truth : becaufc juflicc is founded in 

• n2; iViis//'®-' TTeMxc. c-;«-fixi| iteiT^ Dtmojltj. ^ Uitii^id ? t'>1®- iWj-i;. Slob, i Tilt. 


Truths refpecling -particular Societies, &€. 1 4 9 

truth (as before), and every where the fame *. Therefore, J- by a law to cnaft 
any thing which is naturally unjuft: is to cnaft that which is abfurd ; that which 
by feft. I. is morally cvilj and that which is oppofitc to tkofe laws, by which 
it is manifclUy the will of our Creator wc fhould be governed''. And to cnaft 
what is thus evil mull be ez'il indeed. Lajl/y, to cllablilTi injuilice mull be 
utterly inconfiftent with the general good and happincfs of any fociety } unlefs 
to be unjullly treated, pilled, and abufcd can be happincfs •=. And if fo, it is 
utterly inconfillcnt with the f«^ of fociety > or, it is to deny that to be the end 
of it, which is the end of it. 

V. ji fociety limited by laiKi fuppofesmtgiflrates, and a fubordination of powers : 
that is, it fuppofes 4 government of feme form er other. Bccaufe, where men are 
to aft by iTjles or laws for the public weal, fome mufl of neccflity be appointed 
to judge, when thofe laws are tranfgreft, and how far j to decide doubtful cafes, 
and the like : there mull be fome armed with authority to execute thofe judg- 
ments, and to punijl} offenders : there muft be pcrfons chofen not only to punifh 
znd prevent public evils, but alfo to do many other things, which will be re- 
quired in advancement of the public good : and then the power of making neiv 
lawSf and abrogating or mending old ones, as experience may dire£t or the cafe 
at any time require, as alfo of providing prcfcntly and legally for the fifety of 
the public in time of fudden danger, mail be lodged fomewhcre. 

If there are no executors of the laws, the laws cannot be executed : and if fo, 
they are but a dead letter, and equal to none : and if the fociety has none, it is in- 
deed «3 fociety, or not fuch a one as isthefubjccl of this propofition. Guardi- 
ans and executors of laws arc therefore the vitals of a fociety, without whicli 
there can benof/r<:«/ii/;o«of juftice in it, no care of it taken, nor can it conti- 
nue. And fsnce men can be but in one place at once, thoic mull be numbers 
of thcfe proportionable to the bignefs and extent of it, 

luciii. Ari/l. b Even the Heathens believed, tliat shove all human 'cr.euyijuaTx there were 

itL'/fttxTn kus^haH ^lit la^i^a, which mortals ought not to tranfgrcls : i ykt n »;. yi r-dx^n 
k^ ttu «■•" ^j riuTct. Stfh. Si( ft rignnntt Tarquinio nnlU trxt Rom* fcriptM Itx dt fiufris, itl- 

circo nm fentm legrmftmpiternam Stx. lUrq$4miiii vim Lucrttit — attuUt. ErAt tnim ratio pro- a rtrum nttura, (y- aA rtUt faciriJiim impellent, (^ a Jelielo : qu* non turn Aeniqi 
incifil lex effe, cum fcripta efl, fed tum cum orta e/l. Or/4 aulem J.'mul ejl cum mente divina. Cic. 
' Si t»iu» ftteflAi eft flulttrum fententiii atqi jujfii, ut eorum fajfrxgiii rerutn nmura xerlatur ; cur 
tien ftnciiint. ut, qut maU pernicio/jqi fuiit, hate/tr.iur pro ionis, *c falutariiui ! nut cur, cum jus ex 
tr.jurin Itx ficert pojjit, btnum indim ftctrt non ptjjii ex malo ? Cic. 

V And 

I 50 The Rfxigion of Nature. Se6l. VII. 

Andfurdicr, (ince the concerns of a whole fociety? and fuch things as may full 
within the compafs of ;i ftatutcbook, are ^-^r/'owi^rcqiiiring fcvcral forts and lues of 
ahiliiies^ and lying one above another in nature ; fincc not only private men want 
to be infpecfecl^ hut even magilb'ates and officers themfelvcs, who ;^tho they oft for- 
get it) are ftill but men ; and fince the whole focicty is to be ow, one compafb bo- 
. dy ; I fay, fince the cafe is thus, there muft be men to aft in fcveral elevations and 
qualities as well a^iplnces, of which the inferior ion in their fcveral quarters mull adt 
immediately under their refpe6tive fuperiors j and fo this clafs of fuperiors in their 
feveral provinces under others above them ; till at lail the afcent is terminated in 
fomc head, where the Icgiflative power is dcpofited, and from whence fpirits and 
motion are communicated through the whole body. An army may as well be fuppo- 
fcd to be well difciplined,wcll provided, and well conduftcd witliout cither^f«fr<i/ 
or officers, as a focicty without governors and their/uballerns, or ('wliich is the fame) 
without fome f»r/a of government, toanfwcr the end of its being. 

VI. yl man may part vs'uh fume of his natural rights, and put himfclf under the 
government of laws, and iho/c, who in their feveral fiations arc intruflcdivith the 
execution of them, in order to gain the protcHiun of them, and the privileges of a re- 
gular fvciety. Becaufe by this he doth but exchange one thing for another, 
which he reckons equivalent, or indeed preferable by much : and this he may do 
without afting againft any truth. For the liberties and natural rights, which 
he exchanges, are his own, and therefore no other man's property is denied by 
this: nor is the nature of happinefs denied to be what it is, fincc it ishappinefs 
which he aims at in doing this. On the contrary, he would rather offend a- 
nainft truth, and deny happinefs to be what it is, if he did not do it j efpecial- 
ly feeing, that here his otvn happinefs coincides with the general liappinefs and 
more convenient bcir.g of ll.C Ivir.gvlc-.r. or ccn::r.on\yealth, where his lot fills, 
or his choice dcrcrmins him to live. 

If the quefiion fiiou'd be asked, what natural rights a man may part with, or how 
far he may part with them j the general unCwcr, I think, may be this. Some things 
arc cffential to our being, and fome it is not in our power to part with. As to the 
refi, he may depart from thcmfo farasit isconfiilcnt with the end, forwhicli he 
does this: not farther, becaufe beyond that lies a contradiftion. A man cannot 
give away the natural right and property he has in any thing, \n oxdcx 10 preferve 
or retain that property : but hemayconfcnt to contribute />.?>■/ ofhiscfiatc, in 
order to prcfcrvc the rep, when othcrwilc it might all be loll ; to take his pare 
of danger in defence of his country, rather than certainly pcrifli, be inflavcd, 
or ruinJ by the conqucft or opprcflion of it> and the like. 

VII. ^« 

Truths refpefllng particular Societies, &c. 1 51 

VII. Me*i may bt come members of a foc'icty (;. e. do -what is mcntiond in the fore- 
going propofition) by gi'ving their confent^ either explicitly^ or implicitly. Tliat ;i 
man may fubjcft hinifclf to laws, wc have fcen. If he docs this, he muft do 
it cither in his own pcrfon ; or he muftdo it by iomcproxy, whom he fubilitutcs 
in his room to agree to piibUc laws ; or his confent mull be cullecIcH on\y h-om 
the conformity of his carriage, his adiiering to the focicry, accepting the be- 
nefits of its conlbtution, and acquiefcing in the cllablilhd methods and what 
is done by virtue of them. By the two fir Jl ways he declares himlclf fA-;)/;V///y, 
and direBly : nor can he after that behave himfclf as if he w:is no member of 
the ibciety, without acting as if he had r.ot done what he has done. And this 
is the cafe not only of them, who have been concerned in x.hc firfi formation 
of any government, but alfo of them, who have in the faid manners ' given 
their confent lo ^iny fubfcquetit acls, by which they ownd, confirmed, and came 
into what their anccllors had done, or who have by cuhs put chcmiclves under 
obligations to the public. By the laft of the three ways mentiond a man's 
confent is given indeed implicitly^ and Icfs diredly > but yet it is given, and he 
becomes a party. I'or fuppofe him to be born in fome certain kingdom or com- 
monwealth, but never to have been party to any law, never to have taken any 
oath to the government, nor ever formally to have ingaged himfelf byany other 
a£t. In this cafe he cannot methinks but have fomc love ^nd fympathy for that 
place, which afforded him the firll air he drew j fome gratitude towards that 
conftitution, which protefted his parents, while tjiey educated and provided 
for him ; fomc regard to thole obligations, under which perhaps they have laid 
him, and with which limitations as it were they (or rather the Governor of 
the world by them) conveyd to him his very life. 

If he inherits or takes any thing by the laws of the place, to which he has no 
indefcafiblc right in nature, or which, if he had a natural right to it, he could 
not tell how to get, or keep, without the aid of laws and advantage of fociety } 
then, when he tikes this inheritance, or whatever it is, with it he takes and 
owns the laws which give it him. 

Indeed fince the fecurity he has from the laws of the country in rcfpc«5bofhis 
pcrlon, and rights, whatever they cither are, or may happen to be hereafter, 
IS the general eqatvaknt for h\s fubmijljion to them, he cannot accept thatw\\.\i- 
out bemg obliged in equity to pay this. 

> In pcrfon, or by proxy. 

\' Z Nay 

i^i The Religion of Nature. Sedl. VII. 

Nav, laftly, his very continuing and fettling in any place fhcws, that cither he 
likes the conditution, or likes it ktter than any other, or at lead thinks it bet- 
ter in his circumflances to conform to it than to fcek any other: that is, he con- 
fcnts to be comprehended in it '. 

VIII. IFhen a man is become a member cf a fuciety^ if he -would behave bimfelf 
nccording to truth, he ought to do tbefe things : viz. to conCulcv property as founded 
not only in nature, but alfo in latr j and men's titles to what they have, as 
flrcngthend by that, and even by his o-wn concejfion and covenants ; and therefore by 
fo much the more in\ iolablc and facrcd : inllcad of taking fucli meafures to do him- 
♦clf right, when he is molcilcd, or injured, as his own prudence might fuggeft in 
a flate of nature, to confine himfelf lo fuch ways as are with his own confent markt 
out for him: and, in a word, to behave himfelf according to his fubordinat ion or 
place in the community, and to obfcrve thclawsofit. For it is containdinthe 
7dea of a law, that it is intended to be obferved : and therefore he, who is a party to 
any laws, or profefTcs himfelf member of a fociety formed upon laws, cannot 
willingly tranfgrefs thofclaws without denying laws lohe-what they are, or him- 
felf to be what heisfuppofed or profcflcs h\m[c\'i to be : and indeed without con- 
iradifting all or moll of thofe truths containd in the foregoing propofitions. 

IX. /;; rcfpeii of thofe things, which the laws of the place take no cognizance e/, 
cr when if they do take cognizance of them, the benefit of thofe laws cannot be had 
(tor fo it may fomctimes happen. I fay, in rcfpc<5l of fuch things), be who is a 
?»ember of a fociety in other refpeils retains his natural liberty, is fill as it were in 
a fate of nature, and mufl endeavour to a£i according to tt uth and his beft prudence. 
l'"or in ihc forrner cafe there is nothing to limit him, by the fuppoficion, but 
truth and nature. And in the other it is the fime as if there was notliing; lincc 
in effe& there is no law, where noeffeSl or benefit from it is to be had. As, for 
example, if a man lliould be attacked by thieves or murderers, and has no op- 
portunity or power to call the proper magiltrate or officer to his aflillancc. 

There is a third cxic, which perhaps may demand admillion here: and that 
1.?, when laws arc plainly contniry to truth and natural Juf ice. For tho they 
may pafs the ufual forms, and be ftyled laws } \et, fincc no fuch law c:in abro- 
gate that law of nature and reafon, to which the Author of our being Iiath 
fubjefted us, or make fallhood to be truth > and two inconfiilent laws cannot 

• Plato fays, when anj man has fccn our form of government, f^(. and remains under it, iJlj (fa.- 

I both 

Truths refpeHlng particular Societies, &c. 1 5 3 

both oblige, or fubfilt together; one of them mufl; give way : and it iseafy to 
difcern, iibich ought to do it *. 

There remains one truth more to be annexed here, which may be contra- 
di<5bed by the praftices and pretences of Enthufialb ^. 

X. The focietiei intended in this /eHiony fucb as kingdoms and commonwealths^ 
may defend thcmfehes again]} other nations : or, war may iavoful/y be waged in de- 
fence and forthefecurity of a fociety^ its members and territories^er for reparation of 
injuries. For if one man may in a flate of nature have a right to defend hmifclf, 
(fee feet. \'I. prop. \'ll.j, /u'o may, or //.rff, and fo on. Nay, pciliapstwo 
may have a double right, three a threefold right, i^c. At lead, if the right 
be not greater^ the concern is greater : and there will be more reafon, that two, 
or three, or more fhould be fazrd^ than one only j and thcieforc that two, or 
three, or more ihould defend thcmfehes, than that one fliould. And if this 
may be done by men in a flate of nature, it may be done by them when con- 
federated among themfclves : becaufc with rcfpeft to other nations they are 
ftill in that flate. I mean, fo far as they have not limited themfclves by leagues 
and alliances. 

Bcfide, if a man may defend himfclf, he may defend himfclf by what methods 
he thinks moft proper, provided he trefpaflcs againft no truth ; and therefore, 
by getting the aid and afllftancc of others. Now when -war is levied in defence 
of the public, and the people in general, the thing may be confiderd as if every 
particular man was defending himfclf with the aflillancc of all the re/?, and fo 
be turned into the fame cafe with that of zfmgle man. 

In truth the condition of a nation feemsto be much the fame with that of a 
fmgleperfon when there is no law, or no benefit of law, to be had ; and what one 
man may do to another in /i7j/^s/;/;ow,may bedonc by one nation or politic body 
with rcipcd: to another : and pcrhap.s by this rule, regard being had to what has 
been dclivcrd in fcft. VI. i\iC juflice of foreign wars may be not untruly crtimated. 

Alutual defence is one of the great ends of fociety, if not the greateil, and in a 
panicularand eminent manner involves in it defence ■iQ;im{\ foreign oiemics. Aru.1 
whoever fignalizes himfclf, when there isoccalionfor his fciTicc,mcritsthc grate- 
ful acknowledgements and celebrations of his country-men : fo far at Icallas he 
acts gcneroufly and with a public fpirif, and not in puifuancc only of private views . 

• iUmJ fiuhiJhnMm, extftimare omnia jufta tjfr, aut fcita fini in fofulerum inftitKtis, »Htli^iiiit. — 
Ji fc^ulorum jujfj, ji frmcifHm Jtcrttis, fifenirniiis^Hdiium, -lira conftinurentur, jui tjfrt lalrecinari ; 
)ui, attuittrari: jui, Iffumrnta fal/afhffontrr, fi hdc /hfrx^tis HHt jcitii niuUilnJinii frttarfr.tur 
* Muichcans of oU, ini fome modern;. 


154- ^^^ Religion 0/ Nature. Sedl. VIIL 

As to thokwars, which arc undertaken by men out of ambition ', merely to 
inlargc empire, or to llicw the world, how terrible they are, how many men 
they arc able to flay, how many flaves to make '', how many families to drive 
from their peaceful habitations, and, infhort, how much mifchief and mifery 
thcv arc able to bring upon mankind j thcfc arc founded upon talfc notions of- 
glory: imbellijljd indeed by fcrvile wits and mifplaced eloquence, but condemned 
by all true philofophy and religion. 

Sect. VIII. Truths concerning Families and 


'' I ""HIS fection lliall begin as relation itfelf does, with marriage. 

I. 'The end of marriage is the propagation of mankind, and joint bappinefs of the 
couple intermarrying, taken together; or the latter by itfelf'^. The difference of the 
fexes, with the ftrong inclination they have each to the injoymcnt of the o- 
ther*^, is plainly ordaind by the author of nature for the continuance of the fpe- 
ciesy which without that muft be foon cxtinguifhd. And tho people, when 
they marry, may have many times not fo much the increafc of their family 
in their defign or willies, as the gratification of an importunate appetite ; yet 
fince nature excites the appetite, and that tends to this end, nature (or rather 
its great AutiiorJ may be laid to make this an end of the marriage, tho the 
bridegroom and bride thcmfelves do not. 

• Like thofe particularly of y. Ctfar: ©f whom it is rq^orted, that, animadversA gfuJ HereuUi 
templMn) magni AlcxanJri imagine, mgimwt ; qunji ptrtdfm igna-..i«m fimm, t^ued nihil dum a fi mt- 
niornhiU actum ejfet in tttale quJ jam Alexander orbem terrarum fubegifftt . Suet. i" Some 

po to war oroTip «Vi 3^rf«> i x.twr,yiiriti,t ar^euTteit. tlut. Not Out ot nccclTity, and in order to 
peace i which is the true end of war. noXtibiiJun, itxu(<-n,f «-/*'/*'"• Arift. Ita bellum fufcifiatur, ut 
nihil ttliiid quam fax qut/ita viJealiir. Cic. ' Oi «>3-f*T« i finitn r rnu.T.i.a; X''i" cjfti- 

xtfrtr, i,»M i T lis rn jSi.r, kA. Arift. ^ ' AtS'fi >i yuKtixi ^iAi«e hxu xctTce <puc-ir iiirif- 

v(i». ut^Pux®^ ■yi riji ^uVfi cin}:/afix.ot fjba}i.<» r, T.Airix». Id. 'iJ« y^ » ^«vi«rn Ai!&^®- 
«•»«< icttiTr,' T fiOni^n iAxii' ir« T« i br.XtQ)^ rtjfttx — ^— r« W u'f^aQ>' rijjix Tfc« Tur /*'Ji> iAkh. 
*. Baf. 


Truths concerning Families, &(:. 155 

And then as to that other thing, which cither accompanies the aforediid 
end of marriage, or is fas in many cafes it can only be) the end irflf^.) the 
joint happinefs of the conjuges^ no body can be fuppofcd to many in order 
and on let purpofc to make liim or heifclf unhappy : no nor without a prc- 
fumption of being more happy. For without an apprehenfion of fome degree of 
happinefs to accrue, or what pj-efents itfclf to the imagination as fuch, aivi is 
taken for fuch, what can induce people to alter their condition? Something 
theremullbc, by which ^however things prove upon tri.iy they thinkto betterit. 
And indeed if their circ urn fiances arc fuch, as may inablethem to maintain a fa- 
mily, and provide for children, without difficulties and an over-burden of cares, 
and if they in good carnejl refolve to behave themfclves as they ought, and recipro- 
c.iHy to be iiclpful and loving each to other, much comfort and happinefs *> may 
jiiIUv be expected from this intimate union '^, the interchange of affections, and a. 
confpii"ation of all their counfels and meafures '', the qualities and abilities of the 
one fex being fitted and as it were tallying to the wants of the other. For to 
pafs over in filence thofe joys, which are truell when moll conceald '^ many things 
there are, which maybe ulcful, perhaps ncceffary to the ?«rt», and yet require the 
delicater hand or nicer management and genius of the woman ^ : andfo, vicijjimf 

• That furc is 1 hard hw in P/flM, which injoins iT.';;;t<J!; if^f«; .9>;Afi«5 t^oic, c* i uli fletAniTo «» 
rti ^mJJ t» rtKfiF. Hut mcntiond in S. Hburtd. Ciys othcrwife: f|^' IHiiy DIN Q"pi> yO.; 
^^y^ m3iyO inVfNU'D. Many opinions are takcp up upon flight rcafbns. When OetHtn Uiic.wuj 

fays, 'Ai/r«4 T«{ Jt/a^iic, £ Tu cf/ar*, >i rk? oji'iis »«? -('i Tii» /«,.?(> vTi .^ijf hhfiitjcf iiSf^.Tei;, 
ij^ifcni niKic Ji^soSj cuioioicir, <e»aeT^u;r» ceil Xf"" ^■'^f'"^i »■» 7'<^'., hoW doth he knOW that- 

they were not given for both thcfc cnJs, in a regular way? And {owhcnCltmens Alex. iY.cws his zeol 

agiinft T«< i<ajTt< CTesa?, tif xfo; ?«; I'yxiK? cu,iXi»i, (^c. adding, i^i^Ji yi i,hn, xiip cV '/Attn nct- 
f^>i^^~f, T«/-)ef«.:i I'fi, »A. he docs this bccaufc o Mtc-u uzuyti rSt iyxuat Te« ut^^xc ; and then 

cites a text to prove this, which is nothing to the purpofc, nor I believe any where to be found • 
Oii l5K-«i T >■*•)*"■> ii> Tr.t vi(i>K>. (^utm inttrfrettm fcciitu! ft Clemtnir.tfcio. Crnl.Hir'j.) Ccr. 
tain!ythc ]c%^'s undcrPand their lawgiver othcrwift. Sec how that HJiy nicntiond inlhc law i; cx- 
jtund hyhUim- "» h:Ik. ih. Nor are the fuffrages of Chri(l::;ns wanting. Dens, cum ctitrai mii- 
r>»iite3,fufcefto fixtH, m»rlkHs refupiare leluipfel, foUm emr.ium muUerem fAtienum xiri fecit i — ni 
femmii rcfu£n»>.titni, libido ecgerti '..irot ttliiiJ uppelere, £(c. that is, that tlie man and wife might l< 
kept iiifcparably togcih.T. Laci. ^ K^i re y,^-c-,ft,H ii>ai iJaitu, tC to i.o'ii ci rctuTy r'j <fiV«. ^rifl' 

DTra n:^j\i; ms o cn^iriij nvysi wn'JJ. Rtfh.Utkm. « 'if^ x«&«Ti;"j,i< f«J 

c.tu Tu,iu,«r« — u\ Tuvni ic;u,^i.,iTai. Th. 'f. ' True love is to !< found in marriage, or no 

v/here. flijni y> ^i>..r i«« iriV«T«'i «»i' ».n?»Aia« ^c'/«. S. Chryf. .""IDOD D^DI D^JUO nri'"^V 
1 homely, I ut true faying of a Je-riti commentator. ' ^kcJ factri lurfi mn efi moj'o cctnlti . 

iJ dicere tf. Cic. • lui 7' ; taeyiut t^ iriii«>n, « fi-n— -.v iji t<{ KenitiMi -iufi^fJIif 

bint "aji'^ii r« iitffi, <tAk ^ c« rtrf <(.'<>bi< icitari JTtXiV Tiii tst^iT: X(^'" >T>^>t'7"> k^. S.CIn'yf. 

ie^6 The Religion o/* Nature. Se6l. VIII. 

the W5wa« cannot but want many things, which require the more robufi: and ac- 
tive powers or greater capacity of the man'. Thus, in lower life, whilfl: the 
wheel, the needle, (^c. imploy her, the plough or fomc trade perhaps demands 
the mufclcs and hardincfs of /;/»;.• and, more generally, if JJje inlpects domcftic 
affairs, and takes care, that eveiy thing be provided regularly, fpent frugally, 
and inioyd with neatnefs and advantage, be is buficd in that profcflion, or the 
overfifhtand improvement of that eftate, which muft fuflain the charge of all 
this i he prefidcs, and directs in matters of greater moment -, preferves order 
in the family by a gentle and prudent go\'ernmcnr, £5?^ ''• 

As then I founded the greater focietits of men upon the mutual convenience, 
which attends their living regularly together > fo may I found this le/s, hut Jlric- 
ter alliance between the man and the woman in thc'ir joint-happine/s'^. Nature 
has a further aim, the prefcrvation of the kind. 

1 1 . That marriages are made byfomefolann contracl, "voiu^or oath (and tbefe perhaps 
attended with fome pledge, or nuptial ritei)^, by -which the parties i7iutually ingagett 


* i^iili'yiTKi ru. 'if'/x,, Vj iV(» tViJos ki^foc,, ^ yvtaix.ii;- Ixa^r.vriv *» iSiijAois (14 to ksihw tiShtj? t« tiicc- 

jlrill. ' ^ See the converCition between Ifchem.ichus and his wife in Xtnofhan. « Tho 
Tlato (like w«/iof thcold Cntks and Romans) among many -vtry fine things hath now and thenfome 
that are weak, and even abfurd ; yet I cannot think, thar by his community of women he meant any 
thine like that, which is faid, af. Athtn. to have been praiffifcd iraja Tuf^'iiirorj iwroxui Tft,(pr,(rairu ; 
or that his thought could be fo grofs, as Laciantius reprefents it : Sciicet ut ad eandem muUtrem 
miilti iiri, tanquam cines, conflucrcnt. Fortiius, property being taken out of the world, a great part 
of virtue is cxtinguidid, and all indnftry and improvements arc at an end. And belidc tliat, many 
of the mofl fubftantial comforts and innocent dcligiits of this life are deftroyd at once. Si omnes om- 
nium fuerint (^ marili, & patres, ^ Hxores, ^ liieri, qu* ifla confiijit generis humani eft ? ^uis 

aut lir mulierem, tint mnlier lirum Mligit, nift hahitaierint femfcr itna ? ni/i dexcta mens, dr fir- 
•vata inxiccm fides indnidusim fccerit emit at em, &c. id. However it muft be contr.T, that Phto has 
advanced more than was confident with his own gravity, or with nature. The beft excufe to be 
made for him, that I know of, is that in Atbemus, ''Ioiku i nxarut jju'r, rcXi nrn i>S-fiTf»; ■);«-|«i 
TKs »9(iK5, «»'« T^'S <'^' «<"■» ^i«TA«T,o/«,«7oi4 : or perhaps to fay, that he was fo intent upon 
flrcngthening and defending his common-wealth, that he forgot, if men mull live after his manner, 
there would be little in it morth defending. After all, his meaning to me is not perfeftly clear. 
■* Every one knows how marriages were made among the Romans, confarrtatune, cocmflione, ufu : 
of which ways the two former were attended with many ceremonies : and the legiiim* iaL !lt or 
at Icaft conlcnt of friends (which could not be given without lome folcmnity) preceded all, aiiffici* 
were ufually taken, public notaries and witnclTcs afTilled, c^-r. Among the Greeks men and womm 
wcrcefpoufcdby mutual promilcs of fidelity : bcfidc which there were witneflc:-, and dotal writings 

(T{ei>tri>) J 

Truths concerning Families, ^'V. 157 

live together in /«of, and to be faithful^ afifling^ and the like^ each to other.) in all 
circumjiances of health and fortune., till death parti them ', I take for granted. 
I'or nil nations have fomc form or other upon thclb occallons : and even pri- 
vate contracts cannot be made without feme ivotds in which they are containd, 
nor perhaps without fomc kind of fignificant, tho private, ceremony between 
the lovers ; which lofe nothing of force with rcfpeA to them by their being 
both fr.riies and zi'itne^cs thcml'clvcs. Something mull; pafs between thcm^ 
that is declaratrjc of their intentions, exprcjfes their vows, and binds them each 
to the other. There is no coming together after the manner of mun and ivife 
upon any other foot. 

III. That intimate union^ by ivhicb the conjuges become fojjejl each of the others 
fcrfon *", themisttire of their fortunes ', and the joint-relation they have to their chil- 
dren **, ail Jircngthen the bonds and obligations of matrimony. By every ail done 
m purfuaiicc of a covenant, fuchas the matrimonial is, that covenant isownd, 
ratified, and as it were made de Integra.^ and repetcd. 

PoJfeJJion iscert;iinly more than nothing. When this therefore is added to a 
former title, the title mull needs be corroborated. 

When /ao pcrfons throw their all into one flock ^joint-traders for life., nei- 
ther of them can confillently with truth and honefty take his fhareout and be 
gone (i. e. difTolve the partnerlTiip) without the concurrence of the other; and 
fometimcs it may not be cafy, perhaps poflible, to do it at all. Each therefore 
is even by tiiis bound, and becomes obnoxious to the other. 

And as to the prefent cafe, if the marriage to be not altogether unfruitful, fince 
both the parents arc immediately related to ihtfame child, that child is the medium of 
a Hxt, un;Utcrablc relation between them. For, being both of the fame bloodwith 

(xfiKva.) i at the wedding, facri/ices to Diana and other deities, and the y«u>^Aiei ivx*> '> in<l after 
that, perhaps the being fliut up togetlicr, eating the Kusaniet, a formal Ai/<ri« ^h'm?, (y>c. The pCmp 
of the yevj have been pcnormcd ^033, or "IBWD, or ns'DD: the ceremonies accompanying which 
may be fccn particularly in Shuihh. at. wit!i the additions oiR.Mo. IftrUs {Ebm ez.) And (topaJt 
by other nations) the torm of folcmnization of matrimony, anii the manner, in which pcrfons mar- 
ried give thcrr iroih each to other among us, arc extant in OLr pubiic offires : where they may 
be fccn Ly fuch, as form to have forgo*, what they arc. , Cotnuhto ftubili. Virg. 

b 01 vain ->an stT Ni>n — -iw3 an''p3 Napni -\■y^ ^nn" nNb n3-\Ti3T nns* -ni/a> »>.n;. 

In Ri[h. khokm. £ Aurii -^fn/jjurut Kumt.a, TfM>»^ fiux^trn ru% '/icu>iri>, in u,Mr 

i»., >•; ;iis<» i».».-;i«i. V'$U. "I j;v,K\iri/-'S- ru Ti«,a hiiu t!,K.i. w<r(/7 

X li-.c 

1^8 The Religion o/' Nature. Seel. VIII. 

the chilJ ', they themfclves come to be of the farm l>!ood: and fd th^t relatioft 
which at firfl: was only moral and legal, becomes natural; a relation in nature, 
which can never ccafc, or be difimnuUcd. It follows now tliat, 

IV. Marrying^ ivben there is little or noprofpeSl of true happinefs from the match •>, 
and efpecially if there are plain prcfages of unhappitiefs ; after marriage adultery > 
all kinds of infidelity ; transferring that affeBion^ -which even under the decays of 
nature ought topreferve its vigor^ and never to degenerate (at worfi) but intoafriend- 
flnp of a fuperior kind ^ and the like, are all -wrong ''. Bccaufc the firjl of thcfc 
is belying ones own fenfe of things, and has an air ofdifiraclion ; or however it is 
to act as if that was the leaf and moft trifling of all tranfiftions in life, which 
is certainly one of the great ejl and moft delicate. And to offend in any of the o- 
ther w&ys is to behave, as if the end of marriage was not what it isj as if no 
fuch league had been made between the perfons married, as has been made, a&u- 
ally, and fclemnly, and is M\fubfijling between them j as if they were not pof- 
fejl each of the other ; their fortunes not interwoven i nor their children fo c- 
qually related to them, as they arej and therefore the misbehaviour, being re- 
pugnant to truth, is a fin againft it, and the mighty Patron of it. 

If the moft exprefs and folemn contrads, upon which perfons, when they mar- 
ry, do fo far depend, as in confidence of their being rcligioufy obferved to alter quite 
their condition, begin a new //;r^^ of life, and rifque all their fortune and happi- 
nefs : I fay, if fuch facred compafts as thefe arc allowJ to be broken, there is an 
end of all/rt/7/;> the obligation of oaths (not more binding than marriage vows) 
ceafcsj no juftice can be adminifterdj and then what a direful influence muftthis 
have upon the affairs of mankind upon /to, and other accounts <? 

» In rcfpeft of which that in Plutarch particularly is true, "H ^luVn /*iy»t/(r( a^' t rtif/,uTui iiuif, 
li' ii, ix^riput fbip^ A»£S(r«, iC, Tu/x;iW«, xtitn it.j/j0ori(cn "iinSa to ytvifS/juf. *> Socratti at 

mlolcfcentulo quoJam confiiltus, uxortm ductret, an fe omni mittrimonio ab[iinertt, rtffondit, Utrum 
torum fecipt, acliirum fomittntiam. Hie te, inquit, [oUtiido, hie orbitas, hie geniris interitas, hie hi- 
res alienus exeipiet: iltic perfetuafolicituJo contexttis querelariim.—incertiis libertrumnentHS. X'al.M, 

■» It is vifible that polygamy, pellieate, &c. muft be included here. They are not only inconfittent 
with our forms and the very tetter of the marriagc-contraft, but with the of marriage, which 
hes in fuch a union and love as can only be between two. Arijioilt doth not .-liow there can" be 
even ^xkit friendfl>if between more than two: much lefs therefore, pcrfcft/otf. n.».r« iV«. (pi- 

?.,f. x<tr« TW nXucc. <P>xU,, c^y. <^^>xO- ^'■'"t «^' 'V^' ''^''^' "■""'• ^^^- ]^^' '^ '^'f'^ "**^ "";" 
ri?. Ibiil. ' fteunda csi'.p^ fdciila nuptial Primiim inquinavere, ty geriM, & Jonoi. Hi* 

fonte dcrivata cladu In painam, fopulumqut fiaxit. I lor. 


Truths concerning Families, S^c. 159 

jjUcvance, by fcft. IV. ought to be made for inabilities, and involuntary fail- 
ings. A pcrfon's age, health, cll.ite, or other circumftances may be fuch, and with- 
out xny faulty that he or flie cannot do what they would j or perhaps inftead of 
that one of them may come to want the pity and ajfi(lancc of the other. In this 
cafe ^'which requires the philofophy and fubmillion proper in afflidlionsj it is the 
duty of the one not only to bear 'witb^ but alfo to comfort ^ and do what may be 
done for the other. This is part of the happinefs propofedy which conlills not 
only in pojitive pleafures, but alfo in IcJ/ening pains and wants ; whilfl. the pair 
have each in the other a refuge at hand. 

N . I have dcfignedly forborn to mention that authority of a husband over his 
wife, which is ufually given to him, not only by private writers, but even by 
laws} becaufe I think it has been carried much too high. I would have them live 
fofar upon the level^ as faccordingto myconftant Icflonj to be cpxcmd both by 
rcafon ■. If the mans reafon be ftronger, or his knowledge and experience 
greater (as it is commonly fuppofed to bcj, the -woman will be obliged upon that 
fcorc to pay a deference^ and fubmit to him ''. 

Having now confiderd the man and "woman between themfelves, I proceed in 
the order of nature to confider them as parents ; and to fee (in a few propofici- 
ons following) how things will be earned between them and their i'Z'/Wrfw, as alfo 
between other relations^ coming at firft from the fame bed, '\i truth and matters 
of fact (to be namedjwhcrc the argument fliall call for them) arc not denied. 

\''. Parents ought to educate their children^ take the befi care of them they caity 
endeavour to provide for tbem^ and be always ready to ajjift them. Becaufe other- 
wife they do not carry themfelves towaids their children as being what they 
are, children and theirs : they do not do what they would dcfire to have done 
to themfelves, were they again to pafs through that feeble and tender ftatcjor 
perhaps what has been done to them ' : and befidc, they tranfgrcfs the /aw clla- 
blillid by nature for the prcfcn ation of the race, which, as things are, could 
not without a parental care and affection be continued ; a la-w, which is in force 
among all the other tribes of animals, fo far as there is occafion for it. 

i rrjiLxt^xirx Tj iutiite. Plut.- (A faitcncc, whioh dcfcrvcs to be written in letters of goid.) "Or* 

cv 1 «i(^, iyti Vmuf — »T» rv xf^e; yy iiKtdtc^'.rti'i, i 'V* tfj-a 2 iixe<>,e~T»ty». jip. eunj. ' K«1« 

<^v(ri> •/ MffifH i /MM' » TtTf litHftrxen, «Xvi( i^ c* T»r<; tDtcif^vtn tt^y^Hct. Plato ap. Diog. L- 
c n«>i/TAi.'>fv< }i rti yt/i'«« Ate^/u. naTf)n f t«Jt" i^i^m/ju/w tk/x. Eur. tamttf -vcs altnda ntft- 
mm miiritnJennn dtbito (fi quii tfl fnifn) *lligaxtrimt. V, M. 

X Z Not 

I do The Religion o/ Nature. Seel. VIII, 

Not to do what is here required, is not barely to a£t againfl: truth and nature, 
not only fuch an omidionas is mcntiond infect. I. pr. V. but a heinous inflancc of 
ituelty. If any one can deny this, let him better confidcr the cafe of an infants 
ncglcftcd, helplcfs, and having nothing fo much as tofohcitc for him, but his ovVi 
and (that which will do but little in this world) his innocence : let him think what 
it would be to turn a child^ tho a little grown up, out of doors, dcllitute of every 
thing, not knawing whither to fly % or what to do j and whether it is not 
the lame thing, if he be left to be turned out by any body elfe hereafter^ or (in 
general^ to conflicl with -want and mifery : let him reflcft a while upon the 
circumftances of poor orphans ^ left unprovided for, * to be abufed by every 
body '^, i^c. and then let him fay, whether it is pojjibk for a parent to be fo 
void of bowels, as not to be moved with thefe coniiderations > or what epithet 
he dcfcrves, if he is not. If any of them who have been thus abandond, and 
turned adrift, have done •well^ thofc inftances ought to be placed zmong parti- 
cular providences : as when a vellel at fea, without pilot or fiilor, happens to 
be blown into the port. 

Not only the care, but the early care of parents is required, left death iTiould 
prevent them; death, which skips none, and furprifes many. Not to remem- 
ber this, and aft accordingly, is in practice to contnididt one of the moft cer^ 
tain and obvious of all truths. 

VI. In order to the good of children, their education, 8cc. there mujl be fotne 
Authority over them lodged by nature in the parents : I mean, the nature of the cafe 
isfuch, as necefj'arily requires there fliould be in the parents an authority over their 
children in order to their good. At frfl if fome body did not nurfe, feed, clothe, 
and take care of children, the interval between their lirft and laft breath would 
be very Ihort. They, on whom it is incumbent to do this, are undoubtedly 
their parents : to do this is their duty by the foregoing propofition. Blit tiien 
they muft do it as they can, and according to their judgment : and this is plain- 
ly an aft of authority, to order and difpofe of another according to one's judg- 
ment, tho it be done according to the befi of one's judgment. 

As the child gro'u^s up, the cafe is llill the fame in fome degree or other, till 
he arrives at the age reckond mature ; and very often longer. He is become able 
perhaps to walk by himfelf, but what path to choofe he knows n6t > cannot 

» Inceriiis que fata fcrant, uti fijiirt detur, in the poet's language. ^ See that moving 

ilcfcnption of the H^taj i(<pa,t,Kct in Homer. ' I coulJ never think of that Aratic £iying 

Without pity, Tht tarbtr [3Njn>N] Itunu to (liAvi Hfm tht httfii of an orphan. 

4 • dillinguii'h 

Truths concerning Families, £^c. i6i 

dirtinguilTi his fiifety nnd his danger, his advantages nnd difadvantagcs j nor, in , good and evil : he niufl be warned, and directed, and watched ftill by 
his p.irentSy or ibme body intmllcd by them, or cllc ic might iiave been poffi- 
bly much better for him to have expired under the midwife's hands, and pre- 
vented the cffecls of his own ignorance. 

When he not only iinis about, but begins to Hincy himfclf capable of ^c- 
verning bimfelfy by how much the more he thinks himiclf capable, by fo much 
the lefs capable may he be, and the more may he want to be governed^ The 
avenues oi fenfe arc opend : but the Judgment^ and inSeUcBual faculties arc nor 
lipend but with time and much pra«5ticc. The ivorld is not eafily known by per- 
fons of adult abiliiies > and, when they become tolenibly acquainted with it, 
\ct they find things in it fo intricate, dubious, difficult, that it is many times 
hard for them to rcfolve, what meafurcs arc fitteft to be taken : but they, who 
are not, or but lately, pad their ««/;, cannot be fuppofed to have any extent of 
knowledge, or to be, if they are left to thcmfclvcs, any thing elfe but a prey to 
the villain who firft feizcs upon them. Inftcad of judgment and experience 
■wc findfowTws/;/)' in youth fuch things as arc remoteft from them, childilli ap- 
petites, irregular pafllons, peevilh and obilinatc humors j which require to be 
fubdued^ and taught to give way to wholfom counfcls. Young people lU'C not 
only obnoxious to their oiun humors and follies, but alfo to thofe of their compa- 
niom. They arc apt to hearken to them, and to imitate one anothers mil"! 
conduct : and thus folly mingles with folly, and incrcafcs prodigioufly. The 
judgment therefore of the parenii muft iHll intcrpole, and prefide, and guide 
through all thcfc Jiagei of infancy, cliildhood, and youth > according to their 
power improving the minds of their children, breaking the ftrength of their in- 
ordinate pnffions, cultivating rude n.uure, forming their manners, and flicwin" 
them the way which they cught to be found in. 

Thcfc things are fo infatlf and ^ parent cannot acquit himfclf of the divt}' impo- 
fed upon him in the preceding propofition, if he a£ts fo as to deny them : but 
then he cannot aft fo as not to deny them [that is, Co as to fubduc the paflions of 
the child, break his llomach, and caufe Jiim to mind his inlhuclionsj witli- 
out fome fort of difcipline, and a proper fcverity ; at leall \cry r.ucly -^ 

To all this, and much more that might be urged, mull be fuperadded, 
that the fortunes of children, and their manner of fetting out in the world 

• For certainJy, when it can be. Hoc fatrinm tjl, ftfiuj ccnfH^txnt filinm /mm ffomt rtHi factrt, 
t^uam alttno mttu. Tcr. 


i6i The Religion ^Nature. Sect. VIII. 

dcpcnJing ('commonly j upon their parents, their parents muft upon this account 
be their d'nr^oys, and govern their afFiiirs. 

N. 1. It appears now from the premiHc^, that even /»^>T«/i have not properly a 
dominion o\cr their children^ fuch as is intended fed: VI. prop. V. from whicli this 
p.vental authority is a very different thing. This only rcfpeds the good of the chil- 
dren, and reaches not beyond the means, \vliich x.\\q parents., ading according to 
the bell: of their skill, abilities, and opportunities, find moll: conducive to that 
end: but dominion only refpecls the will o'c the lord, and is of the fame extent 
with his plea/he. Parents may not, by virtue of this authority, command 
their children to do anything Vv'hich is in itfelf ew7; and if they do, the chil- 
dren ought not to obey ». Nor may they do any thing, what they pleafe, to 
them. They may not kill, or maim, or expofc them '' : and when they come 
tohc men or women, and are poficft ofcllatcs, which cither their parents 
("or any body clfe) have given them, or they have acquired by their own labor, 
management, or frugality, they have the {mwc properties in thefe with rcfpe£l: to 
their parents, which they have with refpeft to other people : the parents have no 
more right to take them by force from them, than the reft: of the world have 
So that what occurs in the place abovementiond Ycmxms firm, notwithllanding 
any thing that may be objcftcd from the cafe of parents and children. And 

N. 2. They, who foimd monarchy inpaternal authority, gain little advantage 
with refpeft to dcfpotic or abfolute power. A power to be exercifed for ihcgoodoi 
lubjefts (like that of parents for the ^oo^r/ of their children), and that principally, 
where they arc incapable of helping themfclves, can only be derived from hence. 
Tbcfathcr of his countrey cannot by this way of reafoning bedemonftratedtobe 
the abfolute lord '' of the lives, and limbs, and fortunes of the people, to difpofe 
of them as he pleafes ^. The authority of parents goes not ibis length. Bcfidc, 
if a parent hath an authority over his children, it doth not follow, that the 
eldcji fon lliould h.;vc the fame authority, be it it will, over his brothers 

• Hfc? TdZrit {tj-it'i iis;cf5»5"t5 ycnvn, 5rf«5 u, xj avroi tu^; 5i.si5 ».-i/..ti! i xitJ'etTcci. Hitroc!, 

'' The barlwity oF the thing at length put 3 (lop to the cuftom of expoling children : but it haJ 
been praftifcd by the Perjiani, Greeks, &c. Rowuluj's law only reflraind it, but did not abolilh it. 
For it injoind his citizens only, «Tas-«» ifpW ytrftsv citrfj^ir, i^ b-uyuri^ur xa^ x-cnTcyititi- 'Mmtla- 
lU'Xi 3 |«.>|(?i7 TO'* ya^fJi'jut iiUTi'n rpisT-s?) ir>.ii> ii ti y»eiTo zmein utx::r,cci, xA. Dion. HAlicarn. And 
bcfidc, «T«r«>, ii u~u>, fiux.n f Jsr/aj 5r«7{i xai' iii, k^ xttttc xunet T y /3.» XV"' *^- '*'* 

Ti liis>.<>\j a]aiTi&i>«i Titr, ■jaT(.na-.> iini'iielai. Itl. Thcfc arc inflances of Tuch laws, as fliould not be, 
by prop. IV. fcft. VII. ' Rom.* f.ttrim fatri* Ciceronem libera dixit. Juv. ' '«< Aey.xS' 

y.fjitU) <i|'5". ./irr. 


Truths concerning Families, ^c, 163 

ani/ijlers : and much lefs, that the heir of t\\c firji parent fhould in fiiccceding ge- 
nenuions have it over all the fo/Ai/f'vr/i. The very relation bctwcciuhcm foonva- 
nilhes, and comes at lail in ciTccl to notliing, and this ;;?//V.;;\vich it. 

VII. yfs patents are obliged to educate their children^ &;c. fo children ought to 
conftder parent!) as the immediate authors [authors under the fir ft and great Caufe ») of 
their being ; or to [peak more properly^ of their being born. I know children are apt 
(not very rcrpccltuUy, or prudcntlyj to fay > that their parents did not beget them 
(ox their fakes., whom they could not know before they were bom, but for their 
o^xnpleafure. But they, vr ho make this a pretext for their difobedience, or dif- 
rcgard, have not fufficicntly thought, what pain., what trouble., how m-xny frights 
and cares^., what charges. And \vh;xtfelf-denials parents undergo upon the fcore 
of their children : and that all thefc, if parents only rufhd into pleafure, and 
conlulted nothing elfe, might eafily be avoided, by negleEling them and their wel- 
fare "=. For as to thofe parents, who do this, let them fpcak for themfclves : I 
fhall not be their advocate. 

\'I1I. j^ great (ubmiffion and many grateful acknowledgements, much refpcU and 
piety are due from children to their parents. For if there is an authority in parents 
(as before) thismuftbcanfwerdby a proportionable fubmillion on the other fide : 
Cncc an authority, to which no obedience is due, is equal to no authority. 

If the thought of <j;;«;7j;7.i//o« be generally diiagrecablc, as it fcemstobc, then 
merely to be confcious oi'exijiencc mull have in it fomcthingdefireablc'. And if 
fo, our parents mull be confiderd as the authors, or at Icafl: the inflrumcnts of that 
good to us, whatever it is : which cannot be done, unlefs they arc treated with 
diftinilion and great regard, being to us what no other is, or ezer can be. 

Cod, as the firll caufc of all beings, is often llyled metaphoricallv, or in a large 
fcnfe of the word, the Father of the world, or of us all : and, if we beha\ e our 
fclvcs towards Him as beingfuch, wc cannot ^according to fcift. V. pr. XIX. n. 3 .) 
but adore Him. Something analogous, tho ina low degree, to the cafe between God 
and his offspring there fcemstobc in the cafe bet ween /idrfw// and their children. If 
that requires drjiue ivor/Jjin, this will demand a great ic/pcci and reverence "■. 

• OP'^'J^a pariU; inU'bu.'. $. HhanJ. t Vtimtm oculcs in prHora jo/ftr.t Inftrtre. ^ 

f3tri.'i intus Jefrtr.Jtrt tnrm. ' I confeft, in Stntca'^ words, minimum efft btntfciitm fn- 

rrii mMri/iju* rtneubitum, tiiji tuceUnint aHm, qU4 frefequertnlur hoc mitium mrmtrii, (^ alii' "jfi' 
ciis / " r.?; '■■./, ^ Te gtkb^atncT^ on ^ ? ir.hb^f itatb' ecv79' ^'j^i y) «cy*.^CF it ^»4. 

jlrij'. T :;e (of being alive) ftems to be Ibiiiefhing more tlian what StneeA calLt mufctt^- 

Tum Tc -..'rpuum itnum. < O/ mAjcki t 'Pi/jMmt ii^<i, kA. tt ^ m xttyuiinftt rfr»r« 

Tin •/•""'< it'.j^r.'ra; in r^ jm tCrei '(f^'rtu ii«Aii/. Sim ft. 

i ' Nor 

1 6^ The Religion of Nature. Sect. VIII. 

Nor can I believe, that a chilJ, who doth not honor h'l'i parent, can have any dif- 
pofition to worihip his C;eator '. Tlic precept of honoring parents, to be found 
in almort: all nations and religions, feems to proceed fromfomc fuch fentimcnt : 
for in books we meet with it commonly following, or rather adhering to that 
of iiorjJiipplng the Deity '°. In laying children under this obligation they have 
■ill confpircd, tho fcarce in any thing clle \ 

The admonitions of a parent mull be of the greatefl weight with his children, 
if.they do but remember, that he hath lived longer, and had repetcd occafions 
to confidcr things, and obfcrve events y Inth cooler paj/ions, as he advances in years, 
and Ices things more tru/y as they arcj is able in a manner to predict what they 
them/elves will defiretohave done, when they fliall arrive at his agej may upon 
thefc accounts, ordinarily, be prcfumed to be a more competentyaa'^f thanthcm- 
felves''i and lalUy from his relation to them muil be more Jincertly inclined to 
tell them trutli, than any ctbcr pcrfon in the world can be fuppofcd to bc^'. I 
iay, if young people reflect well upon thefe things, they cannot \n prudence, ox 
even kindnefs to themfehes., but pay the utmoft deference to the advertifaiients 
and drcflions of a parent. 

And to conclude, if parents want the afliftance of their children, efpccially in the 
dcclenfion of their age, and when they verge towards ahclplefs condition again 
they cannot deny or withhold it, but they muft at the fame time deny to requite the 
care and tenderncfs fhewd by their parents towards them in //)«> helplcfs and dan- 
gerous years > that is, without being ungrateful; and that is, without being ?/w/«/?, 
if there be anjufticc in ingratitude ^. Nor (which is more llillj can they do this with- 

* Meo piJiio pittas fundamtntum eft emnlum lirtttrum Cic. The fame author reckons among 
fhofc things, that are laudable, fartntem -vereri «/ deum {neq; tnim mullo /ecus parens tiieris'). Oui" 
fiAj zccM* fjbil^M tTi'iJii|i5 i^£B yiyon r <zci ynii o>.tyufMi >^ sAiiiAfwAiia?. Pint. ^ n«»- 

Ti5 Xiytri tA uS'uriv, if '/ntvTi TiWr,i f^iTx ^f)si ffjwiijv <f ^iyi'ri» n rt (ptia-ic, o, rt rv tfur^v 

va^Nit'ofit®' ifai^tDci.flin. rMi4i»Ti/Aii» j*tT<» T)i» s-fos ©m» iit/T£fa» traji [MiWw]. j'l)/'. Wc indeed ufuiHy 
divide the two tables of A/o/fi's law fo, that the fifth commanJmcnt (Honor tljy father andliy mot/itr) 
falls in the fccond : but the Jews thcmfclvcs divide them othcnvilc ; i; i-iai -f ^ u,iai yr-:?Ki tv Uc/,<\^ 

Hiity^ vxTt;* Ittta-rrci, ro }) riA®- ycfUi, xA. Th.Jud. Agreeably to this, Jofefhiis (ays that 

»; ciyM, Aoyoi were v/ritten upon two tables, iw Ti'rrt ^ 'u<i i)t«Tjf«> [.rAe:»a] : Abarbknfl reckons 
the fit'th commandment the lad of the firft table ; and fays their lihakamim do fo : and in the offices 
of that nation thefe commandments arc mcntiond as written nvyon nU/OD ninPn PV- ' tri- 

ma ighnr o> optima rtruin natura pietatis tji magiftra, Sec Val. A/.u'. <* O Xi'*^) T<t»« 

T«»5-' i^aijlr, TiJ yK^u Tfo5-('.>i;ir» Tw lxif,iy,'M. Plut. « T^y^ 1 '^N !^N\y : ask thy father, 

find he vtll fl>e-a thee. Dcut. * i^'-ii'- 4' «' ^i"pni v«"'^<r' »"■ ^k->.'>' ixa^Kvi. in .>(fiiAcr-«c, 

>i Tcr? aiV.'on ^utat. y^rifji^ry '-j xa^KTi; ^i»~<i.. Arifl. Among the ancients 5^fiT%ji« andrp.iJiMt 

were reckond due. And he, who doth not requite to his parents imboaU' naiun. is cilcd xxt' 


Truths concerning Families, &'c', M5 

out denying wlut they may in their turn require of their childrcn '. In cfFeor 
they do thus by their actions deny that to have been, which has been ; and 
thole things to be pofTible, whicli may be hereafter. 

Not only ^oi/7> infirmities of parents, but luch decays of their w;Wy as may 
happen, ought to be pitied, their httle hartincflcs and milhkcs difTcmbled, and 
their dcfcfts fuppHed, decently ''. 

IX. That f^r" or affeclion onbolh ftdes^ lubicb naturally and regularly is in 
parents towards their children^ and viciflim '^j ought to be ohferved and folhiud^ 
•when there is no reafon to the contrary. 

\Vc have feen before, and it is evident from the terms, thztfenfe ought to 
govern, when reafon does not interpofe; /. t. when there hno reafon., why it 
fhouJd not. If then this '"•fv or mutual afFcftion be an inward fenfe of the cafe 
between parents and children, which, without much thinking upon it, i^ 
felt by them, and fits upon their natures \ it may be comprifed in prop. XI Vj 
and XV^. of feet. III. But whether it is or not, the fame may be laid (which 
mull be repeted in another placej of eveiy affeclion, pafTion, inclination in ge- 
neral. For when there is no reafon, why we iTiould not comply with them 
their own very foUicitation, and the agreeablenefs we apprehend to be in com- 
plying, Ttxc preponderating arguments. This muft be true, lifomething is more than 
nothing j or that ought to be granted, which there is no reafon to deny. So that 
if this *••?-/" be only taken as a kind ofattrailion, or tendence, in the mere matter 
oi parents and children ; yet ftill this phyfical motion oryj»;/)^/i&)- ought not to be 
over- ruled, if there be not a good reafon for it. On the contrary, it ought to be ta- 
ken as ifuggejlton of nature, which fhould always be regarded, when it is not 
fuperfcded by fomethingy///)f;/or; that is, by reafon. But further, here reafon 
doth not only not gainfay, by its filence content, and fo barely leave its right of 
commanding to this bodily inclination ; but it comes in ftrongly to abet and 
infarct it, as defignd for a realonable end : and therefore not to act acccrdin" to it 
is not to a£t according to reafon, and to deny that to be which is. 

X. The fame is true of that ajfcHion^ 'xhicb other relations naturally h.ivc, infowc 
proportion or other, each for other. To this ihcy ought to accommodate thcmfclvc<! 

■ T«.»T^ •/iiM SCA T»« y«»ir<, •!«< «» nltut •ar'&« ci«t<T«r yn»«j5 r)t; rtuvri Ktuittt. tficr. ^ 
epithet fiui (fim -Sji/«j) fliines in Virgil. " Tojit* tfl mier fartniei ac Ubtroi l>mrfiM tor.- 

tmtio, dederint mt-tra., »n rtctftrmt. Sen. ^ Tl;at is, mcthinks, a movin;; litrrription in 

S. Bm/iI (Htji T>.ic.i{ ) of 1 conflift v. hich a poor min liaJ within himfc'f. wh« he liul ni rtl.rr 
wajr left to prefcrve life but by felling one of hi» rhHdrcn. 

Y where 

\66 r/;^ Religion (5/ Nature. Sea.VllI. 

where reafon docs not prohibit. The proof of this afTertion is much the fume 
with that of the foregoing mut. mutaml. 

The foundation of all natural relation is laid in marriage '. For the husband 
and wife having folemnly attachd thcmfclvcs each to other, having the fame 
children, intcrelts, l^c. become fo intimately related as to be reckond united, 
oneflefi., and in the laws of nations many times one perfon ''. Certainly they are 
fuch with refpcft to the poftcrity, who proceed from them jointly «. The 
children of this couple are related between themfclvcs by the mediation of the 
parents. For every one of them being of the fame blood with their common 
parents, they are all of the fame blood (traly confanguinei), the relations, which 
they rcfpeftively bear to their parents, meeting there as in their center. This 
is the nearefl relation that can be'', next to thofc of man and wife, parents and 
their children, who arc immediately related by contadl: or rather continuity of 
blood, if one may Ipeak fo. The relation between the children of thefe chil- 
dren grows more remote and dilute, and in time wears out. For at every remove 
the natural tinftureor fympathy may bcfuppofcJ to be weakendj if for no o- 
ther reafon, yet for this. Every rewow takes off half the comm on blood deri- 
vcd from the grand parents. For let C be the fon of A and B, D the fon of 

C, Eof D, F o f E : an d_lct the relation of C to A and B be as i : then the 
relation of D to A and B will be but \ j becaufc C is but one of the parents of 

D, and fo the relation of D to A and B is but the half of that, which C bears 
to them. Bv proceeding after the fame manner it will be found, tliat the rela- 
tion of E to A and B is ^ (or half of the half)), of F i : and fo on. So that 
the relation, which dependents in a direft line have by blood to their grand pa- 
rents, decreafing thus in geometrical proportion •=, the relation between them of 
collateral lines, which pafles and is made out through the grand parents, mull 
foon be reduced to an inconfiderable matter <". 

, Trimafocietas in ipfo conjugio eft: proxima in liieris, (^c. Cic. *■ hlHlter conjuuBa vir» 

toncejpt in unum. Lucr. '^^U-'n N^1.^ nn3. Ap. K. Elaz.. Azq. {J» paf ' "H my.mxl, 

IdiiXia] (puiiircti :To>.vnoni t-tcit, y^ ^erSi^ 5rSr<t c« •f raj-jix^- ei ye»i~5 p y^ ?-if-/if<ri -u rixta, a>{ 
iavTat Ti errcf r» p rixta ra? yevsTi, »? iT* OMiDut ri 'c>r», 'Ad'i\(f»i j a>i^>i^>i<i ['PiAjiriJ rS cic 

T aiiTat 7rttpuM*ici. ■A»i4't6i ^ i ei ^oiTei jTy.wji? rS iin T ttuTih ii»«»' ytfmrxi eX •» 

iS^ oiitiioTijfi, 61 J[' a».cT(iii:ric<,i, xtX. Arift. *• ^Ham copioft fnavitatis ilia rteorJatio efii 

In toJtm tto-.icilio, anteqitum n.ifa'rer, habit nvi: in iifjem inctinaiulii infarttix ttmpora ptrtp : tofJtm 
)ipptlUiji parentes, f^c. Val. Max. • There is no name for any.difccndcnt, who is more 

thin trintpos, [ It becomes «»v^ji«. Andr. pJ?oJ. 


Truths concerning Families, ^c, i6y 

Ifthcn wefuppofc this affeclwn or fympathy, wlicn it is permitted to act re- 
gularly and according to nature, no rcafon intervening to cxalc or abate it, to ope- 
rate with X llrengtli nearly proportiomblc to the quantity or degree of relation, 
computed as above, we may perhaps nearly difcern the degrees of that obliga- 
tion, which pcrfons related lie under, to afllll each other, from this motive. 

But there are many circumltanccsand incidents in life capable ofafFecting this 
obligation^ and altering the degrees ot it. A man mull weigh the wants of 
bimj'clf ml his ov/n family againfl thole of his relations: he mull confider their 
yJx, their age^ their abilities and opportunities, how capable they are of good 
offices, how they will take them, what ufc they will make of them, and the 
like. He, who defigns to act agreeably to truth, may find many fuch things 
demanding his regard > fomejullly moving him to compadlon, others holding 
back his hand. But however this may in general be taken as evident, that «?*•? 
after our parents and own offspring ' nature directs us to be helpful, in the firji 
place to brothers and fillers, and then to other relations according to their rc- 
fpcctive dillances in the genealogy of the family, preferably to all foreigners •». 
And tho our power, or opportunities of helping them in their wants fhould be 
but little} yet we ought to prcfenxour affection towards them, and adifpofi- 
tion to ferve them, as as we honeflly and prudently can, and whenever the 
proper opportunity ihall prcfent itfclf This nature and truth require. 

Sect. IX. Truths helonging to a Private Man, 
ayid refpecHing (direclly) only himfelf. 

I. "TT E R Y man knows {or may ' know) bejl^ what his own faculties^ and pcr- 
fonal circumflances are, and confequently what powers he has of ailing, and 
governing himfelf. Bccaufe he only of all mankind has the internal knowledge 
of himfelf, and what he is j and has the only opportunity by reficsion and ex- 
penmintfoi himfelf to find, what his own abiUties, paflions, ^c. tnily arc "*. 

• hl*n and If^ifi arc fuppofcd to be onr, and therefore luvc no place here ; any more than a rtiAti 
and hi« ftlf. Otbcrwifc confjdcrd diftin^ly, the one of them ought always to be the fir/l care of 
the other. * Mn/i xonynrrai io-»r KcnTH^ incTim. Htf. • For many I acknowledge 

there are, who fccm to be without reflexion, and almoft thought. Ti'i k'pt%: itit tUtMy funr; s-eA- 
A..- ^»x» ruirn »Aif •Atv«>. S. Chryf. •^ Sic ft qiidjivtril txtrn, 

V i W.lle 

J 68 The Religion of Nature. Seel. IX. 

II. He^ that ivell examines hmfelf.^ I fuppofe^ ivillfindthefe things to be true'. 

1. That there are fume things common to him not only imthfcnfitive animals 
and vegetable^ but alfo with inanimate matter : as, that his body is fubject to 
the general law of gravitation j that its parts are capable of being ieparated, or 
dillocatcdi and that therefore lie is in danger from fails, and all imprcfTions of 

2. That there urc other things common to him with.'vegetabks ■\vA fenfitive ani' 
mals : as, that he comes from a feed (fueh the original animalctdum may be taken 
to be)} grows, and is preferved by proper matter, taken in and dillributed 
through a fct of veflcls > ripens, flourilhes, withers, decays, dies j is fubject to 
*life;des, may be hurt, or killed j and therefore wants, as they do, nourillt- 
ment, a proper habitation, protection from injuries, and the like. 

3. That he has other properties common only to hitn and the /enjitive trilfCAS, 
that he receives by his fenles the notice of many external objects, and things i 
perceives many affections of his body > finds pleafure from fome, and pain from 
others} and has certain powers of moving himfelf, and acting: that iSj he is 
not only obnoxious to hurts, difcafes, and the caufes of death, but alio feels 
them''} is not only capable of nourifhment, and many other provifions made 
for him, but alfo injojs them} and, befide, may contribute much himfelf to ei- 
ther his injoymcnts, or his fufferings. 

4. That beficle thefe he has other faculties, which he doth not apprehend to 
be either in the inert mats of matter, or in vegetables, or even m the fenfitive 
kind, at leaft in any confiderable degree} by the help of which he invelHgates 
truth, or probability, and judges, whether things are agreeable to them, ornot, 
afterthemannerfet down in feet. III. or, in a word, that he is animal rationale ''. 

f . That he is confcious of a liberty in himfelf to act or not to act } and that 
therefore he \sfuch a being as is defcribed feet. I. prop. I. a being, whpfe acts 
may be morally good or evil. Further, 

6. That tlierc are in him many inclinations and avcrfions-y from whence flow 
fuch affections, as defirc, hope, joy, hatred, fear, Ibrrow, pity, anger, (ifc. all. 
which /)ro»z// him to act this or that way. 

7. That he is fcnfible of great defeSls and limitations in the ufc of his rational 
faculties, and powers of action, upon many occafions : as alfo, that his paHions 

, lllud ',tu^t c-tuvTC) noli ptitare ad arrogant'um tninuendam fifum rjfe illcliim, vtriim itiam ut i»- 
T,a NtJIra norimus. Cic. ad Qu. fr. •> Nan [entire mala [na r.oii eft hommii : (y nonferrenen 

ejl iiri. Sen. who condcfcciiils here to be fomcthing like other men. As alfo v/hcn he fays, ^lia 
Uiit, qu* fajfitnttm ftriunt, etiAwfi non pervert tint ; ut dolor capitis, e?f . Hic nen nego [entire frfi~ 
triti-m, 8cc, .' Jl'ii ff 'ffi nor it, ali^niJ/entitt ft habere divintitn, &c. Cic. 

" *" arc 

Truths hdonglng to a Private Man, &c, \ 6g 

arc many times apt to t;ikc wrong turns, to grow warm, irregular, exceHivc ». 
In other worJs, that he is in many rclpcfts falHblc, and inhrm ''. 

LalHy, that he dcfires to be happy : as every thing mull, which undcrflands 
what is mc:tnt by that word. 

lU. If be dtthfind thefe things to befo^ then if he ivill a£l as he ought to do (jbat 
is, agreeabiy to truth and t-a£V) he mttji do fuch things as thefe. 

I . He muJifubjeSl his fenfual inclinations, his bodily pafftons, and the Motions of all 
his membns ' to tea fan j and try every thing by it. For in ihc climax fctdown he 
cannot but obfciTe, that as the principle oi:"-jf^c/a/;o« is fomething above the /«fr- 
tia of mere matter, and fenfe fomething above that again j fo reafon mull be fome- 
thing above all thefe ^ : or, that his uppcnnolt faculty is reafon '. And from hence 
it follows, that he is one of thofc beings mentiond feet III. prop. XI. and that, 
the gre-at la'-jj impofcd upon him is to be go-jerned by reafon. 

Any man may prove this to himfelf by experiment, if he pleafes. Becaufe he 
cannot fat leaft without great violence to his nature_^ do any thing, if he has a. 
greater reafon againft the doing of it than for it. When men do err againfl: 
reafon, it is either bccaufe they do not (perhaps will not) advert, and ufc their 
reafon, or not enough > or becaufe their faculties are defective. 

And further, by fedV. III. prop. X. to endeavour to aft according to right rea- 
fon, and to endeavour to act according to truth are in cfFe£l the fame thing. 
We cannot do the one, but we muil do the other. We cannot a6t according 
to truth, or fo as not to deny any truth, and that is we cannot act right, unlefs 
we endeavour to act according to right reafon, and arc led by it. 

Therefore not to fubject one's fenfiti-ve inclinations and paffions to reafon is to 
deny cither that he is rational, or that reafon is the fuprcme and ruling faculty in 

• y-|-| •>T^ -\Oinn y2tO are (in Jcwifli language) 7\0'yl IIMU/. *• 'Awy^xvn i\xi L,. 

5f*rr« Ti>« kixfj.ic(ri.m. Chryf. c The author o{ S.HhartJ. reckons ti^ht, the right ufe or 

which comprehends all pradlical religion : the hcarr, the eye, the mouth, nofc, ear, hand, foot, and 
riMjn VP>»">. The duties rcfpcdiing thcfc are the fubjed of that (not badj book. "^ Cfim 

trii fsnt h/ic, tjje., zivtre, mielligtrt: (y lapis eji, (^ pecus vivit, nee lamen lapijem pulo zivere, aUf 
f§cnt inliUigire : qui auttin innlligir, turn (y tj[e iT divert ctrtijjlmum tft. Shmrt non ilub'ito id 
ixcelUntiHi jutiicare, fui omnia iria in/unt, quam id cm duo ill unum dtfit. S, Aug. Thus rca^rv 
Jets man above the other vifiblc orders of beings, c?"''- ' Priflo eft domina omnium (y> reginn 

rat It . H*c Ht imftret illi f»r(i animi, qu* obediri debet, id iidtiidmn eft virt. Cic, 

jyo r^^ Religion o/' Nature. SedV. IX. 

his nature: and that is todefcrt mankind', and to deny himfclf to be what he 
knows himfelf by experience and in his own confcience upon examination to be, 
and what he would be very angry if any body fhould fay he was not. 

If a beajl could be fuppofed to give up his fen fe and aftivity } neglect the 
calls of hunger, and thofc appetites by which he (according to his nature) is to be 
guided i and refufing to ufe the powers, with which he is indued in order to get 
his food and prcfcrve his life, lie ftill in fome place, and expect to grow, and be 
fed like a plant ; this would be much the Htme cafe, only not fo bad, as wlien ^ 
man cancels his renfin, and as it were ilrivcs to metamorphize himfclf into a 
brute. And yet this he does, who purfues only fcnfual objects, and leaves him- 
felf to the impulfes of appetite and paffion. For as in that cafe the brute neglects 
the law of bis nature, and affects that of the order below him : fo doth the man 
difobey the law o? his nature, and put himfelf under that of the lower animals} 
to whom he tlius makes a defection ''. 

If this be fo, how wretchedly do they violate the order of nature, and tranfgrefs 
againft truth, who not only reje^ the condudb of reafon to follow fenfe and pafllon, 
but even make it fub/crvient to them'^ } whoufc it only in finding out means to 
cffcft their wicked ends '', but never apply it to the confidcration of thofecnds, 
or the nature of thofc means, whether they are juft or unjuil, right or -ujrong ? This 
is not only to deviate from the path of nature, but to invert it, and to become 
fomcthing more than brutilli ; brutes with reafon, which mull be the mofl; enormous 
and worft of all brutes. When the brute is governed by fcnfe and bodily appetites, 
he obfcrvcs his proper rule j when a man is governed after that manner in defiance 
of reafon, he violates his j but when he makes his national powers to ferve the bm- 
tilTi part, to alTift and promote it, he heightens and increafes the brutality, inlargcs 
its field, makes it to ad with greater force and cfFeft S and becomes a monjler. 

His duty then, who k con fcious to himiclfofthc truth of thole things recounted 
under the foregoing propofition, is to examine eveiy thing carefully, and to fee 

• AhjiHo hom'me in fylveftre animal tran/ire. 'tt tJ Aoyi»a t.wi p^v^il^ia^i^x ; ten S.jfwr. 

"Op« s» (u-ij Ti yal; iii ituci'n -nr.try,. Arr. Pertinet ad omnem oficii quifiiontm ftmptr in froinptu ha- 
bere, {quantum natura hominis fecudibus rcliquifque belluis anteceJat. Cic. '' Hfi? Tr» rir 
;^<p.w» iAi>vi'«» cicTJo-OT. Chryf. ' A thing too often done, ^lu tnim libido, qiit avarieia, 
quad /acinus aut fiifcipitur ntfi confilio cafto, aut fine- ratione firjicilur .' Cotta ap. Cic. '' Some- 
thing iike him, who in Chryfoftom's words, :!^ t oiaxo/x y.nT»^uti to <riuc(p^. « This maltcs 
Cotta fay, Satius just nullam omnmo nobis k diis tmmortalibus dutain ejfe rationem, quam tanta mm 
ftraicie datam • with other bitter tilings. Tho ^an anfwcr to this may be given in the words 
which follow afterward: A deo tantum rutiontin habtmui, fi modo liAbtmus: bonamauttm raticnem, 
aut bonam, a nobis. 

I that 

Truths hehnging to a Private Man, &c\ 1 7 1 

that he complies with no corporeal inclination at the cxpenfc of his reafon \ but 
that all his affeHions^ concupifcible and irafcible, be dircfled towards fuch oh- 
je&Sj and in fuch meafure, time, andphcc, as that allows. Every word * an J ac- 
tion, every motion and Itep in life ihould be condu<5ted by rea/on^. This is 
tlie foundation and indeed the fum of all virtue. 

1. He muP take care not to bring upon himfelf = vjant, difeafes, trouble ; but^ 
on the contrary, endeavour to prevent them, and to provide for his oijan comfort ible 
fubfflence, as far as he can without contradi6ling any truth ^ (chat is, without 
denying matters of fa£l, and fuch propofitions, as have been already or will in 
the fcquel here be {hewn to be true, concerning God, property, the fuperiority 
o^ reafon. Sic.) To explain this limination : if aman fliould confiJcr himkif 
as obnoxious to hunger, weather, injuries, difeafcs, and the reji ; then, to fup- 
ply his wants, take what is his neighbour's property; and at laft, in vindica- 
tion of himfelf, fiy, " I a6t according to what 1 am, a being obnoxious to 
" hunger, (^c. and to aft otherwife would be incompliance with truth " > this 
would not be fufficient to jullify him. The ^>(j«// r«/f requires, that what he 
does, fliould interfere zuiih no truth : but what he docs interferes with/cveral. 
For by taking that, which (by the fuppofition) is his neighbour's, he afts as if 

, This certainly excludes all that talk, which familiarizes vice, takes off thofc reftraints which 
men have from nature or a modeft education, and is fo utterly dcftruftiyc of virtue, that AriflotU 
banifhes it out of the commonwealth. 0>Mi^ ^ixfcX^yiitt iv. 4 tsAiwj, atrxtf «»« ti, <J\r r «/k,o- 
hvjiw »£«j''£v' -« ^' '{' ••.'X'{*< i^i'/tct oTiBj "r xt^jif K. TO T6I1W (rt/ifyl;. b True, manly 

reafon : which is a very different thing from that fuperftitious prccifcncfs, which carries things too 
fer. As V. R. when the Jews not contented to condemn n?n3 -)13"1 or nan mb^lJ, and every 
where to exprefs liDxn yiU, go fo far as to comprehend under ir n^WD a^>^V!/ rbj) DD^W ■'DM 
IPWN ay ; and to add, 131 rT'tfln!? yil 2<'yi03 ,— TJlin? .-nbo l^J'yiO. There areotherfay- 
ings of this kind to be fcen, many of them, among thofe, which R. £/. </.• VuUs has collcclcd: as 
that particularly, 12' T\bia-±> yvC^\T\b t-ibu; ^■^y nitn !':y p. what J£lian reports of Anaxa- 
£eras and others, belongs to this place; that they never laughed : with many other unnccciTary au- 
fterities which might be added. « "h ^O ■>? 'jsJ J'n ON. P. Ab. i nj.<r,J^i.>« ri- 

T»>» [rtn CMTCi iy«t5-i>] i i»£rf »,Tir^ /8i!^* Kufim Jl' I'le-if titi k«t' i{iT<i» c*ifyi»i ■i' ii/J«nu.5>/««. jirijt. 
They, who treated the ieJy and things pertaining to it as merely icXt^ir^M, riiilinguilhing between 
T<t iuirtea. and T« f rufjua.O-, making thefc latter to be aiu t{5? ijU-S^, and leaving the boily as ic 
were to itfclf (ifT» [<r»>it«Tn>] f/,:ctij,txTu, — iin Ta^t): they, I fiy, might injoy their own philo- 
fophy ; but they v/ould fcarce gain many profclytcs now a days, or ever pcrfmde people, that the 
paini they feci are not iheiri, or aiy thing to thtm. Nor indeed do I much craiit many (lories that 
arc told of fome old philofophcrs : as that of Anaxarchiis, when he was pu: to \ mod cruel ifciih 
by Sicocrtm; i tPfttTtrttrrx -f r(a«;i'»t, i.xtT, nri'oTi T ' Ata^ec'^^V !t uXiCKtr, ^ Mtclitf }^tr ^i tJjj.'h. 

Sec EfiH, Arr. Simpl. Anton. D.L»trt. and others. 


172 The Religiox of Nature. Se6l. IX. 

it was not his »eighl;our% but his owx, and therefore plainly contradidbs/af?, and 
thofe truths in {c£t. VI, VII. rclpccling property : when by not taking what is 
his neighbour's, he would contradid no truth, he would not deny dimlelf to be 
obnoxious to hunger, ^c. There are otlier ways of furniihing hirafclf with 
conveniences, or at leaft neccflaries, which are conflftent with properly and all 
fruth : and he can only be f.iid to deny himfclf to be " he is by omitting to 
provide againll his wants, when he omits to provide againll them by fomcof 
thofe ways; and then indeed he doth do it. (Sec p. z8. Anf. to Obj. 3.) 

So again, when a man does any thing to ^^'«'tV prefent fuffcring or dangers ccn' 
/r«rj to the exprefsdiftatcs of rcalbn, and the tenor of forementiond truths, he 
acts as Jifcnfitive being only, not as being what he really is^ fenfttivo-rationalis. 
But when there is no good argument againjl his doing of any thing, that may 
gain him protection from evil, or a better condition of life, he may then look 
upon himfelf only as a being, who needs that which is to be obtaind by doing 
it : and in that cafe, if he iliould not do it, he would be falfe to himfclf, and 
deny the circumltances of his own nature. 

Certainly when a man may ivithout tranfgreffng the limits prefcribed confult his 
own fafety, fupport, and reafonable fatisfiCtion, and docs not j and efpccially 
when he takes a counter- courfc, and expolcs himfclf", he forgets many of the 
foregoing /r«//j;, and treats himfelf as not being what he is. This is true with 
reipect to futurity, as well as the prefent time: and indeed by how much future 
time is more than the prefent, by fo much the more pcriiaps ought that to be 
regarded. At leait injoyments ought to be taken and adjufted in fuch a manner, 
that no one lliould preclude, or fpoil more, or greater to come. 

It may eafily be underftood here,that thofe ew/;,which it is not in a man's power 
to prevent, he mult endeavour to bear patiently and decently, i. e. as fuch > and 
moreover, fuch as are made by this means lighter ^ : for when they cannot be to- 
tally prevented, as much of the cffe£l muit be prevented, or taken off, as can 
be. And in order to this it is good to be prepared for all attacks j efpecially 
the lajl, great one '^. 

3 . He mtifi confcler even bodily andfenfual affcnions,paflions, and inclinations as in- 
timations, uhich many times he not only may, but ought to hearken to. What is faid be- 
fore of the fubjeftion of paflions and appetites to rcafon mult always be rememberd. 
They lU-e not to proceed from unjultifiable cauies, or terminate in wrong objedts > 

• at egirAmiu nos periculh fine cnu{» : quo nihil fottfl effe JIultias. In iratiquillt ttmftftitem »i- 

■vtrfam of tare demeniii efl. Cic. i- Lrviiis fit patientia, ^mcqitij ctrrisert tji nffus. Hor. 

« jMiAiVi! bayx-ti was a great man's definition of philofafhy. 


Truths belonging to a Private Man, ^c, lyo 

■not be unfc.dbnablc or immodcnitc. Being thusreguhled, fet to a true biafs and 
freed from all ei-uptions and violence, they become///^/' as arc here intended ; eentle 
ferments working in our brcalls, without which we ihould fettle in inaftivity '■ • 
and what I think may be taken for jull motives and ^oo.-/ arguments to act upon. 

For if a man finds, that he has not only a luperior faculty of reafon, but alfo an 
inferior appetitive faculty^ under which arccontaind many propcnfions and avcr- 
fions, tbcje cannot be denied to be any more than that ; tho they mult be taken in- 
deed for what they really are^ and not more. When they are checked by reafon 
and truth, or there lies a reafon againjl them fas there always will, when they are 
not within the forcfaid rcftriiStionsJ, they mult be taken as clogd with this circum- 
Itance, as things overruled and difabled : but when they are under no prohibition 
from the fuperior poivers and truth., then they are to be confiderd as unfettcrd and 
free, and become governing principles. For (as it has been obferved upon a par- 
ticular occafion before p. i6f.) when there \sno reafon againjl the complying 
without fenfcs, there is always one for it by prop. XIV. fj6t. III. the inclinati- 
on itfclf, being precluded by nothing above it, is in this cafe uppermoft., and in 
courfe takes the commanding polt : and then a man mult a6c as being what he 
is in n. J. under prop. II. of this feftion. 

Thc7j)r/«_g; of all human actions are in fa£t, cither a fenfe of (/«/j, oraprofpcct 
of Come ple.ifure or profit to be obtaind, fomc evil or danger to be avoided > that 
is, either the reafonablcncfs of what is done, or the manner, in which fomcthing 
doth or is like to affect the agent : and that is again, human actions are founded 
cither in reafon^ or pij/ion and inclination. (I need not add they may be in both.) 
This being fo, what ihould hinder, when reafon does not work, but that the 
inferior fprings ihould retain their nature, and act. 

Bodily inclinations and paiTions, when they obfcrve their due ftthordination to 
reafon, and only take place, where that leaves it open for them, or allows them to 
be as it were alTcnbrs to it upon the throne, are of admirable ufc in life, and tend ma- 
ny times to noble ends. This is applicable to the irafciblc, as well as the concu- 
pifciblc affections and the whole animal fylteni. Love of that which is amiable 
compiffion ^ toward the miferablc and hclplefs, a natur.d abhorrenceMvl refentment ' 

J iiifyn i^TT^Aif «a^> i'.i'/i.fii. Chryf '' When tlic Stoics fay, that a wile man msy 

rclicvcone, who wants hij help, without fii).i>i l\\n\, lownindccd he may, but I very much doubt 
whether he vouU. If lie hid not Ibmc con-.pallion, and in Ibnii; iriL-afurc icW the ails or wants of t.'x 
other. I Icarceknow howhefliould come to take him for an objecl of his cinrity. < 'o u>ii i^' 

initi, >^i.««ir«(-/if»,i//i»©-, iriji' ui «.;, i irr, 4 io-ct ;^<a,»-, i^nxaCrxi. AriJI. To bc angry under 
thcfc conditions is a different thing from ra£t, and thole .'r.iMj^»r/j which perlups Icarce comply with 
any one of them : luch as thit of Altxandtr, who, bccaufc his i^ifw^ died, commanded the 'Ac-kAi!- 
.Tii'> to be all burnt. Arr. 

Z «i 

174 ^^-^^ Religion 0/ Nature. Se^l. IX. 

of that which is villainous or vitiouS orbafc, fear ^ of- evils, are things, which 
duly tcmpcrd have laudable effects: and without them mankind could not well 
lubfill. By wiiich it appears, that the Author of nature has placed thc^ccona- 
tus'Sy thefe tendencies, and reluctancies in us, to difpofe us for action, when 
there are no arguments of a higher nature to move us. So far are they, rightly 
managed, from being mere infirmities. And certainly the philofopber, wjio pre- 
tends to abfolute apathy, maims nature, and fcts up for a half-man, or I don't 
know what "=. 

I mull; confefs however, that our pa£ions are fo very apt to grow upon us, and 
become exorbitant, if they are not kept under an exa5l difcipline, that by way of 
prevention or caution it is advifible rather to affect ar/^^^r^eofapathy, or to recede 
more from the worfe extreme •*. This very propofltion itfelf, which, when rcafon 
isabfent, places y^w/e and inclination in the chair, obliges not to permit the reins 
to our paflions, or give them their full carreer > becaufe if we do, they may (and 

■ will) carry us into fuch cxcejjes, fuch dangers and mifchiefs, as may fadly affect the 
fenfitive part of us: that part itfelf, which now governs. They ought to be 

■'- watched, and well examind > if reafon is on their fide, or Hands neuter, they are 
- to be heard (this is all, that I fay) : in other cafes we mufl be deaf to their appli- 
cations, ftrongly guard againil their emotions, and in due time prevent their rebel- 
ling againft the fovereign faculty. 

I cannot forbear to add, tho I fearlfhall tire you with repetitions, that from 
what is laid here and jufl before, not only the liberty men take in preferring 
what they like bell, among prelcntinjoyments, meats, drinks, 13 c. fo far as they 
are innocent ; but all thok prudential and /aw/«/ methods, by which they endea- 
vom- to fecure to themfelves a comfortable and pleafant being, may be jurtified, 
and that obf. under prop. XIII. in feet. II. ftrengthend. 

» Tliercis, according to Tully, Civile odium, quoomnes improbos odimus. ^ i'<iivit,tB x or,- 

AoKTi TCI ^ooioa— — ^0oBjtf.i9'« iuu TaxT* TX KXKX- iinK aic^Mv, !rt»ix», tircf, ct^lXl'xt, StcuciTtt. 

itM ^ ^ ofi" (footrcjj, ^ x«Pi«»' TO S^i y.y, aitrx^et, k>.. jirift. When one called Xenofhanes cowird, 
becaufe he would not play at dice with him, o^oAoyH zan ^jiAo? fi»«> tjc? tu eaa-x^u )^ «t«a«,S>-. 
?lut. ' A wife man is not axu^'tiu but i/>!Tfto7ra^ii.AriJl. af. Biog. L. <» Air r- 

fi>}^t^ciJi>iy6» ? i/ji(r>i i!m;C'''f"' ^ iJiiccAct itxtTm. T -/i anfn'i, ra fbit »Vi» «iv«fTaiAeTtf«»' to A Jt- 

rer. jiriji. In the Cime chapter he gives two other excellent rules, which 1 cannot but fct down 

here. 2ito.Tir» OHTfo? cc uuTei ivxciTcc^ofel tVju.» Ji"? TO«r«>T>«» a' iavriii i^iAxnr — oTij et t« 

^.«5-f«/*/*'»« T Ji/'Aair i^^ivTii sreiBO-if. And after, 'E> t«»ti p ji*«A«-« <f kAwx-icc t'c M, ^ rtj Irfetrif 

4 Ji 

Truths belonging to a Private Man, ^c. 175 

If the gntificaticn of an appetite be incompatible with rM/J« and truth^ to 
treat that appetite according to what it is, is to deny it : but if it is not, to ufc 
it as it is, is to confidcr it as an appetite clear of all objcftions, and this mull be 
to comply with it. The humoring oi fiicb appetites^ as he not under the intcr- 
dift of truth and rcafon, fecms to be the very means, by which the Author of 
nature intended to fweeten the journey of life : and a man may upon the road as 
well muffle himfclf up againll fun-fhine and blue sky, and expofc himfclf bare 
to rains and llorms and cold, as debar himfclf of the innocent delights of his na- 
turc foraftefted melancholy, want, and pain. Yet, 

4. He mull ufe "duhat means he can to cure bis own dcfeSIs, or at Jeafl to prevent 
the effi£fs of them ; learn to deny temptations, or keep them at a proper dijlance • j 
ezen mortify, "where mortification is necejfary •> > and always carry about him the 
fenfe of his being but a man. He who doth not do this, doth not conform 
himfclf to thtfcventh particular under the preceding prop, ('doth not own that 
to be true, which he is fuppofed to have found true in himfclf J j denies a dc 
fetl to be what it is, to be fomcthing which requires to be I'upplied, or amend- 
ed j and is guilty of an omifjion, that will fall under feft. I. prop. V. 

I might here mention fome precautions, with fomc kinds and degrees o^ mor- 
tification ox [elf- denial, which men will commonly find to be nccelTary. But I 
lliall not prefcribe j leaving them, who beft know their own weak places and 
difcafcs, to fclcct for themfclvcs the proper remedies. 

I ihall only take notice, that fince the felf-dcnial here recommended can only 
refpeft things in themfclves laivful and not unreafonable, and in favor of luch 
our bare inclinations have been allowdto be taken for arguments and direftions, 
it looks as if this advice to deny ones felf ox inclinations inferred a contradidlion. 
But this knot will be quickly untied. For when wc deny our inclinations in 
order to better our natures, or prevent crimes, tho to follow thofe inclinations 
might otherwife be right} yet \ntbefe circumflanccs and under this view there a- 
ril'esa good rcafon againll it, and they, according to the eflablijijd rule, mud 
therefore give way : which is all that is intended '^. 

To appoint things, as x\x.Jfxi(l) Doiftors have done, to !■<: .Tiip'? VU, or I — IN pTnib '^3 
m^ayn (n CInH, wouiJ be right, it thcjr were judicioiillr cliofcn. and not (o vcrv particular and 
trifiin;;. Some of tlicir dutions are certainly juft : a^ tlut "iNU.'2l CN r"J.'N3 Cni< *72rD' E**'? 
CZ32 \^p3' iD nmy. VilJlm. ' What jl>aitld a man Jo to Ikt I lOi'y r-|'0\ Uri/J.-n. « Na 

nttnkcy nol'upetftitious or phiintaflical mortifications arc here recommended, 

/^ i The 

1 76 The Religion of Nature, Se6t. IX. 

The laft claufc of the propofition takes in a great compafs. It will oblige men, 
if they do but think well what they are, and confcqiiently what others of the fame 
kind with themillves alfo are, not to be proud, conceited, vainj butmodeft, and 
humble, and rather diffident of themfclves : not tocenfurethe failings of others 
too hardly, not to be over-fevere in punifhing or cxafting juftice', and parti- 
cularly not to be revengeful -, but candid, placable, manfuctc : and fo forth. 

f . He ought to examine ^ bis own anions and conduH^ and where he finds he has 
iranfgrejfcd % to repent. That is, if the tranfgreflion be againfl: his neighbour, 
and the nature of it admits, to make reparation^ or at leaft as far as he can : in 
other cafes, when that which is done cannot be recalled, or rcpaird, or termi- 
nates in hiwfelf only, to live however under a fcnfe of his fault, and to prove 
by fuch a£ls as are proper, that he dcCncs forgivenefs, and heartily wifhcs it un- 
done} which is as it were an eflay towards the undoing of if*, and all that now 
can be ^ : and laftly, to ufc all pofTible care not to relapfe. All this is involved 
in the idea of a fault, or aftion that is wrong, as it prcfcnts itlclf to a rational 
mind. For fuch a mind cannot approve what is unreafonablc, and repugnant 
to truth ; that is, what is wrongs or a fault : nay more, it cannot but difapprovc 
it, dcteft it. No rational animal therefore can aft according to truth, the trite 
nature of himfelf and the idea of a crime, if he doth not endeavour not la 
commit it ; and, when it is committed, to repair it, if he can, or at leall lliew 
himfelf to be penitent ^. 

If when a man is crif/iinal, he doth not behave himfelf <j;y«c^} or, which is 
the fame, behaves himfelf as being not fuch, he oppofes truth confidently. 

And further, to acl agreeably to what he is fuppofcd to find himfelf to bcy 
is to a£t as one who is in danger o^" relapfing : which is to be upon his guard 
for the future. 

6. He niufi labor to improve bis rational faculties by fuch means, as are (fairly) 
pra5licah!e by him, and confifcnt "with his circumftances. If it be a difadvantagc to 
be obnoxious to error, aiid acb in the dark, it is an advantage to know luck 
truths as may prevent this : if fo, it is a greater advantage to know, or be capa- 
ble of knowing, more fuch truths 8 ; and then again, not to endeavour to improve 

• ;nn r-rnwa □'JSb nnio nwiy I^DP Cwhich words I under/land in the rcnfc, rhat IRaJlii 
fscmstoputupon them. Gen. xliv. 10.) " nj x«fi,<3v; ti i'' l^ij*; t.>oi ha »» iriAic&D ; 

Anr. carm. c Tn y^ n? t ay'iiix. ?/3.i» s-afiPi&an- artTar(^ i^im ; t.'? J"' ix i-.TtrxsAK&i.s; 

•«^aif<,«. ,x,; jr»»«x,«. H fttd. '^ ^Him finitet fcccAp, fine tfl ir.noctni . Sen. 'Evca 

a Jerp fays. .'— imipn ^D nj3D H7^•p■'J l.-ima'nj. i.iUjjJSd. ' •fc.A..i?j^i5<r««; ijhhi<r»- 

Truths helonging to a Private Man, &€. 177 

thofe faciiltic";, by which chcfe truths arc apprehended, is to fTiut them out, as 
being not what ihcy are \ 

And moreover, by the inlargement of our rational faculties we become more 
rational; that is, we advance our nature* ^ and become more attentive to ra//- 
c»al injoyments. 

The ordinary means indeed of improving our minds arc the inlbuction of able 
men, reading, obfcrwuion, meditation : but every man has not proper opportuni- 
ties, or capacity for thefe, or but in fome low degree > and no man is obliged be- 
yond his abilities, and opportunities (by fc6t. IV. prop. 11.^ Therefore Uiatmol- 
lification is added, by fuch means, &c. 

Belidc health, a comfortable ;uid fuitable provifion o{ externals is fo necediuy 
to the well-being of the -dihole man, that without it the rational part cannot 
dwell eal)', all puriuits of luiowlcdgc will be liable to interiuption, and improve- 
ments (commonly^ imperfect'. And fo reafon itfelf (which cannot betray itS 
own intercll) mull for its own fake concuiT in feeking and promoting that, 
which tends to the preferv^ation and happinefs of the isjbule. But the doing of 
this ingrofles time and induftry > and before that which is fought can be obtaind 
(if it is ever obtaind', probably the ufe oi it is loft: except where men live by 
the profcffion of fome part of Icu-ning. 

And as to them who are more free from worldly cares, or whofe bufinefs and 
imploymcnt brings them into a ftricter acquaintance with letters, after all their 
endeavours (fuch is the great variety of human circumftances in other re/pelfs) 
they muft be contented with feveral degrees and purtions of knowledge. Some 
are blcft with clean and ftrong conltitutions, early inftru£tions and other helps, 
fucceeding incouragemcnts, ufeful acquaintance, and freedom from dillurbance: 
whilft others, under an ill ftate of body, oi other diiidvantages, are forced to 
be their own guides, and make their way as well as they can. 

But notv/ithitanding all this, every man may in fome degree or other tndcvs'our 
to cultivate his nature, and pofllfs himfelf of ufeful truths. And not to do this 
is (again) to caft off reafon ("which never can be reafonabk), apoftatize from 
humanity, and recoil into the bcftial life '*. 

• And perhaps as if our own minds were not what they are. For xatrn a>B(urti ? u'itiui igi. 
'/uTtu facii. jiriji. * Anjlotlt being asked, what ht got by fhilofepliy , anfwerd, To UttziTun- 

Tt'^Ti.i'.r M Ti»'< aij^ T ijn T ia<i»» ^'eoot zti'irif. And another time, how tht Itttrncd ifijferJ froKi- 
thl unlitmti, fatd. 'Or» «i ^wn-t; t m^rwurw m? Toi/imi lAiyir e* /aii iuTvX""< ''"" "■"'(''"y ei> ^ 
T«i; iruxixi? tuiru^/it. D.Litrt. ' 'AJ't/»«T«F yj, n » fV^i", rit rsA* X'iriui iix'f't'''' 

iiTU,' 3-««ij« ftifi -/j tj«t1it«i •'jt-VsiTif ii of/tittn, «7A Arijt. <' N.1OT filh (^ItdX^VI temfllt, 

uun in A£rit hcm'mts f»^.m i<ftiarum moJc v/tgAitrntitr, (^c, Cic. 

2. 7. Hi 

178 r/j^ ReligiOxV o/^ Nature. Seel. IX. 

7. He mufi attend to injiriinion ", and even ask advice; efpecially in matters of 
eonfciiueHce. Not to do this is to deny^ that his faculties arc limited and defec- 
tive, or that he is fallible (which is contrary to that, which he is prcfumcd to 
be confcious of; j and perhaps, that it is poflible for another to know what he 
doth not. 

Advice every man is capable of hearing, and the meaner a man's own improve- 
ments are, the more doth truth prcl's him to fubmit to the counfel and opinions of 
others. Nor is every one only capable^ but every one wants upon fome occafions 
10 be informed. In how many countrcy affairs muft ihe/cholar take the rujlic 
for his mailer? Inhowmany other men of bufincfs, traders :ind mechanics ? And 
on the other fide, in rcfpeft of how many things does the generality of the world 
want to be taught by them, who are learned and hofie/l ? 

There is or ihould be a commerce or interchange of counfel and knowledge, as 
well as of other things : and where men have not thcfc of their ozvn growth^ 
they {hould thankfully receive what may be imported from other quarters. 

I do not mean, that a man ought implicitly and Mindly to follow the opinion 
ofanother ''('this other being /flZ/ji'/e too, as well as himfelf), unlefshehas;«/^/«- 
y^Z/agoodreafonfo todo, which many times happens j but by theaflillanceof 
another, and hearing what he has to fay, to find out more certainly on which 
lidc reafon, truth, and happinefs (which always keep clofc togethci^ do lie. And 
thus it is indeed a man's own reafon at laft, which governs. 

He, who is governed by what another fays (ox does) without underftanding 
it and tnaking the reafon of it his own, is not governed by his own reafon^ and 
that is, by no reajon that he has. To fay one is led by the nofe (as we com- 
monly fpcak"^) gives immediately the idea of a brute ''. 

• The e fife cV, w'h^ch XenotratCi's lefture Iiad upon Po/fwo, is remarkable: uniits crafimis ftlnier- 
rimn medicina fanatus, ex infaiiii ganeoie maxirnui fhllofiphus ttiajit. Val. M. '", 

%vho fubmit to their Hh«k«m,m, Ol "tnOU; t^il.lW i^D' bjr nON' ll^^SM. In S. rqq.^r. Many 
more inrtanres might eafily be given. ' Not only we. T?; iAxicCj was ufed in the 

la'iVe fenfe by the Greth. '' ifihil mugh prtftanditm tft, quitm ne, ftcorum ri/u, fequamur 

antecciUnthim gre^em, fergehtesnon qux ewiilHtn tft, fed qua ilur. Sen. Something may perhaps be 
ejrpeftol in this place concernin;^ icgue and f.ijl;wi>, which fecm to be public c'cc'.ai ations of fome 
general opinion; fliewing how far they ought to fway with uf. 1 think, fo far as to keep us 
from king contemned, derided, or marked, where that may liwfully and conveniently be done i 
(ipccially in rcfpcil of trifling .ind little matters. Hut f»rth/r 3 wife man will fcarcc mind them. 
That is a good fcntcnce in VemofhiUts, ll«ii « x;/»H5 e.ra. »«cA«, wi» .T«.a» ^iWys «Jo?in.»- f «t./.S>- y^ 


Truths hehngiiig to a Private Man, &c. ij^ 

Lafrlv, He muji labor to clear his mind of thofe preoccupations and incumbrances 
-jibi.h hang absut it, and hinder him from reafcnsng freely, and judging impartially. 
Wc fct out in life from fuch poor beginnings of knowledge, and grow up under 
fiich remains of fupcrftition and ignorance, fuch influences of company and 
fiuliion, fuch infinuations of plcafure, ^c. that it is no wonder, if men get ha- 
bits of thinking only mo«f it.-ij; that thcfc habits in time grow confirmed and 
obftinatc j and fo their minds come to be ovcrcaft with thick prejudices, fcarce 
penetrable by any ray of tnith or light of reafon. He therefore, who would 
ufc his rational faculties, mull in the firll place difentangle them, and rendci- 
themyj; to be ufed: and he, who doth not do this, doth hereby declare, that 
he doth not intend to ufc them; that is, he proclaims himfelf ;>ra//p«^/, con- 
trarj' to truth, if fuppofition the fourth be true. 

The fum of all is this : it is the duty of every man, if that word cxprcfTes fuch a 
being as is before defcribed, to behave himfelf in all rclpefts fwhich I cannot 
pretend to enumerate^ as far as he is able according to reafon. And fi-om hence 
it will follow, further, that, 

IV. E''jery man is obliged to live virtuoufly and piouf.y. Bccaufe to practice 
reafon ', and truth ^ is to live after that manner. For from the contents of the 
foregoing feftions it is apparent, that one cannot prafticc reafon (or a6t accor- 
ding to truthj wjthout behaving himfclf reverently and dutifully toward that 
Almighty being, on whom he depends j norwithoutya/?;^ and a tender regard 
to the properties of other men : that is, unlefs his injoymentsbe free from im- 
piety, virtuous and harmlefs. And as to thofe virtues, which rcfpefb a mans 
felf, the fame thing ' will be as apparent, when I have told what I mean by 
fome of the principal ones. 

Prudence, the queen of virtues, is nothing but chooCng (after things '^ have 
been duly weighdj and ufing the moft reafonable means to obtain fome end, that 
is reafonable. This is therefore directly the cxercife of rcafon. 

T'emperance permits us to take meat and drink not only as phy fie for hunger and 
thirft,but alfo as an innocent cordiaUnd fortifier againll the evils of lifc,or even fome- 
timcs, reafon not rcfufing that liberty, merely as matter ofpleafure. It only con- 
fines us to fuch kinds, quantities, and feafons, as may bell confilt with our health " 

• IffA -.trtiis imijimi rtci* rAlio Jici feteji. Cic. JUtA n$n aliitd tft quim rrSa ratio. Sen 
•> iJrm tjft dieibAt SocrMtt xtntAttm O" ■''irtiuim. IJ. « I'/i. That a man cannot rndifc rea- 

fon without praftilmg them. "* Tic t' ie»T«, t» t' iwjfAiw, tfi t i)tT». « Tint (ayine 

of limcihtui toPUto, with whom hehadfuppcd the night beforcin the Acatl-mr, (houM beremcm- 
terd. tutiTf 11/ gViTiiiTi - tii ilui' irifiici«»-— 'UiffH'. .Af. Alhtn. 


rSo The Religion 6/ Nature. Sedl.IX. 

thcufe of our faculiics S ""'' fortune, yf-andfhc\v, that we do not think our fdvcs 
made only to cat and drink here •> ; that is, fuch as fpcak us to be what -we are. 

Chaflity does not pretend to extinguifi our tender pafTions, or cancel one part 
of our nature : it only bids us not to indulge them againrt reafon and truth ' > 
not give up the man to humor the brute ^ ; nor hurt others to plcafe our felvei ; 
to divert our inclinations by buiincfs, or Tome honell amufcmcnt, till we can 
gratify them lazvfully, conveniently^ regularly" ^ and even then to participate of 
tlie myllcries of love with »;o^ey?j', as within a veil or facred inclofure, not with 
a canine impudence *". 

Frugality indeed looks forward, and round about > not only confiders the man 
bir/tf'eif, but compaifionates his family ; knows, that, when the cxacteft com- 
putation is made that can be beforehand, there will (HU be found many unfore- 
I'ccn defiderata in the calendar of his expcnccs j is apprcbenfi-ve of the world, 
and accidents, and new occafions, that may arifc, tho they are noi yet in be- 
ing gj and therefore endeavours wifely to lay in as much, as may give him fomc 
kind of fecurity againft future wants and cafualties, without which provillou 
no man, whole fenfc is not quite loll, or circumfcribed within the prcient mi- 
nute, can be very ealy ''. To this end it not only cuts off all frofufion and r.v- 
traz-agance., but even deducts ibmeihing from that, which according to the 
prefent appearance might be afforded ' > and chooles rather that he lliould li\-c 
upon half allowance now, than be expofed (or cxpofe any bodyclfcj to the 
danger of ilarving hercat'tcr "^j when full meals and former plenty iTiall make 
poverty Andfafinig more infupportable. But ftill it forbids no inllance of gene- 
roftty^ or even magnificence^ which is agreeable to the man's Itation and circum- 
iliUices, or fwhich is tantamount) to the truth of his cafe '. 

•* Corpus om'.feumHefternisvitiis animitm q"oqi fr^grxfjAt ma, (yc. Hot. *" Julius 

III j'olo Vivendi caiifafniatotfi. Juv. Hic prar:dtte commiiitones tAnc^iiam »fud inftroi ctnaturi {Leonid. 
ijp.Val M.) may be turned lo a general memento, no man knowing, how near liis death may be. 

■^ T/Ji«i;i haX'./; 'trays T r-xma,. ./Irr. <* Vcnerem Incertam rAfientes, more ftrarnm 

Hor. * In which words arc comprehended naturally (To ^n i)t; JiUfU ipu<ri» r.imxi otu- 

x,:»). * Not as Crarw and Hipparchia (of whom fee D/tfj. L. Sext. Emp. & al.), and indeed 

the Cynics in general are faid to have done : quibiis in propatiile coire cum conjiigibits mos fuit- 
Lactant, Of whom tlierefore dcero fays with good reafon, Cynicorum ratio [al. natio^ totx eft eji- 
cienda. Eft enim ininiica verecundid, fine qua nihil return ejfepoteft, niljil honeftum. ND^ inWN TM 
ijyjIi'D [\y'>J'. i'. Hhas. That in Herodotus, "Au/« xiS^tu cV.oVca,«»« <rinit.hnct t tv utia yj,-> 
ought not to be true. Verecund A natiirati habtnt provifum lupanaria \fbfecrtlum. Aug. ' Er< 
T» T« rux.'i': «Tijt/*afTc» u<pi>;S<ra- fh. f. '' Simonides was wont to fay, BxA'-.u,!;. a, *i»- 

a«ia." T^i 'x^f'^'i F'"''*"" *5"''"T»^». M ^4» ^«2S T (flxur. Stoi. ' Son inttUigunt homines qu.iiii 

titagniim leHigalfit parfmonia- Cic. •< Like them, who cV tj; hotdti r« ^ yifm iipiila-rfa- 

Ka.TUfit>.iirKiif.>, as in Athcn. ' Ea liieratitatt Htami.r, qut profit amicis, noctAt ntmini. 


Truths helonging to a Private Man, 6^c. 1 8 1 

After the fame manner I might proceed upon other/)(jr/iV«/iJr virtues. But my 
notion of- them muft by this time be fufficiently underftood : and therefore I 
fhall only give this general advice. That you may take the traer profpe^t of 
any a£l, place your felf in your imagination beyond it (beyond it in time), and 
fuppofc it already done^ and then fee how it looks j always remembring, that a 
long repentance is a difproportionate price for z/bort injoyment. Or, fancy it done 
by fome other man^ and then view it in thzt /peculum : we are commonly fliar- 
per-fightcd in difccrning the faults of others, than of our felvcs ". And further, 
as to thofe virtues^ which arc faid to confift in the mean, it may be fomctimes 
(afer to incline a little more to one of the extremes^ than to the other: as, rather 
to ftingincfs, than prodigality j rather to inflexibility, and even a degree of ill 
nature, Ihan ta dangerous complaifance, or cafinefs in refpcct of vice, andfuch 
things as may be hurtful j and fo on*". 

Since then to live virtuotijly is to pradlife reafon and aft conformably to truth^ he, 
who lives fo, muft be ultimately happy, byie£b. II. prop. XIV. and therefore not 
only the commands of reafon, but even the defirc of happincfs (a motive, that can- 
not but work ftrongly upon all who think) will oblige a man to live fo. 

It may be collected even from ^^/(fr/fnff, that the virtuous life compared with 
the contrary, if one looks no further than the prefent ftate, is the happier life <^ j or, 
that the virtuous pleafurcs, when the whole account is made up, are the truer ■*. 
Who fees not, that the vitious life is full of dangers and folicitudes, and ufually ends 
illi perhaps in rottcnncfs and rags, or at Icaftin a peevilTi and defpicable difcon- 
tent« ? 

I am not of opinion, that virtue can make a man happy upon a rack ',undcr a vio- 
lent fit of the llone, or the like s j or that virtue and prudence can always exempt 
him from wants andfuffcrings, mend a ftrait fortune, or rc6tify an ill conftitu- 

• Sontfl ineommodum, quale quejqi fit, ex aliii juJicart: ut fi quid dedeceat in aliii, vi- 

Itmuso' Iff. Fit Hum ntfcio quo modo, tit ma^is in aliis cernamus, quam in nobifmet ifjii, fi quid 
dtlinqi4itur. C\c. *' Om, a* itt-rtm vftxitu th 'a.hit\x,nTi; iJi,>i i'uiruirti^v,^, fjunSi vftrfiiairij fi»v~ 

rir, «»i<t KMTautH Ti TSTffin. kX Tint. « Even Epicurus himfclf i^^afn-er <pnr! 'f »^i>.;( T^. 

iifiTv ftJiTttr and a/^' Tn (Jonff T«« «fiT«^ ftu icjHeSj. Diog. L. * Jfocmtei gives one reafon 

for this, where he compares vitious picafures with virtue. 'E%tX ^ »p»r» «eEri>T><, u^un ixurti^t^- 
fA,ir <FTi>.7« -J f^' T«< >u-u<, Txi; ^aiiat^ i?i'u,a. ' Whereas virtue is I'^Jior »;«{ yHfu^. 

Butj af. S. Baf. * For who can bear fuch rants as that, Eficuriu ait, fapitntem, fi in Pha- 

lariMi laurt periiratur, txclamaiurum, Dulet ejl, (y ad mt nihil ftriinit > Sen. r«//y reports the 
*»me. ^ It is in the power ot very tew toafl like him, qui dum varices txfocandas fraherit, 

Itgert librum ferHeravit: or him, qui non defiit ridert, cum ob hoc iffitm irati tortores omnia inftru- 
witnta crudtlitaiis exftrireniur. Sen. 

A a tion : 

J 82 7*/)^ Religion o/* Nature. Sed. IX. 

tion : amidft fo many enemies to virtue, fo many infirmities as attend life, he 
cannot but he fometimes affe^ed. But I have faid, andfiiy again, that the natu- 
ral and ufaal effcft of virtue is happincfs > and if a virtuous man fliould in 
fome refpefts be unhappy, yet rtill his virtue will make him lefs unhappy : for at 
leaft he in joys inward tranquillity, and a breaft confcious of no evil. And which 
kind of life I pray ought one to prefer : that, which naturally tends to happinefs^ 
tho it may be difturbed ; or that, \i\\\c\inaturally tends to unhappinefs ? In brief, 
virtue will make a man here, in any given circumllances, as happy as a man 
can be in thofe circumftances : or however it will make him happy hereafter in 
fome other ftate : for ultimately, all taken together, happy he mufi be. 

Some may poflibly wonder, why among virtues I have not fo much as once 
named one of the cardinal, and the only one perhaps which they pretend to : 
I mean fortitude. That that, by which fo many heroes have triumphed over 
enemies, even the greateft, death itfelf j that, which diftinguifhes nations, 
miles empires, has been the grand theme of alnioft all wits, attrafts all eyes, 
opens all mouths, and afllimcs the name of virtue by way of excellence > that 
ibis Ihould be forgot ! 

To attone for this omiffion I will make this appendix to the foregoing brief 
account. \i fortitudeht taken for natural courage (i. e. Itrength, aftivity, plen- 
ty of fpirits, and a contempt of dangers refulting from thefc), this is conftitu- 
tion and the gift of God"", not any virtue in us : becaufe if it be our ^•irtuc, it 
mufl: confifl: in fomething, which ijue produce, or do our felves ''. The cafe is 
the fame with that of fine features and complexion, a large inheritance, or 
ftrong walls, which may indeed be great advantages, but were never called ivV- 
iues <^. To have thefe is not virtue > but to ufc them rightly, or according to 
reafon, if we have them. 

That this is juftly faid, may perhaps appear from what is to be fiiid on the o- 
iher fide. It may be a man's misfortune, that he has not more courage, a grea- 
ter ftock of fpirits, firmer health, and ftrongcr limbs, if he has a jult oc- 
cafion to ufe them j but it never can be reckond a vice or fault not to ufe what 
he has not : for otherwife it might be a crime not to be able to carry ten thoufand 
pound weight, or outrun a cannon-ball. 

• EiV<fc>.« x«jTffo« iVi, S^io? 5r» e-ot' Toy' \^xv. Horn. ^ Tropter xirtiitemjure UuJamur, f^ 

invlrlute riiie gloriamur. ^uod non contingeret, fi id donuni a dco, non .i nobis haitremui. O'c 
« As that word is ufcd here. For when it is ufcd as in tiiat <»/>. Luc. 'Aftrn /^ riJ/iKT®- ix'tJi, and the 

like paflageS) it has another meaning. 

2, Fortitude 

Truths helonging to a Private Man, ^c. 1 83 

Fortitude confidcrd as a 'virtue confifts in (landing and endeavouring to overcome 
dangers and opporitions,\vhen they cannot be avoided without the violation oirea- 
fon and truth. Here it is, that he, who is cndowd with natural bravciy, a healthful 
conftitution, good bones and mufcles, ought to uje tliem, and be tkxnkful to the 
Doner : and he who is not fo fiivord, niuftyetdo lubat he can : if he cannot con- 
quer, he muil endeavour to he patient and prudent. And thus he, who is natural- 
ly timorous, or weak, or otherwife infirm, w/iJjhave as much, or more o!^ theivV- 
tiie of fortitude, than the hero himfclf > who apprehends little, and feels little, com- 
pared with the other, or pojjibly may find plcalure in a fccne of dangerous action. 

If a man can prevent., or efcape any peril or trouble, fahd veritate^ he ought 
to do it: otherwife he neither confiders himfclf^ nor them as being what they 
are J them not T&unr.ccejfary^ himfelf not as capable of Z'f/'/;^ /;«r/ by them; and 
fo dafhcs againft truth on the worfe fide '. But where that cannot be done, he 
mufl exert himfelf according to his abilities^ whether ^r^a/ or little^ and refer 
the fuccefs to the Divine providence. This is the true 'virtue of fortitude, which 
is nothing but endeavouring firmly and honeltly to act as truth requires ; and 
therefore is direftly deducibic from that notion, on which we have founded 
the morality of human a£ts. 

It has for its o^y>c? not only adverfiiries, noxious animals, and bold undertakings, 
but in general all the evils of life ^ ; which a man mull labor by prudence to ward 
off, and where this cannot be done to bear with refignation, decency, and an hum- 
ble cxpeftation of anadjullmentof allcvcntsin 2i. future flat e : the belief of wuich 
I am now going to prove, in my manner .y to be no vain nor groundlefs conceit. 

\'^. Every one, that finds himfelf as before in prop. 1. finds in himfclf at the fame 
time a confcioufnefs of his own exiflence and a£ls (which is life), zvith a power of 
apprehending, thinking, reafoning, 'willing, beginning and flopping many kinds and de- 
grees of motion in his own members, &c. '. He, who has not thcfe powers, has 
no power to difputc this with me : therefore I can perceive no room for any 
difputc here, unlcfs it be concerning the power oi beginning motion. For theyj 
who fay there is always the fame quantity of motion in the world, mull not allow 
the produftion of any wit' ; and therefore muftfuppofc the animal fpirits not to 

* KaT>al Kj Kufjuxr'^ iktc? 11J71 N?«. Horn. •> Eic-i a" 01 li cV o'iki'« iTieeTjioorrn, T rvf/jecTut 

i(VT<<( f jj,»*.fi.n r«»-ei<. ii iTTiTCitti y.ftt. iutric-xiAirt('/<>i>4ir, rif" uXriTi e\x:s-ctirit ittitiicf, irniiTiti <r»- 

^.«< J'rrn. Th. J. Urn m viribut corftrii (^ Uctrtls lamummoJofprtiluMnh gloria tjl, ftd mxgii in 
lirtutt animi. — Jure ta fortitudo vacatur, quanJo unufqnifque feipfum vincit, iram continet, nutlis il- 
Itctkris tmolli ur H'c^iit inpciitur, nm adtjtrfti ftrturbaiur, nort ixttllilHr fecntMi,if.C. S. Anibr. 
■' ^"'Z* 'tf* f*«rit, frmkm i>li<iHid ftntitt ft haieri divinnm, Sec. Cic. 

A a i be 

184 The Religion o/* Nature. Se6l. IX. 

be put into motion by the mind, but only being already in motion to receive 
from it their directions into thcfc or tholc canals, according as it intends to move 
this or that limb. But to this may be anlwerd, that, if the mind can give thefe 
new direllions and turns to the fpirits, this ferves my purpofe as well, and what 
I intend will follow as well from it. And befides, it could not do this, if it could 
not excite thofc fpirits being at reil. 

It is plain I can move my hand upward or downward or horizontally, fafter 
or flower or not at all, or ftop it when it is in motion, jufi as I -jjHI. Now if 
my hand and thofe parts and fpirits, by which it is put into motion, were left 
to be governed by the law of gravitation, or by any motions already imprcft 
upon them, the cfFcds would be determind by rules of mechanifm, and be ne- 
cejfary : the motion or reft of my hand would not attend upon my will, and 
be alterable upon a thought at my pkafure. If then I have fas I am fenfible I 
have) a power of moving my hand in a manner, which it would not move in by 
thofe laws, that mere bodies already in motion or under the force of gravitati- 
on would obfei-ve, this motion depends folcly upon my will, and begins there '. 

VI. That, which in man is the fuhjeSl or fuppofitum of felf-confcioufnefs, 
thinks, and has the forefaid faculties, mujl be fome thing different from his body or 

For, firft, he doth not I fuppofe find himfelf to think, fee, hear, i^c all 
over, in any part of his body : but the feat of cogitation and reflexion he finds 
in his head ''.• and the nerves, by which the knowledge of external objeftsare 
conveyd to him, all tend to the fame place. It is plainly fomcthing, which 
refides there ', in the region of the brain, that by the mediation of thefe nei-ves 
governs the body and moves the parts of it (as by fo many reins, or wiresj ^^ 
feels what is done to it, fees through the eyes, hears through the cars, {^c, '. 

* E(' /tuVi tivH-a kihTtui [ t« fZyja ] ai t« u-^u^x, f/uiri (puiriKai i? ro trtif, S%Xei In i.To ■i'VX.'ii 
xivtiraci, kA. Oreg. Thaum. ^ Which, is iizttt, iixii iVi t leur^c-im. jirttm. ' ''Ots i 

fiuTiMai;, ixti 1^ ci Jofwf ofcc <}o{U^of»i if xur^ifUi ? >5, <«&< xi(f«A>i» te-ai. Ph. f. * T* 

fijipi IS raftictr^ 'aMyu, »Vir, <i»i' <>T<t» iJff*D '/f'»i)T«i, o-«i'<r«»TS^ iinrif in'*? v Aeytry-i, ■xarru, Tiraxraci 
K, mnriKTai i i,T«ieo«i. Tlut. ' Ncj ne nunc quiJem oculis cernirriui ta, qm i;hkmiis : tuque 

tnim tfi hUhi fenfus in corf ore, fed xit quafi quidam funt ad oculoi, ad aurcs, ad narej a ftdt 

aoimi ftrforatt. Itaque fife aut cogltatione, ant aliqaa vi rnorhi imftditi, afertii atque mtegrii (^ 
tculii C?" auritut, nee videmns, nee aud'mus : ut facile intelligi fojjit, animum <y videre, ^ audire, 
ntn eas furtei, qu* quafi fenefirti funt mimi: qmiui tamtnfentirt nihil queat mem, nifi id agai, <y 
adjit, Cic. 


Truths helonging to a Private Man, &c, 1 85 

Upon amputation of a limb * this thing ^whatever it is) is not found to be 
dimin:/J}d^i nor any of its faculties /oy?. Its //>/7frf of afting, while it is con- 
fined to the body, is only contracted, and part of its injirument loll. It can- 
not make ufe of that which is not, or which it has not. 

If the tyes be ihut, or the ears ftopt, it cannot then (cc^ or hear : but remove 
the obllruclion, and it inflantly appears that ihc faculty, by which it apprehends 
the imprcllions made upon the organs of fcnfation, rcmaind all that while intirej 
and that lb it might have done, if the eyes, or ears had never been opend again j 
or, if the eyes had been out, or the cars quite difabled. This fhews in general, 
that, when :iny fcnfe or faculty fcems to be impaird or loft by any bodily hurt, 
after a fever, or through age, this doth not come to pals, bccaufe it is the body 
that perceives and has thefe faculties in itfelf j but bccaufe the body lofcs its in- 
Jlrumentalityf and gives that which is the true fuijeSl of thefe faculties no opportU' 
nity of exerting them, or of exerting them '•diell : tho it retains them as much as in 
the cafe before, when the eyes or ears were only iTiuf^. Thus diltinct arc it and 
its faculties from the body and its affections. I will now call it the foul. 

Again, as a man pcrufes and confiders his own body^ doth it not undeniably 
appear to be fomething different fi-om the confiderer ? And when he ufes this 
expreflion my body, or tlje body ef me, may it not properly be demanded, who 
is meant by me, pt what my relates to ? It cannot be the body itfclf : that can- 
not lay of itfelfV it is my body, or the body of me. And yet this way of fpeak- 
ing we naturally fall into, from an inward and habitual fcnfc of our felvcs, and 
what we arc, even tho we do not advert upon it. 

What I mean is this. A man being fuppofed aper/on confifting of two paitSj 
foul and body, the -whole per/on may lay of this or that part of him, the foul of 
me, or the body of me : but if he was cither a// /o«/, or all body, and nothing elfc, 
he could not then fpcak in this manner: bccaufe it would be the fame as to fay 
the foul of the foul, or the body of the body, or the I of mc. The pronoun there- 
fore (in that faying my body, or the body of me) muft ftand for fomething clfe, to 
which the body belongs "* j or at leaft for fomething, of which it is only a part, 
viz. the perfon of the whole man <^. And then even this implies, that there is 
another part of him, which is not body. 

' Or even Jetrafio corfore multo, ts Lucrttms fpeaks. •> ne»«K« y^, t ;e<'f*» ^ '^ "^ •»«- 

».t/-^i.»., <;>axAj,fO [h vujj.] ,1*1.11. Chryf. ' Therefore Anjiot It fays, if an old man had 

a youig man's eye, ^Wo. «> iirxif i i ,i&-. 'nn ri y^mt, i rf tA*' ^X'^ «T«3-n«. Ti, i«i" c* 
Z luLjccrzt^ c,^ii»n ^ ,io-.ii, ktA. f HiiToclis (with Others) accounts the foul to be the true 

man. 2u yi it v ■^x'f " A d^ a-it. ' So FU:o ufes Ai/rss for the whelt of tke maoi by 

which the foul, at one part of it, it called «t«im(. 

1 85 The Religion of Nature. Seel. IX. 

It is plain there are two different intercjls in men ', on the one fide rcafon, on 
the other paflion : which, being many times dircftly oppofite^ mufl: belong to dif- 
ferent fubjecls. There are upon many occafions contefts, and as it were wars be- 
tween the mind and the body : (o far are they from being the fame thing. 

Laftly, there is vjevmyperctiye fomethingtuithin us^ which fupports the body 
(keeps it upj, direfts its motion for the better prcfervation of it, whcnany hurts 
or evils befall it, finds out the means of its cure, and the like ; without which 
it would fall to the ground, and undergo the fate of common matter. Thc^o- 
dy therefore muft be confidcrd as being under the dire6lion and tuition of fome 
otherthing, which is (orfhouldbc) the governor of it, and confequently upon 
this account mufl be concluded to be different from it. 

VII. 'The foul cannot be mere matter. For if it is, then cither all matter muft 
think } or the difference mull arifc from the different modification., magnitude^ 
figure.) or motion ^ of fome parcels of matter in refpcftof others j or a hiculty 
of thinking mull he fupcradded to fome fyllems of it, which is not fuperadded 
to others. But, 

In the firft place, that pofition, which makes all matter to be cogitative, is con- 
trary to all the apprehenfions and knowledge we have of the nature ofit} nor can 
it be true, imlcfs our fcnfes and faculties be contrived only to deceive us. Wc per- 
ceive not the leafl fy mptom of cogitation., or fenfe in our tables, chairs, ^c. 

Why doth the fcene of thinking lie in our heads., and all the minifters of (cnla- 
tion make their reports to fomething there., if «// matter beapprehenfive, and co- 
gitative? For in that cafe there would be as much thought and undtrflanding 
in our heels., and every were elfc, as in our heads. 

Hall matter be cogitative, then it muft be fo quatenus matter^and thinking muft 
bcof thceffence and definition of it: whereas by matter no more is meant but a 
fubftancc extended and impenetrable to other matter. And fince, for this reafon, 
it cannot be «fff^r;' for matter to think (becaufc it may be matter without this 
property), it cannot think as matter only. 

If it did, wc fliould not only continue to think always, till the matter of which 
wcconfiftis annihilated, and fo the affertor of this doftrinc would Humble upon 

a 4>«i>irai c* avToTf >$ «»« tj !T«f« r Aoyor 5r«|>:/>tU, o fbocxiTui ri <z itrirtiUi rd Xt'/u. AriJI. 
•> Whether any form, modification, or motion of matter can be a human foul, fecms to be muchfuch 
another qucftionasthatinonc of SfSfM'sepiftlcs, Anjiijlitia, mfortiiuilo, frHdentm, cettrdqut vir- 
tutth onimalia fmt. 


Truths hdonging to a Private Man, &c, 1 87 

»wwor/.'?/;/>' unawares j but ■\vcmuft alfo have thought always ;» time p.ifl, ever 
fincc that matter was in bein:^ ; nor couU there be any the Icall intcrmiilion of 
a^ual thinking : which docs not appear to be our cafe. 

If thinking, felf-confcioufncfs, (^c. were e^eutial to matter, every part of it 
muft have them: and then no fyft em could have them. For a fyftem of mate- 
rial parts would be a fy fleni of things confcious every one by it [elf of its own c.\- 
iftence and individuality, and confcquently thinking by itfelf: but there could 
be no one ail of felf-confcioufncfs or thought common to the ivhole. Juxta- 
pofition in this cafe could fignify nothing: the diftinftion and individuation of 
the fevcral particles would be as much rctaind in their vicinity, as if they were 
fep.iratcd by miles. 

In the next place, the faculties of thinking, i^c. cannot arifc from thejize,jigure, 
texture, or motion of it : becaufe bodies by the alteration of thefe only become gi-ea- 
ter or Icfs ; round or fquare, (^c. rai-e, or dcnfe ; tranflatcd from one place to another 
with this or that new direftion, or velocity j or the like : all which ideas are quite 
different from that of thinking; there can be »o relation between them". Thefe 
modifications and affcftions of matter are fo far from being principles or cau/es 
of thinking and acting, that they are themfelves but f^eff;, proceeding from the 
afbion of fomc other matter or thing upon it, and are proofs of its paffivity, 
deadnefs, andutter incapacity of becoming cogitative. This is evident to fcnfc. 

They, who place the effcnce of the foul in a certain wo//o» given to fomc matter 
fif any fuch men there really bcj lliould confidcr, among many other things, that 
to move the body fpontancoufly is one of the faculties of the foul ^ j and that 
this, which is the fame with the power of beginning motion, cannot come from 
motion already begun, and imprcft ab extra. 

Let the materialift examine well, whether he does not feel fomcthing within 
himfclf, that afts from :in internal principle : whether he doth not c.Kperienccfome 
//^fr/;' fome power of_5or?r«;«_5himfclf, :ind chooftng: whether he does not injoy a 
kind ofinvifible empire, in which he commands his own thoughts, fends them to 
this or that place, imploysthem about this orthatbufuicfs% forms fuch and lucb 

• Nnu> iin riuuc yirlx' T«? '/i «? t« itir.Tic ilia) •^tm^ti. SMufl. *" That the (oul is th« 

principle of motion, or that which begins it in us, is (the it wants no tcftimony) often laid by the 
ancients. ♦«»•• yj inti, k. fiM/^fu, « irfuruf \vxf MKi Tt Kinut. jlri/t. 'H ^uy^>i t» i>J»Si, xitiutTic 
«■*«*«'■«, K. uvrtx!t^Tn. Simp!. ' ^',y/. tun^un,, FUiin. ' 'Hi^'v^ii xmufi nirxt %'.', c^ v"^ 

it' »;s(>», «a. u»x. T. 


1 88 The Religion of Nature. Sedl. IX. 

dcfigns and fchcmes: and whether theieisany thing like this in ^iirfOT.i«(?r», how- 
ever falTiiond, or proportiond j which, if nothing fhould protrude or communicate 
motion to it, would for ever remain fixt to the place where it happens to be, an c- 
tcrnal monument of its own being dead. Can fuch an aSlive being as the foul i% •», 
the fubjecSl of /o many powers^ be itfelf nothing but an accident ? 

When I begin to move my fclf, I do it for fomc reafon^ and with rcfpe£b to fome 
end^ the means to efFc6b which I have, if there be occafion for it, concerted within 
my felf : and this doth not at all look like motion merely material (or, in which 
matter is only concernd), which is all mechanical. Who can imagine matter to 
be moved by arguments^ or ever ^h.ctd fyllogifms and demonfirations among levers 
and puUies ? 

We not only move our felvcs upon reafons, which we find in our felves, but up- 
on reafons imparted by words or writing from others, or perhaps merely at their 
defireorbarefuggeilion. In which cafe, again, no body fure can imagine, that the 
words fpokcn or written (the found in the air, or the ftrokes on the papcrj can 
by any natural or mechanical efficicnce caufe the reader or hearer to move in any 
determinate manner (or at all). The reafon, requell;, or friendly admonition, 
which is the true motive^ can make no imprciTionupon matter. Itmuil be fome 
other kind of being, that apprehends the torce and fenfe of them. 

Do not we fee in converlation, how a pleaf uit thing laid makes people break 
out into laughter^ a rude thing \nto pa£io»^ and fo on ? ThefeafFcdtions cannot be 
the pbyfical effeUs of the words fpoken : becaufe then they would have the fame 
cfFc£t, whether they were underllood, or not. And this is furtlier dcmonflrable 
from hence, that tho the words do really contain nothing., which is cither plca- 
fant, or rude -, or perhaps words are thought to be fpoken, which aie not fpokcn } 
yet if they are apprehended to do that, or the found to be otherwifc than it was, 
the effcft will be ihe fame. It is therefore the fenfe of the words, which is an 
immaterial thing, that by pafling through the underjlanding and caufing that, 
which is the fubjeft of the intclk£tual faculties, to influence the body, produces 
thefe motions in the fpirits, blood, mufcles. 

X What a ridiculous argument for the materiality of the foul is that in Lucretius J Vbi froptUtre 
mtmhra, Conripere ex fomno corpus, (^c. 'videtur (^itorum nil fieri fine tjciu pojfe -viJemus, Kec tHlium 
porro fine cor fore); nonne faterulum eft Corporea natura anirrtum conftare, aiiimamq, .' It nothing can 
move the hviiy, but another bodj, what moves this .' The body might as well move itfcif, as be moved 
hy one that docs. ^ Txx'^et »5«- A^. ^arrU -^ t^'K"' Thai, at, Dio^. L. 

4 They, 

Truths helo'^ging to a Private Man, &€. 1 89 

They, who can fancy, that matter rmy come to live, think, and aft fpontanc- 
ouHv, by being reduced to a certain m.ignitude^ or having its parts placed after a 
certain manner, or being inverted with fuch x figure, or excited by fuch a particular 
motion: they, I fay, would do well todifcova-to us that ^f^rr? of fincnefs, that 
alteration in the fituation of its pans, (^c. at which matter may ^fg/« to find itfelf 
alive and cogitative ; and which is the critical minute^ that introduces thefe impor- 
tant properties. If they cannot do this, nor have their eye upon any particular cri- 
Jis, it is a ijgn thev have no good reafon for what they fay. For if they have no rca- 
fon to charge this change upon iny particular degree or difft re»ce,onc more than an- 
other, they have norcafon to charge it upon any degree or difference at all; and 
then they have no realbn, by which they can prove that fuch a change is made 
at all. Befides all which, fince magnitude, figure, motion are but accidents of 
matter, not matter, and only the fiil/fiance is truly matter ; and lince the fubftaace o^ 
any one part of matter does not di ffer from that of another, if any matter can be by 
nature cogitative, a// mull befo. But this we have feen cannot be. 

So then in conclufion, if there is any fuch thing as matter that thinks, &c. 
this muft be a particular /(rm/f^e granted to it : that is, 9. faculty of thinking 
mudhc fuperMJded to certain parts or parcels of it. Which, by the way, mud: 
infer the exigence of fome Being able to confer this faculty > who, when the 
incptncfs of matter has been well confiderd, cannot appear to bclefs thanowwj- 
fotent, or God. But the truth is, matter fecms not to be capable of fuch im- 
provement, of being made to think. For fince it is not of the e£ence of mat- 
ter, it cannot be made to befo without making matter fl«o//;fr ^/'n^offubilance 
from what it is. Nor can it be made to arifc from any of the modifications or 
accidents of matter; and in refpcftof what clfe can any matter be made to dif- 
fer from other matter. 

The accidents of matter arc fo far from being made by any potver to produce 
cogitation, that fomc even of them ihcw it incapable of having a faculty of think- 
ing fupcraddcd. The veiy divifibility of it does this. For that which is made 
to think muft either be one part, or more parts joind together. But wc know 
no fuch thing as a part of matter purely one (or indivifiblcy. It m.iy indeed 
have pleafed the Author of nature, that there Ihould be atoms, whole parts arc 
actually indifccrpible, and which may be the principles of other bodies : but 
Ibll they confift of parts, tho firmly adhering together. Andif the feat of cogi- 
tation be in more parts than one ('whether they lie clofe together, or arc loofc, or 
in a ftatc of fluidity, it is the fame thing}, how can it be avoided, but that either 
there mull be fo many fc\-eral minds, or thinking fubjlances, as there are /a;/; ('and 
then the confcqucncc, which has been mcntiond, would rcwrn upon us again) j 

B b or 

ipo The Religion ^Nature. Sed:. IX. 

or elfc, that there xmi^ht fomething elfe fuperadded for them to center in, to 
unite their a£ts, and make their thoughts to be one ? And then what can this 
be, but fome other fubjiance^ which is purely one ? 

Mutter by itfclf can never intertain abJlraSfed and general tdeas^ fuch as many 
in our minds arc '. For could it rcflcft upon what paflcs within itfelf, it could 
pofUbly find there nothing hut material and particular imprcfTions} abftraftions 
and metaph) fical ideas could not be printed upon it''. How could one abllraft 
from matter who is himfelf nothing l;ut matter? And then as to material images 
themfclves, which arc ufually fuppofed to be impreft upon the brain (or fome 
part of itj, andllock the phanta/y and memory, that which pcrufes the impref- 
fions and traces there (or anywhere) muft be fomcihingdirtinft from the Zri?/'/?, 
or tbat upon which thcfc imprcflions are made: othcrwife it mull contemplate 
itfelf, and be both reader and hok. And this other diftinct contemplating being 
cannot be merely corporeal, any more than the body can perceive and think 
without afoul. For fuch a corporeal being mull: require y^w,'?, and fuitable or- 
ganSj to perceive and read thcfc characters and x'fy?/^/^ of things; and fo ^/vo/Zat 
organized body would be introduced, and the fame queftions and difficulties re- 
doubled, concerning the foul of that body and its faculties '. 

Ifmyyo«/was mere matter, external vifible objefts could only be perceived 
within me according to the imprej/ions they make upon matter, and not other- 
wife. the image of a cube in my mind (or my idea of a cube) mull be 
always under fome particular ^rc//>ffi', and conform to the iiiles of perfpc£live i 
nor could I otherwife reprefent it to my felf : whereas now I can form an idea 
of it as it is in itfclf, and almoll view all its bedra at once, as it were incom- 
paffing it with my mind. 

I can within my felf fcnrfl the external appearances and imprcflions ofobjefts; 
and advance, upon tlie reports and hints received by my fenfcs, to form ideas of 
things that are not extant in matter. By feeing a material circle I may leam to 
form the idea of a circle, or figure generated by the revolution of a ray about its cen- 
ter: butthcnrecollc6lingwhatI know ofmatter upon other occafions, I can con- 
clude there is no exa£i material circle. So that I have an idea, which perhaps was 
raifed from the hints I received /row; ivithotit, but is not truly to be found there. 1 f I 
fee a /otufr at a great diflance, which according to the impreffions made upon my 

• Diogenes, tho he could fee the taile, and the fw, could not by his eyes fee Plato's TjaTi^jri,:, & 
*vx!}iTK'.. Diog. L. ^ Tlato, & oi c-e^^ji (more generally) fay, that the foul indeed perceives 

olijcdsof Jtcnfc by the mediation of the body ; but there are t^tirx, which it doth k«^' ii/rif ciSw- 
;i:r.5f . Id. e Such a foul rauft be indeed ai Greg. Tf^aum. has it, o-*/*« ?u.^J't.;^;w. "Artrtt j 

'l^X^' A^Xi" Ai'yiiN . , 


Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 191 

material organs fccms little and round, I do not therefore conclude it toht eitbcr : 
there is fomething within, that reafons upon the circumltanccs of the appearance, 
and:is it were commands my fcnfc, and corrcftschcimprcfilon : andtliismullbc 
fomething fupcrior to matter, fince a m.iferialfouHs no othcrwife imprcdiblc itfclf 
but as material organs are. Inilancesof this kind are cndlcfs. (v. p. f JjfA.) 

If we know any thing o£ matter, we know, th:\tl/y itfe If it is a lifelefs thing 
inert, and pafsive only j and afts necej/'arily (or rather is acted^ according to the lavs 
of motion and gravitation. This pafsivenefslccms tobcf^t';;/;^/ toit. And if we 
know any thing oi'curfehes, we know, that we arc confcious of our own exiltencc 
and ads (i.e. that v:clive)i that we have a degree o( freedom; that we can move 
ouv \'c\\esffontaneotiJly; andinlliort, that we can, in many inllances, take off the 
effed of gravitation, and imprcls new motions upon our ipirits (or give them new 
dire<5bions), only by a thought. Therefore to make mere matter do all this is to change 
the nature of it j to change death into life, incapacity of thinking into cogitati^•itv 
necefsity into liberty. And to fiy, that God mwy fiperadd a faculty of thinking 
moving itfclf, Ciff. to matter, if by this be meant, that he may make matter to be 
the fuppofitum of thcfe faculties fthat fubllance, in which they inhere,', is thcfime 
in effect as to fay, that God may fuperadd a faculty of thinking to incegitati-jity, of- 
acting freely to neceffity, and fo on. What fenfc is there in this ? And yet fo ic 
mull be, while matter continues to be matter. 

Thzz faculty of thinking, fo much t.ilked of by fomeas fuperadded to certain 
f)f ems of mxiicvy fitly dilpofed, by virtue of God's omnipotence, tho it he fo 
called, mult in reality amount to the fame thing as another ya^yZ^we with the 
faculty of thinking. For a faculty of thinking alone will not make up the idci 
of a human /o«/, which is indued with many faculties; apprehending, refleft- 
ing, comparing, judging, making deductions and reafoning, willing, putting 
the body in motion, continuing the animal fundtions by its prefence, and gi- 
ving lifcj and therefore, whatever it is that is fuperadded, it muft he fomething 
which is indued with all thofe other faculties. And whether that can be a fa' 
cully of thinking, and fo thcfe other faculties be only faculties of a facul- 
ty' ; or whether they mud not all be rather the faculties of fomcy«^- 

• This is worfc than •i'V^n ■h'X^'i 'n Max. Tjr. and the pbcc juft before cited. The .luthor of 
the £/iiy cone. Hum. UnJtrJl. has himfclf exploded ir, or what is very like it. To titk, Ciys. lie, 
•aiitihiT tkt will tiAt frittlom, it to ask, -ahtthtr one power has another power, one ability another aii- 
lily, a que/lion at /irjl fight too grofy abfurd tomake a diffute, or need an anfwcr. For rrho it tttliat 
feu not, that power t belong only to agent i , and are atlributei only of fubfiancet, and not of powers them- 
plvesl There is, it my memory docs not deceive mc, another pafToge fomc wlicrc in the lame book as 
much (or morcj to my purpofc : but at prtfcnt I cinnot find it. 

li b i fiance *i 

ipi The Religiont o/^ Nature. Se61:. IX. 

ftance ', which, being (by tlieir own conctkion) fuper added to rtiattcr, muft be 
different fiom ir, I do leave the unprejudiced to dctermin. 

Ifmen would but fcrioully look into thcmfelves, I am pcifuadcd thc/o/// would 
not appear to them as a faculty of the body, or kind of appurtenance to it ; but ra* 
thcr as iomcfubjlance^ properly placed in it, not only to ufc it as an inflrumcnt, and 
act by it, but alfo to govern it (or the parts of it j as the tongue, hands, feet, {j'r.) 
according to its own reafon. For I think it is plain enough, that the mind, tho it 
afts under great limitations, doth however in many inllanccs^goirrw the body ^r- 
bitrarily : and it is monftrous to fuppofc this governor to be nothing but feme fit 
difpofition or accident (iuperaddcdj of that matter which is governed. A J}}ip it is 
true would not befit for navigation, if it was not built and provided in a proper 
manner : but then, when it has its proper form, and is become a fyflem of matcriab 
fitly difpofcd, it is not this difpofition that governs it. It is the man, that other fub- 
ftancc, who fits at the helm, and they,who manage the fails and tackle,that do this. 
So our veffels without a proper organization and conformity of parts would not be 
capable of being afted as they arc J but Hill it is not the ill ape, or modification, or 
any other accident, that can govern them. The capacity of being governed or 
ufed can never be the governor, applying and ufing '' that capacity. No there 
muil be at the helm fomething dijiinil, that commands the body, and without 
which it would run adrift, or rather fink. 

For the foregoing reafons it fccms to me, that flatter ca.nnot think, cannot ^j 
made to think. But it' a. faculty of thinking can be fupcradded to a fyftem of matter, 
without uniting an immaterial fubftancc toit'j Hay, if this can be, yets^human 
body is not fuch afyllem, being plainly void of thought, and organized in fuch a 
manner as to tranfmit the imprcHions of fcnfible objcfts up to the brain, where the 
percipient, and that which rcfeHs upon them, certainly refides : and therefore 
that which //;tfrf apprehends, thinks, and wills, mui\ he that fyjiem of matter 
to whicha faculty of thinking is fupcradded. All the premifles then well con- 
fidcrd iudgc 1 befcech you, whether inftcad of faying, that \.\\\s inhabitant oi 
our heads (the foul) is a fyllem of matter, to which a faculty of thinking is 
fupcradded, it might not be more rcafonable to fay, it is a thinking fubftance in- 
timately united to fome fine material vehicle, -which has its refidence in the brain. 

• If the foul is only an accident (or attribute) of the ioJy, how conies this accident to hive (or 
be the fupportof) other accidents, contrary ones too ? As when wcfay, 121 nb^D WSJI nODnWDJ 
S HAtmuH. ^ ErifCT <)>! Ton xc-'"'"" ■'■; ?A;f''''-'- Plito. ' Or, if to a thinking fub- 

fiMci c»n bi fuftr»ddid the modification of folidily. Which way of fpeaking, tho I do not rcmcnilxrr 
to have met with it any where, nor doth it fcem to differ much from the other, yet would plcafc 
Bic belter. 


Truths heJonghig to a Private Man, &c. 193 

Tho I underftand not perfectly the manner, how a cogitative and fpit itual Cub' 
fiance can be thus clofely united to fuch a w^/rr/.i/ vehicle ; yet I canundcrftand 
this union as well, as how it can be united to the body in general (perhaps, as 
how the particles of the body itfclf cohere together), and much better than how 
a thinking faculty can be fupcraddcd to matter: and bcfide, Cc\ci:\\ phienomena 
may moreeafily be folvedby this bypotkefis ; which (tho I iTiall not pcrtinacioufly 
maintain it) in Hiort isthis. /^/'t,. that the human /ow/ is ■icogitative(\ih^3.ncctc\o' 
thcv.lin a w^i/m.// vehicle, or rather united to it, and as it were iufeparably mixt CI 
had almoft faid incorporated) with it • : that thefe aCt in conjun^ion, that, which af- 
fcfts the one, afFefting the other : that the foui is detaind in the hdy ^thc head or 
brainj by Come fympatby or attraction between this material vehicle and it, till the 
habitation is fpoild, and this mutual tendency interrupted (and perhaps turned 
into an avcrfion, that makes it flv off), by fome hurt, or difeafe, or by the de- 
cays and ruins of old age, or the like, happening to the body : and that in the /«/f- 
rim by means of this vehicle motions and imprefsions arc communicated to and fro. 
But of this perhaps fomething more by and by. 

VIII. The foul of manfubftfs after the diffolution ofhii body : or, is immortal. For, 
1 . If it is immaterial.^ it is indifcerpible, and therefore incapable of being dif- 
folved or demolillid, as bodies are*". Such a being can only perifh by annihila- 
tion: that is, it will continue to fubfift and live, if fome other being, able to do 
this, doth not by a particular a6l annihilate it. And if there is any reafon to 
believe, that at the death of every man there is always fuch a particular anni- 
hilation, let him that knows it produce it. Certainly to reduce xny fubjlance 
into wo/i6;>/^ requires jull: the fame power as to convert nothingmio fomething: and 
I fancy they, who deny the immortality of the foul, will be cautious how they 
admit any fuch power. 

I. If the rouUo«WZ'f material; that is, if there could be any wa//fr, that might 
be the fubjedofthofc faculties of thinking, willing, i^c. yet (till, fince we cannot 
but be lenflblr, that all thefe are faculties of ihcfelffame thing ; and tliat all the fcve- 
ral afts of the mind are afts of they<i//;f thing., each of them individual wid truly one : 
I fay, fmcc it is fo, this matter muft be fo perfeilly united in itfclf, fo abfo- 

• It ij worth our cm/iJrrAtion, vbether nilivt (unfir bt not tit froftr attriititt of ffiirit, Mnd t.%JJ^v*- 
fnri'o mAlttr. Heact may it eon\ec!ii'eJ, iliAt crtattd ffiriti art not totally ftparatt from matttr, 
ttcuHt thty art both »ciivt And fajjii-t. Pun ffiirit, viz,. Cod, it only altixr i flirt matttr ii only faf- 
fiit ; ihoft Btmgi, that art both Aclixt and faffivt, wi may jud^t to partakt of both. Hum. Undcrll, 
* . h -. is Socrjtii s argument in PUto. Tlic foul is altogether uintAvi®', ind thciet'orei>»AiJf>-. 
Which Cictrt interpret* thus : nic difctrfi, ntc diftrahi fottfi i ntc inttriri igitur. 

3 Jutcly 

194 ^^-'^ Religion of Nature. Se6l. IX. 

liitcly one, as no matter knowablc by us can be. And then the haft that can be 
allowd is that it iliould be truly fohd, and not a&ually c'lvijlbk ; that is, fuch ;is 
no natural caufe could deftroy. 

To introduce matter with a faculty of thinking, or a thinking matter, is to in- 
troduce matter with a new and oppofite property ; and that is to introduce a neio 
fpecies of matter % which will differ as eflcntially from the other common unthink- 
ing kind, as any fpecies whatfoeverdotlifrom its oppofite in y^i^/ij pradicamentaliy 
even as body doth £vom fpirit. For thinking and unthinking differ as corporeal 
and incorporeal. And if fo, this thinking matter mud always continue to think, 
till cither it is annihilated, or there is a tranfmutation of one fpecies into ano- 
ther : and to take refuge in either of thcfe expe£tations is at leait to cxpccl om- 
nipotence fhould interpofe to help out a bad caufe. 

If anyone iTiouldfxy, that God might by virtue of his omnipotence fupcradd 
to certain parcels of matter a fourth ditnenjion, I fliould not perhaps difpuce the 
Divine power : but I might fiiy, that fuch matter, cxiiling under four dimenfi- 
ons, would ejentially differ from that, which cannot exilt under four, or which 
can exiftbut only under three; and that this four-dimcnfiond matter my\?t always 
remain fuch, becaufe no fubftance can be changed into or become another, ef- 
fentially different, nor do we know of any, that by thccourfcof nature ccafcs 
totally to be, or is reduced to nothing. 

3. The next argument fliall proceed by way o^objeElion and anfwer. Becaufe a 
removal of the principal objection againjl any thing is a good argument /er it. 
Obj. It ieems as ii thinking was not cffcntial to the foul, but rather a capacity of think- 
ing under certain circumftances. For it doth not think, when it lies conceald in the 
■primitive rudiment of the man, in the womb, perhaps in the beginnings of infan- 
cy, in flecp, in a fwoon : and the rcafon of this fecms to lie in the circumftances of 
the body, which either is not fufficicntly extended, and prepared j or for a while im- 
ploys the fpirits wholly in the digcftion of its alimcnt,and other offices in theanimal 
ceconomyi orbyfome external attack, or the working offomcencmygot into it, 
hath its parts diforderd, andthepaffagesfo poffcft, that the blood and other fluids 
can fcarce break through > or after fome fuch manner is pretcrnaturally affected. 
And therefore the queilion to be rcfolvcd is not, whether the foul is material or im- 
material ; and much lefs, whether it will be annihilated at death j bur, whether that 
foul (be it what it wiiy, which ccafcs to think, when the body is «<?////>• ////J)o/f</, 

.• Lttcrttiut fecms to be aware of this- Jam triplex animi t1 natura referta : Hec tamm htcf*t 
flint adftnfum ctmU.i creanJiim. (yc. &Hiiria <^uo^i hit i^itur quxdom natura necrp tfi AttrtbuA- 
tur : M tft ommno nominis expcrs. 


Truths behnghg to a Private Man, £^c. 1 9 5 

can think at all, when the body is quite diffbhed^ and leaves tlie foul no opportu- 
nity of actuating it any more, or operating by it ^. ^nC. If this objection can- 
not be fully anfwerd, till we know more of the nature of/pirilual beings, and of 
that vinculum^ by which the foul and body are connected, than we do at prcfent, 
it mud not therefore be lookd upon as certainly unanfiverabk in it felf j and much 
lefs, if only it cannot be anfwerd by me. It may perhaps be pofTible to turn it even 
into an argument /or //;? immortality of the foul. 

The foul it cannot be denied is a limited being, orabeing, which a£ls under li- 
mit at iom : thefe Umitations at different times are ^//^erfw/, its aftivity and faculties 
being more obftrufted or clogd at onetime x.h\\\ ar.other., andmoflof allinllcep, 
oxwdeH'fuium : as thefe obflruftions arc removed, it acts more t/m;/)' and //w/j; 
and therefore if the flatcof the foul in the bodv ('its confinement thercj may be 
confiderd as one general ■xndi great limitation^ '^^by, when this limitation fliall be 
taken off fthis great obftmction removed^, may it ^ not be allowd to act with 
flill greater freedom and clearnefs > ihegrcatejl it is capable of? Whilfl: it remains 
in the brain, it c-.'.nas it were look out at ^ifezv apertures -, that is, receive the no- 
tices of many things by thofc nerves and organs, which are the inftruments of 
Jen/at ion : but if any of thofe avenues to it be ftopt, that branch of its knowledge 
is forti. time cut off. If ihofc tracks in the brain, or thofe maris, whatever they 
are, and where ever they are imprinted, upon which our i?iemory and images of 
things fccm to depend, are filled up or overcafl by any vapor, or otherwii'c dar- 
kend, it can read them no more, till the cloud is difpci-fcd. (For it cannot r^ij^ 
what is not legible, and indeed for the prefent not there.) And fince even in 
ahjlracled refiexvns the mind is obliged to make ufc of words'^, or fomekindof 
figns, to fix its ideas, and to render them tractable and liable enough to bcpcru- 
fed, compared, Csff. and this kind of /rt«^«j^f depends upon memory; whiUlthis 
is intermitted, theufeof the other is taken away, with all that depends uponir. 
This is the/>rf/f«/y?(j/f of the foul: and from hence the rcafon appears in fomc 
meafurc, why we do not think in found /f^/", Sec. but it docs not follow from 
hence, that the foul cannot fubfifl and act under more inlarged circumftances . That, 
which, being confined to the body, and able to act only according to the op- 

* If iMcan by fmfus means all mannCT of apprchcnfion and knowledge, there is no room for that 
disjunction; Aut nihil tjl (injus animis » mortt reliclum. Ant mors iffa nihil. For if the former 
partlx: true, the other will WIow. •■ Vt'.ut i Jiutino arcere tmijjus [animm]. Sen. 

« Thofe kinds of animals, which do not ffeak, do not reafon : but thofc, which do the one, do the 
other. Therefore -.aTD 'n (or .^ird*. piflN3; is a raiitnal Animal: ami Aoy2^ Cgnifics bothy^«<-A 
and riafgn^ as going together. 

I ponunitics 

1^6 The Religion i/ Nature." Sed:, IX. 

portunities this affords, can now perceive vifiblc objects only with tTjo eyes (^t 
two windows -"J, bccaulc there are no more, might doubtlcls fee with four, if 
there were fo many properly placed and difpofed > or if its habitation were all 
eye (window all round), might fee all round. And fo, in general, that, which 
now can know many things by the imprcfllons made at the ends of the ncn'cs, 
or by the intervention of our prcfent organs, and in thisy?/«^//o« and inclofurecxn 
know them no other way, may for all that, when it comes to be looCed out of 
that prifon •», know thcva immediately, or by fome other medium. That, which 
is now forced to make fhift with words and figns of things in its reafonings, may, 
when it lliall be fct at liberty and can come at them, real'on upon the intuition of 
things themfelves, or ufe a language morc/piritual or ideal. I fay, it is not impo£!v!e, 
that this Ihould be the cafe J and therefore no one can fay, with reafon, that it is 
not : efpecially, fincc we find by experience, that the foul is limited > that the 
limitations are variable; that we know not enough of the nature of fpiritto dc- 
termin, how thcfc limitations are cfFcfted : and therefore cannot tell, how far they 
may be carried on, or taken off. This fuffices to remove the force oi the objec- 
tion. But further, 

A man, when he wakes, or conies to himfelf (which phrafc implies what I am go- 
ing to fayj, immediately knows this, and knows himfelf to be x\\e fame foul thzihe 
was before his fleep, or fainting away. I will fuppofc, that he is alfo confcious to 
himfelf, that in thofe intervals he thought not at all (which is the fame the objcdor 
muft fuppofcj : that is, if his body had been cut to pieces, or mouldcrd to du(t, 
he could not have thought lefs : for there is no thinking Icfs than thinking not 
at all. From hence then I gather, that the foul /r^/erwj a capacity of thinking, 
l^c. under thofe circumftances and indifpofitionsof thcbody, in which it thinks 
no more, than if the body was dcfiroyd ; and that therefore it may, and will preferve 
it, when thcbody is dellroyd. And if fo, what can this capacity be prefcrved for .' 
Certainly «o?, tlut it may »c^•fr be exerted. The Author of nature doth not ufe 
to act after that manner. So that here is this dilemma to be oppofed to the objec- 
tion. Infleepand iwoonings thefouldoth ckhcr think, or not. Ifitrt'ofj, the objec- 
tion has no foundation : and i( ix. doth not, then all that will follow, which I have 
juft now laid. 

If we fliould fuppofc the foul to be a being by nature made to inform fome 
hcdy, and that it cannot exiil and act in a ftate of total feparation from all body j 
it would not follow from hence, that what we call death, muft therefore reduce it 


Truths belonging to a Private Man, SrV. 197 

to a ftate of abfoUitc infcnfihiltty and iKanrji/y, which to it would be equal to 
Kon-exiiience. For tliat bed},, wliich is fo ncccfTary to it, may be (omc fine ve- 
hicle, that dwells with it in the brain ^according to that bypothefis p. ipjO^nd 
goes off with it at death. -Neither the anfwers to the obje£tion, nor the calc 
alter death will be much altcrd by liich -xfuppofition. And fince I confefslfcc 
no abfurdity in ir, I will tiy to explain it a little further. We are fenfible of 
many material imprellions (imprcflions made upon us by material caufes, or bo- 
dies) : that there arc luch wc arc fure. Therefore there muft he fame matter 
within us, which being moved or preflcd upon, the foul apprehends it immedi- 
ately. And therefore, again, there mult he Jlme tnatterto which it is immediate- 
ly and intimately united, and related in fuch a manner, as it is r.ot related to any 
other. Let us now fuppofc this laid matter to be fome refined and fpirituoiis 
•vehicle', which the foul doth immediately inform j with which it fympathizes; 
by wliich itafts, and is acted uponj and to which it is vitally and infeparably 
united : and that this animated vehicle has its abode in the brain, among the heads 
and beginnings of the nerves. Suppofe we alfo, that when any imprejjions arc 
made upon the organs or parts of the body, the effc£ts of them are canicd by 
the nerves \\^ to tlicir fountain, and the place, where the foul in its vehicle is • 
and there they communicate their feveral motions or tremors to this material ve- 
hick (orhy their motions, or tendency to motion, prefs upon it) ; fo that the/ow/, 
which inhabits it in a peculiar manner, and is thoroughly pofTert of it, fliall be 
apprehenfive of thefe motions or prefTurcs : and moreover, that this vehicle fo 
guarded and incompajjed by the body as it is, can be come at or moved by exter- 
nal objects no other way, but by the mediation of the ncr\-cs j nor the Jhit, by 
confcquence, have any direct intelligence concerning them, or correfpondcncc 
with them, any other way. And aswc fuppofc the yo«/toreccivenotieesofthings 
from without inthis manner, fo let us fuppofe, on the other fide, that by mo- 
vmg its own vehicle it may produce motion in the contiguous 7^/'r//j andwrw/, 

■ So Hitrecltj diftinguiftict to av/tuen ywZt cifj^a, c y^ •yv;^;!!? >(rr«» i^tiibx, from thaf, which 
he calls to 'yjirro yu.u, <riu,ct, and to v/hirh the former commuriicates life. TZ uv/tiJu i<^i» e-*!- 
ft«Ti Tf«»-i^ «•<;«<,« inrrar ci. Id. This fine body he calls alfo •!, c-aua, and xtivuMTtxct cvroM. 
In Sifim. hhaiy. there is much concerning that finr tody, in which the foul is clothed, and from 
v/hich it is never to be fcparated, according to an old tradi'ion. Mm. b. Ifr. gives us the fum of it 

in fuch words as thcfc. □'Tiy'? ns a zna .~-io\r:n vabno n ixo ny pn rjij «;< . .,„j ^^^ 
terward, yntino D"3nn D'pT D'Ci/:! ay ni-iwpj n^iCN-in onN'-iDa r-[ri7y r-iioa-jn 

CT-^sn '->nN cji loy crvna cni qu7 ::Nn Diip oi* a^^iy »d' ^3 a^jnnn 
MCO- SA»dias long before him joins to the foul pT DVy ; which he fays is JQ ("' "^''J P"* 

^ ^ and 

ipS The Religion of Nature. Seel:. IX. 

andfo move the body : I mean, when notliing rendei-s them unfit to be moved. 
Let us fuppofc further, that the foul by means of this lehick feels or finds tliofe 
prints and portraits, or thofe effeds and ranaim left by objects on the mind in 
ibme manner or other, which caafe tlic remembrance of words and things : I 
mean again, when they are not filled up, or obfcurcd by any thing > or, when 
there are any fuch to be felt. And laiUy, let us iuppofc, that if the foul in its 
more abJlraBeclznii purer rcafonings, or morefpiritual acts, has any occafion for 
matter^ to fei-ve it, the matter of this •vehicle is that which is always with it, and 
ferves it. All which it is cafy to underftand, and perhaps not very difficult to fup- 
pofe. On the contrary, by many iymptoms it appears molt probable, that that 
matter, to which the mind is immediately prcfent, and in which is its imc fiekinah, 
is not the whole grofs body, but hmcfubtilebody^ placed fas I have fiiid) in the 
region of the brain. For there all the conveyances of fenfible fpccies confpirc to 
meet, and there in reflexion we find ourfclvcs : when a limb is loll, the foul, 'tis 
true, lofes an opportunity of receiving intelligence from or by it, andofufing it, 
but perceives nolofs in itfelf : and tho the /lo^^, many parts of itatleaih ai-e in a 
perpetual flux and continually altering, yet I know that the fubftance, which 
thinks vnx.\\in me now for rather, which islj, is, notW'ithllanding all the changes 
my body has undergone, the very fame which thought above fifty years ago, and 
ever fince j when I playd in fuch a field, went to fuch a fchool, was of fuch a 
univerfity, performed fuch and fuch exercifes, i^c '. If you would permit me to 
ufe a fchool term, I would f ly the egoity ^ remains . Now to anfjcer the objecti- 
on, and apply all this to our purpofe. Why do we not perceive external objefts 
in our Jleepi or a f-woon ? Becaulc the pa fages are become impra6bicable, the w/';;- 
dows fliut, and the nerves^ being obftructcd, or fome how renderd for the time 
ufelefs, can tranfmit no information to it. Why however does it notreafonand 
think about fomething or other ? Becaufe, all the marks by which things are remem- 
berd being for the prefent choked up or diforderd, the remembrance of thofe c^- 
yf(?7;,about which it is wont to imploy itfelf, and even of the -words (or other figns}, 
in which it ufes to rcafon, and to preferve the deductions and conclufions it makes, 
is all fufpended and loft for the time j and fo its tables being covcrd, its books clofed, 
and its tools locked up, the rcquifites for rcafoning are wanting, and no fub)c<5t of- 
fers itfelf, to cxercifc its thoughts, it having yet had little or no opportunity to 

» Cum corpora qitetiJie noflra fliiant, cr ""' crefcittit aiit dtcrtfcant, trgo tot trimm hominei, quct 
qiiol'ulic commtitamur ? aut alius fiti, cum decern anr:oriim ej/em ;aliuj, cum triginta ; iiUhi turn quinquA- 
gintii,aliii!, cum JAm toto cane cafite [urn! S. Hicr. So if mulUic, if our fouls arc nothingdiftercnt from 
our botiies. ^ Thlly has LentHlitas and Affietai i in the lame ferin, tlio not juft the like Uiifc. 

3 take 

Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 199 

rake mhlgber objcH: and more refircd matter for conicm^\xwr\. And to conclude, 
ifirbc dcnrindcd, ^vlly anyoncHiould iniagin, that the- /s«/m;iy tliink, perceive, 
act dfter death, when it doth not do this injiccp, Sec. the anlwcr is ; becaufe thofe 
itictot'ures and impedimgr.ts, which occafiond the formciitiond intcrmifTions, and 
thole great hmitationsunderwhich it labors at all times, will be removed \;\\.h. its 
ird.irgement out of the body. When it iTiall in as proper vehicle be let go, and take 
its flight into the open fields of heaven, ii will then be bare to the n/imediate imprcf- 
fions of objects : and why ihould not thole imprelTions, which artlAcdthew/wy 
that moved and affefted the vehicle and foul in it^affeH the vehicle immedia:ely,v/hcn 
they ^Tc immediately made upon it, without the intcrpofition of the nerves? The 
band, which feels an objedt at the end of ■xjlaff, may certainly be allowd to feel the 
lame much better by immediate contaEl, without the llaff. Nay, why lliould wc 
not think, that it may admit of more objcfts and the knowledge of more things,than 
it can now -, fincc being expofed all round to the influences of them,it may be moved 
not only by vifible objects juil at the extremities of the optic nerves, by founds at 
theendsof the auditory^^c. but become asit wcxtalleyeto vifible objects, all ear 
to audible, and fo on ? And why fhould we not think this the rather, becaufe then 
the foul may be alfo perceptive oi finer impreflions and ez/j^rw/ contacts, and con- 
fequently of more kinds of objects, fuch as we are now incapable of knowing ? And 
then, this being fo, why fhould we not prcfage, that other indozvments, as faculties 
of reafoning, communicating thoughts, and the like, will be proportionable to fuch 
noble opportunities of knowledge ? There fecms to be nothing in this account 
impofifible; and therefore nothing, but what may be. 

If we do but attend, we muft fee every where, that»;^»>' things arc by ways, 
which wc do not, nor f<j« undcrfland ; and therefore we mull be convinced, even 
from hence, that »»«rf may bej and therefore that the objection before us, tho we 
could not falve the difficulties in it, and what is fuppofcd here fliould be all rejected 
35 chimerical, yet ought to be no prejudice againftthcbelief of the immortality of 
the foul, ifthereis<J«_) (but one) goodreafon forir. 

But if wc can in any tolerable manner (which in our prcfent circumflances is as 
much, as can be expected) account for the difficulties ob)CCted, and thole the^rfd- 
/f/Z belonging to this matter, andfhew how it is;)o^Wf that they may conlill with 
immortality, this will greatly corroborate the arguments for it, if not be onc;V- 
felf. This I hope is done : or if I have not fpoke directly to every part of the ob- 
jection, from what has been done that defect may cafily be fupplied. 

4. We may conclude the ibulsof men to be immortal from the nature of God. 
For if he is (which fure no body doubts) a Perfect being. He, as fuch, can do no- 

C c 2, thing 

200 The ReligiOxV of Nature. Se^t. IX. 

thing inconfillent with perfe£l or right reafon. And then no beings nor circum- 
flance of any being, can come from Him as its caufc, which it is not agreeable to 
fuch reafbii lliould be : or fwhich is the fiimej, He cannot but deal reafonably with 
all His dependents. And then again, if wc are in the number of thefe, and 
the mortality of the human foul docs not confiil with reafon, we may be fure it 
is immortal : as lure as we can be of any thing by the ufe of our faculties ; and 
that is, as fure as wc can be of any thing. Whether therefore that doth confijl 
with reafon, or «o/, is to be inquired. 

To produce a being into a ftate of clear happinefs, in any degree, can be no in- 
jury to it i or into a Hate ofmixt happine/s, provided the happincfs certainly over- 
balances the contrary, and the unhappy or fuffering part be not greater than what 
tliat being would cboo/e in order to obtain the Iv.ippineft, or rather than lofe it. 
Nor, again, can any wrong be done by producing a being fubje& to more mifery 
than happinefs, if that being hath it in his own power to avoid the mifery, 
orfo much of it, as may leave the remainder of mifery not greater, than what 
he would rather fuflain than mifs the proportion of happinefs. The only cafe 
then, by which wrong can be done in the producbion of any being, is, when 
it is neceffarily and irremediably to be miferable, without any recompcnfe, or ba- 
lance of that mifery " : and this indeed is a cafe fo grievous, fo utterly irrecon- 
cilable to all reafon^ that the heart of a reafoning and confidering mancanfcarce 
bear the thought of it. So much every one muil underftand of the nature of 
reafon and jultice as to allow thefe things for trutlis incontellable. 

Now then he, who f lys the/o/// of man is mortal, muft lay one of dicfe two things : 
cither that God is an unrcafonablc, unjull, cruel Being ; or that no man in refpeft of 
this life (which according to him is .t//), has a greater llure of mifery, ««tjro/^«^>, 
than of happinefs. To fay the former is to contradid that, which I prefume has 
been proved beyond contradiflion. To which I may add here, that this is to a\-ow 
fuch an unworthy, impious notion of the Supreme being, as one would not entertain 
without caution even of the worfl of men > llich a one, as even the pcrfon himfclh^ 
who fays this, muft know to be fal/e. For he cannot but fee, and muft own many 
inftances of the rea/onablenefs and beneficence of the Deity : not one of which could 
be, if cruelty and unrcafonablcnefs were His inclination ; lincc He has power to ex- 
ecute His own inclinations thoroughly, and isaBeingH«//o/7« in his nature. Then 
to fay the latter is to contradift the whole Jlory of mankind, and even ones ownfirnfes. 

• That paiF-ge in S. Iqqar. imports much the fame thing, that has been laid here : t^'l 
.—101 >i-JK^v) <iN-\ r^ y~^ in'N'SOvu -imm >.iyo'u; mj^i aia iniN^y>;\x; nannvy -isao 
;■•.•< --Don ><in y \r\ cxi sc'o''«i' m><t laun Nin :ir^n dn y-in> anin joDiiyo inN'\-i;-va 
- isvow Ms»-t. . ^ ~ 

I Conli- 

Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 20 1 

Confidcr well the dreadful effects of many w.rr.f, and all thofc barbarous dcfola- 
tions, which wc read of: what cruel tyrants there arc, and have been in the 
world, who far leall in their fits) divert themfelics with the pangs and convulll- 
ons of their fellow- creatures* : what/zar^r^is'', and hovi men have been brought 
into that lamentable llate : how many have been ruind by accidents unforefcen: 
how many luve fufferd or been undone by unjujl laws, judges, wicnclTcs, t^c '. 
how many have brought incurable di/eafes^ or the cau/cs of tlicm, and of great 
torments, into the world with rhem : how many more, fuch bodily infirmities 
and difadvantages, as have renderd their whole lives uneafy : how many arc 
born to no other inheritance but invincible poverty and trouble? Intbnccs arc 
cndlefs: but, for a little lafle of the condition of mankind here, rcflcCl upoa 
that llory related by Strabo (from Polybius) and Plutarchy where, even by or- 
der of the Reman fenatc, P. iy£mylins<) one of the bed of them too, at one 
prefixt hour facked and dcHroyA feventy cities, unawares, and drove fifteen wy- 
riads of innocent pcrlbns into captivity j to be fold, only to raife pay for the 
mercilefs foldiers and their own executioners. Pcrufethat account of thcgold- 
■works in the confines of Egypt given by Diodorus : and think over thecircum- 
ftanccs of the unfortunate laborers there, who were not only criminals, or men 
taken in war, but even fuch as calumny^ or unjujl power had doomd ('perhaps 
for being too good) to that place of tormentj many times with all their relations 

a C.CifAr Stnatores (^ Equites — ceciJit, torfit, noH qimfiionij, ftJznmi causa. UenJt quof- 

Jam IX litis ad iMcernamdtcollabat. Tor/erat per omnia, qud in rtrum natura lriftiJJ!m» funt, 

fidi(ulis,Si.c.Sen. Homt, facrares, jam ftr hCum 0> }ocam occiJitur. Id. '' Slaves were rec- 

kond among beads of old. Oiin y> ym, xtpuxx^, cut' ci kta^xTi <riiy' 11. turif. And fbractiircs as 
mere inftrumcnts and tools. 'O ^ ^bAo« •^•4/i;te» c^/xtof to J ' il^yam i-^vx't ^Sao^. ^ifi. Their 
fad condition I will fct down in Piatt's words. Ouk <i.Jfc< tStc y iVi to na^ruM, tI itS'ixu^ i.)t.» 

iidfxTiin Ti»!c, «1 xtu-Pit T«.^r«»ai i>ii- >i ^,f iV? iJi»»fii»s5 li Tf ex>:A«r.i^o|it,ivo<: , u,), i.o-Ti iVi"» avrci 
ivri etr^Ct, ati^, OL^ii tf at Knh,r»i. « Thofc Ufiiirti ^ «Ti«-oi eVi/>;i«i, which the TifiStut had 

broui^ht upon the cities oi jtfia, are too many to be tr.infcribed : but fome account of them is to be 
fccn in Plui. v. Luc. which may fcrve for one inrtancc out of thoufands. It may be rcricond maiincfs 
\liA<x6,max,masiirtutts,quafigraxiJpm» deli<!a,fumrei as rd/.A/.fays.fpcakingof PAoc/OT'scafe: but 
fuch midnefs has keen very common, and men have fuffercd even for their virtue. Of/i«i cruelly put to 
death, Ocham forortm—, (^ patruum cum cintum ampliiis filiis ac ntfotibus—, nulla injuria UctJ/kks, 
fid quodintin maximum afuJ Perfti pTohitMs o- foriiiudmis laiidim cmfftire viJtbat. Id. And Senrca 
having rcco i mcinlcd the example oi Grtcmus Julius iJifliuiGrdcmus, af. Tacit, the father of 7«- 
liui jigruola, adds, qutmC. occidit tb hoc unum, qited mtlior vir trar, qu,'im ejft qucmquam 
lyrAnuo txfcjiret. 


202 The Religion i?/' Nature. Seifl. IX. 

and poor children*. Or, oncefor all, take a view o( fervifudc, as it is defcribed by 
P:g>iorius. To pafs over the Sicilian tyrants, him oi' Pbero", ^pollodorns '', and 
the like, of which hillory fupplies plenty j confidcr thofe terrible profcriptions 
among the Remans ^, with the reigns of moft of their emperors^ more bloody 
than Lybic lion, or Ilyrcanian tiger, even fome of the Cbrijlian emperors not 
excepted. Read the direful and uniuft executions reported by ylmm. MarccUi- 
tius : among hundreds of others that of Etifebius ''. Kvcry whi/per in thofe times 
or light fu/picion brought upon men the queftion and tortures inconceivable. 
Men's very dreams were once interpreted to be treafon ; and they durft fcarce 
own, that they had ever flept "=. What inhuman punifhments were ufcd a- 
mong the Per/tans *, in an arbitrary manner too j and many times extended to 
whole fimilics, and all the kindred, tho not concerned 8 ? But inllcad of enume- 
rating here burnings, crucifixions, breakings upon the wheel, impalings, "«' 
f io-^B5, {jff . I choofe to refer you to thofe authors, who have defignedly treated 
of the /o>7«^«/j and qtiejlions of the ancients. Look into the hiftoiyof theC/j;;/?/- 
an Churchy and her martyrologies : cxamin the prifons of the inqtiifition.^ the 
groans of which thofe walls are confcious, and upon whaty//^/.;?occafions men 
are racked and tortured by the tormentors there : and, to finifh this detail (hide- 
ous indeed, but too true) as foft as I can, confider the many mafHicres, perfccu- 
tions, and mifcries confcqucnt upon them, which /it//? religion h;is caufed, au- 
thorized, fan£tified. Indeed the hiftory of mankind is little elfe but the hifto- 
ry of uncomfortable, dreadful paflliges : and a great part of it, however things 
are palliated and gilded over, is Icarccly to be red by ^ good naiured man without 
amazement, horror, tears. One can fcarce look into ixneivs-papcr., or out at his 
window^ but hardfliips and fufferings prefent themfelves, in one fhape or other. 
Now among all thofe millions^ who have fuflFerd eminently, can it be imagind, that 
there have not been w«///V«^e;, whofe griefs and pangs have/ar out-weigbd -xXXthcix 
injoyments j and yet who have not been able, either by their innocence, their 

liiiru -acunc, a-vyfitfiaf. *> Mentiond by Cicero with Phalaris. He was tyrant of CaJptnJrin, and 

.is rccrcicntcd (out of Polyinus) as 9«»i>'a"'«l(^ $ <i^«T«TiS>- s-arrtm, c<rci «•«•'' E»)io-i» h s-«f«Ba^e«»- 
ftm tTveuriKirat . Yct ^lian (ays, 'Ex ^ oivk i<,T«v«$Ai'/e^i>©' ^ i/TfJas-IJu.ii'®-, symrt ^»i«»'ti««, xA. 
<: It is faid of Sylla's peace, after Mariiu's party were broken, Fax cum itilo de crndeiitate certavit, (^ 
■vicit. S. Auft. '' ^ui ita evifceralus, ut cruc'tAtibus membra deejfent, imphrans c*lo jufnriam, 

torvum remJcns fundato pellore man/It immobilis, &c. In the reign of Conftantius. « Mtrebant' 

qne doiti quiiUm, quid afud Atlantcos natinon tjfent, ubi memeranlur /omnia non videri. ' J'. Pint- 
iav.Artcx. 6 Ob noxam imiui omnit frofinquitas ferit. Amtn. Marc. 


Truths hdonging to a Private Man, ^c. 203 

pradcncc, or any power in them, tocicape ihnt bitter draughty which they have 
drunk ? And then, how can we acquit i\\c juU ice and re-ifonablenefs of that Being, 
upon whom thelc poor creatures depend, and who leaves them fuch great lolbrs 
by their cxillcnce, if there be no future fiat e, where the proper amends maybe 
made? So that the argument is brought to this undeniable ill'ue j ifthe>///of 
man is not immortal^ either theie is tio God, upon whom we depend ; or He is 
an unreafunablc Being j or there never has been any man, whofc liiftlringsin this 
world have exceeded his injoyments, without his being thecaufe of it himfelf. 
But furely no one of thefc three things can be faid. E>go — • 

That, which aggravates the bard cafe of the poor Ibfferers mcntiond above, if 
there be wo future Jl ate, in which their pail llifTcrings may bcbrought into the ac- 
count, and recompcnled, is, that many times then- pcrfe cut or st^nd tormentors pafs 
their Uves in plenty and grandeur : that is, the innocent have not only the portion* 
that properly belongs to the criminal and unreafonable part of mankind, but 
the gui it y have that, which belongs rather to the innocent '. Such a tranfpo- 
_/<//e« of rewards and punilhments, ending in itfclf, without any refpeft to fome- 
thing which is to follow hereafter, can never confifl with the nature of a Go- 
vernor, who is not very m\ic\\ below rational: a thought, which God for bid zny 
one iTiould dare to admit of Him. To iuppofe the virtuous and ivife left ultimate- 
ly but in the lame Hate with the unjuft and profligate is tofuppofe (\xch a. conjli' 
tution of nature, as never can flow from a principle of reafon, a God of truth 
iTiA equity : and therefore fuch a conftitution, as leaves the former in a wor/e con- 
dition than the other, can much lefs be fuppofcd. 

Obj. It hath been faid, that virtue tends to make men's lives happy even here, ^c. 
and how then can the virtuous be fuppofcd ever to be fo very miferable ? Anf. In or- 
dinary cafes virtue doth produce happinefs : at leafl: it has indeed a natural tendency 
to it ; is the mean,by which it is molt likely to be attaind ; and is therefore the way, 
which a wife man would choofe for his own iakc. But then it doth not follow from 
hence, that there arc wo perturbations in human affairs ; no cafes, in which the ul'ual 
effect of virtue may be overpower d by diftafes, violence, dyfallers. It doth not ren- 
der men invulnerable j cannot command thcfeafons j nor prevent many great cala- 
mities, under which \ii tue and vice mull fall undi/IingtiiJJjd. ('There may be a dirccl 
road to a place, and fuch a one, as he, who fcts out for that place, ought to be found 
in, and yet it is poflible he may meet with robbers or accidents in it, that may incom- 
mode, or hurt him in his journey .) On the other fide, vice and wickednefs may be fo 

• Dill Jtficitt, fi vtlim numtr/irt, qiiiiuj lenis mtli titntrit : nee miniu, fi eommtmortm, quiiuj 
iinfrtbis eftimi. Cic. Thi? 15 juflly faiJ ; tho I account his inftances not tlic raoft appolltc. 


204 The Religion^ o/' Nature. Se6l. IX. 

circumftantiatcd as to be attended with much greater pkafure thxnpain^ contrary 
to the tendency of its nature : that is, a ivickcd man may be of a healthful make, 
born to riches or power, or fortunately placed for attaining them ; and from the 
advantage of a Itrong body, an ample fortune, many friends, or lucky hits, he 
may derive /i/f^/are/, which fhall exceed the prcfent »«fo«w«;>«ff; and fuffejings 
naturally following from his vices ». 

Men's a'>rKw/?««ff;haveanaturalinfluenccwithrclpc6l to the prefent pleafurcs 
or fufferings, as well as their wV/«e or vice. No body fure ever faid, that (j// de- 
pends o»/;' upon thcfe : nor, when the natural tendence of //^f w is aflerted, is the 
natural tendence or cffcft of the ot/jer denied. Therefore indeed, when it is faid 
thztv'ntuc Katurally tends to make men happy even here, the meaning only is, 
that it tends to make men happy in proportion to their circum (lances j and \icc 
does the contrary. It is naturally produftive of that part of happincfs, which is 
in our ow« jfowf;', and depends upon ourfelves; makes men more tiiily happy, 
whatever their circum (lances are, than they could be ivithoat it, and commonly 
tends to mend their worldly circum (lances too : but it is not adcrted, that vir- 
tue can ahvayi intirely corrcft them, or make men fo completely happy in this 
life, as that their injoyments (hall exceed their mortifications ; no more than 
the vices of fomc particular men, tho they bereave them of many folid plcafures, 
and bring troubles upon them too, do hinder their worldly injoyments from be- 
ing greater than their prefent fufferings. Not only our ^r/»^, hut cur place^ 
with the rzwf, and manner of our being in this world depend upon the Author of 
the (chemc the manner oi behaving our fehes in our (lation fliccording to our in- 
dowments, and the talents we havej only depends upon us. And perhaps (which 
has been hinted already) He has lb orderd things on purpofc, that from the various 
compofttions of men's circum (lances with the natural e(fe£ts of their virtues and vi- 
ces, and the many inequalities ari(ing thence, they might fee the neccjjity andr^r- 
tainty of another (late ; and that for this reafon there iTiould always be iomc re- 
markable indances of opprcjl innocence and Jlourifiing -wickednefs. 

The uplliot is, that upon comparing thofe pleafures^which are the natural cf- 
■fe£ls of virtue with thofe fujferings^ which are the natural effects of ill conditu- 
tion or other calamity, tbcjc are many, very many times found to cxxeed ; and c con- 
trario^ upon balancing tbvje evils, which are the genuin cffcCts of vice, againd tiic 

• Yet according to Ariftotlt he cannot h<: bppy for all that. His opinion Diog. L. rcprcicntt 
S-S, Tr.» fS/i TCI x«(«i'«» ii/Toifxi) T(ci KiuieiktiJiietiat, xut iVt ^«/.ir« Tufr, ii/rj Tif ixTej iyair'a i^ 


Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 205 

advantages rcfuking from a fortunate cftate, thefe may often be found to outdo the 
other. Both contrary to rcafon^ if all ends with this hfc, and aftcrdcath be nothing. 
For my part, if tiicre were only fonie few, nay but one inllance of each kind in the 
world funf'ortunatc virtue, and profperous wickednefs), it would be to me a fuffici- 
cnt argument for a future flate : becaufe God cannot be unjull or unreafornble in 
any one inftancc. It mufl: not be forgot here, that many times men of great -vices have 
alio great z'irtucs, and the natural effcft of ihcle may qualify that of the other, and 
being added to their favourable circumllancesmay help to turn thefcalc. 

If there is no other befidc the prefent being, thc^^fw/vj/ and «,7/a/ll:ate of man- 
kind is fcarce confident with the idea of a reafonabk Caufc. Let us confider it a lit. 
tie '. Not to mention what we mull fuffer from the very fcttkment and condition of 
this world by hunger, thirll, heat, cold, and indifpofiiionsj like /f^j-j^i one gene- 
ration drops, and another fprings up, to fall again, and be forgotten ''. As wc come 
into the world with the labor of our mothers, we loon go out of it with our own. 
Chiidhood znd youth aremuch of them loll in infcnllbilicy or trifling, vanity and 
nidcncfs J obnoxious to many pains and accidents ; and, when they arc fptnt in 
the bed manner, are attended with labor and difcipline. When wc reach that 
fJage of life, which ufually takes us from our nearell relations, and brings us out 
into the world, with what dift'iculty are proper imployments and ilations found 
for us .' When wcxxc get out, and left to tcrimblc for ourfclves, how many 
bardfi:ips and tricks are put upon us, before we get the lagacity and dexterity 
to favc ourlclvcs? How many f/;rt«ffj do wc Hand ? How troublefomc '\%bufinefs 
made by unreafonablcncfs, ill nature, or trifling and want of punctuality in the pcr- 
fons with whom we deal ? How do we find ourfclves inibunly furroundcd with 
fnares from men, knaves, enemies ('of which the bell men have fomc^, 
oppofite intcrclls, faftions, and many times from a mifchievous breed, whole chil- 
dijh or diabolical humor fecks pleafure in the untafincfs of other people? Even 
in muiyof thofc /«;o;otc«/;, which men princip.illy propoic to them 111 ves, they 
are greatly difappoinled, and experience flicws, how unlike they are to the an- 
tecedent images of them. They are commonly niixt ••" : the apparatus to molt of 
them is too opcrofe : the completion of them feldom depends upon ourj'elves 

• ti xalii amuln noftrorum a:ijirt Uberum. For, as Stntc* fjys, Siilli cmti^it impuni nafii. 
*' OiiTT|» Ou».Ki yni'f Tc.rct i «>«<v>. r ^ ^uu, i<i' e-n/ntyit. Horn. This is true not only ol 

fingle mtn, but even of cities (famous ones), kingdoms, empires. One may fay the fame concern- 
ing nuny of theno, that Flirui fays of ftii : Laierat »nn»lmm fdts, ut I'tios fuijft crcJirriHi' 
' Ltttr xeliiftMfq, diJftinilhm»n»tMr», fieittiti qimdam initr ^t aHiiirali fnnt jiiml*. Liv. 

D d alonCf 

2o6 The Religion of Nature. Sect. IX. 

rtloHCf but upon a concurrence of things, which rarely hit all right": they art 
gencnilly not only lefs in pra6lice, than in theory, but die almofl as loon as they 
are: and perhaps they intail upon us a tax to be paid after they are gone. To 
goon with tlie hillory of bur/ian life : tho affiiirs go profperoufly, yet flill per- 
haps x family is increafing, and with it new occalions of felicitude are introdu- 
ced, accompanied with many fears and tender apprehenfior.s. At length, if a 
man, through many cares and toils and various adventures, arrives at old age^ 
then he feels moll: commonly his pre£ures rather increafed, than diminilTid, and 
himfelf lefs able to fupport them ''. The bufincfs he has to do grows uygent 
upon him, and calls for difpatcb : mod: of his faculties and aftivc powers begin 
now to fail him apace: relations -md friends, who might be helpful to him fand 
among them perhaps the dear Confort of all his joys, and all his cares <=) leave 
him, never to return more : wants and pains all the while are multiplying upon 
him : and under this additional load he comes melancholy behind, tottering, and 
bending toward the earth ; ciU he cither {tumbles upon fomething which throws 
him into the grave \ or filiating fills of himlclf And mufthe end here? Is 
this ihe period of his being? Is this all? Did he come into the world only to 
make his w^j' through the prefs, amidft many juftlings and hard ftruggles, with 
at beft only a few deceitful, little, fugacious pleafures interfperfed, and {ago out 
of it again? Can thisbean end worthy afirftCaulc/)c^/Vfl/)' reafunahle? Would 
even any man, of common fcnfe and good nature, fend another upon a dijfcuh 
journey, in which, tho he might perhaps now and then meet with a little finootli 
way, get an interval for reft and contemplation, or be flattcrd with fomc vei-- 
dures and the fmiles of a few daifics on the banks of the roadj yet upon the 
whole he muft travel through much dirt, take many wearifom ftcps, be conti- 
nually inquiring after feme clew ordire£l:ions tocairy him through the turnings 
and intricacies of it, be puzzled how to get a competent -viaticum and pay his 
reckonings, ever and anon be in danger of being loft in deep waters, and bcfidc 
forced all the while to fence againft weather, accidents, and cruel robbers, wlio 
arc every where lying in wait for him : I fiy, would any one fend a man upon 
fuehajourneyzs this, only that the man might faint and expire at the end of it, 
and all his thoughts peri fh} that is, either for «o f Wat all, or for the punijhmei.t 
of one, whom I fuppofc never to have hurt him, nor ever to have been capable 

» Soifiblcof this, Socrates ufed to lay, hn t«< iJoret;, ^i ruf' «»«, <i»ie xuf i/uh SufS^. Stt6. 
* Sencx, (^ Uvtjjimij quoqiciiris impar: as Seneca, ofliimfclf, in Tac. f Ro^tis AfiicirnJui 

»m»tt Comugii,(j'C. Juv. * S^i'xja :rxX»t» <r*/w/«T' ivtaZft (or.i^. Scfh. •• 

4 .• of 

Truths belonging to a Private Man, fe'r. 207 

of hurting him ? And now can we impute to God that, which is below the 
common fize of men ' ? 

I :im apt to think, that even among thofc, whofe ftatc is beheld with envy, tiierc 
are many, who, if at the end of their courfe they were put to their option^ wl>e- 
ther, without any refpefb to a future Jiate^ they would repeat all the pleafures 
they have had in life, upon condition to go over again alfo all the fame difappoint- 
ments, the fime vexations and unkind treatments from the world, the fame fe- 
cret pangs and tedious houis, the famelaboisof body and mind, the fume 
pains and fickncffcs, would he far from accepting them at that price ''. 

But here the cafe, as I have put it, only refpefts them, who may be reckond 
among ihc more fortunate pafl'cngers : and ior one, that makes his voyage fo well, 
thoufands are toft in tempcfts, and loft <^. How many never attain any comforta- 
blei'cttlcment in the world ? How many fail, after they have att;iind it, by various 
misfortunes ? W hat melancholy, what diftraftions are caufed in families by inhu- 
mane or vitious husbands, falfe or peevifh wives, refraftory or unhappy chil- 
dren ; ;ind, if they arc othcrwife, if they arc good,what forrow by the lofs of them ? 
How many arc forced by neccility upon drudging and very fhocking imploy- 
ments for a poor livelihood ? How many fubfift upon begging, borrowing, and o- 
thcr iTiifts, nor can do otherwifc ? How many meet with fad accidents, or fall into 
deplorable difeafts ? Are not all companies, and the very ftrcets filled with com- 
plaints, and grievances, and doleful ftories? I verily believe, that a great part 
of mankind may afcribe their deaths to want and dejcdrion. Serioufj} , the pre- 
fent flate of mankind is unaccountable, if it has not fome connexion with ano' 
tbcr, and be not as it were the porch or entry to it ^. 

There is one thing more, of which notice ought to be taken. To one, who 
caretully pemfcs the kory and face of the world, what appears to prevail in it ? [$ 
it not corruption, vice, iniquity, folly at leaft ? Are not debauching «, getting 
per fai aut nefas, defaming one another, creating tyrannies of one kind or other, 

• nu'trif iru,:t ci i^m. .'/j; ixl "f iii 0vr\t ii Ketu ii uhf i| i', T( ut ru^n -T kl,'tn ^i««,aT©«- 

I-.. -•. iTi/(;^,);; iiT« Tict>ifXf/,if T«Aii iuTbp^ii >.4.^»n K, ^ut»y\it t K^^iAnn ^ ricaTiAoif, « to'j & 
.-.-, kX. TeiirSv ':.1-. Haf. * Son tnehtTcult puifqutm accffijit [zilam'], r.i^ J.i. 

Titur mfciii. Sen. ' rAutiffn tt crtit futdHci in month »rJm •vtrtictm ctl/iortm ; ffeeu- 

Urt iaJe rerum mfratt jactr.tmm f,idn ; (^ oculii in d',xtrf» ferrtclis, flHcfimnih intintii mlinrs in- 
iHtrf. yjmftculi (y ifi'e mij'er.i6trij, (fc. Cyrr. •• '3SD ininST nOH . — lin Cnblyn 

C-inn a>iyn. p. Moth. ' O fi fcjj;t in HU fubUmi fpeaiLi ccnftitHtus eailos lius infi. 

rirt ftcrHis, rieludtri tiibicutorum oUii:'iai forei, (y> tiJ ccr.fcienti.%m luminum ftnttrtili* occulta rt- 
ftrurr, Qrc. C)pr- 

Dd 1 pro- 

2o8 The Religion of Nature. Se61:. IX. 

propagating empty and fcnfelcis opinions with bawling and faiy the great bufi- 
nersof'//^/j -iVorld? And arc notallthcfc contrary to reafon? Can any one then 
with reafon imagine, that reafon fliouldbc given, tho it were but to a few, only 
to be run down and trampled upon, and then extinguiJJjd? May we not rather 
conclude, that there muft he fame ivcrld, where reafon will have its turn, and 
prevail and triumph ? Some kingdom of reafon to come ' ? 

f. In the laft place, x\vx\. great expeHation^ which men have, of continuing to 
live in another Itatc, beyond the grave^ has I fuppoie been commonly admitted as one 
proof^ that they f Jail liz-e; and does feem indeed to me to add fome weight to 
what has been laid. That they generally have had fuch an eA;/>£'(J?^//ow, canfcarcc 
be denied. The hillorics of mankind, their deifications, rites, flories of appari- 
tions, the frequent mention oi' a. bades^ with rewards and punilTiments hercafterj 
(ffc. all teftify, that even the Heathen world believed, ihatthcfouls of men furvi- 
ve^ their bodies. Their ignorance indeed of the feats and circumftancesofthsde- 
parted has begot many errors a.ndfaperfiitions > and thefe have been multiplied by 
licentious />flf/; and idle vifonairs : but this, being no more than what is ufual in 
ihc hkc cafes, ought to be no prejudice againll t\\c fundartiental opinion itfelf. 

Cicero '', tho he owns there were different opinions among the Greek philo- 
fophers about this matter > that, quod Uteris extet^ Pberecydes Syrusprimum dixit^ 
animos hominum cjfe fempiternos ; that Pythagoras and his fchool confirmed this 
opinion J that Plato was the man, who brought a reafon for it, i^c. yet tells us 
plainly, naturam ipfam de imtnortalitate animorum tacitam judicare j that nefcto 
quotnodo inhteret in mentions quaft fieculorum quoddam augur i urn; that permanere 
animos arhitramur confenfu nationum omnium j and more to this purpofc. Now 
if this confent was only the effect of fome tradition, handed from parents to 
their children > yet fince we meet with it in all the quarters of the world (where 
there is ar,y civility or fenfe), and in all ages, it fecms to be coeval to mankind 
itfelf, and born with it. And this is fufficient to give a great authority to this 
opinion of the foul's immortality. But this is not all. For it is fupportcd by all 
the foregoing arguments, and many other reafonings and fymptoms whicli we 
may find within ourfelves. All which, put together, may at lead y///?;/)' an 
cxpeftation of a future ftate : that is, render it a juft or rcafonable cxpcdation : 
and then this reajonabk expeSlation grow.-;, by being fuch, into a iurther ar- 
gument, that there ixill be I'uch a Itatc. 

* Bcfidc, there being no faticty of knowledge in this life, we may hope for future opportuniticj, 
■when our faculties (liall be exalted, jj-r. Tr5 a.yri^iU', i ^mi, f cVtG^ itfiij evrtoA*^ i^vtrtlf 
^i^r.Vgrir iairey Unim, kt^. Slut. ^ In Tufc, dijf. 


Truths belonging to a Private Man, ^c. 2 op 

Fancy a man walking in fomc retiredfuhl^ tar from noifc, and free from prr- 
iudicc, to debate this matter with himfclf : and then judge, whether fuch mc- 
dttations as thcle would not be jull. " I think I maybe fure, that neither lifelef! 
" matter^ nor iht vegetatrje tribe, that ftonc, that flower, that tree have any 
*' reflex thoughts : nor do thc/enjitive animals, that fhcep, that ox, fecm to have 
*' any fuch thing, or but in the lowell degree, and in refpcdt of prefcnt objcfls 
*' only. They do not rfrt/ti«, nor^y/?o.vr/?. I may therefore certainly pretend to 
" be fomcthing mui;b above all thcfc things •. I not only apprehend and confi- 
" der thefe external obje&s afting at prclent upon my nerves, but have ideas 
" railed within my felf of a higher order, and many: lean, not only reprefenc 
" to my felf things, that arey or have been, but deduce many other from them, 
*' make excurfions into futurity, and forefee much of what will be, or at Icaft 
*' may be j by Ihi<5t thinking I had almoll: (iiid, get into another world before- 
*' hand: and, whether I fhall live in fome other flate after death, or not, I am 
" certainly a being capable of fuch an cxpe^ation, and cannot but be folicitous a- 
*' bout it : none of which things can be laid of thefc clods, or thofe brutes ^. Can 
" I then be defignd for nothing further, than jufl: to cat, drink, fleep, walk about, 
" and ad: upon this earth "•" ; that is, to have no further being, than what thcfc 
*' brutes have, fo fiir beneath me ? Gm I be made capable of fuch great expeHati- 
*' ons, which thofe animals know nothing of (happier by far in this regard than I 
*' am, if we mull die alike), only to be difappointed at lajl ? Thus phccd, jull upon 
" the confines of another better world, and iGi\ with hopes of penetrating into it, 
" and injoying it, only to make -xfl.wrt appearance here ^, and then to bcfiut out 
" znd totally Junk F Mull I then, when Ibid my laft farewell to thcfc walks, when 
" I dole thefe lids, and yonder blue regions and all this fccne darken upon me and 
*' go out, mud I then only ferve to furnilli dull to be mingled with the aflics of 
" thefc herds andplants, or with this dirt under my feet ? H:ivc I been (ct/o far a' 
*' bo^^-e them in life, only to be leveld -with them at death ? 

This argument grows Jlronger in the apprehenlion of one, who is confcious of a- 
biUtics and irnelk^ual improvements, which he has had no opportunity here of 
ihcwing and ufing, through want of health, want of confidence =, wantofpro- 

• Mcthinks thofe philofophers ra;ke but an odd appearance in ftory, who, looking big and faftu« 
o\i5, at the lime time protcfl'cd, that their own fouk were not fupcrior to thofe of gnats, o>c. •« 

Taji^tXi liiirsicxcTK u,i)«i> Karat ri* irixt ^ix^i'iii uriftniaiTo I'ttTiJ'^ xi kJ iVa??, i fj-vtct.:, ■ 

y^ rv«(^;e^ Ti*' ••<^*» ittrrit <ri>.ereOtiTiTtir ■^vy^'.t, aS Zuffb. •> Altx.imUr i(tCT 

ilcath might lie in the Lwe Hate v/ith his multtier (M. Anton.), lut furc not with his miilft 

' Brnii tft hic fntilui txmuUii, may be juftly CM for all LucrtliHs. ^ O »o«-^2v- c-«iin), 


21 o The Religiox of Nature. Sed. IX, 

per place, want oi liberty. Such improvements, and the knowledge confcquent 
upon them, cannot ultimately rcfpecb /Z;/;/i^/^ ; they can be only an inlargcment, 
and preparation for another. That is all they can be : and if they arc not that, they 
Mc nothing. And therefore he may be fuppofcd thup, further, to argue within 
liimlelf. *' Can the Author of my reafoning faculties be Himfclf fo unreafonabJe 
" as to give me them, either not to imploy them, or only to weary my fclf with 
" ufelefs purfuits, and then drop me ? Can He, who is privy to all my circum- 
" ftauces, and to thcfe very thoughts of mine, be fo infcnfiblc of my cafe, as to 
" have no regard to it, and not provide for it ? 

It gi-o\\'s Jlroriger Jiill upon the mind of one, who reflecting upon theliard 
treatment he has met with from this world, the little caufc he has given for it, 
the pains and fccret uneafinefs he has felt upon that fcorc, together with many 
other fuflPcrings which it was not in his power to prevent, cannot but make a 
Jilent, humble appeal to that Being, who is his laji and true refuge^ and who he 
mutl believe will not de/ert him thus. 

hn.itiy, iiis Jlrot/gejl of all to onc^ who, bcfidesall this, endeavours in the con- 
du£t of his life to obfervc the laws of rea/bn fchat is, of his nature ; and that is, of 
the yiuthor of nature^ upon whom he depends^; laments, and labors againlt his 
owninfirmittes; implores the Divine mercy; ^rays for (ome better Jl ate hereafter j 
a£ts and lives in the hopes of one j and denies himfelf many things upon that \icw : 
one, who by the exaltation of his reafonTind upper faculties, and that, which is 
certainly the cffcd of real and uil-ful philofophy, the pradice of virtue, is ftill 
approaching toward a higher manner of being, and doth already taftcfomething 
fpiritual and above this world. To fuch a one there muft be a llrong expecta- 
tion indeed., and the argument built upon it muft be proportionable. I'or can he 
be indowd with fuch capacities, and have as it were overtures of immortality 
made him, if after all there is no fuch thing? Muft his private ^l&s and conceald 
exercifes of religion be all loft ' ? Can a perfe£t Being have fo little regard to ont , 
who however inferior and nothing to Him, yet regards Him according to his 
hefl abilities in the government of himfelf ? 

Arc fuch meditations and reflexions asthefe well founded, or not ? If they arc, 
it muft be rcafonable to think, that God will fatisfy a reafonabk e.\-peilatiott. 

There are other arguments for the immortality of the foul, /n'o of which I will 
leave with you, to be at your Icifurc pondcrd well. The one is, that, ihhcfotfis of 
inenarcww7rt/(cxtinguinid at deaths, the ctikoi' brufes is by much preferable to 
th\to( men. The pleafures oi' hrutcs, tho but fcnfual, are more fmccic, being 

i Hie pi ft mis honos t 


Truths heJongirig to a Private Man, ^c. 2 1 1 

pallcJ or diminilTid by no divcitjng confidcnuion : they go v:holly into them ; 
and when they have them no:, they Iccm lefs to them , not thinking of them 
Their T^^it/w^; are attended with no reflexion*, hutarcfuch as they are faidto 
be p. 34. obf. 8. They are void oi cares j arc under no apprehcnllon for families 
and pofterityj never fatigue themfelvcs with vain inquiries, hunting after it«ou'- 
Itdge which muft perilli with them ; are not anxious about i\\t\r future Jlate\ 
nor can be difappointed of any hopes or expectations j and at laft fome fuddcn 
blow (or a few minutes oi unforefeen pain) finilhes them, having never /o much 
as ktu-xn that they were mortal. 

The other iSt th:Lt the Cou\ is n principle of life : that, which brings vitality to 
the body. For howfhould that, which has been proved to be a fubftance, and 
at the fame time is alfo a principle of life, and as fuch (as being what it is) is 
alive; I fay, how can that die ', unlefs it is annihilated ? 

Here I begin to be very fcnfible how much I w^ant agttide. But as the religion 
o? nature is my theme, I muft at prcfent content my felf with that light which 
future affords ; my bufincfs being, as it feems, only to lliew, what a Heathen 
fhilofopher, without any other help, and almoll ivreS\7xKT&'^ m^y [,(> fuppofcd to 
think. I hope that neither the doing of this, nor any thing elfc containd inthis 
Delineation^ can be the leaft prejudice to any other true religion. Whatever is 
immediately reveald from God, muft, as well as any thing el(b, be treated as be- 
ing u-bat it is : which cannot be, if it is not treated with the hi»heft regard, 
believed and obeyd. therefore, which has been fo much infiftcd on by me, 
and is as it were the burden of my fong, is fo far from undermining true reveald 
religion, that it rather paves the way for its reception. This I take this oppor- 
tunity to remark to you once for all. And fo returning to my philofopher I can- 
not imagin but that even he would have at leaft fome fuch general thoughts as 
thefe, which make up alraoft the remainder of this laft feftion. 

• Tert fericula, qut viJmt, fugiunt : cum ffugtre, fecurt funt, &c. Sen t> ^<i» 

CI cnN3 r-iiDb CQiDu; any vi;o arma nyiov. s. j^^uar. c sic mihi ferfuafi.fic 

ftntio. cunt fimptr agitttur animui, ntc frineifium motui habeat, quia ft tfj'r mtniiat i ne 

Jinim qnidtm haiiturum ejfe wot hi, quia nnnquatn ft if ft ft rehiluriij. Cic. That in Grfg. Thaum. 
is like this thought ot" T«//f ; H vv;^,, «t/T.>cA,T.t »o-«, iS,rtr, i fixAuxii- i«Ai.^iry>riii,. 
T.«..,T- T. iu iun,r» ii.x>- ri ^ Mi •u,,Tc,xravf» iVi. «A. But that n S.Anftin comes fomething 

nearer to my meaning ; ijl aiiimHi xit* qutJam, utiJi omnt quod unimatum eft lixit. Sm tr^o 

fottft animui mtri. N»m fi carrrr fotirit viiA, wiinimus/fi/ animatum nliquid tft. 


212 7^/^(? Religion 6/^ Nature. Seel. IX. 

IX. The fuul, ivhcn it parts from this grofs bocly^ will pa/s by fomc law inta 
Jvme new feat^ or flat e^ agreeable to the nature of it". Every fpccics of beings 
muft belong lo fame region, or flate. Becaufc nothing can be, but it muft be 
fame where., und fome how : and there being different kinds of abodes and man- 
ners of fubfifcing in the uniNcrfe, and the natures of the things, that arc to 
cxift in them, being alfo different, tlicrc will be a greater cotigruity between 
thcfc fevcral natures refpcftivcly and fomc particular places., orflates, than there 
is between them and others j and indeed fuch a one, that out of thofe per- 
haps they cannot fubfit't, or not naturally. To thofe therefore muft be their rc- 
fpcftivc tcmlemes : to thole they are adjudged by the courfe of nature, and con- 
ftitution of things, or rather by the Author of them •». 

While the foul is in the body, it has fome powers and opportunities of moving it 
fpontaneoufly, ca- otherwife than it would be moved by the nicer laws of gra- 
vitation and mcchanifm. This is evident. But yet, notwithftanding this, the 
weight of that^o^/j, to which atprefent it is limited ('among ether caufes) con- 
ftrainsit to ad for a while upon this ftage. That general law, to which bodies 
are fubjcfted, makes it fmk in this fluid of air, fo much lighter than itfclf ; 
keeps it down j and fo determines the feat of it, and of the foul in it, to be 
upon the furface of this earth., where, or in whofe neighbourhood it was firfc 
produced. But then, when the foul fhall be difengaged from the grofs matter, 
which now inclofes and incumbers it, and cither become naked fpir it, or be on- 
ly veild in its own fine and obfequious vehicle, it muft at the fame time be ei- 
ther freed from the/^u\f of bodies, and fall under yc'?;;^ other, which will cany 
■ it to fomc proper manfion, or ftate "= j or at leaft by the old ones be capable of 
mounting upwards \ in proportion to the volatility of its vehicle, and of e- 
mcreing out of thefe regions into fomc medium more fuitable, and (ifthcphi- 
lofophcr may fay lb) equilibrious. Thus much as to the general ftate of fouls 
after death. But then, 

The tranfmigration of fouls has been much talked of: but en fenttntia.—quoninm rUieuU, o» 
tniino Jignier quam fchcLi, nc refelli quidtin ferib debet ; ejitd qui faeit, -videtHr ■vtreri, ne quiiidcrt- 
dat. So^LacUntim. Indeed who can but laugh, when he reads in Lucian of Homers having been ^ 
camel in Bitclria,iiC. b Xiifi?» -/^ ocaxu ts »«,oiii» s-ju; -« c«.5io». Hierocl. ' Lx humili 

tttque deprejfo in rum tmicabit locum, quifquis Hie eft, qui folutes -vmculis animai iealo reciftt Jinu. 
Sen. 'H "f "";'■« ■x^Ki-ax^u*', JcnSoA^, (f » T uft-rin, ito. TXjfftlF Tir*r, UipKri* Tfi? T T »a>.<i» >u»- 
&«f"<„ 7-C.T6.. I'.f Ttw' buxi ivZ,^i<ti iwii it'uiu, Hicrocl. J Defo/ila fircind, lexior voUiit »J 

eaelum. S. Ilicr. 

X. /// 

Truths behnging to a Private Man, ^c, 2 1 (^ 

X. Th this new fiaie^ or place of abode^ there may be different Jlations befitting 
the differences of particular fouls among themfelves^ as they are more or lefs perfe^ 
in their kind. We fee even inanimate bodies, which have different gravities, 
figures, impuhcs, iyc. fettle into fome order among themfelvcs, agreeable to 
thclc differences. And fo by the fame univeifal rule in nature {viz. that diffe- 
rences in things are attended with anfwcrable relations and effcds) fouls mull 
alio take their fituation xnfome kind of order according to their differences. 

XI. Tlie great difference of human fouls^ with refpccl to perfellion and 
imperfe^ion, lies in their different degrees and habits ' of reafonablenefs or unreafon- 
ablenefs ^. That is to fay, not only in men's different improvements^ or neglefts 
and abufe of their rational faculties j but alfo in the greater or Icfs influence of 
thefeupon their actions, and by confequencc in their different degrees of virtue^ 
or vice. For a man is accounted a reafenable man, when he reafons rightly, and 
follows his reafon : in which expreflion virtue mull be included, being (as 
p. 179, 6? al.) nothing but the practice of reafon and truth. 

That men are rcafonable, or the contrary, indifferent degrees is plain. Some 
reafon well upon fome fubje£ts, but in refpcdl of others, to which they have 
not been accuftomd, are dim and confufed : or they arc partial to their vices 
and palTions, their old impreflions and parties j and fo their reafon is not gene- 
ral, nor has its due extent, or influence. Others, whofe reafon is uncultivated 
and weak, tho they have virtuous inclinations, many times fall into fuperftitioH 
and abfurdtties ; milled by authorities, and over-awed by old or formal modes 
of fpeaking, and grave non-fenfe. Many, if not the moft, feem to have fcarce 
any notion of reafon or virtue at all, but aft fortuitoully, or as they fee other 
folks aft ; moved either by bodily propenfions, or by example. Some few 
there are, who endeavour to improve their underltandings, to difcover what js 
agreeable to reafon, and to fix their opinions-, and conduft their lives accord- 
ingly. And in all ihck feveral kinds there are various degrees of elevation ii> 
knowledge and virtue, and of immcrfion in vice and ignorance, and new diffe- 
rences arifing endlclly. All this is vifibie. 

• The Jews, who generally fay, that by the praiftioe of religion the foul acquire: pcrtcaiow »ih! 
iifeeterna], by fuch a ftrefs upon ^«ii//ot piety, that R.yfMo makes the crtcaofgiving looo s«s.«) m 
charity at once by no means equaj to that of giving one i«t and repealing it looo times moPt 
rriN DVB N'nn byan r^wyo ri'^y-ij -\pv nj-no njp'' lovyn nns bys r^^^y. b '•^d 

r-»«u^n sn 'P'osin i?3u;n ins 7u?03n bir)jm--3ito bsc Nyc^ i->aP' N-^nn niyo— ivfiy 
",■/} a'p ipvni h-yiDH S:w2 'Bavn nun pibD inN wsasn. ir. uv. 

K. c Now 

214- The Religion o/" Nature. Se61:.IX. 

Now the foul, reflefting, finds in itfelf/Tuo general faculties, one, by which it 
.undcritands, and judges, and reafons full which I comprehend under the term r^j. 
tioital faculties, or rea fan); :xnA another, by which it wills, or dctermins to aft, 
according to the judgments and conclufions made in the upper part of it. And 
<the more perfeRly it performs thefe operations (i.e. the more truly it reafons, and 
the more readily it wills and executes the decifions of reafonj, the more perfe6l 
certainly it muil be in its kindj and the more imperfeftly, the more imperfeft. 
The accomplifnments therefore and perfeEliom of human fouls, and the contra' 
ry, mull be in proportion to the forementiond differences. 

XII. According to thefe differences then it is reafonable to think the fouls of men mil 
find their flat ions in the future world'. This is but a corollary from what goes before. 

Obj. Why fhould we think, that God caufcs things to be in fuch a manner, 
as that in the future fate men fhall be placed and treated according to their 
merit, and the progrefs they have made in rcaion and virtue, when we fee the 
cafe to be widely different in this? ^nf. It mull; be remembejxl, that this is 
one of thofe very reafons on which the belief of the foul's immortality is found- 
ed. Now, if it be reafonable to believe there is a future rtate, becaufe things 
are dealt unequally now, upon thatveiy fcore it will be realbnable to think, that 
ihcy are dealt equally ^ in that other ftatc. 

Here bodily wants and affedtions, and fuch things as proceed from them, do inter- 
mix with human affairs, and do confound «»fr;7 \^'\t\\ demerit, knowledge w'wh. igno- 
rance : and hence it conies to pafs many times, that bad men injoy much, and good 
men fuffcr, and both are, if there is no other ftate, in their wrong places. But, when 
the corporeal caufes of mifplacing ihall be Temoved,fpirits for fpirits and their cr<v.«,«T« 
rvtviMtTiKu-) may be fuppofedmore regularly to take their ^«f pofts and privileges: 
the impudent and vitious will have no fuch o;'/)c?7««;/7Vj of getting into circum- 
ftanccs, of which they are unworthy, nor improved and virtuous minds find fuch 
tbjlntii'onsxo keepthem down in circumrtances unworthy of them. Bcfurethc 
■more advanced and pure any rtate is, the more properly will the inhabitants be rank- 
ed and t\\c jufler and more natural will the fubordinarion of its members be. 

Even here we commonly find men in that kind of bufinefs, for which they arc 
educated znd prepared; men of the fame profelTions generally keeping together ; the 
V irtuous and reafonable defiring to be ftho they not always can be) with their like <= j 

• To»»« Tfoo-rKsn-Bt Tjl «j)iT>). riati. '' With an equal or impartial regard to every man's 

jcfcrts; ciiuitably. ' 'Ay»S-« » i»i /kTrm i(«»-(f 'Ai/tj^»t»i ifyt^m. £.PUt. 



Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 2 1 5 

»nd the vicious (as they fcarccly cannot bcjwith theirs. And why fliould wcnot 
think, that ana^W<jr/o«and communion of fouls with thofe of their own fxzCy 
difpofition, and habit? maybe more unii'erfal And complect, when thofe things, 
which mcafure hinder it here, lliall be no more? Ifwcmay think this, 
certainly thofe fields or iVates, in which the virtuous and w//? ' rtiall meet,muft 
be different from thofe in which the foolip and wicked fhall herd together •». 
The very difference of the company will itfelf create a vail: difference in the 
manner of their living. 

XIII. TIjc man/tonsy and conditions of the virtuous and reafoning part miijl be 
froportionably better than thofe of the foolifh and vitious. The propofition can- 
not be inveited, or the cafe be otherwilc, if the conftitution of things de- 
pends upon a re.ifonablc caufc : as I have cndcavourd to flicw it does. 

Cor. Hence it follows, that the praHice of rcafon (in its juft extent) is the 
great preparative for deaths and the means of advancing our happinefs through 
all our fubfequent duration. But moreover, 

XIV. In the future fiate refpe6l will be had not only to men's reafoning.^ and 
virtues.^ or the contrary, but alfo to their injoyments and fufferings here *•. Bccaulc 
the forementiond inequalities of this world can by no means be redreft, unlefs 
men's injoyments and fufferings, taken together with their virtues and vices, 
are compared and balanced. I fay, taken together : becaufc no rcafon can be 
aflignd, why a vitious man fhould be recompcnfed for the pains and mifchiefs 
and troubles, which he brings uponhimfelfhy his vices, as the natural confequcn- 
ccs of them ; nor, on the other fide, why any dcduftions lliould be made from 
the future happmds of agood man upon the fcorc of x.\\o\'c innoccr.t injoyments 
which are the genuin fruit of his moderation, regularity, other virtues, and found 

Cor. fFicked men will not only be lefs happy than tiic wife and virtuous, but 
be really unhappy in that fiate to come. For when all the happinefs, that anfwcrs 
to thofe degrees of virtue, which they had, and thofe fufFcrings, which they 
underwent, above what was the natural cfFed: of their wickednclsj I lay, when 

• o; TKfiXtct^iixiTVi i(^Zf, or ei u\ti^i( ^i^irtipn, in Plate's ftylc. * TtAii/rvr<(n-«« iv 

ij»ci, »««i« tuuHn rvr»r><. Tlate. « Ei' it>.in T itfiiXtTtiiitttTit iwAic^iroi [i «,««,©-] r^tSmc* 

Ec i that 

2i6 The Religion o/' Nature. Se6l. IX. 

that is fubtrafted, what remains upon the account will be fomcthing below no- 
happincfs: which mull be feme quantity o? pojitive unhappinefs^ or mifcry. 

Thus there will be rewards., znd funipments hereafter: and men will be bap- 
py'y or unhappy.) according to their behaviour, injoyments, and fufferings in 
this prefcnt life. But, 

XV. If the immortality of the foul cannot be demonflratecl, yet it is certain the 
contrary cannot ". To fay, when a houfe is ruinous and fain, that it once had 
an inhabitant, and that he is efcapcd out of it, and lives in fome other place, 
can involve no contradiftion, or abfurdity *". And, 

XVI. If the immortality of the foul JJjould be confiderd only as a probability, or 
even as a chance pojjibk, yet Jlill a virtuous life is to be preferred before its contra- 
ry. For if the foul be mortal, and all perception perifhes for ever at our death, 
what in this cafe does a good man lofehy his virtue ? Very rarely more than fome 
afts of devotion, and inftanccs of mortification, which too by cuftom grow 
habitual and eafy % and it may hcpkafant by being (or fceming at latil: to be) 
rcafonable. On the other hand, what does a vitious man gain ? Only fuch in- 
joyments, as a virtuous man leaves : and thofe are fuch, as moft commonly 
owe their being to avitiated tafte ; grow infipid in time > require more trouble 
and contrivance to obtain them, than they are worth ; go off" difagreeably ; 

• Sure thofe arguments in Lucretius can convince no body. Kuae quoniam, quajfitis »niti<iut va- 
Jii, DifflHere humorem, df laticem difcedere cernii; Crede animttm quoque dijfundi, &c. And VrttertA 
citnif writer cum ccrpore ©• una Crtfcert fentimHS, pariterque fenefcere tntntem, &c. ^iiare animum 
queque dijfolvi fauare necejji eft i ^uandoquidem penetrant in eum contagia rncrbi. Nor thofe in 
P/(«y (N.H. 7. SS-)'- ^^ there really are any at all. For to plead the uniegenitale experimentum is 
tx) beg the qucftion ; which may be put thus, Whether we fhall after death be more confcious of 
our exiftence, than we were before we were born. And if Diaarchus's LesiiAci were extant, I be- 
lieve we fhould find nothing ftrongcrin them. The truth feems to be, OJ flxXfTcti i k<«kc£ ubtuitTtt 
j'.vai tIm "S'tS ■\'vx<:f: but he comforts himfelf with this thought, that i ju,it« ^umrtt i^oim iavrS 
will prevent future fuffaings. This is us i« i^x •'>«» x«T«^«y,. Hierod. ^ Nor that the 

foul ftillexifts tf/i.i*6» x«Ta>iT;<r« ^ai:< T v.miTi^n iiKtt. fh J. Domus ah h»bit»ttrt dtfertudiUbitur ; 

f^ corpus, relicium gbanirm, defiuit. Lad. c Mitxfi? -y i i(^,oi i,y.e<, it «t,T« [ijiT^.], 

K«i xf ly" T« r^i-Tti. iViir i' it's ««fo« iKiai, 'Svih i'' w^ut* TtAii, He/. 



Truths belonging to a Private Man, &V. 2 1 7 

arc followd many times by fliarp reflexions and bitter penances in the rear j and 
at bell aftera lliort time end in nothing, as if they had never been. This isall'. 
But then if the ibul prove to be immortal (xs we have all the reafon in the woild 
to think it wil^, what docs the virtuous man ^rt/w ? Hisprcient plcafurcs^ifnot 
lb many) arc more fincere ^ and natural 'j and the effeft of his felf-denials and 
fubminion to reafon, in order to prepare himfelf for a future ftate, is the happi- 
ncfs of that llate ; which, without pretending to dcfcribe it, may be prcfumcd 
to be if/inioital^ becaufc the foul is foj and to be purer and of a more exalted na- 
ture (7. e. triier^ and greater) than any of thefe low injoyments here, becaufc 
that rtatc is everyway in nature above this. And again, what does the wicked 
man lofe ? That happinefs, which the virtuous gain as ftich j and he finks, be- 
Cde, into fome degree of the unhappinefs of that future Hate: of which one 
may fay in general, that it may be as much greater than the unhappinefs or fuf- 
fcrings of this world, as the happincfs and joys of that are above thofe of this. 

Inaftatcthat is fpiritual and ckar eveiy thing will be purer, and operate 
more direftly and llrongly, and (if the expreflion may be tolerated) with more- 
fpiril : there will be fewer obftruftions to either happincfs or unhappinefs : the 
foul will lie more open^ and have more immediate and acute perceptions of ei- 
ther : fo that each of them in their kind will be more intenfc^ the one nearer, 
to pure or mere happincfs, the other to the contrai-y ^. But to enter further 
into the nature and oeconomy of the yet unknown world is tooaiduous an un- 
dcnaking for my philofcpker. 

I lliall only add, that the reafoning and virtuous man has at lead this advan- 
tage over ihcfoolijb and prcfligate^ that, tho his wifdom and vinue cannot al- 
ways reftify that which is amifs in himfelf or his circumftances, they will find 
means to alleviate his prcfliires and difadvantagcs, and fjpport him under all- 
the anomalies of life, with comforts of which the other knows nothing: par- 
ticularly this, the injoymcnt of an humble, but well grounded cxpcftation of 
felicity hereafter^ fincerc and durable '. 

• CtU frtftrtur Admit. •> O ifiriT ^Kcx^iitut i iiJo>«< »ft.iTitft,i>JniK, xafiirm. Hinecl. 

5 If the foul WH mortll, yet the virtuous man tLu iavri TiAuarnT* iinAa^raiiyr, TO i,xun Kttf-xu- 
fl^tt, «v«5«r, iieV.^*! </r»f iV." i fMimufin. i ^ 6 t« ri/AM, ktA. Simpl. * "ilf, ^ 

{*«» ^r «"•'■■ »»f""«i ?■ rxu^aicf 5" ^«i/Air, i».» ^ ii/T^ TJi rfn^ »iK«r, J'l' it /juiiip J'tKtTii'i «<«».'«» i 
finf^^ orityi^. Hitr. • Q' •;^ ('oinni T «kJ'i'k*f, ii' ^aij^ij «»c TrMettKrint, i,».' iuu i>.»-i'o-( 

yi rrvfkiMn Irifi^nru. Her. 

XVII. I/t 

2i8 The Religion of Nature. ^t&,. IX. 

XVII. He therefore, ruho would a£l according to truth, muft, in the lad place, 
not only confider what he is, and how circumfianliated in this prcfent Jlate, and pro- 
vide accordingly j but, further, muji confider himfelf alp) as one whofe exifience pro- 
ceeds on into another, and provide for that too. How I think this is to be done, 
by this time I hope you fully apprehend. 

For a conclufion of the whole matter j let our converfation in this world, fo 
far as we are concernd, and able, be fuch as acknowledges every thing to be 
',i:hat it is (what it is in itfelf, and what with regard to us, to ox\\c\ beings, to 
caufes, chcumftances, confequences) : that is, let us by no aft deny any thing to be 
true, which is true : that is, let us a6t according to reafon : and that is, let us 
acb according to the law of our nature. By honefily endeaiouring to do this wc 
fliall exprefs our duty =■ to Him, who is the Author of it, and of that law i 
and at the fame time profecute our own proper happinefs (the happinefs o? ra- 
tional beings) : we fhall do what tends to make us eafy here, and be qualifying 
our felvcs and preparing for our removal hence to our long homej that great 
revolution, which, at the farthell:, cannot be very far ofF. 

And now, Sir, the trouble isalmofl: over for the prefent, not properly which 
I give you, but which you have brought upon yourfclf, thefe being the 
Thoughts, which you defircd: unlefs I have any where mifreprefented myfelf 
through inadvertence > which I own may be. At the foot of the page I have in 
fome places fubjoind a few little ftriiSlurcs principally of antiquity, after the 
manner of annotations : fuch as, when I came to rcvife thefe llicers, I could rc- 
coUeft upon the fuddcn ^ ; having no common-place book to help me, nor 
thought of any fuch thing before that time. They may fervc perhaps fometimes 
a little to explain the textj and fometimes to add weight j but chiefly to di- 
vert you, who know very well how to improve any the leafl hint out of the 
Ancients, and I fear will want to be diverted. I have alfo printed a few copies 
of this Sketch, not with any defign to make it public, but merely to favc the 
trouble of tranfcribing ' j being minded, fincc I have made it, to leave 
it not only with you, but perhaps alfo with two or three other friends : 

• TfiT®- ^ ei» 9-({«T»i'«5 «T05 itrtuTXTii [i<rxir. ittrit}. Jof. ^ Some more were 

added in the fccond imprcnion. c Nothing more was intended a; firft. Sec the aJ-.trtife. 



Truths heJonging to a Private Man, &c. 2 19 

or however, with my Family, as a priv.ite monument of one that meant well. 
Tho, as to the difpofal and fate of it, much will depend upon your judgment 
and manner of acceptance. 

William Wollaston. 


.4"m n'2»- 

^ .-^r^^i^l-.-- ,^ ^ 


yf Compleat INDEX /<?//j^ Religion <?/"Nature Delineated. 


\CT10NS, monlly 
Scx)J or cviJ, 
in what crea- 
tures to bo 
found p. 7, 3 
— tlicir fprins -73 
— arc exprcUivc as 
well as words 

— miy be fignifioant or infignifi- 
anc It 

— the fatne, when indiffct. nt, 
may have contrary fignificati- 
ons 11 

— fome have an unalterable mean- 

ing ibid. 

— whit conftitutes their depra- 
vity ij 

— what maicosthem unnatural il> 

— morally good or evil, which lo 

— good, not equal 22 

— fiippofe the agent fufcepti- 
ble of happinefs or mifcry 


— according to right reafon, and 
according to truth the lame ^o 

— piil)lic not to be dttermin'd by 
private judgment 5^ 

Adultery, its heinous nature la id 

oDLn 14,, i4i 

Affeftion, mtiiral, its diftatcS to 

b-- follow 'd 16^ 

Agent, 13 difference from inftru- 

mcnt 8 

Agents, nectffary hive no'»5» ib. 
Animals, t'lc wifdom expreffed 

in th~ir ftruOure 8r, S^ 

— the laws by which they are go- 
vern d 9tf, 97 

Aflronomy affords noble pro'ifs 

1* a d-ity 78-Xo 

Attraction, wiiat 79 

— !o'v loJgLd in matter ibid. 


BEings, different orders there- 
of loS 
Btutc*, their f"t''';-''= ird death 
not like tn ■ -i }4,^f 

— capitions tn 1 in kil- 

ling thiTTi lor uft: j5 

— their difference from men no, 

CAufes, when fatlsfaftorily 
known 81 

— the tame with eftefts Otd. 

Chance, what 83 

— no ciufe 83, 84 
ChilVity, what 180 
Children, whence like their pa- 
rents 89j 90 

— their duty to parents i6]--i6$ 
CoTiets, their motions and pha;- 

nomena 80 

Common-fenfc, no proper judgs 

of aftions 23 

Companion, a natural principl.- 

in man 159, 140 

— mort vifible in the bed men Hid. 
Conflagrations, whetherany have 

been univerlal 91--93 

ConfeqiienceSj when juft 44 
Cr>vstoufner?,its/evtral kinds 1^8 

— may be virtuous ibiJ. 
Crimes may l>eevanefccnt 51 

— fo many aflsof injuftice 141 

— of a lefs heinous nature reprc- 
fented 144 

Criminals, their difference 54. 
Cruelty, what 159, 140, 141 

— inconfiftent with trutli and na- 
ture 139, 140 

DEath may enlarge the faciil- 
tit-s of the foul 199 

Detence, mutual, one end of fo- 
ciety icj 

Deluges, whether any have been 
univerfal 9i"9< 

D;fpotic power not founded in 
paternal authority i<2, I6^ 
Dominion not given, or lol>, by 
perfonal cxceLcncies, or dc- 
fefls I JO 

Doubtful cafes, how to prr>oc«l 
in them 31, 5.S', ^9 

Duration, what 75 

Duties of rational agents, what 


— of parents to their children 


— of children to tlicir parents 


— Owing tore-mote relations 16^ 



EDucition of cliildrcn incum- 
bent on tlieir parents 'Co, 

hnilcavour, what If means <? 
h njnymen IS, wlion lawful 40 
Error, in caiifcA ^9— 61 

Evil, its dcijrets how to be rated 

Evil, no independent principle of 

■', . 71 

— whence it may proceed 71,71 

— its tormal ratio 138 


FAfls more expredive than 
words u, II 

— help us to judge of good and 

hacultits remam in the body, tho 

their inltruments are loit 1 8^, 

196, 198 

Falfehoods expreflible by adtions 

Fame, what 117, nS 

Fate, what jiid. 

Freedom, whetherinman 6^,6n 
Forbearance from aftion in the 
pow^rofman 64 

FortitiKle, what 181, 1 8} 

Frugality, what 180 

Future-ftate, ths necedity thereof 

"^' "4 

— the expefhtion of it juft and 
reafonablc 193-211 

C> Eneration of animals how 
J perform'd 89-91 

GlurV, what 116--119 

— the d Jire of it, when juftifia- 

ble i,g 

God, lc;ks not the unhappinefs 

of liis creatures ?« 

— how he conceives of things 

4T, lot 

— his evidence proved by the 
clnin of caufcs 6^-68 

— his exiftencc proved by the 

1 acuities of the mind 87-9? 

— neceffirily cxiftcnt gH 

— producol every thing tbid. 

— fhcwn to be infinite 69 

— liis manner of exiftence incon- 
ceivable ^^, 70 

— exifts in a perfeO manner 70 

— IS but one 70, 7 r 

— fuports all other beings ;> 

— is the Author of nature 7i,7j 

— not the imme-diate Author of 
the afls of fre-e agents -74 

■ — not fpaa , duration or matter 


— not the univerfe 75, 76 

— the caufe of matter and moti- 
"n 76-79 

— the Author of tlie umverfe 7^ 

^ f Cod 


God fs free from defefts 93, 94 

— :S incomprehenllblc <4"'. 

— operates in the government of 
tlie world 94) 9? 

— governs the world by Iiis pro- 
vidence 95— n 4 

— his t'ortknowledge reconcilea- 
ble with human liberty 99 — 


-^ tlic duty which men fhoidd 

have towards him ii^-iiiS 

— how to be conceived of by 
man Hid. 

• — Ills attributes, how to be un- 
der ItooJ ihiil. 

Gno.t and evil, coincident with 
pleafurc and pain ^^ 

•— how imputable to intelligent 
btinj^s ... 63 

Oovernmenr, its origin 149, 150 

Gravitation not alone fufficitnt to 
produce the motions of the 
heavenly bodies 79 

Ciiilr, its degrees vary with the 
iaiportance ot things 31 


HAppincfs, nearly allied to 
truth 3' 

■ — liow to be cftimated 3J 

—•coincident with die true quan- 
tity of plcafure 3^,37 
' — whether capable of exiliing 
witliout pleafure 37 

— ultimate, what 38 
— the duty of every intelligent 

being to procure 38 

— ultimate, not procurable but 
by ihcprafticeoftruth ;!i. 


— never deft ruOive of the nature 
of the creature 39 

— wherein ir confifts 40 

— coincident with truth ibiJ- 

— the end of religion iW. 
— • hard to judge of it in others 


-—every m:in's property 131 

-••-ought to be defended i^^ 


— — how obtainable _ 218 

Heavens, fi^ns of providence 

therein 104, lof 

Honour, how to be given to Cod 

Ii6"i i<) 

Honours, what 118, 119 

when ihv: defire of them ju- 

ftiliabtc 118 

Humanity, what 159 

Human life, itshifiory lor-ioS 

IDeas, immfi'.iirc, nde<iu3tcly 
kn^wn to th" mind 41 
— tluir Immdiitc lelations 
known to the mind 41, 4^ 

Identity, in men, what 117, 19S 

Inanimate beings capable of no 

obligation 63 

■ govtm'd by certain laws 96 

Individuation, a principle in man 


Indolence, a Iiappinsfs infinitely 

diminifh'd 37 

Injuftice, a violation of truth 1 37, 


Innate maxims no proper judges 

of right and wrong 25 

Intelligent beings liave immediate 

objefts ot their underlland- 

ings 41 

' have general ideas 4t 

are under obligations in 

proportion to their facul- 
ties 63 
Itregubrities in nature, whence 
Irreligion, its principal caufe (So, 
Judgment, how to be form'd in 
dubious cafes 58, 59 
Jufticc, wlwt 137 
thcprafticeof itriglit 141 



Indred, to find tlie degrees 

of obligation between 

them 167 

the diftates of natural affe- 

flion for tliem to be regarded 
165— IS7 

LA W of nature, what cS 

Laws obtaining in the uni- 

verfe 96, 97 

~— • of fdciety, natural 1:8, 14S 
—— muft confift with natural ju- 

ilice 148, 149 
— - muftbeobferved 151 
where they fail, thofe of 

nature take place ibid. 

—~ wliat to be done when they 

oppofc the laws of nature 

Liberty, wherein it confifts 53,*.! 
Life, human, itshiltory -^oi— ;o3 
Love of our country, whence 151 


MA N not abrolute'yfrce 10-' 
his duty towards God 


— — a focial crcitiire 145 

the!>eft ju.^geof himftlf i57 

has fome things in common 

with inf.-rior creatun s I'S 

— — is endow'd with various fa- 
culties ibiJ, 

is c'infcious of liberty 18?, 


pofTefled of manv inclinati- 
ons and avi,r(iuns Hi 

Man, fenfibleofdeftfts 1^8 

defirous ot happinefs i69 

mult be fiibjeft to leafon 169 


muft provide for himfelf 


muft hearken to his aflWti- 

ons 172— '75 

muft .remember he is but 

man 17^, '76 

' • muft examine himlelt and 

repent 176 

• • muft labor to improve his 

faculties 17C, 17? 

muft bo advifed 1 78 

■ muft lay afide his prejudi- 
ces 179 

muft live virtuoufly i79 — 


— — is compounded of foul and 
body 184-181J 

—— fummary of his duty in life 

Marriage, its foundation and 
ends 154 

. its advantages 15?, 156 

the nature ofthccompaft 

,,. . '5^157 

• US obligations how 
ftrengthen'd 157 

. how made a natural re- 
lation 1 58 

• how beft to be undertj- 

ken ili'td. 

• the contraft to be religi- 

oufly obfervcd ibiJ. 

the behaviour it requires 

under affliction 159 

whether it gives autho- 
rity to the man ibid. 

the foundation of all na- 
tural relations itfS 

~~ mates a ftrift union ibid. 

Mathematicians, their way of rea- 

Matter, what 74,7? 
its manner of exiftence'77, 


not felf-exiftent 7^, 77 

whether capable of think- 

X. '"'. '8^, 19} 
Men, wlicther they have exifted 
from eternity 91--93 
Mercy, what , ^ 
the praftice of it right 


Mind, its operation in reafon 


IIS progrefs in knowlcd^ 

how it gradually incrtireji 

Its faculties g, 

may be atfef^ed by fuddcn 

InHiiences ioy-,07 

Wonarcny, not founds) in patcT- 
nal aurliorlty 162, it^ 

Monftcrs, wlitr.ce R^^g, 


Monl good »nd evil, whjt 7, 8, 10 

■ coincUcntwitluiglitand 

wrong 10, :i 

tlie vulgar rules for tli- 

ftingiiilhing bcwten 

tliem faulty 11 

Msrility, irsjurt foundition 2? 

Morion, wliat, and how caufcd 

77, 78, 18?, 18+ 

Murder, io heinous rutiu-e :9, 



NAtions to be confider'd as 
finslt p:rfon3 lU 
Natural religion, its foundatioa 
15, i<5, ^^ 
■ why fo called 4° 

■ is the punuit of Inppi- 
ncfs by the piafticc of 
rtalbn and truth 5- 
Nature, what S6 

- variaus lignifications ok 

the word 87 

how rightly foUow'd i ; 

— i? 

■ that of man not purely 

rational 13 

thebw of its Author 26 

Negltftsmay be inconfiftent with 
truth J 6-1 8 

OBjefta, why not percsiv'd in 
neep , , 19S 
l)i;igations of a mixed kind _ 19 
Occupancy, prime, gives right 

OmiJEoss may be finful itf-iS 


PA I N may infinitely £xce£-d 
pltafure 3* 

when true and rc-al 40 

Pain and p'.tifurc, no criterions 
of good and evil 24. 

proportionable to the 

perceptions of the per- 
fons Ji 

— increafed with the facul- 
ty of perceiving them 

• thtir cauf'.s rtlative ^^ 

how to be cltimated ',3, 

not to be judged of in 

others by wliat wc fctl 
ourfclves vv, 'IJ--114 
■ tltc fame with good and 

evil 3? 

— may bear difftient pro- 
portions to each 

■ when equal they dcftroy 

each oUicr ^6 

— — ^— may cliange their ruturr, 

and run, into each otSrr 



Parents, theirduties to thtir chil- 
dren 1^9, 160 

their authority over their 

children iC^o— 16^ 
their authority not do- 
minion 161 
Particles,. their mennl ufe 113 
Paffions of the mind, expreflible 
by gefture 8 

no infinnitics i74 

Pel caption always produced in 

time 32 

Planets hjbilahle 80 

Pleafure, what 31 

when true and real 40 

only the true hjnd good 


I'oireffion, original, gives the 

greateft right _ «3+>i?5 

Power gives no dominion or right 


Praife, what 117, 118 

— how to be given to God 116 

Prayer, a negleft of it a den al of 
God 18, 121 

how to be offered up to 

God 110— 12<$ 

—— requifitcs to the folemn kind 


—— the proper times and places 

for it ibrti. 

in what words to be put up 

the mental alfo verbal 1:2 

to be made audible i -3, » -4 

not to be made txtmpore 

in what poftureto be offer 'd 

— — public, ofihe nature of pri- 
vate 115 
— — true prayer always private 

itstffefts 1:5, ii6 

Principles nt things, unfearchable 

Probability, the fubftitutc for cer- 
tainty 5t-<52 
' rules tor finding it ;£- 5$ 

its highcft degree 8 5 

its force the rtfult of rea- 

fon anj obtervation 58 
• the only light wlien cer- 

tainty leaves us 59 
Property, upon what it depends 

equal in a (htc of nature 

founded in niture and 
triidi ,ji 

^iv(<i abfolutc iil^ht of 

ilil^ofal 136,137 

not juttly diftinguinrd 

from ufutiiif^ 1)7 

Propofitiuns once true remain fo 

inaUcaLs 43 

ProviJence, what 9f 

— — — wlwther there be a di- 
vine providence 9?"ii4 

inttancts tucreof in the 

world 96 

parricular, its cxiftencc 

provea 9S— 114 

Its phasnomcna accoun- 
ted for ibid. 

iiiviliblcminifters there- 
of 107, loS 

Puniflimentsto be diffcrenily fui- 
ted 34 

naturally annexed to 

crinus 143 

• whether they can beeter- 

nal loo 


RAtionil, what denominates a 
creature lb 4^ 

KjiVion in ma'ter 132 

Keafon tlie judge ot afHons • 13 

. diflfers fro.n particular 

knowledge 41, 41 
a fix'd and general tlUng 


the faculty, what 4T 

■ relative to the being wlio 

is poireflTed of it ibrd. 

.- how improvcablc 46 

why It influences men \'a 

little ibid. 

defi:;n'd as thcgovernicg 

principle in man 51 

its criterion _ 51 

. of greater authority than 

fcnfe 54 
whether things are go- 
verned by it " 110--T14 
■ the great preparative for 
death if, 
whence different in dif- 
ferent men 11^ 
Rcjfoning, a method to improve 
in it 4^,50-?; 
— — — may be rightly txerciftvl 
on falfe propofuions 4^ , 

' the requifitcs to ftrit> 

fonin" 47 

■ to what Icngtlis it may 

reach 49 

• right reafoning no chi- 

mrn ibij, 

faUc rfafoning, whence 

i> a ■ ■ ..^ , *''» 5° 

Ktntxion, Its diffciencefiotn r^r- 

ccpiion _ 32, J3 
Relation, how weakcn'd by remo- 
val from th> parents ii« 
Relations, deternili.e- the nitiirc 
of things, anil arc the 
guide ol our aff Ions 18, 
•f >9. -7, i8 

r f i Rcia Ions, 

Relations, not i.nmcilwrf, difco- 

veiablc by fiich as arc 

intermediiK 4^ 

Religion, what ■2'., 69, i'i6 

• its fcundation 7, is'^o 

— — — itsfum andfubftance 126 
Reprif^ils lawful iji-nj 

Repiilfion in matter 79 

Revelation, how to be treated 211 
Rewards and punifhnitnts une- 
qually difti ibuted by hu- 
man laws ... 54 
- tlieirunequaldiftributinnin 
rhis life argues the being of 
another ioi-2c;,2i5, 215 

brought about by the laws 

of nature 104 

Right, natural, what 1:7, 128 
— ^- ftrong in the firft occupier 

Right and wron?, wlnt 14, 20 

I how to be judged ot j^o 

Kigius, natural, how far a Man 

may part witli them ijo 


SEafons, l.ow wifely contrived 

' iccrecy no excufefor injuftice i43 
Self, wherein it conlifts I27 

Self-defence, lawful 131. i?^ 
Self-denial neccffary I75 

Self-prefetvation, a ftrnng princi- 
ple in animals 1^2 
Scnfation, how porform'd 17/ 
Senks may eivefalfcreprefentati- 
ons of things f?, 5+ 

. when ;o be credited 55 

Sentim'nts.expredible by.^efture S 
Sins, not sxcufed by ftcrecy i4} 

tcndeneies towaids them ci i- 

mi'ial i4^> ;^4 

their hvinous nature manife- 

fted 141-141 

Societv, the laws thereof 128 

" ' -laws neceffary thcrdn 

I4S 147 

itsbafis 128, 129 

. reafons for it '45 

its end 128.123,147,148 

fuppoffS government 

149, 150 

fuppofes rules agreed to 


maylKjjudly form'd 1^0 

may be fornn'd by impli- 
cit orexplicitconfent 151 

duties required in it 152 

Soul, what 191, '9J 

— — its dependent manner of cx- 

iftencc; 8>i 

itftcxiftincf Drovid 1!: V"i86 

not ex traduc! 88-9? 

1 N D E X. 

Soul, not a faculty i9t, 192 

immaterial 185—14^ 

itsfe-at, where 184, 192, 198 

■ proved immortal 195-2 1 1 

may tliink after death, tho' 

not in found fleep 199 
^raay have its faculties en- 
larged after deatli 199,217 

paflcs into a new fiate after 

death, agreeable to its na- 
ture 212 

will after death have a feat 

afligned it fuitable to its per- 
feftion Z1J--215 

— its difference, whence in dif- 
ferent perl'ons 11^,214 
•its two principal ficulties 214 
—— its mortality not demonftra- 
ble 11(5, 217 
Sounds,either fignificanc or not 1 1 
Spice, what _ 74, 75 
Spirit,proofs of its exiftence 90,9 1 
Spirit, whether tlie notion of it be 
clear to the mind loS 
Stars, their phasnomena 80 
State of nature, gives equal do- 
minion 119,150 
2T0f)ji', its diftates to be followed 
Succedion may give right i ?5 
Sun, demonftrates the grandeur 
of the fyftera So 


TEmperance, wliat 179, 180 
Things, to judge rightly of 
thein . 18-20 

indifferent, what 20 

Thinking, whether eflential to the 
foul i.rx, i9f 

why not obferved in 

found fleep 195, 19S 
Thoughts,their fleeting nature 122 
Time,prefented by moments 51,55 
Tides, transferable by compaff or 
donation 155 

Trade, the neceffity and lawful- 
nefsthereof 135, i5<5 

Truth, what 8 

its diffisrent acceptations 48 

— nevpr contradifted without 
• impiety l\--\6 

• how dilcoverable 49, To 

— -its criterion^ . 52 

how convey'd to the inind of 

another . 55 

——the way of coming at it 5 i~6i 

difcoverable by reafon and 

finfe ^ ^^ 55 

Trutlis,allofthcmconnflent ii<,T9 

lea>l to thedifcovery of 

truths 43 

Truths, by wlut faculty invefti- 
gited 47 

difcoverable by reafon- 

ir.g . 4S, 49 

may riic from error 54,55 

■ man^ qualifications rc- 

quilite to judge ot them 

di, «i 

■ whether men can aft 

agreeably to them when 
difcovered 62-54 


UN'happinefs, coincident with 
the tru. quantity 
of pain 3<, 57 
— ultimate, what 58 

Unmercifulne'Fj what 159 

inconfiiient with truth 

and nature ib'td. 

Ufagc, proves pofTelTion 10, 157 

Ufuipition of prop.rty, injuiVice 



VApois, the wi'"Jom and good- 
nefs cxpreffed in tlieic 
formation 82 
Vegetables, tlie wiflom expreJfed 
in their flruftare ibid. 
— ^— tlie laws by which they 
are regulated 95 
Vice, tho caufe of unhappincfs 
II?, 21.'; 
its tffefts and confequences 
iH, :i7 
Virtue, whether feated between 
extremes 24, 25 
the prnftice of it recom- 
mended 179-185 

produftive of hippinefs 

18:, 205-ioS, 217 


WA R fhewn to be lawful 
in, i?4 
Writing, why beft praftifed in our 
mother-tongue 125 

Words, what ij, 125 

their ufein tliinking 112, 


lefs cxpreflive than fafts 


World, a fiirvey thereof and its 

furniture 87 

laws of nature obferved 

therein 76-98 

\\'or(hip, how to be given to God 
120 — \:6 . 

publick, why necclTjry 

114, 115 

f 1 N I S.